Continuity and transformation: the institutions of the Beijing government, 1912–1928

Abstract

The period of the Beijing government of Republican China (1912–1928) occurred after the 1911 Revolution that toppled the imperial system and before the rule of the Nanjing Nationalist government. For modern China, it was an era of frequent trial and error in implementing political systems, as well as a significant phase of institutional transition following the New Policy reforms of the late Qing. Many twists and turns during this period of historical evolution stemmed from problems of the late Qing political reform. The three major issues occurring during the 1912–1928 era, namely the legitimacy of the government, the relationship between its legislative and executive branches, and the relationship between the central government and the provinces, were all dominated by the profound influence of traditional Chinese political and cultural frameworks. All of this made the 1912–1928 era more complicated than the late Qing period, increased the difference between one stage of institutional change and another, and accelerated the change in political systems while also broadening the choices available. Therefore, we should not only focus on the complex contention among all parties, but also acquire a deeper understanding of the limits imposed upon institutional renovation by tradition and circumstances through examination of the institutional adaptations behind the chaotic partisan politics.

Keywords:

• Beijing government of Republican China
• institutional transformation
• central–local relations
• imperial system
• constitutionalism

Acknowledgements

I want to thank Professors Wang Chaoguang, Yang Tianhong, Tang Chi-hua, Zhu Ying, and Chen Tingxiang for their comments and suggestions.

Notes

¹ Professor Tang Chi-hua’s recent research on the history of the Beijing government’s diplomacy also illustrates that “the continuity among the late Qing, the early Republic, and the Nanjing government was more noticeable than the break.” See Tang Chi-hua, “Beiyang waijiao,” 134.

² With the exception of published general histories of Republican China, thematic studies usually focus on the history of the 1911 Revolution and the Nanjing government, and there is little research on the Beijing government. This situation has not improved much even after the decade of reform and opening up in the 1980s. See Wang Chaoguang, “Wushi nian lai” and Zhao Lidong, “Jinnian lai”.

³ At least in terms of external form, the Republic of China was the first republic in Asia.

⁴ Some emperors, such as Tang Taizong (Li Shimin), Ming Chengzu (Zhu Di), and Qing Shizong (Yinzhen, also known as the Yongzheng emperor), were all very capable, but were still criticized and questioned, both at the time and by later generations, because they ascended to the throne without following proper and legitimate procedures.

⁵ Late Qing reformers Wu Tingfang and Zhang Jian wrote to the royal regent Zaifeng:

This is the general trend. No system other than a republic can rescue the people from more suffering and keep peace between the Han and the Manchus. This is the national consensus, and well-informed foreigners do not disagree. Constitutional monarchy will not be compatible with China in the future.

Wu Tingfang et al., “Zou qing jianguo,” 367.

⁶ The question of the legitimacy of the abdication of the Qing emperor as well as that of early Republican rule has attracted the attention of researchers in recent years. See Yang Nianqun, “Qing di xunwei” and Yang Tianhong, “Qing di xunwei.”

⁷ “Zhonghua minguo junzhengfu,” 6.

⁸ “Xuantong sannian shiyi yue,” 162–163.

⁹ In Chinese culture, “xunwei” (yielding the throne) usually meant that a power holder took the initiative to yield his position to a talented successor out of modesty and an intent to recommend a more capable leader; in contrast, “ciwei” (quitting the throne) was just an objective description of the act, which could have been consensual or precipitated by pressure, neither of which implies a true respect for the new leader or leaders’ ability. Sang Bing noticed that, as the general representative of the South:

Wu Tingfang first proposed the term xunwei in the second meeting of the peace conference, arguing that he, along with the Provincial Governors Tang Shouqian, Cheng Dequan, and Zhang Jian, had sent a co-authored telegram to the regent Zaifeng, requesting the emperor to xunwei. Yet during the conference, the term xunwei was also used interchangeably with another term, rangwei (resigning). In the formal telegrams that Wu Tingfang sent to Yuan Shikai, the Provisional Government of Nanjing, and all the independent provinces, he also used the term tuiwei (abdicating). When Wu replied to Yuan Shikai on February 6, 1912, Wu’s title and text used both xunwei and tuiwei, e.g., the title was ‘Concerning the Favorable Conditions after the Emperor’s xunwei,’ but the text begins ‘After the tuiwei of the Qing emperor,’ and then follows with ‘after the Qing emperor xunwei’. On the same day, when Wu Tingfang cabled Sun Yat-sen, the ministers in the cabinet, and the speaker of the senate, he used the word xunwei. Wu continued to use both tuiwei and quwei (leaving a position) in his February 9 telegram to Sun Yat-sen, Li Yuanhong, and the provincial governors. Thereafter, in Wu’s letters and telegrams to Yuan Shikai and the Northern generals, he usually used the term ‘xunwei,’ but when addressing the Southern revolutionary government and the rebel provinces, he mainly used the term ‘ciwei,’ which can be found in his telegram to Sun Yat-sen dated February 13. In his telegram to Sun Yat-sen, Li Yuanhong, and the provincial governors dated February 17, Wu Tingfang focused on the issue of abdication and consistently used the term ciwei. Xunwei or tuiwei, however, can be also found sporadically in Wu’s other telegrams to Sun Yat-sen.

See Sang Bing, “Minguo kaiguo de qijian,” 84–85.

¹⁰ Ye Shengtao’ s diary entries in February 1912, in Ye Zhishan, Ye Shengtao ji, vol. 19, 94.

¹¹ Sang Bing, “Minguo kaiguo de qijian,” 86.

¹² In the Socialist Party general meeting of February 18, 1912, one member gave a speech and said:

It is certain that Yuan Shikai will not benefit the people. What he has done is just taking advantage of the current situation to serve his own purpose. [In this circumstance] the so-called Republic is not a real republic, and the second revolution is forthcoming.

Ibid., 87.

¹³ Ibid., 92.

¹⁴ Ibid., 93.

¹⁵ For instance, when the late Qing reformer official Zhang Zhidong governed Hubei, he was dedicated to creating new-style police, study-abroad programs, and new-style schools, and thus was recognized as a role model of enlightened new politics, but when reform touched upon the separation of administration and judiciary, Zhang tried hard to prevent it.

¹⁶ There is no decisive answer to the question of which foreign country’s constitution was the model for the Chinese Provisional Constitution (Linshi yuefa) of 1912, and contemporary scholarship continues to be divided on this issue. After careful comparative study of the texts of constitutions and consideration of early twentieth-century popular opinion, some scholars have recently argued that the Provisional Constitution was modeled on the constitution of the French Third Republic. See Zhang Xueji, “Zhonghua minguo linshi yuefa,” 118–122.

¹⁷ Yang Youjiong and Qu Tongzu, Jindai Zhongguo lifa shi, 96.

¹⁸ Qian Duansheng et al., Minguo zhengzhi shi, vol. 1, 73.

¹⁹ Liang Qichao argued, “We comrades firmly believe that the old-fashioned representative politics is not suitable for China, so we think that the citizens must obtain the final power of self-determination.” See Liang Qichao, “Jiefang yu gaizao,” 20. Also see Yang Duanliu, “Guomin dahui pingyi,” 9–19; Cheng Geng, “Yu duiyu guomin dahui,” 118; and Wang Zheng “Guomin dahui zhi shangque,” 113–114.

²⁰ In October 1909, Hu Bainian, a representative of the Hubei Political Consultative Bureau, expressed his worries about the current situation in his letter of resignation: “The speedy establishment of constitutionalism and the convening of parliament are what men of purpose are striving for and also what the court hopes for.” Yet the constitutional systems in foreign countries that the five Qing ministers saw and examined were all “achievements of hundreds of years, rather than the initial planning in the days of creation.” To pursue the Qing constitutional reform by following the already mature systems of the West might run the risk of neglecting “evolutionary reform in an era of transition, which requires concern about current conditions and the people’s developmental level in order to gradually transition to constitutionalism.” He also argued that what the former study-abroad students learned about were all up-to-date foreign systems, incompatible with Chinese conditions. “Copying an existing system in a transitional period is like a doctor using an ancient prescription, hoping it will have an effect yet not asking the patient about his physiological condition or how the climate affects him.” To remedy this, state leaders should take appropriate measures in accordance with national finances and the developmental level of the people, “in order to implement policies and achieve goals.” Otherwise, Hu cautioned, “it will be far-fetched to expect a perfect outcome within one year, [because] there has never been such high speed anytime or anywhere.” The opinions here concerned the late Qing pursuit of constitutionalism, but the early Republican years were not far away, and Hu’s analysis of the relevance of realistic national conditions when transplanting foreign institutions remained relevant. See Hu Bainian, “Tiaochen xianzheng libi cheng,” 471–474.

²¹ See Guan Xiaohong, Cong mufu dao zhiguan, 480–544.

²² The Qing Administrative Laws, which Oda Yorozu began writing in 1903, used a central government/local government analytical framework to study Qing administrative institutions and called governments below the province “local offices.” This conceptualization was adopted by later scholars in describing the Chinese government structure and is still influential today. Although the entire book was not published until the early Republican years, the first volume with the main thesis was finished in 1905 and published in 1909. An unauthorized Chinese translation of a portion of this first volume appeared in China in 1906. It profoundly influenced the late Qing administrative reform, as well as contemporary Chinese thought on legal concepts. See Oda Yorozu, Qingguo xingzheng fa, 1–13.

²³ In its preface to the provincial financial statement, the Guangxi Provincial Bureau of Finance in the late Qing mentioned the confusion caused by the ambiguous concept of difang:

This bylaw applies to the difang, and whether it can be defined as a province, a prefecture, a county, a district, a city, or a town needs definition here. A tax is levied by a legal entity, yet its uncertain status makes the ownership of the tax revenue also uncertain. The nature of the prefecture, county, district, city, and town is relatively clear, but what is really dubious is whether or not the province is a local entity.

Jingji xuehui, Guangxi quansheng, 66. The representatives in the Political Consultative Council also discovered that it was difficult to define the character of treasury bonds due to uncertainty about the identity of the provincial governors as well as the status of the province:

Before the tax-sharing system is implemented, if the provinces all issue government bonds which are neither national nor local, without clear definition, then it will add to the burdens of the treasury and create a new hurdle for next year’s budget.

“Zizheng yuan diyici changnianhui,” 464, 466.

²⁴ For instance, Shiji (Records of the Grand Historian) includes the sentence:

After Xiang Yu left the Hangu Pass, he sent people to persuade the King of Chu to move the capital by saying ‘In ancient times, the emperors owned the difang of several thousand li, and they must reside in the remote inland area.’

Sima Qian, Shiji, vol. 1, 320.

²⁵ The zhongshu sheng of the Yuan dynasty was the supreme national administrative organ. It sent xing zhongshu sheng, meaning “institutions dispatched by the court,” out to different areas to handle regional affairs. The xing zhongshu sheng was administratively subordinate to the zhongshu sheng, yet its officials’ ranking was equal to that of the zhongshu sheng. The head of the regional xing zhongshu sheng had dual identities as both the highest regional official and the court-commissioned minister. See Li Zhi’an, Yuan dai xingsheng zhidu.

²⁶ I want to thank Professor An Dongqiang of the History Department, Sun Yat-sen University, for sharing with me the information that though the term zhisheng did not appear in the historical source materials of the Qing dynasty, there were uses of it in Ming dynasty primary sources. It might imply direct management and affiliation.

²⁷ Guan Xiaohong, Cong mufu dao zhiguan, 537–539.

²⁸ Guan Xiaohong, “Qing ji waiguan,” 4–30.

²⁹ Guan Xiaohong, “Xinhai geming shiqi,” 29–49.

³⁰ Guan Xiaohong, Cong mufu dao zhiguan, 549–551.

³¹ Ibid., 558–579.

³² See Chen Ming, “Minguo chuqi,” 253–263, 292–306.

³³ Ibid., 318–337.

³⁴ Ibid., 379.

³⁵ The national assembly issue was not only relevant to constitutionalism, but also to civil rights. It emerged during the North–South peace talks and continued during the Beijing government period. Since this topic raises many broad, contentious issues of theory and implementation, I plan to focus on it in another article.

Additional information

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Xiaohong Guan

GUAN Xiaohong, born in 1957 in Guangzhou, received her PhD in history in 1999. She is currently a professor in the Department of History, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou. Her main research areas include modern Chinese history and the history of the Chinese political system. Dr Guan has published A Study of the Late Qing Ministry of Education (Guangzhou: Guangdong Education Publishing House, 2000), Suspension and Abolition of the Civil Service Examination System and Modern Chinese Society (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2013), and From Private Secretariat to Professional Bureaucracy: The Transformation of the Qing Local Official System and Its Problems (Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2014).