The urban vote in Zambia’s 2021 elections: popular attitudes towards the economy in Copperbelt and Lusaka

ABSTRACT

This article analyses Afrobarometer survey data to understand popular attitudes toward the economy of Zambia amongst residents in the ruling party strongholds. The Patriotic Front (PF) won the most votes in urban provinces from 2006 to 2016 but crucially lost to the opposition in 2021 while retaining majorities in its rural base. Historically, opposition parties have won the most votes in urban regions on every occasion that Zambia has experienced an electoral turnover, demonstrating the significance of the urban vote. The evidence presented in this article reveals that respondents in the two urban provinces, Copperbelt and Lusaka, were better educated, had more access to essential services, and had higher levels of access to Information relative to their compatriots in the PF’s rural strongholds. While both urban and rural residents were dissatisfied with the government’s handling of the economy, the PF’s urban base was more likely to punish the ruling party at the polls. Drawing on survey evidence and literature on voting in urban Africa, this article shows that the divergent geographic, social, and economic characteristics of urban and rural areas produce distinct grievances which have implications for policy expectations, political mobilization, and how voters evaluate candidates.

KEYWORDS:

• Urban vs rural
• ruling party strongholds
• economic interests
• United Party for National Development
• Patriotic Front
• voting behavior

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 See: Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 58.

2 Seekings, “Incumbent disadvantage.”

3 Seekings, “Voters, Parties and Elections in Zambia,” 139-140.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 See: Fraser, “Post Populism in Zambia.”

7 Larmer and Fraser, “Of Cabbages and King Cobra”; Sishuwa, “I am Zambia’s Redeemer”; Resnick, Urban Poverty and Party Populism in African Democracies.

8 See: Wahman and Goldring, “Pre-election Violence and Territorial Control.”

9 See: Resnick, Urban Poverty and Party Populism in African Democracies.

10 Wahman and Goldring, “Pre-election Violence and Territorial Control.”

11 Cheeseman, “(Mis)understanding Urban Africa,” 986.

12 Ibid.

13 See: Cheeseman and Larmer, “Ethno-populism in Africa”; Gadjanova, “Ethnic Wedge Issues in Electoral Campaigns in Africa’s Presidential Regimes”; Posner, “The Political Salience of Cultural Difference”; and Resnick, Urban Poverty and Party Populism in African Democracies.

14 Nathan, Electoral Politics and Africa’s Urban Transition, 6.

15 Bratton et al., “Voting Intentions in Africa.”

16 Ibid.

17 Bates and Block, “Revisiting African Agriculture.”

18 Cheeseman, “(Mis)understanding Urban Africa”; Boone et al., “Regional Cleavages in African Politics.”

19 See: Kim, “Party Strategy in Multidimensional Competition in Africa”; and Kim and Kim, “The Winning Party Platform.”

20 Harding, “Who is Democracy Good For?”

21 Bawumia, “Understanding the Rural-Urban Voting Patterns in the 1992 Ghanian Presidential Election.”

22 Resnick, Urban Poverty and Party Populism in African Democracies.

23 Lindberg, “It’s Our Time to Chop.”

24 Paller, Democracy in Ghana; See also: Cheeseman, “(Mis)understanding Urban Africa.”

25 Paller, Democracy in Ghana.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid. See also: Resnick, Urban Poverty and Party Populism in African Democracies.

28 Paller, Democracy in Ghana.

29 Cheeseman et al., The Moral Economy of Elections in Africa.

30 Bates and Block, “Revisiting African Agriculture”; Harding, “Who is Democracy Good For?”

31 Nathan, Electoral Politics and Africa’s Urban Transition.

32 Sishuwa, “Roots of Contemporary Political Strategies.”

33 Rakner, Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991-2001.

34 See: LeBas, From Protest to Parties.

35 Cheeseman et al., “Is There a Populist Threat in Zambia?”

36 Larmer and Fraser, “Of Cabbages and King Cobra”; and Resnick, Urban Poverty and Party Populism in African Democracies.

37 Resnick, Urban Poverty and Party Populism in African Democracies.

38 Muchinga Province was created in 2011 by the PF government. It included eight districts that were previously part of the Northern Province and four districts that were previously part of the Eastern Province.

39 Cheeseman and Larmer, “Ethno-populism in Africa”. See also Sishuwa, “I am Zambia’s Redeemer.”

40 Siachiwena, “The 2011–2016 Zambian Elections.”

41 Ibid.

42 Africa Confidential, “Edgar Lungu’s Surprise Alliance with ex-President Banda – Which May Involve Major Policy Compromises – Should Carry the Day at the Polls,” 23 January 2015. https://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/5948/PF_set_for_victory (accessed 10 April 2017)

43 Lusaka Times, 29 June 2015. https://www.lusakatimes.com/2015/06/29/rb-has-no-case-to-answer-in-the-nigerian-oil-deal-court-rules/ (accessed 3 July 2023)

44 Beardsworth, “From a ‘Regional Party’ to the Gates of State House.”

45 Electoral Commission of Zambia, “Registered Voters by Gender and District.” https://www.elections.org.zm/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/REGISTERED-VOTERS-BY-GENDER-AND-PROVINCE.pdf (accessed 23 January 2022)

46 For a discussion of trends in MMD’s electoral support, see: Siachiwena, “The 2011–2016 Zambian Elections.”

47 Rakner, Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991-2001, 114-115.

48 Helle and Rakner, “The Interplay Between Poverty and Electoral Authoritarianism”

49 Ibid.

50 Rakner, Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991-2001.

51 Electoral Commission of Zambia, “2006 Election Results”

52 Cheeseman and Larmer, “Ethno-populism in Africa”.

53 Electoral Commission of Zambia, “2008 Election Results”.

54 Siachiwena, “Populism in Power.”

55 Ibid, 26-31.

56 Siachiwena, “The 2011–2016 Zambian Elections.”

57 Ibid, 111.

58 Government of the Republic of Zambia, “Zambia Economic Recovery Programme.”

59 Ibid

60 See Hinfelaar et al., “Legal autocratisation.”

61 The UPND petitioned the 2016 presidential results in the Constitutional Court. The Court dismissed the case for technical reasons without addressing the merits of the case. See: Kaaba, “The Adjudication of Electoral Disputes in Zambia.”

62 Tatenda Mazarura and Arnold Tsunga, “Zambian elections: the good, the bad and the ugly,” Daily Maverick, 30 August 2021. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-08-30-zambian-elections-the-good-bad-and-the-ugly/ (accessed 30 October 2021).

63 African Development Bank, “African Economic Outlook 2021.”

64 See: Resnick, Urban Poverty and Party Populism in African Democracies.

65 Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan survey research network that provides reliable data on African experiences and evaluations of democracy, governance, and quality of life. Eight survey rounds in up to 39 countries have been completed since 1999. The Afrobarometer team in Zambia, based at the Institute for Economic and Social Research, University of Zambia, interviewed 1,200 adult Zambians in December 2020. A sample of this size yields country-level results with a margin of error of +/-2 percentage points at a 95% confidence level. Previous surveys were conducted in Zambia in 1999, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2012, 2014, 2017, and 2020.

66 Lynch and Gadjanova, “Overcoming incumbency advantage.”

67 This includes those who indicated that they trust Lungu or the PF ‘somewhat’ or ‘a lot’.

68 Nicole Beardsworth and Samue Kalonde Mutuna, “‘Tribal balancing’: exclusionary elite coalitions and Zambia's 2021 elections,” (this special issue).

69 Paller, Democracy in Ghana.

70 Nathan, Electoral Politics and Africa’s Urban Transition.

71 Ibid, 19-20.

72 Ibid

73 Cheeseman et al., The Moral Economy of Elections in Africa.

74 Bratton, et al., “Voting Intentions in Africa.”