Does counterinsurgency fuel civil war? Peru and Syria compared

Abstract

This article analyses the conflict-fuelling effects of counterinsurgency on civil war in Peru (1980–1995) and Syria (2011–2012). Despite different escalation onsets, in both cases the state's response to the increasingly armed opposition intensified and protracted the conflict. The comparative analysis reveals five interdependent factors that were particularly influential in that regard: the state's denial of demands by certain segments of society; indiscriminate police and military repression; the impunity of state forces; and the expansion of non-state armed groups driven by radical agendas. The research has implications that connect research on terrorism with peace and conflict studies: first, the more the opposition's demands were responded to by disproportionate repression, the more likely became the option of armed insurgency. Second, due to the state's superior military resources, the insurgent groups increasingly applied terrorist operations. Third, at least in the case of Peru, the terrorist tactics put the state on the edge of defeat. However, the adjustment of the counterinsurgency strategy to a more bottom-up approach eventually gained the state the upper hand. The article ends with controversial reflection on how far the recent violence intensification by Syrian insurgents justifies the end; that is, regime change.

Keywords:

• counterinsurgency
• Peru
• Syria
• terrorism
• violence

Notes

1. Beyond the relatively positive image of Assad, the regime featured several unique characteristics that made violent protest unlikely. For instance, these included a foreign policy largely in tune with public opinion, a weak civil society, or the absence of abject poverty of the kind that exists in Yemen or elsewhere.

2. Given a bloody history with Ecuador and Chile, the Peruvian armed forces had organisationally developed a border defense mentality. Consequently, they were unprepared and untrained to fight an unconventional enemy such as SL. Probably more crucial to the initial onset was the lack of intelligence to distinguish between insurgents and civilians rather than the deployment of heavy material such as a motorised infantry battalion, a parachutist battalion or a navy infantry. See Koc-Menard 2006, 335–336; Taylor 1998, 43–48; Hurtado Meza 2006, 13–14.

3. Particularly, nowadays the remaining two SL factions – i.e., Artemio and Proseguir – are classified as narco-capitalistas rather than Maoist revolutionaries. See Mealy and Austad 2012, 560–562.

4. Indeed, according to testimonies, the number and scope of human rights violations reduced while the same figure increased regarding the guerrilla's share in violent repression. See CVR 2003 on this subject.

5. Beyond fewer human rights violations, the “hearts and minds” strategy included civic action campaigns such as free haircuts, soup kitchens or even the building of access roads or trails to remote areas. See Palmer 2005, 96–98.