Future visions, present conflicts: the ethnicized politics of anticipation surrounding an infrastructure corridor in northern Kenya

ABSTRACT

This work analyses the politics of anticipation and ensuing fears, tensions and conflicts in relation to Kenya’s Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor which is to pass through several previously marginalized counties in the north of the country. Isiolo county, in the centre of Kenya is home to several different ethnic groups of whom some are perceived to be better informed about LAPSSET than others, or have certain advantages in terms of claims to indigeneity, ethno-political dominance, land tenure security or access to markets, which help them to position themselves accordingly. This anticipatory positioning – actions people take in anticipation of the future – is raising fears and heightening the claiming of land and ethnic boundary-making, leading to heightened tensions and exacerbating existing conflicts of which three specific cases are considered. We show how ethno-political divides on a national and regional level become effective at the local and county level, but at the same time, how the positioning of actors in anticipation of future investments impacts on ethnic boundary-making, as division lines are re-enacted and redrawn.

KEYWORDS:

• LAPSSET
• infrastructure
• anticipation
• ethnicity
• politics
• Isiolo
• conflict

I see a change in the future, in 20 years to come. New development, education, long-lasting solutions for peace. I also see the increase in the use of violence due to the implementation of LAPSSET project as communities might use force to get their rights, […] displacement of pastoralists as they are not aware of the project and their land rights […] There will also be increase in gun use due to loss of land to the elites […] This thing called LAPSSET will divide us more than uniting us.¹

Such were the conflicting visions of a peace worker in Isiolo county, Kenya, as he considered the impact of the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor, one of Kenya’s large-scale infrastructure projects anticipated to boost prosperity,² but also to increase dispossession and various forms of contestation.

Since independence Kenya has had an intermittent focus upon infrastructural development as a key to driving growth.³ Kenya’s Vision 2030, announced in 2008 again prioritized infrastructural development to connect parts of the country through roads, railways, ports, airports, waterways and telecommunications and investment.⁴ And, while previous development plans favoured the former “White Highlands” and their environs in southern Kenya, this time, the focus was laid on the country’s marginalized north: the government claimed that ‘by 2030 it will become impossible to refer to any region of our country as remote.’⁵

This article contributes to the increasing body of knowledge concerning the ways the future is implicated in the present rolling-out of developmental megaprojects, and in particular the politics of anticipation as visions are translated on the ground and local actors attempt to position themselves to benefit from the expected developments. It is interested in the social fissures which may be deepened by these processes, in particular those which run along ethno-political lines, a common paradigm in Kenya for accessing resource wealth and opportunity.

It is our contention that the “high-modernist” ⁶ infrastructural plans like LAPSSET do not just dissolve into localized practice but are performative by spanning a field of future opportunities and constraints in which actors position themselves, enhancing contestations and conflicts.⁷ The role of expectations towards mega-projects in enhancing conflicts is increasingly recognized,⁸ heightening tensions that are often framed along ethno-political lines.⁹ “Knowledge controversies,” the struggle over what should and should not be known about the planned developments¹⁰ and who is able to access information about future developments, are central to such politics of anticipation. Some actors have the economic or knowledge capital or political advantage to “buy-in” to the big vision, while others don’t.

In Isiolo, a semi-arid cosmopolitan county in the centre of Kenya, where several infrastructure projects are located, some ethnic groups are perceived to be better positioned to be informed about LAPSSET than others, or have certain advantages in terms of claims to indigeneity, ethno-political dominance, land tenure security or access to markets, which help them to position themselves accordingly. The county has a history of inter-communal and ethno-political conflict, and is also a regional hub for the illegal small-arms trade. Pastoralists risk being dispossessed of grazing land, as the majority pastoralist population has very low literacy rates and the communally held rangelands are not yet protected by community titles, although the possibility is foreseen in a new Community Land Act.¹¹

Against this volatile background, the paper lays out a distinctive contribution: that anticipatory practices can be enacted via ethnic competition and conflict. Cormack observed how the heritage of rangeland management is mobilized and ethnicized in Isiolo in response to LAPSSET plans,¹² while in the town, Elliot notes that between 2014 and 2015, the anticipation of LAPSSET and the increased demand for plots that accompanied it was amplifying the politics of land, settlement and ethnic identity.¹³ This article contributes to the emerging work on the LAPSSET Corridor, focusing on other parts of Isiolo county. It is based on several phases of qualitative social science research in Isiolo county from 2016 to date, drawing on more than 50 individual interviews and 20 focus group discussions with respondents occupying various tiers and sectors of society including pastoralist men and women, farmers, elders, business people, NGOs, religious leaders, politicians, administrators and state and non-state security personnel. After briefly elaborating our perspective on ethnic politics, ethnic territorialization and anticipation in Kenya and the north, we provide some background on LAPSSET and Isiolo county. We then bring to the fore the expectations, hopes, fears, positions, and positioning of different actors with regard to the anticipated benefits of LAPSSET, relating them to present conflicts that are unfolding in areas along the LAPSSET Corridor in Isiolo county before even the infrastructure is materially present.

Ethnic politics and territorialization in Kenya

A brief history of ethnic politics and territorialization is necessary to contextualize the ethnicized claim-making occurring in the anticipation of the LAPSSET project. While ethnic territories existed to some extent in the pre-colonial period as historians record,¹⁴ these were more fluid and dynamic than the rigid and regulated boundaries that followed under the colonial administration.¹⁵ The colonial strategy was pursued partly for the ease of administration, effected through the appointment of village headmen and location chiefs (who would need the trust and understanding of their subjects).¹⁶ In the post-colonial period, ethnic territorialization was further strengthened and politicized through the advent of votes for all citizens, and later through multi-party politics in 1992 with its geographically located constituencies. More recently since 2013, the enactment of devolution, as provided for in the 2010 Constitution has created new centres of power in counties and raised the stakes for control of the budgets and resources therein. While this has had the effect of reducing the country’s previous “winner take all” polarization,¹⁷ at the same time, it is has had the effect in some places of intensifying ethnic territorialization and inter-county boundary conflicts.¹⁸

Jenkins also notes that ethnic identification and territorialization has remained strong in the post-colonial period, particularly in the arena of politics, where the “immigrant-guest” metaphor plays out; meaning while non-indigenous people may be welcomed, they are expected to abide by the rules, that is, to align themselves with the political preferences of their neighbours.¹⁹ However, Lynch also notes, observing politics in parts of western Kenya (Mt Elgon and Baringo), that there is fluidity in ethnic identification; ethnic groups and their boundaries may be constructed and deconstructed – even if not completely “invented” – in a pragmatic manner in order to stake claims on resources. Lonsdale similarly notes that land is ‘as much a political asset as a social and economic resource,’²⁰ and claims of autochthony are used as strategy for claiming it.²¹ Other claims on land besides autochthony, he notes, include claims of being able to effectively control, manage or work the land – a strategy often used by “immigrants” or “guests,” as opposed to the original inhabitants who may be perceived not to have fully exploited it.

In the northern rangelands specifically, colonial government policy also determined the limits of territory for ethnic pastoralist groups, making some contested directives which continue to feed into conflict today. As Lynch has shown for other regions in Kenya, Schlee and Shongolo explain relationships between the Oromo – which the Borana nowadays consider themselves to form part of – and Somali pastoralist groups in the Kenya-Ethiopia border area are fluid and their ancestry intertwined, which contributed to a situation of shifting narratives of ethnic affiliation and political alliances.²²

Key to the dynamics of ethnic territorialization is a scramble for land, which in northern counties is still mostly communally owned. The Land Act (2012) and Community Land Act (2016) were enacted to provide for pastoralist land rights by recognizing their rights over communally owned land and allowing for group registration and compensation. However, the law also has the unintended consequence of formalizing previously more fluid and negotiable boundaries, which may contribute to ethnic territorialization. Further internal and external factors increase ethnicized scrambles for land, as Greiner identifies in his work on East Pokot, Baringo, Kenya, an equally semi-arid, pastoralist area situated to the southwest of Isiolo county. He argues that in addition to political devolution and internal dynamics of increasing trends of sedentarization and agro-pastoralist livelihoods,²³ investment projects and their anticipation impact on ethnic territorialization. In the following, this work will further elaborate on this dynamic for the case of Isiolo.

Ethnic politics in Isiolo county

Isiolo county, like much of northern Kenya is politically and socio-economically marginalized as a result of its remote geographical location, aridity and colonial and post-colonial political history. Relevant here is Isiolo’s involvement in the irredentist “Shifta War” from 1963 to 1967 (in which inhabitants of the northeast agitated to join a Greater Somalia) and an ensuing prolonged emergency period in which the state response was characterized by collective punishment and marginalization.²⁴ The economy of Isiolo is mostly anchored in pastoralism and to a lesser extent, wildlife conservation and tourism; agricultural development is very limited and confined to areas along the sole major source of water in the county, the Ewaso Nyiro river.²⁵

The main ethnic groups include the pastoralist Borana, Somali,²⁶ Samburu and Turkana and the agriculturalist Meru. It is generally agreed that Borana are politically dominant in the county, and physically occupy the largest part of the land. Borana claims to Isiolo are generally made on the basis that the colonial government gave them exclusive rights to all of Isiolo county east of Ngaremara (the ward that lies in the panhandle-shaped part of Isiolo as shown in Figure 1) as Boye and Kaarhus explain.²⁷ With regard to the other ethnic groups, these authors note that the Samburu who claim to have been there previous to the Borana were forced westwards and north of the Ewaso Nyiro into what is now Samburu county, and into parts of what is now Oldonyiro ward in Isiolo county. Some Somali clans came as traders in the colonial era and have claims in and around Isiolo town, while Turkana were brought as workers into the same area at that time. Meru, and other Somali clans were later immigrants into Isiolo town and Garbatulla and Kinna respectively, taking advantage of Borana displacements and losses during the Shifta War. Somali clans from Wajir and Garissa have historically claimed only access and user rights in dry seasons.²⁸

Figure 1. LAPSSET Corridor in Isiolo county (Flash symbols denote sites of tension and conflict and described in this article).

There is a general mutual acknowledgement of the various claims, but perennial resource-based conflicts between Borana and Samburu along the county borders, and Borana and Somali groups along the borders of Wajir and Garissa at times take ethnopolitical and territorial dimensions.²⁹ There is also frequent conflict over resource access between pastoralists and the agriculturalist Meru of Meru county along a contested inter-county border, which similarly has strong political overtones.³⁰ The recent past has seen violent clashes in Isiolo in the 2007 pre-election period³¹ and again in 2009–2012 in which up to 300 people died, related to territorial and political dominance in Isiolo North constituency.³²

The politics of anticipating infrastructure projects

Such ethno-political conflict is also related to infrastructural projects planned in the region. Arguably, the anticipation of future displacement and political disenfranchisement as well as future benefits pushes land claims in Isiolo. Recent research interest has focused upon ‘the economy of anticipation’ in economic zones or corridors where developments are largely ‘not yet.’³³ In the words of Cross, ‘To speak of an economy of anticipation is to focus our attention on the diverse ways in which people orient themselves toward the future and the ways that expected or promised futures conflict or converge.’ Describing large-scale infrastructure project plans in India, he elaborates on many kinds of ‘anticipatory practices’ of envisioning, planning and preparation which take place there.³⁴

In an economy of anticipation, the official vision of planners is just one – even if the most powerful – among a range of diverging visions and fears of the future as espoused by different sections of society. The idea, therefore, differs from a frontier perspective, which assumes that, similar to the colonial governments which went before, ³⁵ official planners are often ignorant of local land-use practices and perceive the spaces before them as unoccupied, unutilized³⁶ or backward and in need of transformation.³⁷ The concept of a ‘politics of anticipation’ that scholars of environmental studies have proposed alerts us to the variegated practices and logics of future-making, highlighting that explicit imaginaries such as developmental visions are just one dimension of future-making. Practices constitute another dimension, where future-making may also be unconscious and implicit.³⁸ Referring to such variegated dimensions and practices of anticipation, we conceptualize the actions of various groups reacting to official developmental visions as ‘anticipatory positioning.’

Cross also draws attention to the emotions attached to anticipation, noting that these are ‘deeply affective spaces in which the future is felt, encountered and inhabited.’³⁹ Similarly, Haines in her study on a planned highway in Belize notes that ‘applying the lens of anticipation reveals how expectations and fears can affectively animate social and political patterns, emphasising particular versions of history and visions of the future in processes of shaping resources and negotiating access and rights.’⁴⁰ Greiner equally evokes an economy of anticipation in his work on East Pokot, examining increasing practices of individual fencing of land plots among agro-pastoralists in East Pokot, who expect future investments in the region from renewable energy development (geothermal)⁴¹ and the LAPSSET Corridor. He refers to an economy of anticipation ‘primarily to grasp the anxiety, motivation, and agency involved with respect to people’s expectations of future material benefits.’⁴²

The planned LAPSSET corridor signifies enormous socio-economic and ecological transformation for the northern counties and yet, at present, there is very little of the actual project on the ground. Plans consist of a road, railway and oil pipeline, traversing seven counties from Turkana to Lamu Port. The corridor is to be 500 m wide, flanked by 25 km wide special economic zones on each side, and a resort city whose water needs would be served by a twin dam complex on the Ewaso Nyiro river in Isiolo⁴³ thereby threatening downstream communities. Progress has been slower than planned, and at the time of writing, the only completed infrastructural projects associated with LAPSSET are three berths of the Lamu port, the renovation of Isiolo airport, an abattoir (yet to be operationalized) and the Isiolo-Moyale highway.⁴⁴ Although the latest LAPSSET route has been made public in 2019,⁴⁵ participation has been rather uneven.⁴⁶

Another important development deserves a mention: a donor-funded highway from Isiolo through Mandera in the far northeast of the county heralds profitable trade links with Somalia and better services for the northeast.⁴⁷ Likewise, the Isiolo-Moyale highway has led to improved trade links with Ethiopia, a reduction in travel times and reduced opportunity for banditry.⁴⁸ However, the new airport brought problems of displacement from community land, irregular and disorderly compensation and resettlement processes; land grabbing by political elites in the wake of the administrative chaos following devolution ⁴⁹ and restrictions of pastoral mobility.⁵⁰ An estimated 1,000 people remain displaced and uncompensated.⁵¹

Although little of the infrastructure foreseen in LAPSSET plans in Isiolo county is implemented as of yet, recent research has shown that the anticipation of future benefits and dispossession is already driving present changes. Lind et al. note that the ‘new emphasis on developing pastoralist areas through investment in resources, land, infrastructure and small towns is resulting in new forms of territorialization, contentious politics and social difference.’⁵² This is illustrated by Elliot who describes ethnic politics in Isiolo county relating to land, as embodied in the anticipatory actions of ordinary people. In Isiolo town these include fencing, building, occupying, purchasing and acquiring legal documents. Although there is a desire for economic inclusion, this is also about political inclusion by ‘staking a claim on the future city.’ Laying exclusive claims to land, both individual and collective, is how people ensure their political inclusion.⁵³ Elliot’s work identifies a process of ‘town-making’ that is, inviting one’s kin to settle to achieve political representation.⁵⁴ She specifically mentions the politics of anticipation in the smaller settlement of Gotu town discussed below. In Gotu, Garre people have settled in historically Borana ancestral lands and gained some political favours through their support of the former Isiolo governor’s campaign, so that some Borana fear that Garre would claim Gotu as ‘theirs’.⁵⁵ Thus LAPSSET is speculated to threaten Borana land ownership and hence political dominance through the economic gains of other ethnic groups which may later translate into political gains. Below we present our own empirical findings relating to such dynamics.

Findings

Positions and positioning

The anticipated LAPSSET project has led various actors to position themselves to benefit from economic opportunities or compensation for land. There are high levels of land speculation by people who would appear to have inside knowledge and political connections.⁵⁶ At the time of writing a social media post was circulating about five pieces of grabbed community land in Ngaremara ward near Isiolo town (see Figure 1). Such grabbing can involve members of the communities local to Isiolo, or outsiders, and be facilitated by leaders at various levels, from local informal leaders, and civil society leaders to county and national government. A LAPPSET Corridor Development Authority Official confirmed:

You see […] with the resort city, people are jumping all over for land, even killing each other […]. As an authority, we were never prepared for such large-scale land grabbing and land speculation by elites that we have seen interested in the LAPSSET corridor […].⁵⁷

In September 2019, land titling was announced in Isiolo.⁵⁸ However, after heated debate this was later partially revoked, to apply only to settled areas.⁵⁹ Although land titling would appear to make local land rights more secure, the exercise in Isiolo has elicited a range of responses. For many, it was feared that this would make the land more vulnerable to being bought or illegally grabbed by those with money or connections, particularly the land lying near to Isiolo town and the LAPSSET route. Anger was expressed by mainly Borana Members of Parliament at the idea that land would be titled and removed from the common pool, and also many Turkana (who are pastoralists) have collectively rejected land adjudication because they believe they will lose their land, and even successfully pursued a court case against the adjudication exercise.⁶⁰

On the other hand, some Turkana and others have welcomed the titling of land in Ngaremara and around Isiolo town. These views seem to relate to the likelihood of benefit through compensation or saleable land, or the viability of that land for alternative uses to pastoralism. An official in the land adjudication office said: ‘They have been pressuring us … The wananchi [citizens] ask for titles all the time.’⁶¹ A local peace worker of Borana ethnicity developed a vision of individual titling that sounded like paradise on earth:

And we will be very proud actually as citizens of this country because some of us have never seen a title deed […] And we don’t know how it looks like. It’s a small document but very precious […] In fact if I own it, my sons and daughters will not work. I will just sink a borehole and they will work in their farms (…) And we will be very happy … So in fact when the mega-projects will start […], we can also embark on growing tomatoes and onions. One day I got 2.8 million Kenya Shillings ($ US 28,000) from onions … only in four acres of land. As a pastoralist, I will not look after livestock now, I’m not ready because it is hardship.⁶²

The growing influx of new people into the county does create some concerns for many Borana and even other pastoralists,⁶³ particularly regarding non-pastoralist groups, educated elites and those with closer ties to the state. This is seen as a threat to pastoralism and pastoralist land rights and culture. As expressed by a Borana peace activist:

[…] these big mega projects were all targeted in Isiolo, I think the government has an aim of actually displacing, displacing the local people in Isiolo […] A lot of immigrants from elsewhere will come to Isiolo and majority of us from Isiolo will be displaced.⁶⁴

In some cases, these concerns focus on specific ethnic groups. Members of the different ethnic groups are to some extent differentially positioned in relation to opportunities offered by LAPSSET. In the Gotu area discussed in this article, the Garre Somali are recent immigrants⁶⁵ and are considered economically powerful, while Meru agriculturalists in the town and along the disputed Meru-Isiolo border are perceived as having both economic power and stronger ethno-political ties to the National Government. Lastly, there is a reaction against Somali pastoralists from Garissa who are increasingly settling near the LAPSSET route and the Isiolo-Madogashe road on the eastern side of the county. The concerns have fed into tensions and conflicts at various sites along the planned LAPSSET corridor in Isiolo, of which three instances are discussed in detail below.

Tensions in Gotu location

Gotu location lies to the north of the proposed LAPSSET route and falls within the proposed special economic zone. It is also about 10 km north of the Isiolo-Madogashe road to be renovated by the World Bank. The north of Gotu location abuts the Ewaso-Nyiro river for a stretch of over 60 km and the small cluster of mabati (corrugated iron) houses known as Gotu town is located there. Gotu is a water source, hence a dry-season grazing zone for the Borana pastoralist community and the settlement sprang up less than two decades ago.⁶⁶ The area is attractive for several reasons including planned developments and potentials for ranching, agriculture and mineral exploitation.

Although Gotu location is mainly inhabited by Borana pastoralists, there are around 60 Garre Somali households living in and around Gotu town.⁶⁷ They carry out pastoralism, farming and trade and are well-placed to benefit from LAPPSET development. Amongst other trades, Garre sell camel milk which is claimed to have various health benefits; this is transported daily to Isiolo town and processed for sale. The Garre also occupy some positions on the board on the Gotu side of the Nakuprat-Gotu wildlife conservancy in the Ngaremara area and some Borana suspect them of using the conservancy concept to increase Garre claims on land in the area.⁶⁸ Garre traders have also gained from the newly refurbished Isiolo Moyale Road, dominating trade in Isiolo town and up to Moyale on the Ethiopia border, as one county administrator noted:

The Garre and the Somali are wealthy while the Turkana have no money and they live the furthest [from Isiolo town]. Traditionally, the Turkana have been forced to sell their lands to the powerful and monied Garre and Somali, but with the LAPSSET and more knowledge, Turkana have opened their eyes.⁶⁹

Although Borana people in Gotu and administrators noted that they have been living in peace with the Garre,⁷⁰ the settling of Garre communities has been strongly resisted by some Borana elites.⁷¹ The spread of camels is resented by some Borana, as camels are destructive feeders and Borana argue that this contributes to the degradation of rangelands:

People have a lot, so many camels, too much camels that are commercial. (…) You know, if it doesn't rain they go back to the same place again, graze and graze until it becomes overgrazed. Overgrazing means they degrade it.⁷²

In response to Garre economic activities, some Borana elites attempted to regain control over the area, by reactivating an old group ranch that they had supposedly registered back in 1996.⁷³ In early 2019, the large group, numbering 180, which included politicians, tried to claim and fence a 13,400 hectare piece of land in Gotu. They raised 44 million KShs (US $440,000) to buy this land which extended to the river and lay completely within the Nakuprat-Gotu community conservancy. Some fences had already been erected when they were ordered to stop by the County Commissioner.⁷⁴

Another response to the growing dominance of the Garre was a public notice that was given by the Borana Council of Elders over local radio in March 2019.⁷⁵ Although the Council is not made up of politicians, they wield significant political power. The Council notice said:

Many have forgotten they are our guests … We remind all that the owners of Isiolo county are, and have always historically been Borana … We have … allowed grazing rights to the Garre for a long period but they have not appreciated our kind gesture, rather, they have been both abusive and quarrelsome including dishonoring the community by refusing to attend the meetings called by the Borana Council of Elders. In view of this we demand that the Garre communities move out of our grazing lands with immediate effect.⁷⁶

The notice was followed by tension, leading to the national government county-level peace committee to intervene, bringing together elders and elected leaders from both sides, which succeeded in averting conflict.⁷⁷

It is important to highlight the political context of these issues that reach up to the regional level. The Garre-Oromo/ Borana competition operates in both Isiolo and Marsabit and the Council of Elders is closely linked with the overarching traditional authority for all Borana, based in Ethiopia. There has been long-standing ethnicized conflict in Moyale town on the Ethiopia side of the border, between Garre and Oromo, so these statements are likely to have political motivations⁷⁸ but LAPSSET is also a factor in inflaming tensions.

Isiolo-Meru boundary conflict

The Isiolo-Meru county boundary (previously the district boundary) is a source of bitter contention, both at the political level and the community level between Meru farmers and Isiolo-based (Borana and Turkana) pastoralists who clash over land. The conflict was severe in 2015 due to political incitement and tensions over which communities would benefit from the proposed LAPSSET project.⁷⁹ The conflict takes the form of livestock theft, killings, displacements and looting between the warring communities.⁸⁰ The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project captures seven distinct conflicts or incidents from 2015 to 2019 in which there were a total of 33 deaths. This reached a peak in July 2017 with three days of fighting in which 1,000 people were displaced and 13 killed in Igembe Central, Meru.⁸¹ In October of the same year, two people were killed in a massive cattle raid in Tigania East, Meru. Disputed areas along the border include Kiwanji, Gambela, Epiding and Kachuru among others and the newly constructed airport that is situated in both counties.⁸² They lie within the approximately 10 by 50 km rectangular area between the mapped Isiolo-Meru boundary and the Isiolo-Madogashe road which runs parallel to it (shaded pale green in Figure 1).

Meru representatives have consistently appealed to the colonial boundary demarcation which originated in 1924, but their Isiolo counterparts argue that this itself was erroneously marked and that Isiolo district representatives did not attend the deliberations of a Boundary Commission in 1962 because of a protest related to the Shifta War.⁸³ The 2013 Nanyuki Accord attended by elected leaders and community leaders of Isiolo and Meru counties sought to calm tensions⁸⁴ and foresaw that the dispute would be resolved through institutional mechanisms.⁸⁵ However, agreements were broken and conflict continued. A taskforce under the Ministry of Interior in 2015 surveyed and demarcated boundaries, but was denounced by Isiolo county government as being unrepresentative, tribal and carried out by the wrong office.⁸⁶ Then in June 2017, a High Court ruled in Isiolo’s favour, that an independent commission be set up to resolve the dispute, until which point the status quo should remain.⁸⁷ However, the ruling was not heeded in practice.

The dispute has been exacerbated by devolution,⁸⁸ which has raised the stakes for political control of land, resources and in particular, the planned large-scale developments and airport that lies in both counties.⁸⁹ Since 2018, contrary to the court ruling above, the Meru county government has been carrying out land adjudication and giving title deeds in disputed areas. Alliances between local Turkana in favour of titling and Meru have been forged in this way.⁹⁰ Although these disputed areas have historically been administered by Isiolo, Meru has now created a ‘special’ ward in Tigania East subcounty of Meru, extending its services to this area with developmental investments like boreholes. In another bold move in 2015, Meru began establishing Nyambene conservancy in the disputed area⁹¹ and in 2018, stationed armed rangers there as a means of boosting security for some time.⁹²

Borana elders interviewed voiced anger and fear:

Meru now claim up to Gotu, Ngaremara is their own. They think they will just take. Borana, we are in trouble … The Meru have woken up because of the road; all the jobs, benefits will go to Meru … They want to snatch our land; blood will be poured if they want to take our resources.⁹³

Some voiced their belief that the violence was being stage-managed by politicians and elites⁹⁴ and that there was a notable lack of action by the central state institutions to contain it, given the presence of six Rapid Defence (paramilitary) Units and Anti-Stock Theft Units of the Kenya Police in the area.⁹⁵ To add to these suspicions, all three chairmen of the LAPSSET Corridor Development Authority as well as past National Ministers of Land were Meru. This comes on a background of resentment by other ethnic groups against people from the Mount Kenya region (including the Meru) who are often viewed as expansionist and dominant in the national political landscape. Further, Meru people are struggling with population growth and lack of land.⁹⁶

Territorialized Borana-Somali pastoralist conflict

In addition to the farmers described above, pastoralist groups from neighbouring counties are also perceived by Isiolo residents to be making claims on Isiolo county to get benefits and compensation. Garbatula sub-county (which is made up of Kinna, Garbatula and Sericho wards), has experienced conflicts in recent years connected to both LAPPSET and the Isiolo-Madogashe road plans. Although seasonal migration by Somali pastoralists from Garissa county has been normal, upon negotiation with local Borana pastoralist leaders, there is an expectation that they return to their own lands when rains begin.⁹⁷ An administrator in Kinna noted that new settlements have been created on the Isiolo-Modagashe road and these groups have been naming boreholes with their own names, suggesting possible claiming of that land. ‘They are grazing in the area without the opinion leader’s permission. If you complain and speak, they point a gun at you.’⁹⁸ Elders in Kulamawe, Kinna ward confirmed this, ‘We have guns from Garissa, guns even they pass here on the road and no one asks. We see we are in danger.’⁹⁹

According to ACLED data, the Isiolo-Garissa border area and Garbatulla subcounty has been a site of conflict with many displacements and several deaths since 2016. Hotspots include Madogashe, Mata Bofu, Uchana, and El Dera, Duse and Korbesa in Kinna ward.¹⁰⁰ Some of these are as far as 80 km from the border. The conflict has intensified in 2021 and explosives were being used by Aulihan Somali to launch attacks on Borana settlements in Korbesa at the time of writing in July 2021.¹⁰¹ These conflicts are not only about pasture and water resources but also about territorial claims which have only recently emerged relating to the anticipation of benefits from the planned improvements to the Isiolo-Madogashe Road.¹⁰² According to government communications, the Borana say that they have been displaced from their villages by their neighbours from Garissa, who have taken over their houses, shops and businesses. Moreover, in one site of conflict known as Escot, Somalis are now attempting to claim compensation for property sacrificed to the road, though they had only recently forced the Borana out of it.¹⁰³

Discussion

Anticipatory positioning and the capacity to envision

This research has documented the anticipatory practices, hopes, fears and conflicts of local actors living along the planned LAPSSET Corridor. The Kenyan state expresses a vision of modernity, connectivity, tapping of economic potential, at the same time hoping to remedy the marginalization of the north.¹⁰⁴ The visions by some local entrepreneurs are in line with the official developmental vision, namely visions of business opportunities, effortless earnings from agricultural land that is secured by titles, together with irrigation and farming to supply goods to a growing population, tourism potentials and new markets through the airport.

Arguably, the existing visions span a field of possibilities, in which actors position themselves by anticipating the future. In the short term, some are anticipating compensation payments and jobs relating to LAPSSET construction and tenders. In the long term, visions of the future have important spatial dimensions concerning rural and urban landscapes, and land tenure is a key issue around which divergent visions are framed. Land in pastoralist areas is shifting in significance from being a communal resource to being a commodity to be bought, developed or sold and the subdivision of land opens the way for elites to emerge and grow in economic power while other people are dispossessed.

The abounding hope and grabbing of opportunities was matched by fears and suspicions, of physical, social and economic displacement and cultural estrangement of pastoralists by land grabbing, private land tenure, modernization, and open violent conflicts.¹⁰⁵ The suspicion is captured vividly by a commentator from Northern Kenya: ‘How is the metaphor of negation now the glitzy developmental jewel?[…] hidden in the folds of this grand development vision of LAPSSET is exploitation, oppression and dismissal of the North.’¹⁰⁶ In addition, there are century-old prophecies among the Borana, one by ‘prophet’ Arero Bosaro about a ‘black road [tarmac] that would come from the South, … and when that is complete, there will be problems in the area; there will be a war and the people will be decimated.’¹⁰⁷ Dismissal of these concerns could be felt in some of the interviews with LAPSSET officials:

LAPSSET is a game changer; it’s the biggest project under Vision 2030, and those people in Isiolo resisting the project are stupid […]. They claim they have been marginalized and neglected and when you bring development they complain […] very stupid people.¹⁰⁸

Two characteristics revealed in the work allow people to position themselves favourably in the long term, the first is having sufficient knowledge about the future and the market, and the second is economic stability to be able to think beyond immediate economic needs and to be able to do something with the land in question. These characteristics often run along ethnic lines. Although Meru and Garre are minorities in Isiolo, assumed to have less political clout, the Garre have been able to extend their influence in the economic sphere, and from there to attain political influence while the Meru have helpful political links at the national level. It is common knowledge that in many parts of Kenya indigenous residents have sold land cheaply, rendering the next generation as squatters and paupers while outside entrepreneurs mint money from the sold land. Similarly with titling of land in Isiolo, Elliot finds that some of those given new title deeds are selling it off and hence being ‘displaced by money.’¹⁰⁹ However, as a twist in the story, some subsequently buy more livestock and move to a new piece of community land, thus benefitting from both systems (and also causing conflict in the receiving area) – hence not all are mere victims, as stressed in Li’s work.¹¹⁰ In addition, in contrast to the example of the land acquisition by elites in Gotu showcased here, land acquisition and enclosures may also be done with the support of ordinary ethnic followers, as Elliot shows in her work on ‘town making’ in Isiolo.¹¹¹

As anticipatory positioning is happening in the present, it follows existing social fissures,¹¹² often along ethno-political dividing lines.¹¹³ However, social class is another dividing line which may be independent of ethnicity, a finding which is echoed in Cross’s study of an economic zone in India.¹¹⁴ Thus class and political influence are influential factors in determining both the capacity to envision – in the sense of participating in vision formulation and dissemination – and the capacity to position oneself in anticipation of future economic investments.

From anticipatory positioning to ethnicized conflict

The fear of violence in the county is strong because the history of conflict in Isiolo county similarly played out along intercommunal and ethno-political lines, together with a high presence of firearms among individuals and groups due to a weak state security presence.

In terms of ethnicity, conflicts centre around who is anticipated or feared to gain economically and politically from the new developments, and this also relates to land-tenure differences. LAPSSET and other projects exacerbate pre-existing ethno-political tensions over boundaries, land claims, business opportunities and voting blocks. The Meru-Isiolo county boundary conflict illustrates how actors position themselves in anticipation of LAPSSET – the actions are not guided by positive (yet diverging) visions but by the aim to secure one’s own position and reap the most material benefits for oneself and one’s own camp.¹¹⁵ The county government has emerged as a major player in the LAPSSET vision as it is the implementing agency of the national government and the new middle agency to negotiate for the local communities. Both county governments clash over which should benefit, and locals clash on an inter-ethnic level over territory.

Interestingly, Borana elites simultaneously oppose land privatization and enclosures as members of parliament who protest against land titling, and pursue ethnicized, exclusive claims via the Borana Council of elders’ statements. In public, leaders of the predominantly pastoralist Borana community tend to take a stance protective of pastoralist mobility across communally managed rangelands, e.g. with regard to the issue of individual titling vs. community land. By publicly affirming their indigeneity and authority over the Isiolo rangelands (practically the Merti rangelands) through the customary system of grazing management, they speak for the silent, uneducated majority and seek to affirm control over the ‘old’ pastoralist order. At the same time, hidden from public scrutiny, some try to acquire land exclusively for themselves as in the case of Gotu. As elites are able to foresee business opportunities and have enough financial clout, they are also tempted to act upon those. All these strategies arguably represent different ways of anticipatory positioning, i.e. attempts to benefit from future investments and to avoid being left behind by other groups seemingly more able to benefit.

Other research in the Isiolo area showed that similar dynamics are happening along the Isiolo-Mandera road, whereby Borana elders are encouraging people to migrate and form group ranches along the road to prevent the occupation by Somali groups previously mentioned. As with other group ranches in the country, there is a danger that this is beginning of the slippery slope to privatization.¹¹⁶

This implies that while the narrative of ethnicity is used to mobilize people for collective benefits and control over land, it may also be used to further the individual economic and political interests of those in the higher social classes to the exclusion of the larger ethnic group. As elites are more favourably positioned as regards knowledge about future economic developments, suspicions by some local people about who drives those ethnicized conflicts are also directed towards the elites: Traditional cattle-raiding is re-interpreted in the light of the planned LAPSSET corridor with local people asking themselves, ‘Do elites want to displace us through insecurity, to benefit from LAPSSET?’

Conclusion

This article has analysed how people in Isiolo county position themselves in an arising field of opportunities and constraints, a zone of “not yet,” a future that is opened up by Vision 2030 to transform northern Kenya through an infrastructure corridor. This anticipatory positioning is raising fears and heightening the claiming of land and ethnic boundary-making, leading to heightened tensions and exacerbating existing conflicts.

We argue that anticipatory action is informed by different capacities of envisioning. The Kenyan state expresses a vision of modernity, connectivity, tapping of economic potential, at the same time hoping to remedy the marginalization of the north. On the ground some actors share this vision and are enthusiastic for the benefits and opportunities that may be brought by private titling, compensation, markets and industries. However, especially those actors on the ground who did not participate in the vision-making process, mostly express fears for the demise of pastoralism.

Beyond suspicion against the central state, anticipatory action in Isiolo county is informed by existing ethno-political divides and boundaries. Ethno-political divides on a national and regional level become effective at the local and county level, as seen in territorial disputes around Gotu location and the Meru vs Isiolo county and Isiolo vs Garissa boundary conflicts. But at the same time, the actions people take in anticipation of future investments impact on ethnic boundary-making, as division lines are re-enacted (Borana – Somali), contested and redrawn (county boundaries). Conflicts occur on a backdrop of inter-communal and ethnopolitical conflict and are armed and sometimes deadly. Actors are pitted against each other along lines of ethnicity, county and class, implying differentiated political and economic clout and access to information. Lastly, this work shows that while the dynamics of ethnic politics and territorialization are very active surrounding the LAPSSET corridor area, social class, in which the ethnic card may be played, also has an important role in who gains and loses from LAPSSET.

Acknowledgments

This work was first presented in 2019 at the European Conference on African Studies in Edinburgh, UK. Thanks to our research assistants, participants and helpful officials and to the several reviewers for their very useful comments. Thanks also to our driver Laban who got us safely through difficult conditions with a smile, and to Tessa Mkutu for her editing expertise.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft under the Collaborative Research Centre project ‘Future Rural Africa: Future-making and social-ecological transformation,’ grant number 228. The paper also draws from previous research findings funded by the World Bank.

Notes

1 Interview, a peace ambassador, Isiolo Town, 6 September 2018.

2 LAPSSET Corridor Development Authority, “Brief on LAPSSET” and Browne, LAPSSET.

3 Zelezer, “Economic Policy and Performance.”

4 Government of Kenya, “Vision 2030.”

5 LAPSSET Corridor Development Authority, “Investment prospectus,” 5.

6 Scott, “Seeing Like a State.”

7 Bovensiepen and Meitzner Yoder, “Introduction: The Political Dynamics”; Filer and Le Meur “Large-Scale Mines”; and Unruh et al., “Linkages.”

8 Behrends, “Fighting for Oil”; Greiner, “Land-Use Change”; and Kinyera and Doevenspeck, “Imagined Futures.”

9 Chome, “Land, Livelihoods and Belonging”; Chome et al., “Demonstration Fields”; and Greiner “Land-Use Change.”

10 Barry, “Material Politics,” 7; Behrends, “Fighting for Oil”; and Kinyera and Doevenspeck, “Imagined Futures.”

11 Mkutu and Mboru, Rapid Assessment.

12 Cormack, “Pastoralist Heritage.”

13 Elliot, “Planning, Property and Plots”; and Elliot, “Anticipating Plots.”

14 Pavitt, Kenya: The First Explorers.

15 Jenkins, “Ethnicity.”

16 Lynch, “Negotiating Ethnicity.”

17 Mkutu et al., Securing the Counties.

18 Carrier and Kochore, “Navigating Ethnicity”; Schlee and Shongolo, Pastoralism and Politics; and Greiner “Land-Use Change.”

19 Jenkins “Ethnicity.”

20 Lonsdale “Soil,” 308.

21 Ibid., 311.

22 Boye and Kaarhus, “Competing Claims”; Schlee and Shongolo, Pastoralism and Politics; and Arero, “Coming to Kenya,” 295–8.

23 Greiner, “Land-Use Change,” 539–40.

24 Whittaker, “The Socioeconomic Dynamics”; and Whittaker, “Legacies of Empire.”

25 Isiolo County Government, “County Integrated Development Plan.”

26 Some Somali clans were earlier considered Boran or self-identified as Boran. Schlee, “Brothers of Boran,”; cf. Schlee “Changing Alliances.”

27 Boye and Kaarhus, “Competing Claims”; and Arero, “Coming to Kenya,” 293.

28 Boye and Kaarhus, “Competing Claims.”

29 Mkutu and Mboru, Rapid Assessment.

30 Mkutu, “Pastoralists, Politics.”

31 Ruto et al., “Conflict Dynamics in Isiolo.”

32 Ibid.; Cox, “Ethnic Violence”; and Sharamo, “The Politics.”

33 Tsing, “Natural Resources and Capitalist Frontiers,” 5100.

34 Cross, “Dream Zones,” 9.

35 Enns and Bersaglio, “On the Coloniality.”

36 Schetter, “Ungoverned Territories.”

37 Harrison and Mdee, “Entrepreneurs”; Mosley and Watson “Frontier Transformations.”

38 Anderson, “Preemption”; Groves, “Emptying the Future”; and Granjou et al., “Politics of Anticipation.”

39 Cross, “Dream Zones,” 9.

40 Haines, “Imagining the Highway,” 406.

41 Hughes and Rogei, “Feeling the Heat.”

42 Greiner, “Land-Use Change,” 541.

43 Government of Kenya, Sessional Paper No. 8.

44 On the different local perspectives on the Isiolo-Moyale road see Kochore, “The Road to Kenya.”

45 See Natural Justice, “LAPSSET Land Acquisition Map.” https://naturaljustice.org/natural-justice-lapsset-land-acquisition-map/

46 Mkutu, “LAPSSET Corridor Developments.”

47 Gitonga Marete, “Building Plans for Sh85bn Isiolo-Mandera Road on the Home Stretch.” Business Daily, February 5, 2020. https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/corporate/shipping/Building-plans-for-Sh85bn-Isiolo-Mandera-road-/4003122-5443978-85r75wz/index.html 

48 Owino, “The Implications.”

49 Kanyinga, “Devolution.”

50 Owino, “The Implications.”

51 Group interview with journalists, Isiolo Town, 11 May 2017.

52 Lind et al., “The Politics of Land,” 3.

53 Elliot, “Town Making.”

54 Ibid.; and Elliot, Anticipating Plots.

55 Elliot, Anticipating Plots; and Elliot “Town Making,” 51.

56 Peace Committee Member, Isiolo, 10 May 2017.

57 Interview, LAPSSET Corridor Development Authority official 19 February 2019.

58 See http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/LegalNotices/2019/LN150_2019.pdf

59 Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 1, 10 January 2020 “The Land Adjudication Act” (Application)(Amendment) Order

60 Waweru Wairimu, “Turkana Community in Isiolo Wants Land Adjudication Halted.” Daily Nation, January 7, 2020. https://www.nation.co.ke/counties/isiolo/Locals-oppose-Isiolo-land-adjudication/1183266-5409246-d0y894/index.html; Environment and Land Court at Meru. Petition No 5 of 2019; and High Court of Kenya at Meru. Petition No. 7 of 2018.

61 Interview, land adjudication office, 17 June 2019.

62 Interview, Borana Peace Activist, Isiolo, 22 March 2019.

63 Focus group discussion with Interfaith leaders Isiolo town, 8 May 2018.

64 Interview, Borana Peace Activist, Isiolo 22 March 2019.

65 Interview, local administrator in Gotu, 8 September 2018.

66 Interview, Borana Council of Elders, 18 June 2019; Interview, Local administrators, 9 May 2020.

67 Phone interview, a senior county administrator, 16 May 2020.

68 Interview, Borana Council of Elders, 18 June 2019.

69 Interview, county administrator, Isiolo town, 17 October 2018; Interview, Borana Peace Activist, Isiolo 22 March 2019.

70 Interview, an administrator in Gotu, Gotu, 8 September 2018: This was supported by an interview with a senior administrator in Isiolo, 5 May 2020.

71 Phone interview, officer for Parliamentary Service Commission, Isiolo North Constituency office, Isiolo, 23 April 2020.

72 Interview, Borana Council of Elders, 18 June 2019.

73 Phone Interview, Group ranch leader, June 2019.

74 Interview, board member of Nakuprat-Gotu conservancy 8 September 2018.

75 Interview, Borana Council of Elders, 18 June 2019; The Borana Council of Elders was created in 2006 to have a national political organ that brings together all different Borana clans and their traditional institutions that manage all aspects of Borana society.

76 Borana Council of Elders, “Resolution of the Borana Council of Elders.” Slides shared on 12 March 2019 in Isiolo Town. This was broadcast on local radio. https://www.slideshare.net/oskare10/borana-council-of-elders (Accessed 11 May 2020).

77 Phone interview, a senior county administrator, 16 May 2020.

78 Phone interview, a senior county administrator, 16 May 2020; see also Vivian Jebet, “Somali Elders Back Senator Kuti’s Bid for Isiolo Governor.” Daily Nation, April 7, 2017. https://www.nation.co.ke/counties/isiolo/Somali-elders-back-Kuti-Isiolo/1183266-3880822-phrfqnz/index.html

79 F. Ngige and A. Abdi, “Is LAPSSET Cause of the Bloody Conflict Along Meru/Isiolo Border?” The Standard, November 1, 2015. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000181277/is-lapsset-cause-of-the-bloody-conflict-along-meru-isiolo-border; and Owino “The Implications.”

80 Mugo, “Gov’t Challenged.”

81 Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED.”

82 Interview, an official in the office of, Coordination Civic Education, County Cohesion Department, Isiolo, 17 October 2018.

83 High Court of Kenya, Constitutional Petition No. 551

84 Ibid.

85 Resolutions of the Meru/Isiolo leaders meeting held at Sportsman Arms Hotel, Nanyuki, 20 December 2013.

86 High Court of Kenya, Constitutional Petition No. 551.

87 Ali Abdi, “Land Row Rocks Isiolo and Meru as Residents Blame Rift on Lapsset, Army.” The Standard, August 18, 2018. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001292364/land-row-rocks-isiolo-and-meru-as-residents-blame-rift-on-lapsset-army (Accessed 14 November 2018)

88 Kanyinga, “Devolution.”

89 Ibid.

90 Phone interview, Community leader in Ngaremara, 16 May 2020.

91 Kimanthi and Mwiti, “Leaders Clash.”

92 Interview, an administrator for civic education, County Cohesion Department, Isiolo, 17 October 2018.

93 Focus Group Discussion with Borana elders in Kula Mawe, 18 October 2018.

94 Interview, Somali businessman in Isiolo Town, 2019; a county administrator in Ngaremara suggested something similar.

95 Senior County Administrator, Isiolo Town, 17 October 2018.

96 Meru County Government, “County Integrated Development Plan.” See also Hillary Megaka, “Stop claiming our electoral boundaries, Isiolo MPs tell Meru Governor.” People Daily, November 13, 2019. https://www.pd.co.ke/news/politics-analysis/stop-claiming-our-electoral-boundaries-isiolo-mps-tell-meru-governor-13199/

97 Phone interview, peace activist, 10 July 2020.

98 Interview, sub-county administrator in Kinna, 18 October 2018

99 Focus Group Discussion with elders in Kula Mawe, 15 October 2018.

100 Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED.”

101 Interviews and observations of burned ground, 9 July 2021.

102 Interview, officer in Parliamentary Service Commission, Isiolo North Constituency office, Isiolo, 20 October 2018.

103 See Letter dated 12 June 2021 from Peace Chairman for Garbatulla to Deputy County Commissioner for Garbatulla “Protest on land owenership at Kambi Samaki (Uchana)” and Letter LND.16/1/VOL.1/102 dated 21 June 2021, from Deputy County Commissioner for Garbatulla to the County Commissioner for Isiolo county. “Protest over NLC compensation on Isiolo-Modogashe rd”.

104 Hesse and MacGregor, “Pastoralism: Drylands Invisible Asset?”

105 Cf. Enns and Bersaglio, “The Coloniality.”

106 Dalle Abraham, “The New Frontier for Development and the Politics of Negation in Northern Kenya.” The Elephant, November 15, 2019. https://www.theelephant.info/features/2019/11/15/the-new-frontier-for-development-and-the-politics-of-negation-in-northern-kenya/

107 Kochore, “Road to Kenya,” 505.

108 Interview, LAPSSET Corridor Development Authority official 19 February 2019.

109 Elliot, “Planning, Property and Plots”; Cf. Li, “Indigeneity, Capitalism, Dispossession.”

110 Li, “Centering Labour”; and “Ethnic Cleansing.”

111 Elliot, “Town Making.”

112 Cf. Szpunar et al., “Neural Envisioning”: Results from neuroscience suggest that humans appear to place their future scenarios in well-known visual–spatial contexts.

113 Cf. Chome, “Land, Livelihoods and Belonging.”

114 Cf. Cross, “Dream Zones.”

115 Cf. Odhiambo’s distinction between two different attitudes to politics among the new Kenyan political elite following independence, with former President Kenyatta representing the mentality to enjoy the fruits of independence by accumulation of personal wealth vs. the faction led by Tom Mboya, who were interested in developing a political vision by reflecting on the purpose of independence and strategies for achieving this. Odhiambo, “The Ideology of Order,” 195.

116 Mkutu, “Anticipation, Participation, and Contestation.”