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ABSTRACT
The political settlements literature [Khan, M. Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-enhancing Institutions. School of Oriental and African Studies Working Paper, 2010. Accessed June 19, 2014. http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/9968; North, D., J. Wallis, and B. Weingast. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009] has assigned a privileged role to rents as instruments used by ruling elites to maintain political stability. Since then, there has been some attempt [Hickey, S. Thinking about the Politics of Inclusive Development: Towards a Relational Approach. Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre Working Paper No. 1, 2013; Hudson, D., and A. Leftwich. 2014. From Political Economy to Political Analysis. Development Leadership Programme Research Paper 25, Birmingham] to highlight how ideas may play a similarly important role in contributing to political stability. This article explores how ruling elites in Rwanda responded to a ‘critical juncture’ in 2012 when donors withdrew foreign aid after they alleged that the Rwandan Patriotic Front government was supporting rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Ruling elites then used an idea – Agaciro (a Kinyarwanda word, which means dignity or self-respect) – as one instrument to maintain political stability and legitimise its revised development programme in Rwanda. Ruling elites have also used the rhetoric around Agaciro to target the younger generation in Rwanda. This paper argues that Agaciro is symbolic of the vulnerabilities faced by ruling elites in Rwanda today. These vulnerabilities are a specific outcome of the Rwandan developmental strategy, which combines neoliberal market-led reforms, with some developmental state-like policies. The Agaciro concept was also operationalised, with the creation of an Agaciro Development Fund (AgDF) in 2012. The AgDF was legitimised on the basis of a commitment to self-reliance (among elites) during a time where symbolic coalition building among elites was important for political stability. However, Agaciro is also used to project the country’s development strategy (particularly in relation to entrepreneurship and financial inclusion) as one of opportunity, instead of acknowledging the severe inequality that has been associated with development in Rwanda thus far.
Acknowledgments
A previous version of this paper was presented at the European Conference on African Studies in Lisbon in 2013. Thank you to all those who provided feedback at the panel. Three reviewers of the journal also provided thoughtful suggestions and criticisms. Special thanks is also due to those who were interviewed for this paper. Any errors and omissions are my sole responsibility.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. Ansoms and Rostagno, “Rwanda’s Vision 2020 Halfway Through.”
2. Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, “Policy for Agriculture and Horticulture in Rwanda.”
3. Interviews, May 2013 and January 2015.
4. MINECOFIN 2013.
5. Capoccia and Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures,” p. 348.
6. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, 29.
7. Rutazibwa, “Studying Agaciro.”
8. Kamat, “The Privatization of Public Interest.”
9. Hickey, Thinking about the Politics of Inclusive Development and Hudson and Leftwich, From Political Economy to Political Analysis.
10. Khan, “State Failure in Weak States.”
11. Khan, Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-enhancing Institutions, p. 4.
12. Ibid.
13. Hickey, Thinking about the Politics of Inclusive Development and Hudson and Leftwich, From Political Economy to Political Analysis.
14. North et al., Violence and Social Orders.
15. Khan, Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-enhancing Institutions, 20.
16. Roy, “The Political Economy of Growth under Clientelism.”
17. Knight, “Transformations of the Concept of Ideology” and Lee, “Beyond Ideology.”
18. Hudson and Leftwich, From Political Economy to Political Analysis, 89.
19. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, p. 220.
20. Paige, Coffee and Power and Cramer and Richards, “Violence and War in Agrarian Perspective.”
21. Hickey and Lavers, Investing the Political Economy of Social Protection, 11.
22. Jackson, Civilising the Enemy.
23. Pouliot, “The Materials of Practice,” p. 34.
24. “Rwandan officials have provided military support to M23 through permanent troop reinforcements and clandestine support through special forces units of the armed forces stationed alongside the Congolese armed forces in Rutshuru for joint operations.” United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Panel of Experts,” 7.
25. Beswick, “The Risks of African Military Capacity Building.”
26. Smith, “Kagame Defies UN Condemnation.”
27. Clark, “Why the Congo Experts Need More Scrutiny.”
28. Kagire, “Now Rwanda Tightens Its Belt.”
29. Interview, MINECOFIN, May 2012.
30. Moss et al., An Aid-Institutions Paradox?
31. Interview, Special Policy Unit in the Office of the President, May 2013.
32. Ibid.
33. Sommers, Stuck.
34. Interview, Office of the Prime Minister, May 2013.
35. Amsden, “Say’s Law.”
36. Behuria and Goodfellow, The Political Settlement and ‘Deals’ Environment in Rwanda.
37. Reyntjens, “(Re-)Imaging a Reluctant Post-genocide Society.”
38. Interview, Joseph Nzabamwita, Spokesperson – Ministry of Defence, May 2013.
39. Kagame, “Opening Address at Umushyikirano”.
40. Russell, “Africa’s Biggest War”; HRW, Curse of Gold; and French, “Kagame’s Hidden War.”
41. Longman, “The Complex Reasons.”
42. Clark, “Kagame’s Power Struggle.”
43. Stearns, From CNDP to M23.
44. Observations made during interviews, May 2013.
45. Land worth “millions of dollars” belonged to Tribert Rujugiro, who was formerly closely aligned to ruling elites in Rwanda. Stearns, From CNDP to M23.
46. Stevis and Barker, “Rwanda's President Denies Role.”
47. Himbara, “Testimony by David Himbara.”
48. Rwirahira, “Byabagamba, Rusagara Get Lengthy Jail Terms.”
49. Uwiringiyimana, “Court Orders Kabuye Release.”
50. Kanuma, “At Big RPF Meeting.”
51. Himbara, “The Day When Rwandans Learnt”; Himbara, “Why I Quit”; and Himbara, “The African Leader Obama Shouldn’t Invite.”
52. Kagire, “Kigali Fighting Back.”
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Gahiji, “Are Military Officer.”
56. Himbara, “Why I Quit.”
57. North et al., Violence and Social Orders.
58. Kagame, “Remarks at Umurinzi Young Professionals.”
59. Kagame, “Remarks at the Agaciro Fundraising Event Organised by Umurinzi Young Professionals.”
60. Mugambage, “Agaciro.”
61. http://www.paulkagame.com/index.php/news/888-we-must-fight-back-against-injustice-president-kagame
62. Rutazivwa, “Studying Agaciro.”
63. Chang, “Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark.”
64. Gahiji, “Govt. Initiates New Development Fund.”
65. Kaitesi et al., “Agaciro Hits Rwf7 Billion.”
66. Gasore, “Agaciro Fund Money.”
67. The New Times, “Kagame Rallies RPF Cadres.”
68. Rwanda Focus, “Agaciro Is about Patriotism.”
69. Internal MINECOFIN document.
70. Kagame, “Umurinzi Young Professionals.”
71. Rhetorical commonplaces are words that have a shared meaning among groups. Each set of speakers, audiences and issues are characterised by different groups of rhetorical commonplaces which speakers draw on to convey a shared meaning of their arguments to audiences. Jackson, Civilising the Enemy.
72. Kamasa, “Eight Teams for ‘Agaciro’ Tournament”; Mugabe, “Ten Clubs for Agaciro Fund”; and Kimenyi, “Artistes for Agaciro Fund.”
73. Mpyisi, “Agaciro as the Next African Philosophy.”
74. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism.
75. Mwai, “Agaciro Fund Seeks to Diversify Investments.”
76. Kagame, “Speech at Commencement Ceremony for Gashora Girls Academy.”
77. Pells et al. “Promising Developments?”
78. Amsden, “Say’s Law.”
79. Behuria, “Between Party Capitalism.”
80. Behuria, “Committing to Self-reliance.”
81. Agatumba, “MDGs.”
82. McNeil, “Rwanda’s Health Care Success Story.”
83. Tumwebaze, “Over 89% Rwandans.”
84. Bateman and Chang, “Microfinance and the Illusion of Development.”
85. Honeyman, The Orderly Entrepreneur.
86. Ibid.
87. Roy, Poverty, Capital.
88. Ibid.
89. Blowfield and Dolan, “Business as a Development Agent,” 5.
90. Bateman, “Why Doesn’t Microfinance Work?”
91. Interview, PSF Representative, January 2016.
92. Clark, “After Genocide” and Verhoeven, “Nurturing Democracy.”
93. Reyntjens, Political Governance.