The ghosts of state terror: knowledge, politics and terrorism studies

Abstract

Employing a discourse analytic approach, this paper examines the silence on state terrorism within the broader terrorism studies literature. An analysis of this literature reveals that state terrorism is noticeable mainly for its absence as a subject of systematic academic study. Following the textual analysis, the main finding – the silence on state terrorism within terrorism studies – is subjected to both a first- and second-order critique. A first-order or immanent critique uses a discourse's internal contradictions, mistakes and misconceptions to criticise it on its own terms. In this case, the absence of state terrorism is criticised for its illogical actor-based definition of terrorism, its politically biased research focus, and its failure to acknowledge the empirical evidence of the extent and nature of state terrorism. A second-order critique entails reflecting on the broader political and ethical consequences of the representations enabled by the discourse. It is argued that the absence of state terrorism from academic discourse functions to promote particular kinds of state hegemonic projects, construct a legitimising public discourse for foreign and domestic policy, and deflect attention from the terroristic practices of states. The exposure and destabilisation of this dominant narrative also opens up critical space for the articulation of alternative and potentially emancipatory forms of knowledge and practice.

Keywords:

• state terrorism
• knowledge
• power
• discourse
• terrorism studies

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Conference in San Francisco, CA, USA, 26–29 March 2008. I am grateful to Eric Herring, Jeffrey Sluka, Ruth Blakeley, and the anonymous reviewers for their comments.

Notes

1. Andrew Silke has claimed that if current trends continue, more than 90% of all terrorism studies literature will have been published since 2001, and that a new book on terrorism is published every six hours in the English language (Shepherd 2007). In fact, research using publishing databases found that even before 2001, terrorism publications had grown over 234% on average between 1988 and 2001 in fields like terrorism studies, communication studies, comparative politics, peace studies, economics, and psychology (Gordon 2004, p. 109).

2. This is not to say that state violence and repression has not been studied, but rather that it has not been systematically studied under the rubric of ‘terrorism’ or by recognised terrorism studies scholars.

3. A great deal of my previous research has involved a discourse analysis of texts from the terrorism studies field. For this paper, I re-examined many of these texts, as well as a number of new texts. Previous discourse analytic studies that broadly support the findings in this paper include, among others, Jackson (2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c).

4. There are numerous examples of state agents being directly involved in bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, and the like. Obvious cases include the bomb placed on a Korean Airlines flight from Baghdad to Seoul in 1987 by two North Korean agents that killed all 115 persons on board; and the Lockerbie bombing in 1988 by Libyan agents (Hoffman 1998, p. 190). In other cases, state agents have planted bombs in so-called ‘black flag operations’ that aim to implicate non-state groups as the perpetrators.

5. Grosscup (2006) provides a convincing and eloquent argument about why the doctrine and practice of strategic bombing is a form of state terrorism – not least because its original formulation was as ‘terror bombing’ aimed at civilians and intended ‘to create such terror, destruction and misery as to undermine civilians’ morale and in swift order break their fragile will to resist’ (p. 24).

6. This doctrine guided US policy towards South Africa at a time when it directly sponsored and supported massive civilian-directed pro-insurgency terror by Renamo in Mozambique and Unita in Angola. It can be a rgued that South Africa could not have continued to prop up Renamo terror with impunity for more than a decade without US support (Mamdani 2004, pp. 87–95).

7. It can be argued that the imposition of sanctions, particularly when the effects of such sanctions result in extensive civilian deaths and appear to be directed at intimidating the entire society (as occurred in Iraq after 1991 where as many as half a million excess deaths were recorded), constitutes a form of terror.

8. Mamdani (2004) makes the pertinent point that in places like Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Angola, Mozambique, and Congo, governments were compelled to reconcile with terrorist movements that had engaged in massive civilian-directed terror. In this sense, reconciliation became a codeword for impunity and the lack of justice functioned to sustain an international atmosphere of tolerance towards terror (pp. 250–251).

9. Evidence of the use of terror by the colonial authorities is contained in an extremely large literature on the history and nature of colonialism, as well as the large post-colonialism literature. More immediately accessible summaries of colonial terror can be found elsewhere (Barker 2002, pp. 61–86, Herman and O'Sullivan 1989, pp. 3–7).

10. US officials admitted as early as 1983 that the Contras were engaged in the killing of civilians, kidnapping, torture, and indiscriminate attacks. It later emerged that a CIA Contra training manual, Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, advocated exactly these kinds of civilian-directed pro-insurgency tactics. Similar forms of training were provided through proxies to the Afghan insurgents. Similarly, Stohl (1988) quotes CIA data that show that Cuban exile groups engaged in 89 separate terrorist incidents from 1969 to 1979 alone (p. 189) (also Mamdani 2004, pp. 102, 116; Herman 1982, p. 63).

11. For example, evidence from former British and French intelligence officers suggests that MI6 paid large sums of money to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, a terrorist group associated with al-Qaeda, to assassinate Colonel Gadafy in 1996. It is alleged that British intelligence provided sanctuary to members of the group in Britain and subsequently thwarted attempts by Libya to bring Osama bin Laden to justice (Guardian Weekly 2002). There is also evidence that British and American intelligence agencies provided a green light to various ‘Islamist’ groups training insurgents to fight in Bosnia (Meacher 2005).

12. After 11 September 2001, the US continued to harbour groups such as Government of Free Vietnam (GFVN), the Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF), and other Vietnamese and Laotian dissident groups who had been involved in a number of terrorist attacks over the past few years (Kurlantzick 2002).

13. As Winkler (2006) has noted, official claims that the target state provides support for non-state terrorism has preceded virtually every US military intervention since the Reagan era.