ABSTRACT
Proscription represents a central pillar of counterterrorism, criminalising organisations and associated practices, and framing proscribed groups as “terrorist”. While an emerging field of research on proscription is developing, there has been little attention given to the discursive roots of the practice. Therefore, this article makes three contributions: first, it provides a historical contextualisation of proscription by focusing on the North of Ireland as a crucial case study; second, it provides conceptual depth to existing accounts of proscription through the combination of genealogy and critical discourse analysis; and third, it draws on original and archival material from interviews, parliamentary Hansards, and Government records. Two arguments follow from this analysis: (1) proscription embodies a discourse designed to protect state legitimacy rather than to stop political violence; and (2) the discourse of proscription becomes embedded over time, thereby constraining conflict transformation as material justifications for its continuation become displaced by their symbolism. The article concludes by showing how these arguments have important implications for proscription in international relations, with relevance to a much wider range of cases including Turkey and Sri Lanka.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Feargal Cochrane, Harmonie Toros, as well as the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments, and a particular thanks to all those interviewed as part of this research.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. The validity of these claims made by ex-prisoners is widely challenged because many believe these organisations have not given a clear justification for their continued presence, even if they have renounced violence.
2. A 2018 special issue in Terrorism and Political Violence is an exception alongside some specific case studies outlined below.
3. While Northern Ireland was not formed until partition in 1921 this is not problematic as the focus here is on the groups operating within Northern Ireland and the practices of proscription, not the Northern Irish Government.
4. This only relates to the groups as a whole that have endorsed the peace process and disarmed; not individual members – or indeed sub-groups like the East Antrim UDA – who continue to engage in organised crime. Proscription is not intended to address these latter issues, only those of terrorism conducted by organisations. The article acknowledges the importance of ongoing organised crime, but challenges the arguments that proscription is designed to address this, not political violence.
5. While analysing discourse over such an extensive period is in danger of selection bias, focussing specifically on the key parliamentary debates linked to the introduction and development of proscription ensures that the findings are selected consistently and are comparable.
6. These refer to 40 semi-structured interviews conducted in the United Kingdom from January to October 2016 with academics, senior police officers, civil servants, NGOs, ex-prisoners and politicians.
7. See for instance the HL Deb (20 June 1918) vol 30 cc338. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1918/jun/20/ireland#S5LV0030P0_19180620_HOL_41.
8. This is the term used in the Parliamentary Hansards.
9. SI 864/1974.
10. This was a bombing of 2 pubs in central Birmingham which resulted in the deaths of 21 people and the injury of 182 others.
11. These were offences listed as scheduled offences in the Emergency Provisions Act 1973 and only applied if the prisoner was serving a sentence of life, or at least 5 years. Furthermore, only offences committed before 10 April 1998 would be considered.
12. The LVF and INLA were also initially listed, but removed following their ceasefires, illustrating the objective of the early release scheme in incentivising groups to cease violent activities.
13. These are the IRA, Fianna na h’Eireann, Cumann na m’Ban, Saor Eire, Continuity Army Council, INLA, INLO, UVF, UDA, UFF, RHC, Orange Volunteers, Loyalist Volunteer Force and Red Hand Defenders. These organisations are those listed directly in Schedule 2 of the Terrorism Act 2000.
14. This was common practice for many Unionist politicians but has declined following the formation of the DUP/Sinn Fein led executive. For a recent example of the usage, see for instance: “Alliance cannot see that Sinn Fein-IRA is using the Irish language as a weapon”, Newsletter (19 May 2017).
15. For instance, the Jellicoe and Earl (Citation1983: 4) recommended that such measures should only be retained only “while it continues to be effective”.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Daniel Kirkpatrick
Daniel Kirkpatrick is a Lecturer at the University of Kent in the School of Politics and International Relations. His research interests focus on the criminalisation of political expression in counterterrorism practice and discourse.