The jihadi insurgency in Mozambique: origins, nature and beginning

ABSTRACT

For the last three years, Mozambique has been facing an insurgency in its northern province of Cabo Delgado. There is much confusion and debate as to what is going on. Who are the insurgents, what do they want, and where do they come from? Debates have focused particularly on the role of religion and the external dimension of the insurgency. Drawing on fieldwork from 2018 and 2019, this paper focuses on the first attack of the insurgents in October 2017 and uses this to explore the origin, nature and early history of the contemporary armed violence. It uncovers that the insurgents belong to an Islamist sect which began a decade earlier and shifted to armed jihadism in the mid-2010s.

KEYWORDS:

• Insurrection
• religion
• sect
• history
• Islamism
• jihadism
• Cabo Delgado
• Mozambique

Acknowledgements

This article is dedicated to Abdul Raufu Mustapha – mentor, friend and colleague – who was professor of African Politics at the University of Oxford and director of the Nigeria Research Network. He edited several volumes on religion and conflict in Nigeria which were an inspiration for this article, including Sects & Social Disorder: Muslim Identities & Conflict in Northern Nigeria; Creed & Grievance: Muslim–Christian Relations & Conflict Resolution in Northern Nigeria (with David Ehrhardt); and Overcoming Boko Haram: Faith, Society & Islamic Radicalization in Northern Nigeria (with Kate Meagher). I wish to thank the many people who have helped me with the research, whose name I keep anonymous for reasons of security. In relation to institutional support, I wish to express my gratitude to the Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos (IESE) in Maputo and the Centro de Investigação e Estudos Económicos e Sociais de Cabo Delgado (CIEES) in Pemba as well as Irish Aid who part-supported the research through Queens University Belfast. A Portuguese version of this article will be published as Cadernos IESE (Maputo), noº 20 (2020), online at http://www.iese.ac.mz/publicacoes-cadernos.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Joseph Hanlon, “Mozambique’s Insurgency: A New Boko Haram or Youth Demanding an End to Marginalisation?.” Blog LSE, 19 June 2018 (https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2018/06/19/mozambiques-insurgency-a-new-boko-haram-or-youth-demanding-an-end-to-marginalisation, accessed 19 June 2018). João Mosca sees the insurgency as part of a ‘resource curse’; see “João Mosca: Cabo Delgado já vive ‘maldição dos recursos naturais’.” Deutsche Welle, 3 January 2020 (https://www.dw.com/pt-002/jo%C3%A3o-mosca-cabo-delgado-j%C3%A1-vive-maldi%C3%A7%C3%A3o-dos-recursos-naturais/a-51711555, accessed 3 January 2020).

2 Habibe, Forquilha and Pereira, Radicalização Islâmica, 11–12.

3 Santos, “War in Resource-Rich Northern Mozambique,” 11–12; and Liazzat Bonate, “Why the Mozambican Government’s Alliance with the Islamic Council of Mozambique Might not End the Insurgency in Cabo Delgado.” Zitamar, 14 June 2019 (https://zitamar.com/mozambican-governments-alliance-islamic-council-mozambique-might-not-end-insurgency-cabo-delgado, accessed 14 June 2019).

4 International Crisis Group, “Al-Shabaab Five Years after Westgate” See also Sunguta West, “Ansar al-Sunna: A New Militant Islamist Group Emerges in Mozambique.” Terrorism Monitor (Jameston Foundation), 14 June 2018, 5–7; and Eleanor Beevor, “Who Are Mozambique’s Jihadists?.” International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) blog ‘Analysis’, 25 March 2020 (https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2020/03/csdp-mozambique-jihadists, accessed 3 February 2020).

5 Matsinhe and Valoi, “The Genesis of Insurgency,” 9; and Habibe, Forquilha and Pereira, Radicalização Islâmica. See also Gregory Pirio, Robert Pittelli and Yussuf Adam, “The Emergence of Violent Extremism in Northern Mozambique.” Spotlights Africa, Centre for Strategic Studies (USA), https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-emergence-of-violent-extremism-in-northern-mozambique/ (accessed 26 March 2018).

6 Mustapha, Sects & Social Disorder, 3.

7 Chome, “From Islamic Reform to Muslim Activism.”

8 Raquel Loureiro and António Cascais, “Ataque em Mocímboa da Praia terá sido ‘caso isolado’.” Deutsche Welle, 16 October 2017 (https://www.dw.com/pt-002/ataque-em-moc%C3%ADmboa-da-praia-ter%C3%A1-sido-caso-isolado/a-40977442, accessed 16 October 2017).

9 Agência Lusa, “Grupo que atacou polícia no norte de Moçambique visava provocar desordem.” Deutsche Welle, 6 October 2017 (https://www.dw.com/pt-002/grupo-que-atacou-pol%C3%ADcia-no-norte-de-mo%C3%A7ambique-visava-provocar-desordem/a-40849000, accessed 8 October 2017).

10 Francisco Mandlate, “Jovens radicais sonham com califado em Mocímboa da Praia.” O País (Maputo), 9 October 2017 (http://opais.sapo.mz/jovens-radicais-sonham-com-califado-em-mocimboa-da-praia-, accessed 9 October 2017).

11 Habibe, Forquilha and Pereira, Radicalização Islâmica, 11.

12 Ibid. Some authors mistakenly use the term Ansar al-Sunna which is the name of a youth branch of the Islamic Council of Mozambique. Ansar al-Sunna has nothing to do with the insurgency; in Cabo Delgado it is registered as Ansaru-Sunna.

13 For this reason, I have chosen to use this term in the article. In contrast, the United States’ administration seems to have made a tactical choice to use the term Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jamaah to avoid politicians in Washington conflating the Mozambican movement with the Somali organization. See, for example, US Embassy in Mozambique, Mozambique 2018.

14 Cited by Agência Lusa, “Grupo que atacou polícia.” Deutsche Welle, 6 October 2017, op.cit.

15 Mandlate, “Jovens radicais sonham.” O País (Maputo), 9 October 2017, op. cit.

16 Lusa, “Mocímboa culpa migrações e recrutamento no estrangeiro pelos ataques em Moçambique.” Diário de Notícias (Lisbon), 15 October 2017 (https://www.dn.pt/lusa/reportagem-mocimboa-culpa-migracoes-e-recrutamento-no-estrangeiro-pelos-ataques-em-mocambique-8844248.html, accessed 7 October 2019).

17 Mandlate, “Jovens radicais sonham.” O País (Maputo), 9 October 2017, op. cit.

18 Interview, April 2019.

19 Cited by Nádia Issufo, “Ataques em Moçambique: ‘Está tudo sob controlo em Palma’.” Deutsche Welle, 2 May 2018 (https://www.dw.com/pt-002/ataques-em-mo%C3%A7ambique-est%C3%A1-tudo-sob-controlo-em-palma/a-43600360, accessed 2 May 2018).

20 Monhés is a pejorative term in Mozambique meaning ‘Asian Muslims’.

21 Cited by Mandlate, “Jovens radicais sonham.” O País (Maputo), 9 October 2017, op. cit. The authors of this report translated this quote and all other quotes in this report.

22 Cited by Loureiro and Cascais, “Ataque em Mocímboa da Praia.” Deutsche Welle, 16 October 2017, op. cit.

23 Where the niqab veil covers only the head, the burqa covers the entire body from head to feet, with only the eye slit as opening.

24 Quranists pray three times a day; they do not recognise the Hadiths that specify five prayers per day. Quranists derive their name from the fact that they only recognise the Quran as a legitimate source of religious law and guidance.

25 Interview with Sheik M., Mocímboa da Praia, 2018.

26 Kaarsholm claims the secularism practiced in Mozambique was ‘radical’. See Kaarsholm, “Islam, Secularist Government, and State-Civil Society Interaction”. For another viewpoint, see Morier-Genoud, “A Prospect of Secularization?” and “The 1996 ‘Muslim holiday’ affair.”

27 Tibi, Islamism and Islam. Olivier Roy made the same point more than 20 years ago, calling it ‘le grand malentendu’ (the great misunderstanding); see Roy, Généalogie de l’islamisme.

28 Among the huge literature on ‘sects’, see Johnson, “A Critical Appraisal of the Church-Sect Typology.”

29 The Conselho Islâmico de Mocambique (CISLAMO) is a Wahhabi organization recognized by the government and financed by the Kuwaiti Africa Muslim Agency (AMA).

30 Relatório da Conferência islâmica, Nampula 10–13 de Novembro de 2016, pp. 13–14. There are only few Shia in Cabo Delgado, and the presenter talking about this province boasted that they had managed to expel them from the town of Mocímboa da Praia.

31 Interview with Sheik X., Pemba, 2019.

32 Interview with Sheik X., Pemba, 2019.

33 Mustapha makes the same point in relation to Boko Haram in Nigeria; see Mustapha, Sect & Social Disorder, ch. 3.

34 Copy of the application in possession of the author.

35 Interview with official head of Nhacole, Balama, 2019.

36 Copies of the minutes of the meeting in possession of the author; interview with CISLAMO sheik, Balama, 2019.

37 There is another version of the story whereby the state expelled Sualehe in 2009 and he returned in 2010, only to be expelled again in 2011.

38 Interview with A. and B., Chiure, 2019.

39 Sheik Abdulcarimo Fadile, “O Problema do Muçulmano ser um Funcionário Público.” Al-Hujomu (Pemba), No. 40, 13 December 2015.

40 Interview with C., Chiure, 2019.

41 Interview with C., A. and B., and D., Chiure, 2019.

42 Relatório da Conferência islâmica, Nampula 10–13 de Novembro de 2016, 13.

43 Habibe, Forquilha and Pereira, Radicalização Islâmica, 13.

44 Interview with Sheik X., Pemba, 2019; and Habibe, Forquilha and Pereira, Radicalização Islâmica, 13–15.

45 Habibe, Forquilha and Pereira, Radicalização Islâmica, 10.

46 Interview with Y., Pemba, 2018; interview with W., Pemba, 2018.

47 Interview with D., Pemba, 2019.

48 Habibe, Forquilha and Pereira, Radicalização Islâmica, 13; and interview with F., Pemba, 2019.

49 “Tumultos em Pangane provocam morte e feridos.” Domingo (Maputo), 9 November 2015 (https://www.jornaldomingo.co.mz/index.php/arquivo/26-reportagem/7791-tumultos-em-pangane-provocam-morte-e-feridos, accessed 3 February 2018).

50 Interview with Y., Pemba, 2018; interview with W., Pemba, 2018.

51 Chichava, “Os primeiros sinais do ‘Al Shabaab’ em Cabo Delgado.”

52 Adelina Pinto, “Detidos três membros de grupo muçulmano que promove desinformação em Cabo Delgado.” Mazagine Independente (Maputo), 21 June 2017 (http://www.magazineindependente.com/www2/detidos-tres-membros-grupo-muculmano-promove-desinformacao-cabo-delgado, accessed 27 April 2020). Rádio Moçambique published the item the day before, but it has disappeared from its website.

53 Tibi, Islamism and Islam, 135. The term jihadi is problematic since it has two meanings, the less known one referring to the self-discipline that is necessary to become a good religious person. Bonelli and Carrié offer as alternative the cumbersome expression ‘political violence making reference to Islam’. I use the term armed or violent jihadi. See Bonelli and Carrié, La fabrique de la radicalité, 15.

54 For a constructivist reading of ethnicity in Mozambique, see Sérgio Chichava, “Por uma leitura sócio-histórica da etnicidade em Moçambique.”

55 Feijó, “Assimetrias no acesso ao Estado.”

56 Ana Sousa Santos, “History, Memory and Violence,” ch. 8.

57 Haysom, Where Crime Compounds Conflict.

58 Bonate, “Transformations de l'islam à Pemba”; Declich, “Transmission of Muslim practices and women’s agency”; Macagno, “Les nouveaux Oulémas”; Morier-Genoud, “L’islam au Mozambique après l’indépendance.”

59 Morier-Genoud, “The 1996 ‘Muslim holiday’ affair,” 421–22. For Cabo Delgado specifically, see for example The Joshua project (https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/13902/MZ, accessed 4 November 2019).

60 Jacinto Veloso, “O cenário mais provável.” Savana (Maputo), 5 June 2020. Jacinto Veloso is a very influential Mozambican politician who has held many high positions, including head of the secret services.

61 Among others, see the (influential) writings on Facebook of Julião João Cumbane, CEO of Empresa Nacional de Parques de Ciências e Tecnologias (Maputo).

62 The opposition and some Frelimo officials are very keen on this idea. See, for example, the declaration of the late head of the opposition in André Baptista, “Dhlakama fala de ‘cunho político’ nos ataques de Mocímboa da Praia.” Voice of America, 17 October 2017 (https://www.voaportugues.com/a/dhlakama-fala-de-cunho-politico-nos-ataques-de-mocimboa/4074861.html, accessed 17 October 2017).

63 The bishop of Pemba has argued repeatedly that the insurgents have ‘no face’ and the president of the Republic has said the same on several occasions. Among others, see the Bishop’s “Comunicado do Bispo de Pemba aos cristãos e às pessoas de boa vontade.” Pemba, 10 June 2018, and President Nyusi cited in Ramos Miguel, “Nyusi reconhece ser difícil conhecer motivações dos ataques em Cabo Delgado.” VOA Português, 6 June 2019 (https://www.voaportugues.com/a/nyusi-reconhece-ser-dif%C3%ADcil-conhecer-motiva%C3%A7%C3%B5es-dos-ataques-em-cabo-delgado/4948100.html, accessed 14 October 2019).

64 Nuno Rogeiro, O Cabo do Medo, 175 (and 204 for the commanders).

65 See the ‘Cabo Ligado’ reports for these months (https://acleddata.com/cabo-ligado-mozambique-conflict-observatory/). The Al-Qaeda claim was made by the Thabat Agency on 22 May 2020. For the insurgents’ videos in Swahili, see Pinnacle News Facebook page on 29 May 2020 (https://www.facebook.com/pinnaclenews79, accessed 29 May 2020).

66 Vincent Foucher “Nigeria: divisions au sein du groupe jihadiste Boko Haram.” Radio France Internationale, 25 February 2017 (http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20170225-nigeria-boko-haram-divisions-al-barnawi-shekau-vincent-foucher-icg, accessed 3 January 2020); International Crisis Group, “Facing the Challenge of the Islamic State in West Africa Province.” ICG Report no. 273, 16 May 2019 (https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/273-facing-challenge-islamic-state-west-africa-province, accessed 3 January 2020); Zenn, “Boko Haram's Conquest for the Caliphate.”