https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7888-6348
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ABSTRACT
Recent research on African legislatures, once considered rarely autonomous, has found that some broad-scale mass movements, including pro-poor campaigns, hold legislators accountable. This article meanwhile examines the conditions under which narrow local constituency issues, shaping partisan differences, can hold relevant representatives and parties accountable while prioritizing over executive pressures and clientelist personal gains. I argue that this sort of political accountability in legislatures can be observed concerning sectoral policy interests, which, in Africa, are often geographically concentrated along ethnicity and party support lines. Drawing on a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches including interviews, news coverage reviews, and a statistical analysis of legislative debates on the 2019 Sugar Bill in Kenya, I show that the growing and collective efforts of sugar farmers to influence their local representatives and parties to support the legislation, tying them to the same electoral fate, prompt legislators to speak in favor of their local interests. This implies that sector-based policy concerns, when addressed by organized policy backers, are used as an effective mechanism for maintaining party unity and accountability in the legislature.
Acknowledgement
I thank Kithaka wa Mberia for his help during my fieldwork and Martha Seje for her research assistance, both of University of Nairobi, as well as the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. I am also grateful for the feedback from the participants of the 2022 bi-annual conference of Korean Association of African Studies and the Academy Lunch of Africa Cluster at the University of Bayreuth in 2022 where earlier versions of this article were presented.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Funding
This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-20212130001) and Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.
Notes
1 Thomas and Sissokho, “Liaison Legislature”; Lindberg, “What Accountability”.
2 Murana, “Effects of Legislature”; Demarest, “Men of People”; Opalo, Legislative Development.
3 Okafor, “Remarkable Returns”; Collord, “Pressuring MPs”.
4 Kenya National Assembly, “Crisis Facing”.
5 Cooksey et al., “Comprehensive Africa”.
6 The Sugar Bill, 2019 (NA Bill No. 68 of 2019)
7 Okafor, “Remarkable Returns”; Collord, “Pressuring MPs”.
8 Rogowski, “Commerce and Coalitions”; Frieden, “Invested Interests”.
9 Kim, “Economic Signals”; Kim, “Party Strategy”.
10 Berman, “Civil Society”; Dalton et al., “Public Opinion”.
11 Ake, “Unique Case”, 239–40.
12 Esty and Caves, “Market Structure”.
13 Milner, “Political Economy”.
14 Ferejohn, “Incumbent Performance”; Mayhew, “Congressional Elections”.
15 Jacobson, “Deficit-Cutting Politics”; Canes-Wrone, Brandy, and Cogan, “Out of Step”.
16 Buck and Cain, “British MPs”; Samuels, “Money Matter”; Crisp and Desposato, “Constituency Building”.
17 Grimmer, “Appropriators Not”.
18 Poole and Rosenthal, Congress.
19 Proksch and Slapin, “Position Taking”.
20 Krehbiel, “Where Party”; Hix, “Political Parties”; Figueiredo and Limongi, “Presidential Power”.
21 Carey, “Competing Principals”; André et al., “Legislators’ Roots”.
22 Kam, Party Discipline; Hagopian et al., “From Patronage”.
23 Hall and Wayman, “Buying Time”; Austen-Smith and Wright, “Theory and Evidence”.
24 Bouwen, “Exchanging Access”; Eising, “Institutional Context”.
25 Opalo, “Leveraging Legislative”.
26 Lindberg, “What Accountability”; Van Vliet, “Weak Legislatures”.
Some survey-based research, however, reveals discrepancies between citizens’ and MPs’ perceptions of the role of MPs: citizens tend to emphasize the representative function of MPs in lawmaking, whereas MPs tend to undervalue it. Mattes and Mozaffar, “Legislatures in Africa”; Nijzink et al., “Parliaments and Enhancement”.
27 Okafor, “Remarkable Returns”.
28 Collord, “Pressuring MPs”.
29 Rogowski, “Commerce and Coalitions”; Frieden, “Invested Interests”; Whitfield and Buur, “Politics of Industrial”; Noble, “Collective Action”.
30 Kjær, “Political Settlements”, 234.
31 Kasara, “Tax me”.
32 Boone, Crespin-Boucaud, and Kim, “Sectoral Interests”.
33 Varshney, “Urban Bias”; Harding, “Democracy Good”; Bates and Block, “Revisiting African”.
34 Rogowski, “Commerce and Coalitions”; Midford, “International Trade”; Hiscox, “Commerce, Coalitions”.
35 Kim, “Economic Signals”; Kim, “Party Strategy”.
36 KACC, “Review of Policy”.
37 Barkan, “Progress and Retreat”.
38 Omolo, “What Ails”.
39 The major problems include tension between millers and farmers surrounding weighing cane at farm gate and sucrose-content-based payment, the enforcement of sugarcane zoning, and the need for greater farmer representation.
40 KNA 2015.
41 Kariuki, “Political Economy”.
42 FAOSTAT data.
43 Kariuki, “Political Economy”.
44 GAIN, “Kenya’s Sugar”.
45 Monroy et al., “Analysis of Incentives”.
46 Koome Kimonye, “Arrest sugar cartels,” Citizen Digital, 17 August 2015; KTN News “How cartels are killing Kenyan sugar industry,” Morning Express Newsroom, 20 June 2018; Kombo and Ndiema, “Review of the State”.
47 KNASFO, “Report of Sugar”.
48 Reuters, “Kenya offers $5 mln bailout to rescue troubled Mumias sugar firm,” 30 January 2015; Kenya News Agency, “Cabinet approves sh117 billion bailout for state-owned sugar factories,” 10 October 2023.
49 KNASFO, “Report of Sugar”.
50 The farmer organizations that joined the alliance were Kenya National Federation of Sugarcane Farmers (KNFSF), Kenya Sugarcane Growers Association (KESGA), Kenyan Alliance of Sugarcane and Allied Products (KASAP), and the Sugar Campaign for Change (SUCAM). KNASFO, “Report of Sugar”.
51 Interview with the Secretary General of Kenya National Federation of Sugarcane Farmers (16 July 2021).
52 KNASFO, “Report of Sugar”.
53 Wanyande, “Management Politics”, 129 and 135.
54 There were two sets of relevant regulations: The Crops (Sugar) (General) Regulations 2020 and the Crops (Sugar) (Imports, Exports, and By-products) Regulations 2020. The use of the Crops Regulations in the following denotes both sets.
55 Dalton Nyabundi, “Draft sugar regulations left out our input, farmers claim,” The Standard, 25 July 2021; An interview with the Vice Chairman of KNFSF, Sony Branch (8 July 2021).
56 “Statutory Instruments Register (2021)”, Committee on Delegated Legislation, 12th Parliament (5th session).
57 Faith Matete, “Cane farmers back CS Munya’s sugar reforms,” The Star, 29 October 2020; An interview with a cane farmer from Migori County (8 July 2021); An interview with a Migori Senator (5 August 2021); Africa Confidential, “Opposition Fall”; Emojong Osere, “MP blames power brokers for sugar industry collapse,” The Star, 17 June 2020.
58 In an interview with the Secretary General of KNFSF, he said they had 61 meetings with the government Task Force committee regarding the sugar policy.
59 An interview with the Vice Chairman of KNFSF, Sony Branch (8 July 2021).
60 Interview with The CEO of Mumias Out-Growers Company98 (8 July 2021).
61 An interview with the Vice Chairman of KNFSF, Sony Branch (8 July 2021).
62 The 2019 Sugar Bill Clauses 5, 18, 19, and 31.
63 NA Hansard July 1, 2021; Business Daily, “Sugar Bill”.
64 NA Hansard Oct. 6, 13, 21, 2021.
65 Interview with the Secretary General of KNFSF (16 July 2021).
66 One seat had been left vacant during the observation period.
67 During the Second Reading, MPs have the first opportunity to debate the general principles of the bill. If agreed, the bill is moved to the committee stage where each clause and any amendments to the bill are discussed.
68 There was no one who spoke against the bill in both meetings.
69 Constituencies in 14 counties, namely Bungoma, Busia, Homabay, Kakamega, Keicho, Kisumu, Kwale, Migori, Nandi, Narok, and Siaya, are measured as sugarcane-producing areas.
70 I used county level data for the Odinga-support variable as no constituency-level data is available.
71 The Kenyatta-Odinga coalition, established before the 2022 elections through the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI), is not directly tested for its effect on the Sugar Bill, as the individual party variables sufficiently demonstrate the impact of their affiliations on the debate, given that the BBI entailed a coalition among the existing parties.
72 Cox, Chapter 13, “Swing Voters”.
73 I give 0.5 for the MPs elected from the by-elections.
74 The Uhuru-Raila handshake might have an effect on the bill passage, but that effect is not found in the speeches.
75 Interview with a nominated ODM MP (6 August 2021).
76 Interview with the Kabuchai MP of FORD-K (6 August 2021).
77 Interview with the North Mugirango MP of JP (6 August 2021); Tony Wafula, “MP Wamunyinuyi clashes with Lusaka over Sugar Bill stalemate,” The Star, 23 May 2022.
78 Bowler, “Private members’ bills”.
79 Interview with Senator of Migori (5 August 2021).
80 Interview with a lobbyist of the Kenya Tea Sector Lobby Group (29 July 2021).
81 Kim, “Economic Signals”; Kim, “Party Strategy”.
82 Robert Amalemba, “CS Wamalwa urges senators to pass Sugar Bill, says reforms crucial,” The Standard, 23 May 2022.
83 Lynch and Crawford, “Democratization in Africa”.