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Abstract
This article criticises three assumptions regarding terrorism and the agents who carry it out: (1) terrorists are always indiscriminate in their targeting; (2) terrorism is never effective in combating oppression; and (3) terrorists never participate in fair negotiations, as they merely wish to switch places with their oppressors. By criticising these three prejudices against terrorism, the article does not attempt to justify or excuse terrorism generally nor in the specific case of Sri Lanka which is examined. Instead, it creates the necessary room for such justifications or excuses to be critically appraised by dismantling some popular myths surrounding terrorism.
Notes
1. A moral excuse is different than a political excuse which may overlook whatever wrong-doing for the sake of expediency or national interest.
2. While there may be other problems with Coady's definition (e.g., its vagueness regarding ‘political purposes’ and what sorts of attacks upon non-combatant property might be categorised as terrorism), I will focus only upon the issue of targeting which is at the heart his definition.
3. While Walzer (Citation2004) doesn't present a formal definition of terrorism, his account follows a similar line of combining indiscriminate targeting and coercive intent.
4. Honderich's definition remains vague on two levels: (1) insofar as it is unable to provide any meaningful demarcation between small wars and large-scale terrorist campaigns and (2) as Honderich (Citation2006, p. 121) acknowledges, the definition relies upon international law that is by no means firmly established. In addition, Honderich provides no clear argument for why all revolutionary violence ought to be counted as terrorism nor why terrorist tactics can never be resorted to in war.
5. An emphasis upon the indirect instrumental form of terrorism also avoids: Honderich's vague demarcation based upon the scale of violence, his equating of all domestic revolutionary violence as terrorism, and his definition's dependence upon international law which is not truly established.
6. However, when the violence only contributes indirectly to the military aims by the terror it elicits, then the military personnel involved can be fairly accused of terrorism.
7. I have elsewhere supported this broad definition in greater detail and provided a typological analysis of those acts that fall under the definition (see Kaplan Citation2008).
8. Walzer (Citation2000, pp. 263–268) argues along a similar line that the dropping of atomic weapons upon non-combatants in Japan supported the tyrannical demand for unconditional surrender. The aim was not to reach a mutually accommodating settlement to the war but to impose a ‘solution’ by terrorising a general population.
9. The Sixth Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution banned any party calling for secession or home rule. All members of parliament were required to swear an oath to uphold the constitution and all of its amendments, thus leading to all members of the opposition party to leave parliament.
10. The LTTE's activities included attacks upon the Mullaitivu army camp in the occupied northern territories (killing over 1200 soldiers) and the bombing of the Central Bank in Colombo (killing over 150 civilians and wounding over 1500). On the other hand, the government resorted to strong-armed repression tactics that included razing remote villages, making free use of torture, and sanctioning death squads that carried out a campaign of ‘disappearances’ against Tamils.
11. While a full justification of the LTTE's terrorist methods would likely require that one show their resort to terrorism to be more effective and less costly than any alternative, I am only arguing that the case of the LTTE shows that terrorism can be effective in combating oppression.