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ABSTRACT
Deployed to Mogadishu, Somalia in March 2007, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) became the Union’s longest running, largest, most costly, and most deadly operation. Yet, of the 54 AU members, only 6 contributed troops to AMISOM: Uganda (2007), Burundi (2007), Djibouti (2011), Kenya (2012), Sierra Leone (2013) and Ethiopia (2014). This article applies a widely utilized theoretical framework to explain peacekeeping contributions in order to analyse why these six states chose to join AMISOM. It concludes that there is no single or uniform explanation for their decision. Nevertheless, the most common official justifications – assertions that events in Somalia posed a direct security risk to the troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and normative commitments to African solidarity – were often less important than other unacknowledged or downplayed factors. Specifically, a combination of institutional, political, and economic factors was generally more important in understanding why these six states became AMISOM TCCs. Joining AMISOM did help alleviate some regional security concerns but the decision also brought tangible benefits at home to both the TCC governments and their militaries.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Dr Timothy Rainey of the ACOTA programme for granting him access to its unclassified documentation concerning AMISOM, this journal’s anonymous reviewers, and the editors of this special issue for their helpful comments.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. See Milton Olupot, “UPDF Earn Dollars in Somalia,” New Vision (Kampala), February 4, 2007; “Somalia: ‘We’ll Fight Back If Attacked,’ AU troops say,” IRIN News, March 7, 2007, http://www.irinnews.org/report/70549/somalia-well-fight-back-if-attacked-au-troops-say and Wikileak Cable, 07ADDISABABA2185, 13 July 2007, para.7.
2. Mary Karugaba, “4 Nations Plan Somalia Entry,” New Vision (Kampala), July 22, 2010 and Sarah Childress, “Civilian Casualties Dog Troops in Somalia,” Wall Street Journal, July 29, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704895004575395111138942560.html.
3. KDF, Operation Linda Nchi, 257–8.
4. On how states display varied commitments to different organizations when it comes to providing peacekeepers, see Daniel, “Contemporary Patterns.”
5. See Williams, Fighting for Peace in Somalia.
6. For example, Victor, “African Peacekeeping;” Bellamy and Williams (eds.), Providing Peacekeepers; Cunliffe, Legions of Peace; Kathman and Melin, “Who Keeps the Peace?”.
7. Bellamy and Williams, Providing Peacekeepers, Introduction and chapter 19.
8. This framework has subsequently been utilized by over 90 scholars, analysts and practitioners to produce the 71 country profiles available on the Providing for Peacekeeping project website at www.providingforpeacekeeping.org.
9. For a more detailed explication see Bellamy and Williams, “Introduction,” 18–21 and Bellamy and Williams, “Explaining,” 418–24.
10. See Bruton and Williams, Counterinsurgency, 35.
11. AU Peace and Security Council communiqué, PSC/PR/Comm. (LXIX), 19 January 2007.
12. Cited in Fisher, “Managing Donor Perceptions,” 418. The strength of these stated sentiments is undermined by Uganda’s decision not to deploy troops in the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS, 2004–7).
13. Ibid. and interviews, senior Ugandan officials, Washington DC, June 2009; Addis Ababa, 30 July 2012.
14. Fisher, “Managing Donor Perceptions,” 405. That Museveni decided to deploy troops to Somalia in 2005 probably helped shield him from more powerful criticism of his controversial retention of power in the 2006 presidential elections. See also Jowell, “Uganda.”
15. Fisher, “Managing Donor Perceptions,” 417.
16. Interview, Ugandan official, Addis Ababa, 30 July 2012.
17. Els De Temmerman, “1,500 Troops Set for Somalia,” New Vision (Kampala), January 24, 2007.
18. Interview, Ugandan official, Addis Ababa, 30 July 2012.
19. Museveni is well known for dominating Uganda’s national security policy since he assumed power in 1986. See, for example, Mutengensa and Hendrickson, State Responsiveness; Jowell, “Uganda.”
20. Training and support for the UPDF was one of the five reasons stated by Defence Minister Crispus Kiyonga. See note 12.
21. See, for example, UN, Final report, esp. paras 97–131 and Schomerus “They forget.”
22. Jowell, “Uganda.”
23. Ibid. and Fisher, “Managing Donor Perceptions,” 418.
24. Interviews, Bancroft personnel, Washington DC, June 2013.
25. See Vlassenroot et al., “Doing Business.”
26. Memorandum for the record, 5 June 2007. ACOTA files.
27. Wilén et al., “Sending Peacekeepers Abroad.”
28. Wikileak Cable 07BUJUMBURA215, 26 March 2007, para.6.
29. Wikileak Cable 07BUJUMBURA206, 22 March 2007; Wikileak Cable 07BUJUMBURA215, 26 March 2007; Wikileak Cable 07BUJUMBURA244, 2 April 2007.
30. Wikileak Cabke 07BUJUMBURA215, 26 March 2007.
31. Ibid., para. 3.
32. One European military officer working with the Burundian government believed this list to be overly short and optimistic! Wikileak Cable 07BUJUMBURA244, 2 April 2007.
33. Wilén et al., “Sending Peacekeepers Abroad,” 315.
34. Interviews, Bancroft Personnel, Washington DC, June 2013.
35. Memorandum for the record, 1 June 2009. ACOTA files.
36. ACOTA Partner Summary: Burundi, 8 August 2012. ACOTA files.
37. Wikileak Cable 07BUJUMBURA460, 15 June 2007.
38. Ndayaziga, “Enjeux autour,” 3. [Author’s translation.]
39. Communication with Western human rights NGO official, July 2012.
40. Wilén et al., “Sending Peacekeepers Abroad,” 307.
41. Ibid., 313.
42. Elizabeth Dickinson, “For Tiny Burundi, Big Returns in Sending Peacekeepers to Somalia,” Christian Science Monitor, December 22, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2011/1222/For-tiny-Burundi-big-returns-in-sending-peacekeepers-to-Somalia.
43. Wikileak Cabke 07BUJUMBURA215, 26 March 2007, para.3.
44. Wilén et al., “Sending Peacekeepers Abroad,” 316 and Ndayaziga, “Enjeux autour,” 4.
45. Wilén et al., “Sending Peacekeepers Abroad,” 316.
46. Ibid., 317.
47. Interviews, Western diplomat, Addis Ababa, 30 April 2012; US official, Djibouti, 22 November 2014.
48. Battalion Hiil One, or Hiil Walaal as it was also known, is Somali for half-brother. In comparison, the subsequent deployments of Battalions Hiil Two and Three went more smoothly.
49. Interview, UNSOA official, Nairobi, 12 August 2012.
50. Interview, UNSOA official, Nairobi, 13 December 2012.
51. Interview, UNSOA official, Mogadishu, 3 January 2013.
52. Communication, US official, Djibouti, 28 September 2015.
53. Interview, UNSOA official, Mogadishu, 3 January 2013.
54. Interview, FAD officer in AMISOM, Mogadishu, 4 January 2013.
55. ACOTA Partner Summary: Djibouti, 8 May 2011. ACOTA files.
56. 1–9 April 2011 East Africa trip report. ACOTA files.
57. ACOTA Partner Summary: Djibouti, 8 May 2011. ACOTA files. The FAD subsequently removed all tents and equipment from Camp Ali Ouney to Camp Miriam and established their peacekeeping centre in Arta.
58. Communication, US official, Djibouti, 28 September 2015.
59. See note 56 above.
60. Interview, US official, Djibouti, 22 November 2014.
61. Ibid.
62. Interviews, EU officials, Addis Ababa, 2–5 May 2012; AMISOM official, Nairobi, 6 August 2012.
63. Letter dated 17 October 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. (UN doc. S/2011/646, 18 October 2011).
64. KDF, Operation Linda Nchi, 253.
65. Ibid., 253.
66. International Crisis Group, The Kenyan Military, 3.
67. Government of the Republic of Kenya and the United States of America, White Paper on Military Cooperation, A Multidimensional Approach to Security: Kenya’s National Military Strategy for the period 2011–2016 (4 June 2010). Kenya became an ACOTA partner in April 2000 and subsequently hosted ACOTA’s AMISOM Force Headquarters training programme at the IPSTC.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. IGAD communiqué, 25 November 2011, http://igad.int/attachments/422_communique%20from%20IGAD.pdf.
71. KDF, Operation Linda Nchi, 260.
72. As explicitly stated in Ibid., 260 and 266.
73. Ibid., viii.
74. See Throup, “Kenya’s Intervention.”
75. “AMISOM to pay KDF soldiers Sh84,296 monthly allowance,” Business Daily Africa, March 12, 2012, http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate-News/Amisom-to-pay-KDF-soldiers-Sh84-296-monthly-allowance-/-/539550/1365072/-/3pjwglz/-/index.html.
76. Ibid.
77. KDF, Operation Linda Nchi, 263.
78. Sierra Leone also deployed a few military officers to AMISOM’s force headquarters and about 40 individual police officers.
79. Wikleak Cable 09ADDISABABA1139, 14 May 2009.
80. “Sierra Leone to contribute one battalion of soldiers for Somalia,” Standard Times Press, no date, http://standardtimespress.org/?p=589.
81. Albrecht and Haenlein, “Sierra Leone’s,” 30.
82. Interview, UK official, Nairobi, 6 August 2012.
83. Interview, UN official, Addis Ababa, 3 August 2012.
84. Albrecht and Haenlein, “Sierra Leone’s,” 26–36.
85. Ibid., 33.
86. Ibid., 28.
87. Cited in Ibid., 29.
88. Communication with US official, 1 September 2012.
89. Interview, US official, Addis Ababa, 30 July 2012. UNSOA was not permitted to buy ammunition for AMISOM contributing countries.
90. Albrecht and Haenlein, “Sierra Leone’s,” 33.
91. Cited in Ibid., 29.
92. Cited in Ibid., 29.
93. Interview, Ethiopian official, Addis Ababa, 31 July 2012.
94. Interview, US military official, Addis Ababa, 27 April 2016.
95. For details see Bruton and Williams, Counterinsurgency, 9–11, 37–41.
96. Meles Zenawi, press conference, Addis Ababa, 26 June 2007 cited in Allo, “Ethiopia’s Armed Intervention,” 157.
97. For example, Samatar, “The production,” 171–3.
98. Aaron Maasho, “Ethiopian Troops Quit Somali City, but no Full Withdrawal Planned,” Reuters, July 22, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-somalia-idUSBRE96L0HX20130722.
99. Interview, Ethiopian analyst, Addis Ababa, 16 October 2013; Laura Heaton, “Somalia: On Scene in Baidoa after Ethiopia’s Rout of Al-Shabab,” Newsweek, March 12, 2012, http://www.newsweek.com/somalia-scene-baidoa-after-ethiopias-rout-al-shabab-63659.
100. On 12 November 2013, UN Security Council resolution 2124 increased AMISOM’s uniformed personnel from 17,731 to 22,126. Ethiopian officers were part of AMISOM’s force headquarters staff since 2012.
101. Communication, Ethiopian analyst, 14 November 2013.
102. Communication, senior US official, Addis Ababa, 13 November 2013.
103. Ibid.
104. Communication, EU official, 15 January 2014.
105. James Jeffrey, “Ethiopian Troop Withdrawal From Somalia Exposes Peacekeeping Problems,” France 24, 16 December 2016, http://www.france24.com/en/20161215-ethiopian-troops-withdraw-highlighting-peacekeeping-internationally-funded-peacekeeping.
106. “Ethiopia withdraws troops in Somalia over ‘lack of support’,” BBC News, 26 October 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-37775555.
107. “Outcome of the 21st MOCC Meeting on AMISOM,” AU Press Statement, 11 November 2016, http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/press-statement-mocc-11.11.2016v2.pdf.
108. ACOTA Partner Summary: Ethiopia, 1 August 2013. ACOTA Files.
109. Interview, US official, Addis Ababa, 27 April 2016.
110. Figures for AMISOM casualties are not publicly available but this was clearly the most deadly peace operation in the post-Cold War period, if not the post-1945 period. See Williams, “How Many.”
111. For example, there appears to be some evidence of this issue at work in relation to Ethiopia and Ghana. See Dersso, “Ethiopia” and Aubyn and Aning, “Ghana.”
112. Communication, US official, 6 June 2015.
113. Communication, EU official, 25 July 2016. See also Williams, “Paying for AMISOM.”
114. For example, Beswick, “The Risks” and McNerney et al., Defense Institution Building.
115. Beswick, “The Risks.”
116. See Williams, “The Ambiguous.”