The House of Federation: the practice and limits of federalism in Ethiopia's second federal chamber

Abstract

Multiethnic Ethiopia has been “exercising” federalism for the last two decades with unique constitutional and institutional designs. This article deals with House of Federation, the second chamber of the federal parliament, which, in both its composition and competence, hardly shares the attributes that characterize federal chambers elsewhere. While previous studies have focused on its powers of constitutional interpretation, this article attempts to provide a wider picture of the House of Federation by discussing its composition and competences, the constitutional and political underpinnings behind its (unique) design, and associated ramifications and paradoxes. It shows how representing individual groups rather than member states at the federal chamber, though constitutionally justifiable, is practically problematic in light of the powers constitutionally attributed to the House of Federation, which are predominantly regional in their dimensions and implications. With regard to its competences, the article argues, the fact that the House of Federation is non-legislative is not only an indication to the paucity of “shared-rule” in Ethiopia, but also paradoxical in view of the emphasis on group “self-rule” and the guardian powers that the House has in respect to the federal constitutional order. Discussing its considerable arbitration assignments, apart from the widely discussed constitutional interpretation, it demonstrates that Ethiopia's House of Federation is also unusually and predominantly adjudicative.

Keywords:

• federalism
• second chamber
• representation
• Ethiopia
• House of Federation

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Erk and Anderson. “The Paradox of Federalism,” 191.

2. See Beremo, “The Import of Institutions”; O'Leary and Bernard, The Politics of Ethnic Conflict; Elazar, “From Statism to Federalism”; Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict.

3. Griffiths, Handbook of Federal Countries.

4. See Osaghae, “Federalism and the Management.”

5. See Mohadji, “Comoros (Union of the Comoros).”

6. Kidane, “New Approaches to State Building.” Also Turton, Ethnic Federalism.

7. Clapham, “Ethiopia and the Challenge of Diversity,” 50.

8. See Turton, Ethnic Federalism.

9. See Kreptul, “The Constitutional Right of Secession”; Tesfa, “Federalization with Constitutional Guranteee.”

10. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems.

11. Watts, “Model of Federal Power Sharing.”

12. See Watts, “Federal Chambers compared”; Stephan, “Federalism and Democracy.”

13. See Watts, “Federal Chambers Compared.”

14. See, for example, Assefa, “Federalism and the Adjudication”; Yonatan “Judicial Review and Democracy”; Gethahun, “Mechanisms of Constitutional Control.”

15. Assefa, Federalism and the Accommodation, 442.

16. Ibid.,100.

17. House of Federation, “Fourth Term Members.”

18. Negarit Gazeta, “Proclamation No. 7/1992.”

19. See Stepan, “Federalism and Democracy.”

20. See FDRE, The 2007 Population Census.

21. See FDRE, “The Constitution of Federal,” article 8.

22. Ibid., article 39 (3).

23. Ibid., article 47.

24. Vaughan and Tronvoll, The Culture of Power, 84.

25. See Watts, “Federal Chambers compared”; Stephan, “Federalism and Democracy.”

26. Negarit Gazeta, “Proclamation No. 251/2001,”article 34.

27. Assefa, Federalism and the Accommodation, 442.

28. See FDRE, “The Constitution of Federal,” articles 104 and 105.

29. Ibid., article 103 (5).

30. Ibid., article 99.

31. Ibid., articles 64 (7) and 98.

32. Burgess, Comparative Federalism, 156.

33. Negarit Gazeta, “Proclamation No. 251/2001,” article 37.

34. See FDRE, “The Constitution of Federal,” article 64.

35. See Negarit Gazeta, “Proclamation No. 251/200,” “Proclamation No. 359/2003.”

36. Wheare, Federal Government, 57 &58.

37. Duchacek [quoted in Burgess], Comparative Federalism, 157.

38. FDRE, “The Constitution of Federal,” article 82. See Negarit Gazeta, “Proclamation No. 251/2001.”

39. Negarit Gazeta, “Proclamation No. 251/2001,” article 7 (2).

40. Ibid., article 14.

41. Ibid., article 46 (3).

42. See Markakis, “The Politics of Identity;” Vaughan, “Ethnicity and Power.”

43. See Abbink, “Ethnicity and Constitutionalism.”

44. See House of Federation, “Decision on the Silte Question.”

45. Negarit Gazeta, “Proclamation No. 251/2001,” article 19 (1).

46. Ibid., article 19 (2).

47. Ibid., articles 27–31.

48. See, for example, Asnake, “Federal Restructuring in Ethiopia”; Fekadu, “Overlapping Nationalist Project.”