Abstract
An axiomatic assumption in contemporary democratic theory is that accountability mechanisms generate trust and legitimacy in and for democratic systems: in relation to decision-makers (elected officials), facilitators (the public bureaucracy) and outcomes of public policy (scope and quality). However, how wise is it to take this assumption for granted? What if accountability mechanisms applied in democracies with high levels of trust promote distrust rather than trust? This article will elaborate on and analyse the inherent theoretical logic of performance scrutiny as a basis for performance accountability in political-administrative systems inspired by new public management reforms. Performance scrutiny practices derived from Sweden, a high-trust society, are used as empirical illustrations and as a basis to generate hypotheses on how and why practices to analysis performance accountability have the potential to counteract trust.
Notes
1. for ex. schools (2–3% 1998, 15% 2005, 20% 2009 (www.skolverket.se ) home-care (3% 1993, 13% 2007, 23% 2012) SOU 2000: 38, www.socialstyrelsen.se, Meagher and Szebehely (Citation2013).