Diplomacy, terrorism, and national narratives in the United States–Iran relationship

Abstract

The United States and Iran have failed repeatedly in the last thirty years to normalise diplomatic relations. Each attempt to open a dialogue has been set back by acts of terrorism or perceptions thereof, and the small openings for diplomacy were quickly shut. The difficulties of normal diplomacy should be understood in light of the national narratives that guide each country's international behaviour, narratives that include strong admonitions on terrorism and sow distrust. One method to overcome the obstacles thrown up by these national narratives is to explore their dynamics and attempt to write a new, common narrative.

Keywords:

• terrorism
• United States
• Iran
• trust
• diplomacy
• critical oral history

Notes

1. Louis Freeh, then FBI Director, is a strong advocate of the Iranian connection (Freeh 2006); others involved in the investigation are considerably less certain, among them the Secretary of Defense at the time of the bombing, William Perry, who told the Council on Foreign Relations in 2007 that ‘I believe that the Khobar Tower bombing was probably masterminded by Osama bin Laden… . At the time, the evidence was pointing to Iran’ (UPI.com 2007).

2. The restarting of relations with Libya is sometimes regarded as a potential model for Iran, i.e. bringing Qaddafi ‘in from the cold’ was done through a lengthy and careful set of quiet negotiations that ultimately concluded with Libya ceding its bad behaviour for acceptance in the family of law-abiding nations. This was Britain's work more than America's. And while sometimes a thorn in the side of the US, Libya is geostrategically a very minor player compared with Iran.

3. It is a project I began in 2006 with Blight and Janet Lang of Brown University, and Malcolm Byrne of the National Security Archive.