“Isolated, apolitical and tragic”: comparing media portrayals of incel violence to violence of right-wing and Islamist perpetrators

ABSTRACT

How incidents of mass violence are portrayed has great consequences for how the violence is understood and responded to, including whether it requires political attention. This article examines the portrayal of incel violence, a relatively new phenomenon of violence perpetrated by people who identify with the misogynistic worldview present in and perpetuated by incel online forums. It does so through placing this violence in comparison with Islamist violence and right-wing violence, both of which have shaped understandings of mass violence so far. By conducting this three-way comparison, this article investigates to what extent portrayals of incel violence align with media portrayals of other types of violence. This article finds that incel violence is portrayed in an overly personalised manner without much reference to the violence’s gendered socio-political context, hindering the possibility of incel violence being understood as political. Not only does this article helps understandings of incel violence per se but also provides insight into to what extent processes of politicisation and securitisation play a part in understandings of misogynistic violence.

KEYWORDS:

• Incel
• violence in news
• framing
• terrorism

Introduction

It is well established that the manner in which an incident of (mass) violence is presented effects how it is made sense of and further shapes the reality we live in. For instance, this is observed in framings of the “Global War on Terror” that made possible the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in the name of “freedom” and the disproportionate policing of non-white communities (Abu-Bakare 2020; Khan 2021; Reese and Lewis 2011). These representations often conform to, and in turn, confirm both gendered and raced biases (inter alia Abu-Bakare 2020; Gentry 2020; Khan 2021; Martini 2018, 2023; Nacos 2005). Such biases include the propensity to label violence perpetrated by the non-white Other as “terrorism” (Adam and Kearns 2020; K. Powell 2018; K. A. Powell 2011), the tendency to downplay certain types and perpetrators of violence, such as sensationalising female perpetrators and excusing white perpetrators (Betus, Kearns, and Lemieux 2021; Falkheimer and Olsson 2015; Zdjelar and Davies 2021), or the ignoring of domestic violence or intimate partner violence (Buiten and Salo 2007; Seely and Riffe 2021).

Previous research on the portrayal of mass violence outside warring contexts has mostly engaged with Islamist violence and right-wing violence, indicating a difference in portrayal based on who the perpetrator is, their perceived motivation and wider context of the violence. Some scholars point out that Islamist violence tends to be presented in a manner that immediately conflates it with “terrorism” (Adam and Kearns 2020), thus resulting in undifferentiated coverage (von Sirkoski et al. 2021). Likewise, reporting of Islamist violence tends to situate it within the context of the “Global War on Terror” (K. A. Powell 2018, 2011), while also paying attention to external radicalisation, i.e. the perpetrators’ path to violence (Betus, Kearns, and Lemieux 2021; Mitnik, Freilich, and Chermak 2020). Meanwhile, research on the portrayal of right-wing violence has shown that reporting tends to focus on the individual perpetrators (Falkheimer and Olsson 2015; Zdjelar and Davies 2021), discussing their personal motivations and backgrounds, ultimately conveying a lower frequency and thus seemingly reduced threat of the violence (Adam and Kearns 2020; K. A. Powell 2011). Further, this portrayal often individualises the violent incidents as well as attributing a sense of coincidence to the violence, disguising the coherent political framework motivating such violence (Gentry 2022).

Since 2014, there have been numerous incidents of mass violence perpetrated by people identifying as incels. The expressions of this violence have been similar to previous incidents of Islamist and right-wing violence, predominantly shootings, as well as stabbing and driving into people. Incel is a portmanteau of involuntary celibate and describes a predominantly male movement that is centred around anti-feminism, racism, experiences of perceived victimhood and resentment (Ging 2019; Kelly, DiBranco, and DeCook 2022; Lewis, Rowe, and Wiper 2018). The incel worldview advocates for a “gender revolt” (Zimmerman, Ryan, and Duriesmith 2018) and is characterised by a prevalence of violent fantasies and hateful rhetoric (Baele, Brace, and Coan 2019; Marwick and Caplan 2018; Scaptura and Boyle 2020). Incel violence is political in the sense that the violence intends to draw attention to the perceived social injustices experienced by the perpetrators (O’Donnell and Shor 2022), as well as seeking to organise society differently. Further, incel worldviews have some ideological overlap with right-wing extremism, especially via so-called “great replacement” theories (Wilson 2022).

But to what extent is incel violence perceived as a threat in need of political attention? While the research discussed above has focused on incels, their worldviews and community, little is known about how incel violence is perceived publicly (c.f. Byerly 2020; Bengtsson Meuller 2024). The main aim of this article is to further understandings of how this form of mass violence is understood through a comparison to other forms of mass violence. I ask: how does the portrayal of incel violence align with or diverge from media portrayals of Islamist and right-wing violence? How might potential differences and similarities between the portrayals of the three types of violence shed light on whether incel violence is framed as an issue requiring (political) attention? By putting the portrayal of incel violence in direct comparison with other types of violence that are similar in their expression of violence (e.g. mass shootings in public places), I aim to open up the “gendered violence silo” (True and Tanyag 2017; Wright 2016) – meaning not looking at gendered violence in isolation from other violence and instead incorporating insights on gendered violence into general understandings of mass violence.

This study not only explores an under-researched area of the portrayals of incel violence but further investigates how understandings of misogynist violence are affected by processes of politicisation and securitisation, which are known to affect understandings of other types of violence. In doing so, I also contextualise the manner in which incel violence is reported on. Rather than analysing the portrayal of incel violence in isolation, the patterns in reporting across the three types of violence examined here will provide insight into how portrayals of incel violence fit with established understandings of mass violence, and why it might (not). Yet, while the article contributes in particular to research on the perception of incel violence, and more broadly conversations regarding understandings of misogynistic violence (DeCook and Kelly 2021; Gentry 2020, 2022; Zempi and Smith 2021), it also provides nuance to the similarities and differences between the portrayals of right-wing and Islamist violence.

This article is based on a content analysis of 343 articles from US national media outlets on incidents of incel, right-wing and Islamist violence that took place in the US between 2014 and 2019. The focus on the US is warranted as it is the country where most of the mass violence by incels has been carried out. Yet, while the US clearly constitutes a specific discursive and political context, patterns found in the portrayal there are likely to translate to other contexts, as similarities can be expected across Western contexts in portrayals of right-wing violence and Islamist violence. This article finds that incel violence is generally made sense of through the perpetrators’ personal motivations and life experience, without much reference to the violence’s (gendered) socio-political context. While portrayals of incel violence to some extent align with established understandings of mass violence, they at times deviate from these in unexpected ways. Ultimately, this article contends that the comparative over-emphasis on personal narratives within portrayals of incel violence prevents the politicisation and securitisation of this form of misogynistic violence.

Understanding violence as politicised and securitised

As noted above, the manner in which something is framed shapes both understandings of the world and the world itself. In the case of violence, how incidents are presented affects understandings of the perpetrator and their motivations for the violence, while also ultimately affecting responses to the violence: how much, and what kind of, coverage does it receive? Is it considered to be in need of political attention? Is the violence characterised as a threat and to whom? What are deemed appropriate responses to the violence? Answers to these questions are both shaped by, and in turn effect, processes of politicisation and securitisation, i.e. an issue entering the political sphere or gaining political attention and the subsequent move of lifting issues from the realm of “normal politics” into the realm of security. This section begins with an introduction to the concept of framing, before exploring it in relation to both politicisation and securitisation.

Framing describes the act of presenting something in a specific manner, including choices of what to focus on and what to exclude (Entman 2004): it is the organisation of information (K. Powell 2018). As such, framing provides the interpretative structures (P. Norris, Kearns, and Just 2003) used to contextualise and make sense of particular events, which over time structure the social world (Entman 1993; Reese 2001); frames help particular worldviews become seen as “common sense” (Adam and Kearns 2020; Gitlin 1980). Further, frames will not only define the issue or event in question, but they also explain causes as well as determining legitimate responses (Entman 2004; Zdjelar and Davies 2021, 295). The different parts to, and functions of, framing are: defining problems, diagnosing causes, making moral judgements and suggesting remedies (Entman 1993, 52), whereby the issue in question is defined and then reiterated, or promoted, throughout these parts. Language is central to framing; delineating, creating and perpetuating a particular interpretation. This in turn highlights how frames make certain interpretations salient, which always occurs at the expense of others (Curran and Gibson 2020, 354).

Different interpretations evoke and require different responses. Whether violence is considered in need of political attention or even framed as a threat depends on processes of politicisation and securitisation. While these frames build on each other, with the latter being somewhat of an escalation of the first, there are distinct mechanisms at work in each.

There are several factors that promote a framing of violence that demands political attention and that contribute to the process of politicisation. The first is how the violence is labelled, i.e. whether it is referred to in a very descriptive manner, describing what took place, or if it is labelled in a way that feeds into previously established frames of reference (such as the “terrorism” label), a practice known as normative labelling. The latter in particular contributes to the process of politicisation, as labels that connect the violence to already politicised discussions provide immediate reference points for where and how these discussions are to take place. This becomes the “defining the problem” (Entman 1993) part of the framing of violence.

A second factor in the framing of violence as political, and thus the process of politicisation, is if the violence is presented as an episodic incident or within a thematic framing (Iyengar 1991). The episodic framing suggests that the violence is a one-off incident, maybe even accidental, and thus does not require consideration within broader, political discussions. Alternatively, thematic framing places the incident within its broader context, implying links to other incidents of violence and suggesting a bigger picture. This contextual understanding, born out of so-called thematic framing (Falkheimer and Olsson 2015; Iyengar 1991), allows a recognition of how the violence in question relates to other issues that are already established as in need of political attention. As such, it facilitates a faster, more seamless politicisation, as the violence in question is slotted into previously defined points of reference and narratives; the need for political attention becomes self-evident.

The final factor considered here within the process of politicisation is the motivation of the violence – which goes hand in hand with the diagnosis of causes. Framings of the motivations of violence can largely be divided into two categories: those focusing on personal motivations, including the life stories of the perpetrators; and those centring political motivations, such as broader ideology. The latter has a similar effect to the more contextual framings discussed above; by framing the violence as motivated by ideology, the suggested causes of the violence are linked to issues that are already politicised. The notion of ideology suggests an overarching aim that motivates the violence, often at odds with the political system. Thus, once violence is framed as motivated by ideology, it is deemed to be politically motivated – characterised as seeking an alternative reality or making a political statement – which in turn suggests a need for political attention. Contrastingly, framing violence as personally motivated conveys the sense that the violence was bound to and originated from the individual perpetrator (Gentry 2020; Betus, Kearns and Lemieux 2021). Thus, without the perpetrator, the threat of violence is deemed to be low; the violence is contained to its perpetrator. By framing the violence as deriving from the perpetrator, and their personal life stories, the violence is not considered to be linked to its socio-political context, and thereby not indicative of or reflecting wider socio-political dynamics.

In many ways, the process of securitisation builds upon a process of politicisation. In order to securitise an issue, it has to already have been politicised – as securitisation is the move from “normal politics” into the realm of security (Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde 1998; Gray and Franck 2019; Wæver 1995). Securitisation is thus the elevation of an already politicised issue to the next level, characterised by and evoking notions of existential threat, which in turn justifies extraordinary measures to tackle these threats (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998; Wæver 1995). In addition to a prior politicisation of the issue at hand, the process of securitisation also relies on the securitising actor, the referent subject that is threatening and the referent object that is threatened, as well as the audience (Balzacq 2005; Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka 2016). These power dynamics become apparent in investigations of who has the power to “speak security” and who does not (Booth 2007; Hansen 2000; Hirschauer 2020), but they are also foundational to the frames of reference into and through which the securitisation process occurs. As such, the move from the sphere of politics to the sphere of security is aided by previously established understandings of who is dangerous and who is in danger. As highlighted above, these understandings are “intrinsically connected to the project of race” (Amin-Khan 2012; Bilgin 2010; Ibrahim 2005; Moffette and Vadasaria 2016, 293), as well as indicative of gender hierarchies (Gentry 2020; Gray and Franck 2019).

For an incident of violence to be securitised, it needs to be framed in accordance with accepted understandings of what constitutes a threat. Similar to the distinction between thematic and episodic framings introduced above, the process of securitising violence can be aided through references to pre-established and accepted threats; for example, through linking incidents of violence to the “Global War on Terror” (GWoT). Likewise, framings of violence as caused by or belonging to a group increase the perceived threat (Adam and Kearns 2020; Groothuis 2020; K. Powell 2018) and thereby contribute to a process of securitisation. Similarly, references to radicalisation will evoke notions of the Muslim Other, that are firmly anchored in securitisation frames (Amin-Khan 2012; Jackson 2007). In line with this, presentations of the violence’s perceived, or actual, motivation can contribute to the process of securitisation, similarly to how presumed ideology can contribute to politicisation.

Overview of the field: what we know about portrayals of violence

How then do the above processes feature within and shape portrayals of violence? And how may they do so differently for different types of violence? This section starts by providing an overview of existing research on portrayals of Islamist and right-wing violence, followed by an overview of prior research on incel violence.

The way in which Islamist violence is portrayed is deeply attached to the label of “terrorism” and associated constructions of the Muslim “Other” (Gentry 2020; Khan 2021; K. A. Powell 2011). Powell argues that once a terrorist event takes place, the perpetrator’s Muslim or non-Muslim identity is established prior to discussing potential causes of the attack (2018, 8). Similarly, in their comparison of the “terrorist” and “Islamist” labels, Baele, Sterck, Slingeneyer and Lits find that the two have become synonymous (2019, 533), in the sense that they generate and fulfil the same stereotypes (see also Adam and Kearns 2020; Greenaway and Cruwys 2019; K. A. Powell 2011; Reese and Lewis 2011; von Sikorski et al. 2021). As such, reporting of Islamist violence often features discussions of external radicalisation, i.e. the influence of a group recruiting for a specific cause (Mitnik, Freilich, and Chermak 2020; Betus, Kearns and Lemieux 2020), which in turn contributes to the construction of an organised other that is to be taken seriously (Hase 2021; Matthews 2015). Combined, this results in a portrayal of Islamist violence that dehumanises the perpetrators, in line with colonial imaginaries of the others, and places the violence within wider, global contexts (Kundnani 2015).

In contrast, right-wing extremist violence is often portrayed and understood in opposition to the factors presented above. Due to the raced construction of terrorism, right-wing extremist violence has been overlooked or not always been considered policy-relevant (Gentry 2020; Martini 2023; J. J. Norris 2017). Crucially, this distinction is made apparent through the notion of “domestic terrorism” (K. A. Powell 2011) – which is generally found to be downplayed (Chermak and Gruenewald 2006; Dolliver and Kearns 2022; Fishman and Marvin 2003). Unlike portrayals of Islamist violence, which often evoke narratives of the “Global War on Terror”, commentators on right-wing extremist violence predominantly forgo discussion of the wider international context. In their investigation of who gets to be labelled a “terrorist”, Hamas Elmasry and el-Nawawy argue that acts of violence by non-Muslim perpetrators were predominantly framed as isolated (2020). Portrayals of right-wing extremist violence centre around its perpetrators, investigating their motivations in detail and to some extent, excusing the violence, in the form of discussions surrounding mental illness or access to weapons (King 2017; K. Powell 2018). This results in a humanised and more empathetic portrayal (Betus, Kearns and Lemieux 2020; Zdjelar and Davies 2021), feeding into the notion of the “lone wolf” perpetrator – which in turn affects perceptions of threat, insofar as violence by individuals is considered less threatening than violence perpetrated by groups (Feick, Donnay, and McCabe 2021; Hase 2021) and less frequent. Falkheimer and Olsson find that these perpetrators are portrayed as “intelligent but mentally unstable” (Falkheimer and Olsson 2015, 75), which suggests that the violence is an unfortunate occurrence rather than part of a wider political ideology. Likewise, the perpetrator’s personal life is often described in detail, thus personalising the perpetrator and presenting the violence as secondary rather than fundamental to the individual’s identity (Zdjelar and Davies 2021).

While the above has provided insight into the portrayals of both Islamist violence and right-wing violence and the dynamics that influence these, there has been little research placing these two into direct comparison. Some scholars have produced adjacent work, such as Ghazi-Tehrani and Kearns who investigate the difference in media coverage of hate crimes and terrorism, finding that the latter incidents score higher in newsworthiness and that non-white perpetrators of terrorism receive more coverage than white perpetrators (2020, 16). Others have examined who gets labelled a terrorist in news coverage of a variety of violent incidents (de Veen and Thomas 2022; Dolliver and Kearns 2022; von Sikorski et al. 2021), or have placed two different groups of perpetrators, or perpetrators with distinct characteristics, in direct comparison. Hamas Elmasry and el-Nawawy analysed the portrayals of the Las Vegas and Orlando shootings, finding that the Muslim perpetrator of the latter was portrayed in a more humanising manner than the perpetrator of the former, a US-born Muslim with alleged ties to terrorist groups (2020, 876). Meanwhile, Betus, Kearns and Lemieux (2021) examine the propensity to label violent incidents as either “terrorism” or “mental illness”. They find that there is no discernible difference between labelling of “mental health” between attacks perpetrated by white people compared to people of colour, yet also confirming that portrayals of attacks perpetrated by Muslims are more likely to reference terrorism (Betus, Kearns and Lemieux 2020, 1148).

Research related to incel violence has so far predominantly focused on the incel community and its members, having explored its foundations, rhetoric and worldviews and finding prevalent notions of anti-feminism, racism, misogyny and resentment (Ging 2019; Kelly, DiBranco, and DeCook 2022). The latter has been particularly evident in examinations of how members deal with a perceived sense of illegitimacy and feelings of frustration (Cottee 2021; Lounela and Murphy 2023; Speckhard et al. 2021; van der Veer 2020; Witt 2020), derived from and directed at a social hierarchy based on sex and attractiveness (Baele, Brace, and Coan 2019). Research on the rhetoric within the incel community has found it to “reinforce a misogynistic ontology” (Marwick and Caplan 2018, 543) that is particularly “active” when women are considered to be “transgressing patriarchal gender norms” (Lewis, Rowe, and Wiper 2018, 532). Turning to research on incel violence, Scaptura and Boyle examined the foundations of this violence, specifically looking at how challenges to the group status of men lead to violent fantasies about mass murder and rape (2020). Beyond these fantasies, widespread support for violence exists across incel forums (Baele, Brace, and Coan 2019), with violence against women being specifically glorified (Jaki et al. 2019).

While some have taken this as evidence of a violent extremist ideology unifying the incel community¹ (Carian, DiBranco, and Ebin 2022; Harris and Conway 2021; Zimmerman, Ryan, and Duriesmith 2018) and push for it to be considered as such (Duggan and Mason-Bish 2021; Gentry 2022; Laura and Gentry 2015; Zempi and Smith 2021), others have argued against considering it as a political threat (Hoffman, Ware, and Shapiro 2020; Richter and Richter 2019). Nonetheless, O’Donnell and Shor find explicit evidence of a violent discourse within the incel community (2022, 345), as well as clear political ambitions. Their research indicates a political nature to the violence, albeit at times vague or improbable, that is predicated upon four explanations: seeking attention, exacting revenge, reaffirming masculinity, and pursuing political change (O’Donnell and Shor 2022, 339). Similarly, the incel worldview’s flirtation or rather distinct overlap with racist theories such as “the great replacement” and anger directed at women choosing non-white sexual/romantic partners, are considered to be mutually escalatory (Gentry 2020; Jasser, Kelly, and Rothermel 2020; Wilson 2022).

While the portrayal of both Islamist violence and right-wing violence has been studied extensively, there is limited research into how incels and violence perpetrated by members of their community are portrayed and understood by the wider public. Byerly has investigated how coverage of incel behaviour draws links to sexual aggression, as well as recognising the roles of computer technology and social media in coalescing online communities (2020, 292). In a previous study (under review), I examined the narratives present in the portrayals of incel violence and their perpetrators, finding a strong tendency to individualise the violence through focusing on the perpetrators’ life experiences and family backgrounds, while overlooking the violence’s wider socio-political contexts. Bengtsson Meuller further demonstrates how focusing on incels contributes to an overlooking of wider misogyny within the UK context (Bengtsson Meuller 2024).

Yet, without any form of comparison, it is impossible to say something more general about the seeming lack of politicisation of incel violence. Arguably, it is only through comparing incel violence to other types, taking it out of the “gendered violence silo” (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2013; True and Tanyag 2017; Wright 2016), that we can gain grounded insight into understandings of misogynistic violence as well as provide nuance to wider understandings of how mass violence is portrayed, made sense of and responded to. As incel violence is a relatively recent phenomenon and manifestation of gendered violence, we cannot expect this form to be portrayed or politicised in the same way as both Islamist violence and right-wing violence. Yet, neither should its novelty be a reason for not situating the portrayal of incel violence in the context of representations of other mass violence, particularly with violence that is similar in its form. All incidents analysed here are similar in their form of violence.

Based on both prior research and theories pertaining to the processes of politicisation and securitisation, the following expectations can be made about portrayals of Islamist and right-wing violence. Table 1 below not only presents these expectations but further guides the comparison between incel violence and the other two types of violence, thereby helping to map out where findings about the portrayal of incel violence fit within broader understandings of mass violence.

Table 1. The dominant framings of Islamist and right-wing violence.

	Labelling of violence	Motivations for violence	Politicisation/Securitisation
Islamist violence	Labelled as “terrorism”; presented w links to GWoT, i.e. thematic	Primarily political; discussion of group membership and ideology	Immediate securitisation through group reference and GWoT
Right-wing violence	Descriptive labelling of the violence; presented as episodic incidents	Mainly personal, perpetrator-centric explanations and their life stories	Not securitised, maybe politicised. Yet within frame of gun violence not necessarily ideological context

Method and material

This section introduces and discusses the methodological choices made within this study. As such, it presents the selection of cases, the selection of material and the method of content analysis, including the analytical framework used to examine the material.

The selection of cases was guided by the need for a context in which all three types of violence had occurred – the US –, which also has experienced the most incidents of incel violence. As mentioned, while there are limitations with the US context, due to its particular history of mass shootings and ongoing gun debates,² understandings of incel violence within this context are expected to translate to other contexts, as this has been the case for other types of violences. As incel violence is an emerging phenomenon, the pool of incel violence from which to choose specific incidents was rather limited: in total, there have been around ten incidents that are identified as motivated by incel ideology within the US. Further, to compare, the incidents need to share certain characteristics.

I identified the following shared characteristics across three incidents of incel violence in the US: age of the perpetrator³; form of violence as shooting; declarations of motivation for the violence; comparable impact in terms of the number of victims. These then also became the characteristics according to which I selected incidents of Islamist and right-wing violence. As such, the specific incidents included in this study (see Table 2) share the aforementioned similarities yet differ on the ideological motivations for the violence. Most importantly, they all share the same form, shootings. While it is impossible to find cases that match perfectly on all characteristics, I have selected eight incidents of violence that are sufficiently similar to make a fruitful comparison whilst providing a sample of articles that is large enough to answer the research questions.⁴ The table below provides details on the case selection of the different incidents of violence analysed here, as well as indicating some details of their respective perpetrators.

Table 2. List of incidents included in study.

	Date of incident	Age of perpetrator	Victims Dead, injured
Incel violence	23/05/2014	22	7, 14
	01/10/2015	26	10, 8
	14/02/2018	19	17, 17
Islamist violence	16/07/2015	25	5, 2
	12/06/2016	29	49, 53
	06/12/2019	21	3, 8
Right-wing violence	17/06/2015	21	9, 1
	03/08/2019	21	23, 23

To compare the portrayals of the incidents presented above, I chose newspaper articles as these act as both a name giver and transmitter of information to the public (Baele et al. 2019; Bhatia 2008). They often reflect and reinforce dominant narratives (Adcock 2010; Gitlin 1980; P. Norris, Kearns, and Just 2003), as well as “assign[ing] blame, encourag[ing] empathy, or simply ignor[ing] certain aspects of an event” (Mortensgaard 2020, 149). Thus, newspapers’ portrayals of incidents of violence do not just reflect dominant narratives, but also shape perceptions of what is in need of political attention, and what is considered a threat.

For each of the incidents of violence analysed, I searched for national newspaper articles within a time span from the incident itself to 2 months afterwards, which allowed me to include both immediate reporting after the incident took place and longer discussions about motivations for the attack once more information had been released. However, all articles ended up being published within three weeks of the violence taking place. I chose national newspapers with the highest weekly paid circulation: the New York Times (483,701 copies), the Wall Street Journal (1,011,200 copies) and USA Today (1,621,091 copies).⁵ Per incident, I searched the Factiva⁶ database for the name of the respective perpetrator, the place in which the violence took place and within the 2-month time period. This resulted in a total of 343 articles: 88 each for incidents of incel and right-wing violence, and 167 for incidents of Islamist violence. The articles selected are newspaper articles, i.e. not op-eds or commentary. Further, they are considered here as one singular corpus of material, rather than analysed per newspaper, as the analytical focus lies on the comparison between different types of violence.

Turning to the method of analysis, this article conducts a content analysis of newspaper articles about incidents of Islamist, right-wing and incel violence, guided by framing theory. It not only uncovers patterns within the material but also examines how much attention is paid to particular aspects of the coverage (Boreus and Bergström 2017). The coding process of the material was conducted in two stages. The first stage pertained to coding the manifestations into four broad categories, detailed below and in reference to the first two functions of the framing process. In the second stage, I then analysed the codes within these four categories/questions, identifying patterns and sorting them into separate substantive categories (e.g. dividing labels of violence into normative or descriptive).

The analytical framework below provides an overview of the questions, corresponding codes and examples of manifestations used to code the 343 articles. I did the coding manually, which aided the revealing of those subcategories that were not drawn from prior research, such as home life or previous behaviour. Discussions of potential politicisation and/or securitisation emerge out of the patterns made visible by the coding, rather than being individual codes themselves. The articles are coded on a paragraph-level basis, which means that every article could be sorted in several codes and articles themselves may contain the same code several times.

Function 1: defining the problem

Table

What is the violence labelled as?
codes	descriptive	normative
manifestations	“shooting”; “attack”; “incident”; “mass-shooting”; “murder”	“massacre”; “tragedy”; “rampage”; “acts of horror”; “bloodbath”; terrorism’
(2) How is the violence framed in terms of context?
codes	thematic	episodic
manifestations	Links to GWoT; links to discussions on gun violence, the internet/social media; other (related) incidents of violence	“random” label; no links to wider discussions; focus on single event and its perpetrator

Function 2: diagnosing causes

Table

(3) What is reported about the perpetrator of the violence?
codes	Personal Experience	Home life	Previous behaviour
manifestations	Loneliness; outsiderness; social environment, i.e. few friends	Family set up and relationships; no fixed address, foster families	Being a “nuisance”; “anti-social behaviour”; history of violence; history of (mental) illness
(4) What is considered the cause of the violence?
codes	Personal motivations	Political motivations
manifestations	Feelings of victimhood and isolation; loneliness; outsider; frustrations; revenge	Ideology; group allegiance; manifestos; references to radicalisation and overarching justifications for the violence

Findings

Labels and context of the violence

To begin the analysis and situate the incidents of violence in relation to each other, I first set out to answer the first two questions presented above. These pertain to how the violence is labelled and how it is contextualised, thus providing an overview of the type of portrayal of the incidents of violence – addressing the “defining the problem” function of framing. They thus give initial understandings of where to situate the violence in question, which in turn informs the more in-depth discussions of the motivations and causes of violence, discussed in later sections.

Table 3. Number and proportion of references by frame type and violence category.

	descriptive label	normative label	thematic frame	episodic frame	total number of articles
Incel violence	28 (31.82%)	61 (69.32%)	30 (34.09%)	57 (64.77%)	88
Islamist violence	28 (16.77%)	102 (61.08%)	93 (55.69%)	0 (0.00%)	167
Right-wing violence	24 (27.27%)	47 (53.41%)	34 (38.64%)	46 (52.27%)	88

Note: The proportion indicates the percentage of the specific frame relative to the total number of articles that focus on each violence category. Since different frames are not mutually exclusive, the proportions for each violence category do not sum to 100%.

As seen in Table 3, descriptive labelling (such as “shooting”, “attack”, etc.) of the violence is much more common across portrayals of both incel and right-wing violence than portrayals of Islamist violence. However, in terms of normative labelling of the violence (e.g. “massacre”, “tragedy”, etc.), the portrayal of incel violence is closer to the portrayal of Islamist violence, i.e. featuring three times as much normative than descriptive labelling. In fact, the articles on incel violence have the highest share of normative labelling – situating portrayals of incel violence away from understandings of the other types of violence. This may be because incel violence is not (yet) as familiar as both right-wing and Islamist violence, thus causing reporting of it to focus more on the shock and seeming inexplicability of the violence. Additionally, the location of incel violence – close to educational facilities – may contribute to a portrayal of the incidents as more shocking, thus warranting more normative labelling, as the violence took place in spaces associated with (innocent) children and adolescents. This could also explain the fact that incel violence is labelled as “deadly” the most, closely followed by the articles on incidents of Islamist violence.

In terms of context, the articles on incel violence present the violence as seemingly isolated incidents focusing on the individual perpetrator over wider societal discussions. This is similar to the portrayal of right-wing violence, which is also presented more episodically, whereas Islamist violence is portrayed solely thematically, i.e. connected to the Global War on Terror. However, incel violence is presented in relation to one broader societal discussion: guns and gun control debates, rather than in relation to other incidents of violence. This might once more be explained by the location of the incidents of incel violence, as these easily fit into established narratives and debates around gun ownership and safety, as well as related narratives about school shooting.

The fewer references to thematic framing within the portrayal of incel violence relate to discussions surrounding the internet and social media, primarily focusing on the perpetrators’ internet presence and societal debates surrounding the role and responsibility of social media companies. As the incel community exists solely online, one might expect references to the internet and social media to be most prevalent within portrayals of incel violence, in comparison to the other types of violence. However, while references to the internet and social media do feature in the articles on incel violence, in comparison with the other two types, this is firmly in the middle position. The articles on right-wing violence feature almost twice as many references to the internet and social media than the articles on incel violence, with only a marginal share held by the articles on Islamist violence. However, for the latter, the internet does also show up in relation to the radicalisation of the perpetrators.

Links to previous incidents of similar violence can be a good indicator for placing the violence in question within its context; here, the articles on incel violence feature the fewest references, whereas both of the other two types are repeatedly linked to prior related incidents of violence. Examples of the latter include “manifesto reflects the language found in white supremacist online forums” (NYT 21 June 2015); “Since the 11 September 2001, terrorist attacks, these […] become known as self-radicalised and self-directed” (NYT 22 July 2015); “the global conversation turned to radicalised Muslims bent on terrorist attacks” (NYT 14 June 2015). Throughout the articles, incel violence is seldom placed in relation to the bigger picture of gender-based violence, or indeed misogyny, and instead each incident is discussed in a primarily self-contained manner. At times, other, similar, incidents are listed to provide reference points, but these are only listed, not necessarily discussed. One explanation of this could be that incel violence is not (yet) as well-known as the other two types, and therefore any narratives may not yet have been established or rather connections have not yet been made. However, there are possible “bigger picture” discussions to be had in relation to incidents of incel violence, such as those relating to misogyny, sexism and anti-feminism; all of which feature implicitly in discussions of the violence’s potential motives, explored in the following section.

Combined, the above provides an overview of where incel violence is situated in relation to portrayals of the other two types of violence. In terms of descriptive labelling, portrayals of incel violence were similar to those of right-wing violence. However, when it comes to normative labelling, articles on incel violence featured the highest share of normative labelling and are more closely aligned to portrayals of Islamist violence than portrayals of right-wing violence. This indicates a strong (emotive) response to and presentation of incel violence which results in the exceptionalising of the violence itself. The portrayal of incel violence thus implies the violence to be a greater shock in comparison to the other two types of violence, which could be due to a sense of unfamiliarity and presumed incomprehensibility of the violence.

For contextual discussions, the portrayal of incel violence generally presents the violence as isolated incidents without discussions of wider socio-political contexts. At times, however, portrayals of incel violence do feature discussions such as those pertaining to wider gun debates or the role of the internet and social media. Yet these are presented loosely as facilitating factors to the violence, rather than thematised as potential causes for the violence itself. While this section has primarily focused on situating incel violence in relation to the other two types of violence, it already points to a portrayal that is not conducive to a politicisation of incel violence – through emphasising its apparent inexplicability and presenting the violence as isolated incidents.

Perpetrators and causes of the violence

The latter two questions posed to the text, regarding the violence’s perpetrator and its cause, interact so as to create an understanding of where the violence originated. They are considered here together due to this interaction, as insights about the perpetrator ultimately shape perceptions about the motivations for the violence, thereby fulfilling the “diagnosing causes” stage of the framing process. This section addresses personal and political motivations in turn, examining how these may shape understandings of whether or not, and to what extent, political attention is required for incel violence, as well as analysing potential subsequent securitisation processes. Table 4

Personal motivations and life experiences

Table 4. Number and proportion of references by life experience of the perpetrator and violence category

	Family	Social isolation	Deviant behaviour	Mental health	Emotions	total number of articles
Incel violence	13 (14.77%)	25 (28.41%)	18 (20.45%)	23 (26.14%)	6 (6.82%)	88
Islamist violence	13 (7.78%)	3 (1.80%)	19 (11.38%)	10 (5.99%)	0 (0.00%)	167
Right-wing violence	9 (10.23%)	5 (5.68%)	4 (4.55%)	4 (4.55%)	0 (0.00%)	88

Note: The proportion indicates the percentage of the specific frame relative to the total number of articles that focus on each violence category. Since different frames are not mutually exclusive, the proportions for each violence category do not sum to 100%.

In comparison to the other two types of violence, the perpetrators’ backgrounds and life experiences feature heavily in articles on incel violence, at a factor of nearly three times as many. Portrayals of incel violence thus focus significantly on the perpetrators, seeking to find explanations and causes of the violence in the life experiences of those who carry out the violence. The “personal narrative” features to similar extents in portrayals of right-wing and Islamist violence, whereas the portrayal of incel violence is predominantly focused on the perpetrators’ life experiences and personal motivations, thus suggesting that understandings of incel violence do not necessarily align with portrayals of the other two types of violence. Incel violence is presented as being rooted in the perpetrators, more so than for the other two types of violence, and as such gendered/misogynistic violence are seen to be born out of, and thereby contained to, the individual perpetrators – thus negating any investigation of the bigger picture or consideration of directing political attention to this issue.

The trend of personalised narratives featuring heaviest within the portrayal of incel violence is also evident within the different subcategories (e.g. their family and social environments, as well as emotional lives). More so, the portrayal of incel violence remains an outlier, i.e. substantially different from the portrayals of right-wing violence and Islamist violence, throughout these subcategories. Articles on incel violence include four to six times as many references to the perpetrators’ mental health. Examples of these include: “deep and puzzling psychological problems as [the parents] struggled through divorce” (NYT 3 June 2014), “a troubled young man who struggled to control his behaviour” (WSJ 15 February 2018), and “concerns about mental health – a shadow that hung over this family” (NYT 2 June 2014). These references are often incorporated into substantial discussions about long-standing problems – and thereby suggest an underlying medical reason for the violence, which in turn shifts responsibility away from the perpetrator and furthers the personalising narratives.

Likewise, articles on incel violence also feature the most references to the perpetrators’ previous behaviour, referring to their anti-social behaviour and deviance, in comparison to the other two types. Examples of this discuss how incel perpetrators had a “history of bullying and social ostracism” (USAT 27 May 2014), how they became a “socially awkward menace” (WSJ 16 February 2018) to their upscale neighbourhood, and “took an interest to shooting small animals with a pellet gun” (WSJ 16 February 2018). While expectations suggest that perpetrators of Islamist violence are often presented, and made sense of, as inherently deviant others, and thus situated far away from the presumed normative centre – that is, white, Western, Christian, liberal and heteronormative – it is somewhat surprising to see this narrative within portrayals of incel violence. Such a deviation suggests a form of othering taking place. Whereas Islamist violence is othered based on the presumed inherent deviance of the Muslim extremist and assumed terrorist perpetrator, incel violence may be othered as a consequence of overlooking its gendered nature; as the violence appears inexplicable, there has to be something inherently wrong with the perpetrators of incel violence. Thus, while Islamist violence is othered on the collective level, incel violence and its perpetrators are othered on an individual level. Its seemingly individual nature presents the issue of incel violence as a fixable problem contained to individuals, effectively portraying it as not as big a problem and thus not necessarily in need of political attention.

The focus on the individual perpetrator, and their personal motivations for the violence, extends into the references to the perpetrators’ emotional states at the point of and leading up to their violence. Prior research suggests that perpetrators of incel violence would be portrayed in a similar manner to perpetrators of right-wing violence when it comes to addressing the rationality of their violence. Yet, it is only within the articles on incidents of incel violence that references to the perpetrators’ emotions are present – such as references to “angry young man with rage […] and resentment” (NYT 3 October 2015). Combined with discussions of the perpetrators’ family backgrounds, primarily focusing on stories of divorced parents and changing places of residence, these references portray incel violence to be caused by non-traditional, unstable circumstances and subsequent emotional distress. Examples of such unconventional family situations are one perpetrator’s parents’ divorce and the subsequent “boom-and-bust cycle” (NYT 2 June 2014) of the father’s career or a strange mother–son relationship in which the mother “exhibited bizarre behaviour and was noticeable overprotective of her son” (WSJ 8 October 2015). Here, the portrayal of incel violence aligns more with the portrayal of right-wing violence, as articles on the latter include the most references to perpetrators’ family backgrounds. As such, family background (i.e. a more personalised narrative) appears to also play a big role in understandings of incel. Through this emphasis on perpetrator-centric causes of incel violence, the violence is further individualised, leaving little room for politicising or even securitising it.

The focus on the perpetrators’ experiences continues through discussion of their social isolation, experiences of loneliness and other related feelings. For example, articles include references to the perpetrators’ “social isolation start[ing] from a young age” (NYT 24 May 2014), or as being “lonely and disaffected” (WSJ 5 October 2015). The perpetrators of incel violence are characterised as outsiders of their communities, both among their peers and larger social circles, having a history of not “fitting in” and experiencing large degrees of isolation. On the one hand, this provides further evidence to the sense that incel violence is caused by something odd about its perpetrators. On the other hand, it also contributes to a portrayal of the perpetrators as people who are struggling and having negative experiences – someone the audience is encouraged to empathise with. In comparison, the articles on the other types of violence feature very few references to the social isolation of the perpetrators.

Overall, the above indicates that narratives of personal motivations contributed to by stories of the perpetrators’ social exclusion, their family backgrounds and previous behaviours, are prevalent throughout the portrayals of incel violence. Incel violence is thus presented, and made sense of, as contained within and derived from isolated, inherently troubled individuals and their life experiences. While this personalising narrative is not completely surprising, somewhat aligning with understandings of right-wing violence, the extent to which the depiction of incel violence differs from portrayals of the other two types of violence is, with articles on both right-wing violence and Islamist violence only featuring a third of the references present in the articles on incel violence. Such an emphasis on the personal motivations and stories about the perpetrators themselves and their struggles to fit in result in the actual violence becoming secondary to the narrative of exclusion. Instead of focusing on the violence that took place, its victims and potential responses to it, the perpetrator-centric portrayal of incel violence shifts attention away from the violence. In turn, this framing also suggests that political attention is not strictly required to address this violence, as it is a problem contained to the individual perpetrators and their life experiences, and thus unpredictable, which does not necessarily warrant political attention.

Political motivations and ideology

Discussions of the political motivations and ideology behind violence play into understandings of potential threats and, in turn, may suggest conclusions as to whether it is appropriate to be considered as such – as well as affecting the perceived need for political attention. Here, the portrayal of incel violence differs greatly from the portrayals of the other two types of violence. There is scant reference to “political motivations” across the articles on incel violence, while nearly all of the articles of Islamist violence and right-wing violence referenced political motivations. Both observations – the lack of references within articles on incel violence and the similarity across the other two types of violence – somewhat defy expectations. For the former, one explanation might be that incel violence is a relatively recent occurrence and thus, as touched upon above, has not yet been situated within wider understandings of violence, i.e. within the same frames of reference as the other types of violence discussed here. This would have an effect on the extent to which political motivation is discussed in relation to incel violence. However, by the third incident of incel violence considered here, four years after the first one, one might expect connections to have been made. Meanwhile, the unexpected similarity across the other two types of violence is more nuanced than it first appears, as the types of “political motivations” references differ, with more “terrorism” reference within portrayals of Islamist violence, while portrayals of right-wing violence feature more general references to ideology. Table 5

Table 5. Number and proportion of references by political motivation and violence category

	Terror(ism)	Radicalisation	Ideology	total number of articles
Incel violence	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)	1 (1.14%)	88
Islamist violence	97 (58.08%)	16 (9.58%)	30 (17.96%)	167
Right-wing violence	16 (18.18%)	1 (1.14%)	58 (65.91%)	88

Note: The proportion indicates the percentage of the specific frame relative to the total number of articles that focus on each violence category. Since different frames are not mutually exclusive, the proportions for each violence category do not sum to 100%.

The absence of references to the “political” in portrayals of incel violence reveals the depoliticisation of this type of violence in the public sphere. Yet, there are some observations to be made concerning its absence. Similar to episodic framing discussed above, not featuring any discussions of political narratives in the portrayals of incel violence does still convey messages about whether it should be granted political attention. References to terrorism are very quick indicators for whether or not a political motivation is seen to be attached to the violence in question. While articles on both Islamist violence and right-wing violence feature references to terrorism, with most references within articles on Islamist violence, articles on incel violence do not at all. As references to terrorism immediately evoke ideas of threat, and the political attention directed to it, its absence within portrayals of violence suggests that the potential, and experienced by the victims, threat of the violence is not central in portrayals of incel violence. To some extent, and reiterating findings above, portrayals of incel violence present the incidents away from the violence itself.

In turn, this affects the potential to discuss the violence within its socio-political context and recognise its political motivation. Similarly, there are no references to processes of radicalisation within the articles on incel violence. Here, the process of radicalisation is taken as an indicator for a pre-existing ideology that the perpetrators bought in to and ultimately were inspired by. Yet, this also takes place in incel communities. Within their online spheres, members of incel communities are exposed to and actively maintain a certain belief system, which provides motivation and ideological background to the incidents considered here. Yet, the absence of any references within portrayals of incel violence implies that the violence “came out of nowhere”, or rather was not inspired by a pre-existing political group or ideological thought. This furthers the impression that incel violence occurs in isolated incidents and that the violence itself is contained to the perpetrator, thereby negating any need for political attention to address the violence.

This is further reiterated by explicit references, or rather the lack thereof, to the perpetrators’ ideology across the news reports. Articles on incel violence contain the fewest references to ideological motivations or affiliations, with only one reference throughout the 88 articles. In comparison, the other two types of violence are more consistently presented and discussed with references to ideology. The latter are more often explicitly linked, such as in these examples: “an extreme racist ideology” (USAT 26 June 2015), “radicalised Muslims bent on terrorist attacks” (NYT 14 June 2016) or “since the 11 September 2001, terrorist attacks [these people are known] as self-radicalised and self-directed” (NYT 22 July 2015). The one reference to ideology in the articles on incel violence concerns links to right-wing extremist ideology, where a perpetrator had “put a Nazi symbol and the phrase ‘I hate N—’ on his book bag” (WSJ 18 February 2018).

The portrayal of right-wing violence features the most references to ideology, contrary to expectations, although many of these are due to repeated mentioning of memorabilia, imagery or general aspects of the ideology in question. This leads to a narrative whereby, despite a high number of references to ideology, the perpetrators of right-wing violence are portrayed as people who commit ideological violence rather than being explicitly depicted as having these ideological views themselves. This sentiment is also reiterated within the portrayal of incel violence, as the absence of discussion of the violence’s ideological motivations constructs an understanding of incel violence as a non-ideological and thus non-political incident. Yet, all of the incel perpetrators considered here had explicitly named incel worldviews and ideology as their motivation for their violence, as such the lack of discussion of these ideological factors within the articles is rather striking. Combined, as incel violence is not presented in a politicised manner, this in turn prevents the next step of securitising the violence.

The general absence of narratives of political motivations within the portrayal of incel violence contributes to an understanding of this violence as not politically motivated, not posing a potential threat and therefore not needing political attention. The non-political narrative within the articles on incel violence is primarily constructed through its absence. Meanwhile, portrayals of incel violence reiterate the isolated nature of these incidents, and deny any connections to wider socio-political issues, or pre-established political/ideological causes. This in turn also affects the extent to which a sense of potential threat is conveyed. The isolated incident portrayal contributes to a sense that the threat of violence is low, or rather random, without direction (from a larger entity, such as a terrorist group). In that sense, the violence is also not immediately associated with seemingly illegitimate actors, as it would be if connected to a terrorist group for example, thus not immediately making judgements of the moral nature of the violence. Instead, incel violence is portrayed in an overly personalised manner, in comparison to the more salient types of violence, which in turn diminishes considerations of potential political motivations.

Conclusion

This article contributes to understandings of how and to what extent processes of politicisation and securitisation are present in regard to misogynistic incel violence. It thus provides an empirical basis to demonstrate that ultimately incel violence is framed in a way that neither suggests nor elicits political attention. Further, this article explored how portrayals of incel violence align with or differ from established understandings of mass violence. By conducting this comparison, it not only breaks incel violence out of the gendered violence silo but gives misogynistic violence the sustained academic attention that other types of violence receive, in turn highlighting the implications of how different violences are made sense of.

Through an analysis of 343 articles, this study demonstrates that the portrayal of incel violence largely contributes to an exceptionalising of the violence through placing emphasis on the perpetrators’ personal motivations and life experiences. Incel violence is thus removed from its socio-political context and instead presented in an almost liminal space: without obvious political motivations. The violence is isolated and contained to the individual perpetrators. However, the isolation of this violence happens in a way which characterises the perpetrators as inherently odd so that they cannot simply be cast aside and ignored. While this does not grant legitimacy to the violence, it also does not do condemn it. Although prior research demonstrates a variety across portrayals of different types of violence, the extent to which the portrayal of incel violence diverges is surprising. Within the three-way comparison of this study, the portrayal of incel violence generally does not follow what we know of and expect from prior understandings of Islamist violence and right-wing violence. Incel violence is portrayed in a manner that overwhelmingly focuses on the individual perpetrator, centring their apparent otherness. This otherness however is different to the otherness present in portrayals of Islamist violence, whereas the latter is created on a collective level, incel violence and its perpetrators are othered individually. This in turn enables incel violence to be contained and fixable without political or security attention.

Is incel violence portrayed in this manner due to the tendency to downplay or silence discussions around misogynistic violence? Partly, yes. One reason for this personalised portrayal may be the general reluctance to recognise, name and problematise misogyny and its attendant violence (Gentry 2020, 2022; Bengtsson Meuller 2024; Carian, DiBranco, and Kelly 2023). Changing this would require a conversation about, and collapsing of (gendered and racialised), hierarchies of what violence is deemed in need of political and/or security attention.

However, other factors are also at play here. As discussed previously, there are parts of the “school shooting narrative” that overlap with portrayals of incel violence. And while these are not to be conflated, similarities in both portrayal and expression of the violence may shape understandings of incel violence. Another factor is the assumed race associated with incel violence. While inceldom is not an exclusively white phenomenon, nor are all incel perpetrators white, the way it is portrayed and understood is similar to right-wing extremism, i.e. without racially othering the perpetrators as would be expected in the case of Islamist extremism. Likewise, the notion of an underlying misogynistic ideology may therefore not be as evident or considered relevant, as is the case for right-wing extremist violence. It is thus particularly pertinent how the portrayal of incel violence at times diverts from the portrayal of right-wing extremist violence. This article contributes to understandings of incel violence, offers an insight into how portrayals of incel violence compare to portrayals of Islamist violence and right-wing violence, and ultimately contributes to ongoing conversations seeking to name, challenge, and respond to misogyny in all its guises.

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Notes on contributors

Luise Bendfeldt

Luise Bendfeldt is a PhD candidate at the Department of Government at Uppsala University. Her current research focus is on male supremacy, misogyny and incel violence. Luise is particularly interested in both the power dynamics of portrayals of violence, and how the portrayals themselves are in turn shaped by power. Her further research interests include theories on protection, sexualities within international politics, and critical military studies.

Notes

1. This is not to suggest that all those who may identify as involuntarily celibate are also inherently extremist. Rather, it pertains to a specific subset of the incel community, which Kelly, DiBranco and DeCook term the “misogynistic incels” in order to distinguish the male supremacist ideology from personal identification with the term incel (2022, 165).

2. Such debates tend to be exacerbated by incidents that take place at or near an educational facility (Kalish and Kimmel 2010; Kimmel 2008). However, whilst there are some overlaps between the “school shooting narrative” and incel violence, the two are distinct not least because incel violence is not confined to violence in educational facilities. A conflation of the two might also have implications for the potential of incel violence to be considered an issue in need of political, or even security, attention.

3. Following No Notoriety’s advice, the perpetrators themselves will not be named but rather identified as a collective per type of violence, resulting in three perpetrators of incel violence, two for right-wing violence and three for Islamist violence. The No Notoriety campaign advocates for the responsible use of the names and images of perpetrators of mass violence (nonotoriety.com).

4. While I included three incidents each for incel and Islamist violence, only two incidents of right-wing violence are included. This is due to the selection criteria, primarily the age of the perpetrator.

5. The circulation numbers are from 2019 (as per the Alliance for Audited Media).

6. To address concerns of the potential for duplicates on Factiva I removed any duplicates. Factiva is a licenced service and services offered to institutions may differ, and therefore affect the potential sample. However, this is also the case for competitors and Factiva remains one of the top choices for research on newspaper articles (Noah, Liebler, and Webster 2023).