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Abstract
From 2008 to 2012, a dramatic upsurge in maritime piracy in the Western Indian Ocean captivated global attention and led to the development of robust counter-piracy measures, including the deployment of navies, legal prosecutions, and the use of armed guards on merchant ships transiting through the region. By the end of 2012, incidents of maritime piracy, successful or otherwise, plummeted by over 80% leading many to cautiously declare an end to the Somali piracy cycle. The rise and fall of piracy is primarily seen as an indicator highlighting the strength or weakness of global governance mechanisms at sea or the stability and reach of the central government on land in Somalia. While issues of governance at sea and on land are key factors in explaining the ebb and flow of this practice in the Western Indian Ocean, this article focuses on the particular structure of Somali piracy as a kidnap and ransom economy in order to account for its rise and fall. Framed within a language of work and entrepreneurship, piracy was enabled through systems of risk pooling and credit networks that both allowed for its spectacular expansion and ultimately led to its decline. Emphasizing the framing of piracy as a form of work also ties this practice simultaneously to longer histories of predation in oceanic domains from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, and territorializes it within a wider Somali trans-regional economy in ways that befuddle distinctions between legal and illegal, public and private, formal and informal.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. World Bank Group, The Pirates, 2–3.
2. International Maritime Bureau, Annual Report, 20.
3. The High Risk Area is a region demarcated by maritime insurance companies where additional precautions as well as War Risk insurance cover is required.
4. Little, Somalia: Economy Without State.
5. Hansen, Piracy in the Greater Gulf of Aden, 24.
6. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mod4iJ3b5c4 (last accessed 29 August 2015).
7. Interview with “Arale” [to protect confidentiality all names and other identifying details have been changed].
8. Ibid.
9. Interview with “Absame.”
10. On histories of Privateering, see Starkey, British Privateering; Swanson, Predators and Prizes.
11. Ritchie, Captain Kidd, 11.
12. Heller-Roazen, The Enemy of All.
13. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns.
14. Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, 140.
15. Ibid., 158.
16. Smith, “The Machinations.”
17. On the Indian Ocean as a site for geopolitical wrangling, see Kaplan, Monsoon. For a more historical overview, see Ho, “Empire Through Diasporic Eyes.”
18. On the economics of piracy, see Anderson, “Piracy and World History.”
19. Goose, The History of Piracy, 1.
20. Starkey, “Pirates and Markets,” 108.
21. Dawdy and Bonni, “Towards a General Theory,” 675.
22. Ibid., 685.
23. Ibid.
24. Hallaq, An Introduction to Islamic Law.
25. Peters, Crime and Punishment, 54.
26. Lewis, Blood and Bone, 21.
27. Little, Somalia, 16.
28. Ibid.
29. Ferguson and Gupta, “Spatializing States.”
30. A year after coming to power in a military coup, in October 1970 the regime of Siyad Barre proclaimed on Radio Mogadishu that Somalia would henceforth be dedicated to “hanti-wadaagga ‘ilmu ku disan” (Scientific Socialism). Framed as a technocratic and pragmatic merging of “socialist ideals” with “Islamic principles” Scientific Socialism (1970–1975) sought to both legitimate the Barre regime and consolidate its allegiance with the Soviet Union and the communist bloc during the heydays of the Cold War.
31. Quoted in Adam and Geshekter, eds, Proceedings of the First International Congress, 178.
32. Interview with “Timo.”
33. Lewis, Blood and Bone, 19.
34. Samatar, “Review of Lewis I. M.”
35. Besteman, Unraveling Somalia.
36. Schlee, “Customary Law and the Joys of Statelessness.”
37. For a related critique of the anthropological and social scientific focus on governance and order in non-state spaces, see Scheele, “The Values of Anarchy.”
38. Mahmoud, “Risky Trades,” 571.
39. See de Goede “Hawala Discourses” for a critique of counter-terrorism rhetoric around informal money transfer systems. Somali piracy similarly led to an outcry (especially in neighboring Kenya) in policy and popular circles on the specter of piracy ransoms making their way into neighborhoods like Eastleigh in Nairobi. It is crucial to note that these were largely unsubstantiated accusations fostering greater surveillance and violence against Somalis in Kenya. At the same time, distinguishing between “ransom money” and “clean money” is always a moral and political exercise difficult to accomplish either in the world of global banking or Somali trade networks.
40. Interview with “Suraj.”
41. Bahadur, The Pirates of Somalia.
42. Hansen, Piracy in the Greater Gulf of Aden.
43. Besley, Fetzer, and Mueller, “The Welfare Cost of Lawlessness.”
44. Percy and Shortland, “The Business of Piracy”; Shortland and Varese, The Business of Pirate Protection.
45. Gupta, “Monsoon Fever,” 517.
46. Interview with “Hassan.”
47. Hart, “Informal Income,” 62.
48. Bromley, “Introduction,” 3.
49. MacGaffey, The Real Economy, 9.
50. Ibid.
51. Roitman, “The Politics of Informal Markets,” 685.
52. Interview with “Faisal.”
53. Interview with “Hassan” Hassan was referring to Abshir Boyah, one of the most celebrated pirates in Puntland currently serving a prison sentence in Bosaso, Puntland. Boyah is credited by many (along with Afweyne) for creating hijack and ransom economy and transforming Somali piracy from a protection system targeting trawlers illegally fishing off the coast of Somalia to capturing merchant shipping.