Interpretation, judgement and dialogue: a hermeneutical recollection of causal analysis in critical terrorism studies

ABSTRACT

This article problematises Critical Terrorism Studies’s (CTS) seeming reluctance to engage in causal explanation. An analysis of the meta-theoretical assumptions on causation in both orthodox and critical terrorism studies reveals that the latter’s refusal to incorporate causal analysis in its broader research agenda reproduces – despite its commitment to epistemological pluralism – the former’s understanding of causation as the only sustainable one. Elemental to this understanding is the idea that causation refers to the regular observation of constant conjunction. Due to the positivist leanings of such a conception, CTS is quick to dismiss it as consolidating Orthodox Terrorism Studies’s lack of critical self-reflexivity, responsibility of the researcher, and dedication towards informing state-led policies of counterterrorism. Drawing on recent work in the philosophy of science and International Relations, this article advances an alternative understanding of causation that emphasises its interpretative, normative and dialogical fabric. It is therefore argued that CTS should reclaim causal analysis as an essential element of its research agenda. This not only facilitates a more robust challenge against Orthodox Terrorism Studies’ conventional understanding of causation but also consolidates CTS’s endeavour of deepening and broadening our understanding that (re)embeds terrorist violence in its historical and social context.

KEYWORDS:

• Terrorism
• causation
• orthodox versus critical terrorism studies

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Erratum

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Lee Jarvis for his editorial assistance. I would also like to thank Harmonie Toros for involving me in a research project on political violence that provided the original impetus for this article. Finally, also thanks to Charles Devellennes and two anonymous reviewers whose suggestions and comments strengthened the presentation. Needless to say that any errors are mine alone.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. This arguably involved a reinterpretation of the psychological element since it no longer concerned the psychology of the perpetrator but of the psychology of those whom it is perpetrated upon.

2. Porpora also considers interpretivism to be part of post-modern relativism. As this tends to contradict the interpretive and historical conceptualisation of causation that stems from his broader argument, it is not entirely sure what interpretivism exactly stands for in this context.

3. There is of course a tendency to approach OTS as a reified category that no longer corresponds to the heterogenous body of scholarship that it is. Horgan and Boyle, for instance, argue that such a conception is “not representative of the existing breadth of research activity” (2008, 51) in the field. The present analysis therefore engages the way that causation has been conceptualised (or not) in this body of scholarship rather than indicating that it represents a homogenous and codified body of scholarship.

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Notes on contributors

Lucas Van Milders

Lucas Van Milders is a PhD candidate in International Relations at the University of Kent. His research focusses on International Relations theory and radical hermeneutics.