Abstract
Fadi Ismail is Group Director of Services of MBC Network, a pioneering pan-Arab Dubai-based network of satellite channels which includes the news channel Al-Arabiya. After teaching Cultural Studies at the American University of Beirut, he began to work in the media. For ten years he covered world and Middle East news as a reporter, news producer, and Deputy Head of news for MBC. He was part of the team that launched Al‐Arabiya in 2003. He has since moved to the production of drama, entertainment and documentaries. He has published several articles and a book (Critical Review of Concepts of Modernity, Progress and Renaissance in Modern Arab Thought) in Arabic language on critical Arab thought and Islamic thought.
Harmonie Toros: What do you think are some of the key problems in the coverage of terrorism-related subjects, be it in the Western media or the non-Western media?
Fadi Ismail: I'm afraid that I might be repeating the same clichés or stereotypes that, from an Arab perspective, have been articulated many a time: the lack of balance, the bias, the lack of depth, the lack of historicity, and therefore the non-objectivity. Each one of them needs a thesis of its own and I'm not sure I'm doing a great service to the reader to be lumping these together. But you will find the criticism of imbalance in any conference on Western media, be it an academic conference or even a media conference. The Western media have a problem of credibility because they are not exactly taking facts to their logical end.
HT: Do you think it is more useful to look at an example that you were particularly struck by rather than at the more general situation?
FI: To be honest, there is nothing new under the sun. In the sense that – in terms of acts of terrorism which everybody considers to be terrorism, such as al-Qaeda terrorism – every time there is an incident, there is the same approach. With respect to the Arab‐Israeli conflict, let's say Hezbollah or Hamas or the like, that to me also presents a déjà vu in terms of repeated images and the way the coverage has been handled since the Intifada. Yes, for the sake of having a closer look, one could take a case study and go into more depth, but I would end up giving you more or less the same impressions in every instance. Every time there is a crisis or event, which seems to be the case every few months, there is the same approach, a kind of déjà vu. This is why I say there is nothing new under the sun. I forgot to mention that you can't lump Arab and Western media together. I think that there is no one Arab media. The Arab media are ideologically and politically polarised. I don't want to give the impression that I don't believe that Western media are ideologically or politically motivated. Obviously, the way Fox News covers news of the Western world might not have a lot in common with the way the BBC covers them. On the other hand, there might be some parallels – more parallels between the BBC and some Arab media than between Fox and some Arab media. So it is not black and white: Arab media versus Western media. In a way, if I had to start, we would have to start with the problem of defining terrorism and who the terrorists are because that is essential. We would have to define what terrorism is because that is a very contentious, controversial issue; and a divisive issue in the Arab press. Probably, most of the mainstream Western media would agree on who the terrorists are. In the Arab media, it has been an uphill struggle to define terrorists, to agree on who they are and to name them as such.
HT: What are the divisions in the Arab media on the question of the definition? How would you characterise the different positions?
FI: I think that for some time there was some hesitation to call al-Qaeda terrorists. You would call them ‘al-Qaeda’, you would call them ‘those who attacked us’, but you would not call them ‘terrorists’. You would not describe them as such. In a way, this is partly an ideological problem which is in some quarters reflected in the Arab media: that it is OK to bloody America a little bit, or bloody the West a little bit. In the early post-9/11 days, while the attacks were not accepted or condoned, the perpetrators were equally not strongly condemned. Only after years of terrorist attacks did describing al-Qaeda as terrorists become the norm. And that is part of the problem because many Arabs and the Arab media – and again I can't generalise – took time before they saw things as they are. That was part of the polarisation of the Arab world, part of terrorism becoming an ideological issue in the Arab world. Lots of circles – even government circles – refused to see it as ‘our’ problem: ‘This is somebody else's problem, this can't be ours, this is just a minority of people who have been brainwashed.’ Then it turned out to be a much, much bigger problem. The media have accentuated this problem in some places because they have been playing the emotional card, claiming that we – Arabs, Muslims – have the moral high ground. That is why I say some of the media played a nationalistic and jingoistic role. I'm not sure if I'm being too harsh on Fox but we have lots of ‘Foxes’ in the Arab media.
HT: Western media outlets are regularly accused of ‘sanitising’ their coverage of violence (or certain types of violence) by not broadcasting, for example, the extent of attacks in Iraq. Do you find this problematic and if so, why? What effects do you think this will have on viewers?
FI: I think that from one point of view, ‘sanitising the images of violence’ can only lead to marginalising the conflict and to down-playing the human costs involved in these conflicts. They become mere lifeless numbers and statistics on who was killed or injured. This is part of an Orientalist paradigm of keeping the Western citizen blissfully happy and relaxed in their own world, shielded from the bloody problems of the ‘uncivilised’ rest of the world. Politically, when you sanitise images of war and conflict, wars and conflicts become trivial to our lives. Not seeing how bad things really are will only lead to bias, inaccuracies and distortions in seeing reality, to wrong perceptions and flawed policies. This is not a call to see gruesome footage on a daily basis, but rather a call not to shy away from seeking the truth, even if that means being exposed to harsh footage from time to time.
HT: Arab media have been accused by Western outlets and by others of radicalising their viewers by broadcasting particularly gruesome images of violence in the Middle East and/or by broadcasting the tapes of radical leaders such as Osama Bin Laden or al Zawahiri or others. Do you believe that there is a connection between radicalisation and the broadcasting of such images and messages?
FI: There could be a relationship, but I see the issue of transmitting images in a much wider cultural–historical perspective. Let me elaborate: Since World War II Western societies have not had big wars or civil wars, therefore bloodshed has been an exception. Images of bloodshed are a distant memory that nobody wants to repeat and that don't touch people's lives. Yes, Ireland is an exception, definitely, but Ireland is a small island, separate from the mainland. Also, the Baader-Meinhof group was a small group of terrorists which committed a few terrorist attacks. But the masses did not feel them, did not feel them near their homes.
If I were to generalise – I was trying not to generalise before – but if I may generalise in this case, most Arab societies have been living in ongoing civil wars. Sometimes they erupt like volcanoes, you can see the eruption, and sometimes they are cold civil wars. But there is always bloodshed next door. That is true in Sudan, that is true in Lebanon, that is true in Palestine, that is true in Algeria. It is true in many parts of the Arab world. Therefore, images of bloodshed are not remote, are not far away, they are always next door, and therefore there is no sanctity to those images. Death is part of life. Thus, it is not gruesome; it is not something that you will stop your children from watching. Having now a deeper knowledge of the psychological impact of those kinds of images on children, I tend to protect my children from watching these. I allow them to see two seconds and then tell them not to watch any more of it. That is a personal decision. I assume lots of people in the region wouldn't mind their children watching such images because somehow they are part of their landscape or surrounding.
I wouldn't want this to be interpreted as saying that Arabs like blood. But I am saying that I do not believe that there is a conspiracy here whereby these images are broadcast with the sole purpose of inflaming the viewer. I am trying to say there is no particular sensitivity towards showing those images.
Having said that, obviously, to continuously be showing these kinds of images is an invitation to the masses for two things: one, to feel powerless because these things are happening and they can do nothing to stop them from happening; which then creates anger, which creates frustration, which, in turn, creates in some people an urge for action. And, yes, the urge of having to act could lead to suicide bombers and to those who feel that radical solutions have to be found, that they have to do shocking things that have as strong an impact as those shocking pictures. Therefore, on the one hand, the media have a radicalising impact, but on the other hand, I would object to exclusively blaming the media for the process of radicalisation. If there is radicalisation, then there are objective reasons for that radicalisation and the media simply focus on them and make them visible, but they do not create them.
HT: With regards to the broadcasting of appeals for violence by radical leaders, is there a link between that and radicalisation? There is a lot of debate on whether such messages should be broadcast at all, and various Western outlets choose not to broadcast them.
FI: Are you referring to bin Laden?
HT: Yes, bin Laden or al Zawahiri.
FI: Actually, this issue is part of the divisions between the media camps in the Arab world. There are media – the most effective ones being the satellite stations – which refused to broadcast the entire speeches and only broadcast excerpts which were not very inflammatory in terms of calling for action, instead just describing the West and employing the usual al-Qaeda discourse. But there are others who purposely aired whole speeches, at least until recently, under the banner of the freedom of speech, under the banner of allowing people to hear what is being said. This is part of a competition that was media related but had a political agenda behind it. So, I am saying one cannot look at the media landscape and the Arab world without looking at the political agendas and the political framework behind those media. The media are a very powerful tool in the Arab world; they have been successfully used one way or another. In a way, the masses, if I may use that word, have paid the price because I don't think there is a more effective method of mobilising anger than the media, and the broadcasting of satellite television in particular. They have divided Arab societies more than they were already divided, or they have at least deepened existing divisions. This is part of the political game. Competing ideological and political powers each have their own vision of the status quo, each have their own vision of the Arab world and where is it going. What is amazing is that those who give bin Laden extensive airtime are, at the end of the day, not necessarily for bin Laden, would not be happy, if what he calls for were realised. But some media outlets use his speeches tactically in order to gain the status of a troublemaker and to therefore gain popularity, to gain the appreciation of the streets. Strategically, al‐Qaeda ideology is against the interest of every single Arab regime, if I want to describe it in that way.
HT: Would you say that the media are being used by political forces, such as political movements or countries, against each other, or are the media themselves acting against the interests of other countries?
FI: Both. The media are not independent actors. Those media outlets which are private are semi-independent; there is nobody who is completely independent. But those who are, are state-funded or funded by political movements – despite the claims of freedom of speech and information – are being used to disseminate various ideologies and world-views and are therefore being used for their impact on the streets. Now, I have heard in many conferences people asking the satellite media to play an even more dangerous role in mobilisation, as if the media are supposed to replace the non-existent or the very weak and inefficient political parties in the Arab world, the revolutionary political parties. But that would be changing the role of the media. The media are not supposed to be an ideological tool. We would be re-engineering communism in modern disguise whereby the media are part of the totalitarian state or ideology. This is the current problem we are facing. We don't have totalitarian regimes in the Arab world, but we have media that are being asked to play or are seen as playing the role of revolutionary political parties; and that is part of the current crisis. The political system needs political actors. The media, in the absence of political parties, play a visible socialising and mobilising role. But then the media are not an organisational structure. The media don't organise a demonstration, somebody else organises the demonstration. This is where the discord lies. In the latest crisis in Gaza, the media have definitely been playing a mobilising role, but you still need someone to go to the street and call for a demonstration. In a way, in the last crisis, the divisions over al-Qaeda and all the divisions over how one ought to tackle terrorism will disappear because the media cannot be but nationalistic vis‐à-vis Israel. So even if you are not with Hamas, you are against Israel. The tone vis-à-vis Israel and the approach taken are very similar across the Arab media. Having said that, even in the current Gaza crisis, the media are divided over Hamas. That was also the case with Hezbollah in 2006. So there is unity against Israel, but there is no such unity with respect to Hamas and what the best course of action is in this conflict.
HT: When you say that the media are playing a mobilising role in Gaza, how are they playing this mobilising role in the current crisis?
FI: Something happened between 2006 and 2008, which sociologists and psychologists need to look at. In 2006, when Israel attacked South Lebanon the media employed the same mobilising tools as they are now in the current Gaza crisis, but not much happened. The demonstrations across the Arab world and internationally were not very loud, they were not very visible. But this time, the demonstrations were very visible. The streets are stirring; maybe not as much as some would like to see, but nevertheless much more than in 2006. Now, one has to recognise this development as a sign of the increased influence of the media, of some of the media, that is. What has made this impact even more effective is that the media – and I'm talking about the Arab media here – are all anti-Israel. So there is a unity of purpose. Everybody is showing the same pictures. While there definitely are different tones among the various media outlets as to how the events are described, the images of hundreds of dead children and innocent civilians are still powerful enough to stir emotions and to activate calls for actions, which this time has led to street demonstrations in a lot of places.
HT: And do you believe the media are consciously trying to mobilise the public? Or could the mobilising impact they have be an unconscious side-effect of the broadcasting of certain images?
FI: I think some are trying to actively mobilise the public more than others. I would like to believe that, from a professional point of view, news editors don't have an item on their daily running order called ‘mobilising the streets’. I would like to believe that it is their agenda to approach reality as it is and to transfer that reality to the viewers' homes. This is what professional news people will do.
Now, what is happening is that in addition to this calm and realistic approach, there are some media outlets which instrumentalise events to inflame the public. I think that is the best way of describing it. The reasoning for this policy is partly to gain popularity, but maybe to some it is part of their perceived calling. To them, the media shouldn't be neutral, they should have a position on everything. The philosophy of the role of the media might be different in the Arab world, or in countries in crisis, to that in places where there is free competition.
So in a way, I feel that this time the media have a more visible and successful impact on the streets, that is all media. At the same time, there are divisions in terms of how the media is reporting. For example, Hamas – is it winning or is it losing? What is the political price of violent resistance in a humane way? These are issues that are being honestly tackled by some of the media outlets. But this is also causing schisms and divisions in the Arab world. On my way home this evening, I was listening to a live chat show on the radio and my impression was that the debate became divided along nationalistic lines. So, the Egyptians were defending Egypt, which was being harshly criticised by other Arabs on the show. Obviously, in Egypt there are many who do not appreciate the politics of the regime, but the ultra-nationalistic feelings of many Egyptians have been stirred and they are now mobilising to defend their country, irrespective of whether they agree with the regime's policies. For this is the nature of things: when one's country is being criticised, no matter if the criticism is justified or not, one will defend one's country for patriotic reasons. We now have a new fault line which is national in its nature; not political, in terms of somebody being for or against a certain policy or political party/movement. It is a division along national lines, between Egyptians and non-Egyptians. This is a new development.
HT: Do you think that it is helpful to use the term ‘terrorism’ and if not what are the alternatives?
FI: That is a tough one. Because if we have a commonly agreed and clear-cut understanding of who the terrorists are, then we should call them just that – terrorists. But is there really such a consensus? In the absence of any consensus, one falls back on the saying ‘somebody's terrorist is somebody else's freedom fighter’. Immediately, you become part of the problem, rather than being a detached observer of the problem. This is not a call not to use the phrase, but rather a call to look at who you are using it about and whether there is a consensus. I don't think anyone today will reject using the term ‘terrorism’ in relation to al-Qaeda and their acts in Iraq and all around the world since 9/11 until the present. But in other situations, it is different; take the Tamil Tigers for example. Some might say that killing the innocent is not in itself a terrorist act, but I'm not so sure. Maybe I'm subjective even in this case.
Media outlets which call Hamas – who are defending Gaza today – terrorists, are immediately perceived as biased and not objective. This complicates things; this compromises the professionalism of those who are using it. The same problem exists with using the term ‘martyr’. This is a huge issue now in the Arab world. In the Arab world, there is currently an enormous uproar about which media outlets are using the word ‘martyrs’ to describe those who have been killed in the Israeli bombings and fighting and which media outlets just use the neutral term ‘killed’. This is a debate that is as divisive as anything in the Arab world and it is another example of the divisions and the ideological schisms existing in the Arab world.
HT: With this journal we are trying to put forward a more critical approach to the study of terrorism in Western academia. What advice would you give to us and what do you think are our chances of success?
FI: I would say that in the West the practice of investigative journalism was coined, created and practised and that we, in the Arab world, have been trying to learn that practice. But we have many obstacles in our way, objective ones and subjective ones. In many cases, investigative journalism addresses issues that are taboo or no-go areas. I'm saying this because I believe the same needs to be done in relation to terrorism. Maybe what we need is investigative study into terrorism, which means dissecting terrorism. It is such a complicated and loaded term that it needs contextualisation – not justification – when being used, or one immediately risks missing something. So, maybe we need to change the study of terrorism as an academic field – which, after all, the media rely on and from which they borrow the discourse – in such a way that every time one talks about terrorism, one must historically contextualise it and pay appropriate attention to its historicity.
Because this is how you will come to understand. One mustn't condemn, nor must one condone, right from the beginning. What happens in a lot of cases is that we come to the terrorism debate with our minds already made up. And we then just choose the points in the debate which confirm our attitude.
I think that terrorism as a phenomenon can only be understood if we look deeper. I think if we only look at what is happening today and what happened in Afghanistan and at 9/11, we will not fully understand the phenomenon. Having said that, we should also be very careful of automatically attributing everything to history: there is a tendency to say that Historical Islam condones terrorism and that there is an intellectual and practical historical reservoir that is ready to be tapped into. If we do that – and there might be some historical trends or precedents, I'm not denying that – but if we simplify in that manner, if we simplify modern terrorism by attributing it to one particular historical reason, then we are missing the point. The danger is that the media, applying their usual simplistic and reductionist approach, will increase the general ignorance in the audience rather than enlighten it on the phenomenon of terrorism. This leads to a situation in which, when we come to any debate about terrorism, we are already influenced by unhelpful or inaccurate images and notions on the issue.
So I am not re-inventing the wheel when I say that what is needed is simply a multidisciplinary approach that contextualises terrorism socially, economically and politically, as well as ideologically. With that kind of approach, I think there is the possibility of understanding this phenomenon. And, by the way, this debate needs to be conducted within the academic world but it needs to include different parts of academia. Rather than continuing the current situation where somebody is dictating their simplistic vision of what terrorism is and what its reasons are and where others are debating just that, without offering a more sophisticated approach. You don't need to ask a representative of al-Qaeda to explain their ideology – that will never happen, and those people are too ideologically blocked to even have a debate. But there are enough experts from different countries across the Middle East, the Islamic world, Europe and the US and other parts of the world who are willing to have a real, honest and open debate about terrorism. I think we need to be sophisticated about this most dangerous phenomenon of the 20th and 21st century.