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ABSTRACT
In the early 2010s, Zanzibar and coastal Kenya witnessed the rise of assertive secessionist grassroots movements articulating perceived injustices committed by ‘upcountry’/mainland ruling elites. While on the islands, the Jumuiya ya Uamsho na Mihadhara ya Kiislam (Organisation for Islamic Awareness and Propagation) championed the breaking up of the Tanzanian Union, in Kenya, the Mombasa Republican Council actively campaigned for the creation of an independent coastal state. Locating these groups within two distinct histories of contentious politics, the article asserts that even though in both cases the temporary salience of secessionism revolved around controversial processes of (post-)colonial state formation, the overall dynamics of sub-nationalist mobilisation that have unfolded in Zanzibar and coastal Kenya since the early 1990s differ fundamentally. Specifically, the article demonstrates how and why it is only in Zanzibar that sub-nationalism has emerged as a viable political project. Furthermore, it shows that while in the archipelago, sub-nationalism and political Islam have become deeply interwoven, in coastal Kenya, they have emerged as separate strands of contention. Exploring and accounting for these differences, the article challenges the notion of two convergent paths of regional separatism grounding in the history of the Sultanate of Zanzibar.
Acknowledgements
This paper is a product of empirical research conducted with funds from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). The research for this article would not have been possible without the help of Hassan Mwakimako. The author is also grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Daily Nation, “Two Killed, MRC Leader Arrested in Dawn Gunfight,” 15 October 2012, https://web.archive.org/web/20190512022841/https://www.nation.co.ke/news/MRC-leader-arrested-following-gunfight/1056-1533332-4nr0xq/index.html.
2 BBC, “Zanzibar Clashes Over Missing Cleric Sheik Farid Hadi,” 18 October 2012, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19997774.
3 BBC, “Viongozi wa Uamsho, mahakamani Zanzibar,” 22 October 2012, https://www.bbc.com/swahili/habari/2012/10/121022_zanzibar_uamsho.
4 Cooper, From Slaves to Squatters; Lofchie, Zanzibar.
5 Brennan, “Lowering the Sultan's Flag.” In 1888, Sultan Hamed bin Thuwaini had leased the coastal strip to the Imperial British East Africa Company. Seven years later, he then agreed to delegate the strip’s administration and protection to Britain in exchange for annual rent payments.
6 Bratton and Van De Walle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions,” 482–4; Hartmann, “Leverage and Linkage,” 82.
7 The Economist, “Contagion of Discontent,” 3 November 2012, https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21565641-muslim-extremism-spreads-down-east-africa%E2%80%99s-coastline-contagion-discontent.
8 Byrne and Englebert, “Shifting Grounds for African Secessionism?” 481.
9 Ibid., 482.
10 Forrest, Subnationalism in Africa, 5.
11 Salafism represents a tradition of Sunni Islamic reform that is based on the notion of an exemplary community of “pious ancestors” made up of the earliest Muslims. It is marked by a devotion to ritual and doctrinal purification revolving a literalist treatment of foundational texts.
12 Bennett and Checkel, “Process Tracing,” 19–31.
13 All interviews were carried out in Kiswahili.
14 Glassman, “Sorting out the Tribes,” 397.
15 The Arab-African distinction grounds, inter alia, in colonial ‘divide and rule’ politics. While the term ‘Arab’ is commonly applied to the descendants of the Omani rulers of the 18th century, the label ‘African’ is used to designate groups of mainland/hinterland origin such as the Mijikenda.
16 In colonial Zanzibar, the label ‘el-Shirazi’ was popularised by islanders using it to distinguish themselves from mainland immigrants by claiming ‘indigenousness’ and Middle Eastern descent at the same time. See Glassman, “Sorting out the Tribes,” 401–7.
17 Sheriff, “Race and Class”; Lofchie, Zanzibar, 183–257; Glassman, “Sorting out the Tribes.”
18 As the Shirazi label in Zanzibar, in colonial coastal Kenya the identity category ‘Swahili’ became closely tied to claims of ancient Middle Eastern origins. See Willis, Mombasa, 184–200.
19 Despite its special status, the coastal protectorate was included in the administrative system of the Kenya Colony. Within the coastal strip, pre-colonial Zanzibari titles such as ‘liwali’ (governor) and ‘kadhi’ (Islamic court judge) were turned into formalised administrative offices that nominally remained part of the Sultan's civil service.
20 Salim, The Swahili-Speaking Peoples, 233–46.
21 Among the Mijikenda (‘nine tribes’) the Digo, Duruma and Giriama are the most populous groups. The Mijikenda-label came into use in the 20th century together with the so-called Singwaya myth about a common northern homeland shared by all nine tribes (see Willis, Mombasa, 17–47). Today, the Mijikenda are listed as the largest ethnic group in the Coast region with a particularly large presence in the counties of Kwale and Kilifi where they constitute more than 80 percent of the population. While the Digo are largely Muslim, the other Mijikenda groups are mainly Christian or follow traditional systems of belief.
22 Prestholdt, “Politics of the Soil,” 267–8.
23 Brennan, “Lowering the Sultan's Flag,” 831–2.
24 Ibid., 858.
25 Hunter, The Hundred Days' Revolution, 61–73.
26 Shivji, Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism? 72–6.
27 Hunter, Zanzibar, 118–30.
28 Ibid., 118–30. The idea of a merger was not new. In 1959, it had already found its way into an official document of Nyerere’s Tanganiyka African National Union produced in the aftermath of the second conference of the Pan-African Freedom Movement of Eastern Africa. See Shivji, Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism? 31.
29 Ibid., 76–82.
30 Willis and Gona, “‘Pwani C Kenya’?” 56–60.
31 Salim, The Swahili-speaking Peoples, 242–3; Gona, A Political Biography, 262.
32 Willis and Gona, “‘Pwani C Kenya’?,” 60.
33 Anderson, “‘Yours in Struggle for Majimbo’,” 561–3.
34 Wolf, “Contemporary Politics,” 137.
35 Stren, “Factional Politics,” 52.
36 Gona, “A Political Biography,” 265–6. Ngala is quoted as having said, I condemn those who go round spreading hostility and hatred, especially to up-country men, that they are unwanted here. As Chairman of KANU in Mombasa and as a Government Minister I shall be the first person to resist such nonsense, even by going as far as resigning my ministerial post as I believe that no Kenyan should be discriminated against by his own fellow Kenyans (as quoted in ibid., 265–6).
37 Kanyinga, Re-dstribution from Above, 69–80.
38 Gona, “A Political Biography,” 267–73.
39 Wolf, “Contemporary Politics,” 137–9.
40 Willis and Gona, “‘Pwani C Kenya’?,” 61.
41 Lynch, I Say to You, 157–65.
42 Wolf, “Contemporary Politics,” 144.
43 Ibid., 143.
44 Three years before the party had been denied registration three years before, there were speculations that the statès willingness to eventually allow the SPK to compete in the 1997 general election were part of a larger governmental strategy to diffuse the anger of the Digo population in the context of the Kaya Bombo raids. See below and Mazrui, “Ethnic Voices and Trans-ethnic Voting,” 285–6.
45 SPK constitution as quoted in Mazrui, “Ethnic Voices and Trans-ethnic Voting,” 287.
46 Wolf, “Contemporary Politics,” 150.
47 Human Rights Watch, Playing with Fire. The perpetrators, who became known as the ‘Kaya Bombo raiders’, killed at least hundred residents and caused the displacement of more than 100.000 people. They were recruited and organised with the support of local KANU leaders eager to maximise the ruling party’s vote share and to ensure a smooth re-election of President Moi.
48 Mazrui, “Ethnic Voices and Trans-ethnic Voting,” 275.
49 Interview with Rashid Shakombo, 17 May 2018, Mombasa.
50 Benson Amadala, “Kenya: No Merging with KANU, Party Officials Tell Shakombo,” Daily Nation, 29 April 2002, https://allafrica.com/stories/200204290003.html; Interview with former SPK Vice-Chairman John Mumba, 11 June 2018, Kilifi.
51 Gona, “Changing Political Faces,” 244.
52 Apart from the SPK, several other majimboist parties have been created since the early 1990s. Most notably, in 2006, the then representative of the Bahari constituency, Joe Khamisi, initiated the formation of KADU-Asili. See Gona “Changing Political Faces,” 249.
53 Shivji, Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism? 104–7; Wilson, US Foreign Policy and Revolution, 79, Karume was killed by the army officer Ali Mafoudh whose father had been murdered in detention.
54 Shivji, Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism? 163–81.
55 Ibid., 181–234.
56 Bakari, The Democratisation Process, 114–5; Hamad in Burgess, Race, Revolution and the Struggle for Human Rights, 232–3; Triplett, “Zanzibar.” Ironically, in the 1970s, the “frontliners” had been initially promoted by Jumbe to weaken the former Karume loyalists.
57 Hamad in Burgess, Race, Revolution and the Struggle for Human Rights, 258–9; Sheriff, “The Union,” 156.
58 Bakari, The Democratisation Process, 175. Hamad was charged with theft of secret government documents.
59 Ibid., 173. The Chama cha Wananchi was created by James Mapalala who also became the CUF’s first chairman. However, after falling out with Hamad, Mapalala was expelled from the CUF in November 1994.
60 Fengler, Konfliktformationen und Zukunftsperspektiven, 78–82.
61 Sheriff, “The Union,” 156; African Elections Database, “Elections in Zanzibar,” http://africanelections.tripod.com/zanzibar.html.
62 Matheson, “Maridhiano.”
63 Fengler, Konfliktformationen und Zukunftsperspektiven, 78–82.
64 Loimeier, Between Social Skills and Marketable Skills, 116–35. Sufism is an umbrella term applied to mystic currents within Islam. In East Africa, Sufism was popularised in starting in the late 19th century thanks to the arrival of the Qadiriyya, Alawiyya and Shadiliyya Sufi orders.
65 Sheriff, “The Union,” 156.
66 Purpura, “Knowledge and Agency,” 379.
67 Loimeier, Between Social Skills and Marketable Skills, 129–31.
68 Kresse, “Swahili Enlightenment?”; Loimeier, Between Social Skills and Marketable Skills, 116–49.
69 Willis and Gona, “‘Pwani C Kenya’?,” 62.
70 Oded, Islam & Politics, 135–47; Bakari, “A Place at the Table,” 24–8.
71 See, e.g. Goldsmith, The Mombasa Republican Council, 35; Mazrui and Shariff, The Swahili, 151–63.
72 For a list of these grievances see Oded, Islam & Politics, 137–47.
73 On the CUF as a predominantly Muslim party see Gilsaa, Muslim Politics, 326–30, 471–95.
74 Oded, Islam & Politics, 149–62.
75 Thordsen, New Muslim Activism, 41–7.
76 Chome, “Marginalisation politique,” 90–1.
77 Willis and Gona, “‘Pwani C Kenya’?,” 63.
78 Ibid., 62–3.
79 Chome, “Marginalisation politique,” 90.
80 Gona, “Changing Political Faces,” 245.
81 Mazera Ndurya and Jonathan Manyindo, “Shirikisho Split over President,” Daily Nation, 8 September 2007, https://www.nation.co.ke/news/1056-205740-lvaxhmz/index.html. Interview with former SPK Vice-Chairman John Mumba.
82 Gona, “Changing Political Faces,” 244–6, Interview with former SPK Vice-Chairman John Mumba.
83 The Nation,“Mwakwere Denies he is Shirikisho Leader,” 31 December 2008, https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/1064-509258-7u1d9iz/index.html.
84 Gona, “Changing Political Faces.”
85 Chome, “Marginalisation politique,” 96.
86 Willis and Chome, “Marginalisation and Political Participation,” 120–1; Interview with SPK Secretary General Adam Mbeto, 16 May 2018, Mombasa.
87 Chome, “Marginalisation politique,” 101.
88 Willis and Gona, “‘Pwani C Kenya’?,” 65–6.
89 Willis and Chome, “Marginalisation and Political Participation,” 117.
90 Mwakimako and Willis, “Islam and Democracy,” 31–2.
91 In 1992 Aboud Rogo had unsuccessfully run for a seat on Mombasa’s municipal council as an IPK youth activist. See Ndzovu, Struggle against Secular Power, 5–7; On the MRC’s multi-religious nature see Willis and Gona, “‘Pwani C Kenya’?,” 65.
92 Chome, “Marginalisation politique,” 96.
93 Willis and Chome, “Marginalisation and Political Participation,” 127.
94 Waddilove, “The Coast,” 726.
95 Waddilove, “Support or Subvert,” 9, TradeMark East Africa, “KPA Dismisses Joho’s Threat to Take Over Port,” 24 July 2014, https://www.trademarkea.com/news/kpa-dismisses-joho-threat-to-take-over-port/.
96 See Rogers Omondi, “NASA Leaders Begin Process to Divide Kenya,” Kenyans.co.ke, 3 November 2017, https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/24304-nasa-leaders-begin-process-divide-kenya.
97 Baya Samuel, and Mohamed Ahmed, “From Public Spats to Support: Joho, Uhuru Enjoy Friendship,” Daily Nation, 20 November 2018, https://www.nation.co.ke/counties/mombasa/Joho-relishes-new-friendship-with-Uhuru/1954178-4860338-cf3oy3z/index.html.
98 Interview with SPK Secretary General Adam Mbeto, 16 May 2018, Mombasa.
99 Maureen Kakah,“ Court Upholds Lifting of MRC Ban,” Daily Nation, 26 July 2016, http://web.archive.org/web/20170310064938/https://www.nation.co.ke/counties/mombasa/Court-upholds-lifting-of-MRC-ban-/1954178-3310546-kcfrgl/index.html.
100 Chome, “Marginalisation politique,” 101. The assailants have remained unknown.
101 Malemba Mkongo, “Mombasa Court Declares MRC Chair Missing,” The Star, 10 April 2017, https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/04/10/mombasa-court-declares-mrc-chair-missing_c1540760.
102 In the early 2000s, the local authorities regularly provoked public Salafi protests by stipulating that the “timing” of the month of Ramadan had to be guided by the local sighting of the moon as opposed to its sighting in Saudi-Arabia. See Loimeier, Between Social Skills and Marketable Skills, 132.
103 US Embassy/Tanzania, “Zanzibar’s Imams Declare a Truce,” 26 May 2005, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05DARESSALAAM1015_a.html.
104 Branson, Party Rules.
105 US Embassy/Tanzania, “Zanzibar: Hardline Islamists blast Kikwete on Zanzibar’s Status in TZ,” 3 September 2008, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08DARESSALAAM564_a.html.
106 Fouéré, “Julius Nyerere in Zanzibar,” 184–91; Video footage of many of these rallies is available on Youtube. See, for example, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rPWAyR5Gli4.
107 Mwananchi, “Uamsho: Tutapambana hadi tuhakikishe Zanzibar inakuwa huru,” 6 June 2012, https://www.mwananchi.co.tz/habari/Makala/1597592-1552662-sxkpvmz/index.html.
108 The Economist, “Contagion of Discontent.”
109 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6YiisvzO9fQ (16:26–27:18 Min), and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qnJR_q48oB0 (0:01–10:23 Min).
110 Hamad, “Muungano wa Mkataba.”
111 Bakari, The Democratisation Process, 176.
112 Branson, Party Rules. To enter into force, this proposed constitution would have to be approved by popular referendum on the mainland as well as in Zanzibar. As the vote was called off prior to the 2015 general elections, the Tanzanian constitution from 1977 is still in effect.
113 Throup, “The Political Crisis.”
114 Roop, Tronvoll, and Minde, “The Politics of Continuity and Collusion,” 263–4.
115 Bob Karashani, “Zitto’s Party Stirs up Tanzania, But is the Honeymoon about to Come Ende,” The East African, 30 March 2019, https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/Zitto-Kabwe-party-stirs-up-Tanzania/4552908-5049194-78gh3v/index.html.
116 DW Swahili, “ACT Wazalendo yajitenga na vurugu za kisiasa Tanzania,” 26 March 2019, https://www.dw.com/sw/act-wazalendo-yajitenga-na-vurugu-za-kisiasa-tanzania/a-48063013.