How ‘terrorism’ does not end: the case of the Official Irish Republican Army

Abstract

This paper is the first critical analysis of terrorism disengagement by the Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA). This process was conducted in instalments over nearly three decades. It has not been theoretically assessed as far as studies on ‘how terrorism ends’ are concerned, and it does not fit into any existing models of terrorism disengagement. The end of terrorism in relation to the OIRA is not only the story of a terrorist organisation ending its armed activities, but also a case study of terrorism disengagement with important policy implications for decision-makers faced with the threat of terrorism.

Keywords:

• terrorism
• Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA)
• republicanism
• nationalism
• disengagement
• Northern Ireland

Notes

This paper makes use of the author's extensive interviews with current and former members of the Official republican movement. The author interviewed representatives of all of the major factions of The Workers' Party. The author also interviewed representatives of the Provisional republican movement and current affairs journalists who covered the conflict in Northern Ireland and were keen to offer numerous independent comments on the developments within Official republicanism. This broad approach was used to ensure sufficient triangulation of the information provided by the interviewees, many of whom are now bitterly opposed to each other.

In 1972 the OIRA announced a ceasefire and soon afterwards allegedly dismantled the armed wing of Official republicanism.

The proponents of the theory that the IRA in the 1960s was meaningless are Coogan (1995) and Bowyer Bell (1993). English (2003) takes a different view of the organisation in that period.

The feud and the formation of the IRSP has received detailed coverage in Holland and McDonald (1994).

This phrase was first used by one of the author's interviewees, Danny Morrison, at the Sinn Fein Annual Conference in 1981.

For a table with the electoral performances of different republican political fronts, see Dunphy and Hopkins (1992).

One example of both practitioners' and academics' thinking alongside each other about strategies to defeat anti-state insurgency and terrorism is the current (mid-2008) situation in Iraq in which the counterinsurgency effort is led by American officers with PhDs from distinguished American universities (Sennott 2008).