Are forest carbon projects in Africa green but mean?: A mixed-method analysis

ABSTRACT

As a climate change mitigation strategy, emission reduction projects, such as those related to forest carbon, are being developed around the globe. Framed under a multiple-win narrative, such projects are praised by multi-lateral organisations as initiatives that simultaneously mitigate climate change and foster socio-economic development in project countries. A great deal of scholarly literature, however, has found that projects fail to deliver on the promised benefits and can even have security implications. This study contributes to an emerging body of literature on the undesired effects of climate change mitigation interventions in the Global South. Research into the security implications of climate change mitigation actions remains scarce and the current evidence is largely drawn from case-by-case analysis. Using a multi-level logistic regression model based on the geospatial information of 22 forest carbon projects in Sub-Saharan Africa, this study finds that community contestation drastically increases after project implementation and that violent conflict also increases in the wider project landscape. The qualitative findings from one sampled case, the Bukaleba forest reserve in Uganda, provides further support for this relationship by documenting not only conflict events but also multiple factors that can increase conflict risk.

KEYWORDS:

• Climate change
• green economy
• forest conservation
• carbon offsetting
• violent conflict
• social unrest

1. Introduction

As a response to the global climate crisis, many economies around the world are adopting low carbon development strategies to transition to resilient, green, and climate-neutral economies. This process is often referred to as the ‘Green Transition’. The Green Transition is driven by the theory of ‘green growth’, which simultaneously calls for a ‘green economy’ and ‘sustained economic growth’ and rests on the assumption that GDP growth can be fully decoupled from natural resource use and carbon emissions at a pace fast enough to combat climate change (Hickel & Kallis, 2020).

Measuring carbon as a performance metric has become standard in the pursuit of the green transition and to account for unavoidable emissions, economic actors and states continue to opt for market-based strategies such as carbon taxes, or carbon offsetting, which refers to the compensation of unavoidable emissions through carbon credits. Carbon credits are generated through projects developed for the carbon market in various economic sectors, from clean energy and energy efficiency to mining and mineral production, to waste handling and disposal, and forestry and land-use. Under the current direction of climate policy, such projects remain an integral market-based instrument of the green transition and will continue to be promoted as part of low-carbon development policies. Given the economic growth imperative and the need to reduce mitigation costs, offsets are frequently generated in the Global South, despite the fact that the majority of developing countries there contribute the least to global greenhouse gas emissions and, due to lower adaptive capacity, particularly rural communities in the Global South are disproportionally affected by the consequences of climate change (EU-UNEP, 2019). The climate crisis threatens to reverse the last few decades of progress in sustainable development, poverty reduction, and global health (Reimann & Burns, 2019). As a response to this new challenge multiple solutions have been proposed and climate mainstreaming is one of them, a phenomenon which refers to the integration of climate policies and measures into ongoing development planning and decision making (Ayers et al., 2014). This process is frequently referred to as a ‘development-first’ approach (Kim et al., 2016; Pervin et al., 2013). The link between them is also enshrined in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which is why a similar narrative is used by intergovernmental organisations and projects developers, who present carbon projects as multiple-win success stories that simultaneously contribute to global climate change mitigation, adaptation, and socio-economic development in project countries (UNFCCC, 2018).

Studies on the security effects of climate change provide diverging conclusions (Koubi, 2019; Nordås & Gleditsch, 2007) but climate change is often called a ‘threat multiplier’ that can seriously exacerbate volatile situations (CNA Corporation, 2007; Huntjens & Nachbar, 2015). But to what extent do forest carbon projects affect the security situation in project landscapes? To date the security implications of climate change mitigation strategies remain under-researched, but understanding potential unintended consequences when dealing with climate change is crucial (Corbera et al., 2019; Dabelko et al., 2013; Mirumachi et al., 2020; Reimann & Burns, 2019). While there are excellent case studies (e.g. Ece et al., 2017; Ibarra et al., 2011; Kemerink-Seyoum et al., 2018) that link forest carbon projects to violent and non-violent social conflict or discuss risk-multiplying factors, to the author’s knowledge this is one of the first analyses that uses quantitative methods based on the geospatial mapping of forest carbon initiatives to explore this relationship in broader terms. This study contributes to gaining a better understanding of that relationship and presents a critical analysis of the security impact of forest carbon projects in Sub-Saharan Africa. With a mixed-method research design, this study not only exploits the advantages of quantitative research to draw inferences from this relationship on a larger scale but also contributes to the external validity of previous small-n studies. Based on a geospatial mapping of 22 forest carbon projects in Sub-Saharan Africa, this study evaluates the relative chance of violent events involving civilians and community contestation. Then the study will cross-validate the results of the statistical analysis and seek further elaboration and illustration by studying the Bukaleba Forest Reserve project in Uganda, which is one of the 22 projects included in the statistical sample. The fieldwork for the case study was conducted by local and foreign researchers from the Shared Value Foundation in 2017.¹

Around the globe, over 800 million people live in and around forests, of which over 250 million live below the extreme poverty line and forests are essential to their livelihoods (FAO, 2018). The world’s biodiversity is also largely dependent on forests and forests are key for a healthy climate (FAO and UNEP, 2020). The purpose of this paper is not to discredit forest-based climate interventions but to contribute to an emerging body of literature that sheds light on the undesired effects of climate change mitigation interventions in the Global South and to discuss potential solutions. The structure of this paper will be as follows: in the next section, the paper will first briefly introduce the carbon market and the development process of forest carbon projects. Then the theoretical concept will be introduced, followed by the design and results of the multi-level analysis. Next, the results of the Bukaleba case study will be elaborated and the discussion and conclusion will close the paper.

2. Carbon market and project development process

The revenue generating idea of the carbon market is simple: each ton of reduced or avoided carbon emission can be traded on the carbon market in the form of carbon credits. The Kyoto Protocol created a legally-binding market-based policy approach to mitigate climate change consisting of three mechanisms: the intergovernmental emission trading scheme (ETS), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and Joint Implementation (JI) (Stephan & Paterson, 2012). Under the CDM and JI mechanisms, carbon projects are developed, and the credits generated can be bought to offset unavoidable emissions as described above. Only carbon credits generated under those three mechanisms can fulfil obligations and emission reduction targets agreed upon under the Kyoto Protocol. It is also referred to as ‘compliance carbon market’. Companies or individuals can choose to reduce their emissions ‘voluntarily’, when not obligated to legally, on the ‘voluntary carbon market’. Projects developed for the voluntary market are implemented in accordance with industry-created standards and their registration process is usually less cost-intensive and, in particular, less bureaucratic than for CDM and JI projects (Climate Corporation, no date). In 2019, the overall voluntary carbon offset value transacted was over USD 280 million, over half of which accounts for the forestry and land-use sector (USD 159.1 million) out of seven project sectors evaluated (Donofrio et al., 2020). Forest and land use credits were the second most traded credits on the voluntary market after renewable energy credits but the highest priced (USD 4.3 / tCO2), highlighting the interest of buyers in these types of credits despite the price.

This study focuses on forest carbon offsetting projects developed for the voluntary carbon market and registered under the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS), a carbon program developed and managed by the organisation Verra. VCS is the most-widely used voluntary carbon standard in the AFOLU sector (agriculture, forestry, and other land use). The cost of a VCS forest carbon project can be divided into three categories: (1) project development (e.g. for feasibility studies, stakeholder consultations, project design documentation), (2) implementation cost (planting trees, managing and protecting forests), and (3) market transaction costs (e.g. for credit issuance) (Covell, 2011). It is difficult to estimate the exact cost of a forest carbon project and costs vary widely project to project. But project development alone can cost up to several hundred thousand of US dollars (Covell, 2011). Figure 1 outlines the four main steps of the project development process (adopted from Forest Trends, no date). Project implementation often starts some years before the project’s developer seeks its verification. Therefore, steps two and three tend to be conducted simultaneously.

Figure 1. Development process carbon project.

3. Theorising the nexus between forest carbon interventions and conflict

There has been an increase in research interest in the socio-economic effects of forest management over the past ten years (Malkamäki et al., 2018). Looking at the potential benefits of forest carbon projects through the lens of the sustainable livelihoods framework, a tool frequently used by development practitioners to understand vulnerability in a given context and to develop strategies to protect and strengthen livelihoods (CDA, 2016), forest carbon projects could have several potential benefits: long-term financial advantages through carbon payments but also jobs that can increase peoples’ financial capital. Physical capital may also be enhanced for certain communities through infrastructure development and with reduced deforestation and reforestation ecosystems may be restored, enhancing natural capital for communities through increased biodiversity and environmental services. Projects can also increase social capital within communities by strengthening community-level institutions, enhancing the bargaining capacity and political power with local governments (Tacconi et al., 2010b). However, the general viability and sustainability of such projects is challenged and ecological and socio-economic project benefits often seem to fall short of initial expectations and benefits promised under the success narrative and multi-win promises (Aggarwal & Brockington, 2020; Massarella et al., 2018; Svarstad & Benjaminsen, 2017). Also, there is little evidence that long-term poverty alleviation pledges from project developers and local governments have been met (Kangalawe & Noe, 2012).

Generally, it has become more and more evident that the overly-positive discourse coming out of multilateral institutions and project developers and empirical evidence collected on the ground do not match up, and understanding if these findings can be generalised is vital. Local communities commonly contest the implementation of forest carbon projects and some projects have been linked to violent conflicts, although violent actions are less frequently documented than other forms of contestation. In the Backdraft report, Dabelko et al. (2013) have spotlighted multiple emerging climate policy actions and cases and their potential to ‘inadvertently exacerbate existing conflicts–or create new ones’, including REDD+. They find that if not carefully designed and implemented, forest carbon interventions disrupt the social fabric of host communities by enforcing or reenforcing social inequality and ethnic tensions, negatively impacting livelihoods prospects, and undermine political stability (Dabelko et al. 2013). These negative effects act as threat or risk multipliers, which increase the risk of conflict and violence in the intervention area and beyond. For example, Kemerink-Seyoum et al. (2018) analysed the design and consequences of two forestry projects in Ethiopia and their empirical evidence indicates that contestation over the use of remaining natural resources aggravated pre-existing conflicts within and between communities and was a contributing factor in instances of violent conflicts. In a critical analysis, Mirumachi et al. (2020) discuss the security implications of low carbon development and find that who benefits and who loses from mitigation and adaptation measures is deeply rooted in local social and power structures, leading to the marginalisation and dispossession of the most vulnerable members of society. Furthermore, the authors quite importantly point out that burdens and trade-offs of measures may be lingering in time, which is why pre-project impact assessments might not be able to identify them (Mirumachi et al. 2020). Other scholars go beyond criticising impact assessments and claim that project developers even bypass their own guidelines for participatory engagement and ignore the potential adverse social effects of their actions and potential security implications (Ruiz-Mallén et al., 2015; Work et al., 2019). These findings are related to the concept of ‘maladaptation’, defined as ‘action taken ostensibly to avoid or reduce vulnerability to climate change that impacts adversely on, or increases the vulnerability of other systems, sectors or social groups’ (Barnett & O’Neill, 2010, p. 211).

Existing research has identified numerous problems related to forest-based climate interventions and the remainder of this section will discuss their empirical findings in three clusters: direct impact, which refer to effects resulting from newly enforced forest use policies, political and societal factors, which take into consideration that different local realities and contexts may be better equipped to deal with challenges arising in the context of forest carbon interventions than others, and project design factors, which include conflict enabling factors related to the intervention’s design and implementation (Figure 2). Further illustrations of the issues covered in this section will be provided in the discussion of the Bukaleba forest project later in the paper.

Figure 2. Impact clusters.

3.1. Direct impact

Similar to other land-based investments, such as agriculture or large-scale hydropower, forest carbon interventions alter land use policies. In that sense, the impact of forest-carbon projects is likely to resemble other land-based investments’ (Malkamäki et al., 2018). It is usually peasants with unsecure land titles that are hit the hardest from those changes as they can lead to outright or gradual dispossession and eviction. Dispossession by the state or private actors are frequently documented in relation to forest carbon interventions, leading to forced resettlement and severe disruption of livelihoods (Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012; Brockington and Igoe, 2006; Chomba et al., 2016; Lang & Byakola, 2006). Apart from involuntary migration as a result of forest carbon interventions, major changes to livelihoods through withdrawn access to reforested or newly conserved lands, for example, can also lead to distress migration, which can spark tensions in receiving areas about crop and grazing land as well as access to other resources such as water. The changes in land use of areas may also have further consequences and lead to the disruption of migration routes of cattle herders and as such increase the risk of tensions with other land users. Projects can also enforce or reenforce intercommunal conflicts when opinions of community members are split between those who support an intervention and those who oppose it or between those who qualify to participate and those who do not (Massarella et al., 2018; Tacconi et al., 2010b). Projects have been found to also reproduce existing inequalities and forms of social exclusion and create frictions within and between communities (Astuti & McGregor, 2017; Corbera, 2012). New land use policies under forest carbon projects might also have other implications for livelihoods: as a result of restrictions on hunting or cultivation, food access can deteriorate particularly for the low-income population in the project regions (Kangalawe & Noe, 2012; Tabeau et al., 2017). Ibarra et al. (2011) discovered that forest conservation in the state of Oaxaca in Mexico led to decreased subsistence crop yields and, combined with a hunting ban, villagers have seen their local food security destabilised. Increased household incomes through job creation and carbon payments are an important selling point of forest carbon interventions. However, the effective employment opportunities arising with investments are frequently not able to make up for traditional or former value creation and steady jobs with the investments are rare, so only a few people can actually benefit from them (Schoneveld & Zoomers, 2015; Schoneveld et al., 2011; Wunder, 2008). Also, carbon payments seem to have only limited impact on household incomes, particularly for marginalised groups (Jindal et al., 2012).

3.2. Project design

There is an overwhelming consensus in the literature that local communities are widely excluded from the design of forest carbon projects and standards and guidelines are systematically circumvented (e.g. Ruiz-Mallén et al., 2015; Work et al., 2019), which is expected to impact the success of forest carbon projects and to act as a risk-multiplying factor for conflict. Projects seeking verification under the VCS standard, the standard certifying the projects sampled for statistical analysis here, are required to adhere to safeguards to avoid or mitigate negative socio-economic and environmental impacts. The safeguards consist of local stakeholder consultations and a 30-day public comment period (Verra, 2019). The local stakeholder consultation includes a thorough assessment of all stakeholders, including an analysis of social, economic, and cultural diversity as well as legal or customary tenure rights within the project area (Verra, 2019). However, various studies have discovered failures of or strong limitations on these safeguards (e.g. Chomba et al., 2016; Ece et al., 2017; Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2012). According to the VCS program regulations, ‘Where AFOLU project activities do not impact local stakeholders, projects are not required to meet the [stakeholder consultation] requirements’ (Verra, 2019, p. 39). The exemption from the stakeholder consultation requirements is an issue. Governments may classify land or forests as ‘unused’ that are in fact under customary tenure and as such not recognised by law and existing land use and claims go unrecognised because the claiming parties are marginalised (Alden Wily, 2011; Diop et al., 2013; Larson et al., 2013). Therefore, without a thorough and independent land use assessment by the project developer, it might be hard to determine in some cases if there is effectively no impact on local stakeholders. Project designs are also often shaped by neo-institutional thinking that assumes that interventions can be externally designed and locally implemented (Kemerink-Seyoum et al., 2018). Ece et al. (2017) discovered in their study of forestry programs in six Sub-Saharan African countries that technical project objectives are favoured over democratic representation and that local governments are systematically circumvented. Instead, project committees, non-governmental organisations, and local forestry department offices act as ‘representatives’ of the community (Ece et al. 2017). They found that ‘decision-making processes are rarely “free”, barely “prior”, poorly “informative”, and seldom seek any form of democratic “consent” or even “consultation”’ (Ece et al. 2017, p. 357). Such a centralised national approach to conservation limits the participation of rural communities in the project design, which is also prone to unequal sharing of carbon benefits (Angelsen et al., 2008). Local groups may be marginalised when they are excluded from the project design and when they are not adequately consulted. Additionally, a rift between households that support an intervention and those that do not can lead to friction between them. Some community members may also be more involved in a project than others: some may find jobs and some may benefit from carbon payments because they hold legal land titles to forested plots. However, various scholars argue that even if projects involve compensation to communities, they have the potential to induce conflict by recasting land tenure relations or because the distribution of those payments is perceived as unjust (Hunsberger et al., 2017; Massarella et al., 2018). Furthermore, when communities are not adequately consulted, local knowledge or other land use, which holds cultural significance such as burial grounds or sacred forests may be disregarded in the project’s design (Scheidel & Work, 2018), which bears the potential for conflict once the project is implemented.

3.3. Political and societal factors

Mirumachi et al. (2020) in their study of security concerns of low carbon development find that social and political constructs are decisive in whom low carbon development threatens or offers an opportunity. The issue of land tenure rights has been extensively studied, particularly in relation to REDD+ projects (e.g. Chomba et al., 2016; Corbera et al., 2020; Felker et al., 2017; Hunsberger et al., 2017; Larson et al., 2013; Wright, 2011). Although in many countries forests are largely public lands, hence owned by the state (Tacconi et al., 2010a), the social relation and embedded meaning of land, forests, and their resources has frequently been socially constructed over time, which is often not reflected in property rights. Interventions that alter control and management of land and resources and fail to recognise land relations beyond ownership risk contestation not only because the potential disruption of livelihood but also because rent appropriation may not be conceived of as divided equally. Multiple REDD+ projects have promoted tenure security and tenure reforms to enable more equitable participation in projects (Sunderlin et al., 2009). However, recognised and secure land rights are a requirement to enter into PES agreements, so financial contribution under REDD+ still favours land owners over communities with no formal land rights (Tacconi et al., 2010b). Even if land ownership is not contested, most schemes require the land owner to provide formal land title papers, which can be complex and require significant financial resources to acquire and those opportunity costs may not be fully covered by carbon payments or can even lead to economic losses (Aggarwal, 2021; Tacconi et al., 2010b). Alonso-Fradejas (2021) frames this as the resource property question in climate stewardship and green transitions, where the economic distribution of forest carbon projects depends on who owns the forest land. And because forest property rights are usually not formally registered in the name of local communities, it’s those who hold formal rights that largely benefit from those schemes as they can either profit themselves or distribute it based on their own criteria (Alonso-Fradejas 2021).

Generally, a well-functioning state and strong institutions can be expected to be better equipped to address tensions arising from forest carbon projects than a weak state with only limited reach and capabilities to contain competition (della Porta, 2008; Hendrix et al., 2016; Stewart, 2000). Corrupt governments may have limited incentives to foster inclusive project development due to potential payments for the projects (Angelsen et al., 2008). Lastly, ethnic diversity can also play a role in a project’s success or failure. A study by Krieger and Meierrieks (2016) analysed the effect of large-scale land acquisitions on the risk of ethnic tensions and found that land acquisitions are associated with a higher risk of ethnic tension, especially in contexts with a history of intercommunal violence.

4. Multi-level analysis

4.1. Data

To investigate the conflicting narratives under discussion an impact evaluation was conducted including 22 VCS AFOLU project polygons on violent events as well as forms of community contestation such as riots and protests.² For this analysis a panel dataset from 1997 to 2018 was coded based on the geospatial mapping of 22 registered VCS AFOLU projects based in Sub-Saharan Africa, data on conflict events and a set of controls. As it is expected that the land-use change within the project areas affects the surrounding areas, the models were also estimated with buffer radii of 10 and 25 kilometres in addition to the model estimation without a buffer. To determine the buffer radii, information on the grazing mobility of nomadic livestock herds and incoming feed flows for sedentary livestock was used. Feed for sedentary livestock is primary sourced within a maximum radius of 25 km (Amprako et al., 2021), so that was used as the outer radius. The mobility of livestock depends on a variety of factors such as the type of livestock species and climatic conditions. Turner and Schlecht (2019) reviewed literature on grazing mobility in Sub-Saharan Africa and found that the average daily grazing radius and travel distance ranges between approximately 5.5 and 10.5 kilometres. To have a balanced range of buffer radii, the wider range was used for the models. This results in three different units of analysis: exact project polygon and projects with 10- and 25-kilometre buffer radii, respectively.

4.1.1 Independent variable (treatment)

Project polygons registered with VCS as of 30 December 2019 with a start date between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 2014 were included. The independent variable was coded 0 for pre-project years and 1 as of the project’s start year. Once the project was coded as 1 it will remain 1 for the remaining years of the panel since the projects have a duration of at least 50 years. From the sample grouped projects were excluded because they foresee the inclusion of new project locations over time (Verra, no date), which cannot be accounted for in the panel dataset because of data lacking in the project descriptions. Detailed project information was available for VSC projects, including exact geo-spatial information of the project area.

4.1.2 Dependent variables

The Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) (Raleigh et al., 2010) was used to measure the dependent variables. ACLED codes violent and other conflict events in Africa (and elsewhere) from the year 1997 onwards into three general event types: (1) violent events, which includes violent clashes between at least two armed groups, remote violence, and violence against civilians; (2) demonstrations; and (3) non-violent actions (ACLED, 2019). To measure community contestation, demonstrations and non-violent actions were aggregated. The dependent variables were coded as a binary variable per year per project. That means that when at least one conflict event took place it was coded as 1.

4.1.3 Controls

The models controlled for ethnic diversity, state capacity, precipitation, and project size. The Ethnic Power Relation dataset (GeoEPR) (Vogt et al., 2015) was used to capture possible ethnic tension. The 2019 GeoEPR dataset geo-codes all politically relevant ethnic groups from 1946 to 2017. The number of groups present were aggregated per unit of analysis per year and data for year 2018 was imputed using the value of 2017. For state capacity, the relative political extraction indicator from the Relative Political Capacity Dataset was used (Fisunoglu et al., 2020). The indicator measures the ability of a government to collect resources and is particularly suitable for analysing developing countries because it captures the effects of subsistence economy. To control for weather anomalies, the Standardized Precipitation-Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI) was used. Much of conflict research has focused on precipitation or temperature (Harari & La Ferrara, 2017). However, the SPEI dataset considers the joint effects of precipitation, potential evaporation, and temperature, which accounts for the fact that the impact of rainfall on crop growth stages depend on the amount of water the soil can retain (Harari & La Ferrara, 2017). Lastly, the size of the project polygons was calculated to control for the geographical scope of the projects.

4.2. Methods

The quantitative part of this study estimated the effect of forest carbon projects on the relative chance of violent events and violence against civilians (model 1) and community contestation (model 2) within all 22 project landscapes (area without buffer), 10-kilometer buffer, and 25-kilometer buffer, using a multilevel logistic regression model. As mentioned above, different local realities and contexts may be better equipped to deal with tensions arising around forest carbon interventions than others. Independence between the observations could not be assumed because observations within the same country are usually more similar to each other than between different countries, and projects can be of different natures. For example, some projects may have stronger usage restrictions than others, higher profit sharing, or associated infrastructure projects. By using a multi-level logistic model, this interdependence could be accounted for by including random effects at the country, project, and country-year level. Aligned to model D discussed in Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother (2015), this four-level model (Figure 3) recognised that projects within the same country have more in common than projects from different countries. Furthermore, it took into consideration that projects observed in the same country in the same year have more in common than projects observed in the same country but in a different year.

Figure 3. Data structure.

4.3. Results

Throughout all models and buffer sizes, project size and precipitation (Exp(β) = ∼1) have an equal likelihood of outcome, implying that the outcome (conflict or not) is equally likely. The influence of state capacity is also statistically insignificant.

4.3.1 Model 1 – violent events (Figure 4)

In terms of violent conflict events, within a 25-kilometer radius the odds of a conflict occurring were almost 2.5 times greater after project implementation compared to before (Exp(β) = 2.40, p < 0.05). In absolute terms, this is an increase in the probability of conflict associated with the project of 12% (AME = 0.12).

Figure 4. Multilevel logistic regression: Model 1.

4.3.2 Model 2 – community contestation (Figure 5)

A significant effect of community contestation was found in all models. Within a 25-kilometer radius, the odds of a conflict occurrence were over eight times greater after project implementation than before (Exp(β) = 8.33, p < 0.001). The odds of a conflict occurrence within a 10-kilometer radius was almost twelve times greater (Exp(β) = 11.76, p < 0.001) and over 21 times greater (Exp(β) = 21.30, p < 0.05) within the exact project area (i.e. 0k). However, in absolute terms the probability of conflict associated with the projects increases more in the widest radius: In 25k the probability increases by 32% (AME = 0.32), in 10k by 18% (AME = 0.18), and in 0k by 4% (AME = 0.04).

Figure 5. Multilevel logistic regression: Model 2.

5. Bukaleba case study

5.1. Introduction

In the theoretical framework, various risk multiplying factors were discussed but limitations in data availability mean many of the factors cannot be tested on a large scale. The Bukaleba case, therefore, provides potential explanations for how the factors discussed work as a conflict mechanism. Historically, local communities in and around the Bukaleba forest reserve have used the land for small-scale agriculture and cattle grazing. The forest is formally owned by the Ugandan government but the 1962 Public Land Act provided farmers with the opportunity to settle on public land for agricultural purpose without prior consent from the government (Lyons & Westoby, 2014). The 2001 National Forestry Policy, however, stipulated a maximisation of private sector involvement in forest management (Republic of Uganda, 2001), which represented a shift to the use of public lands. The Bukaleba Forest Project (BFP) is located within the Bukaleba Central Forest Reserve in the Mayuge district around 120 km east of Kampala. It includes four villages (Nakalanga, Bukaleba, Walumbe, and Namugongo) and is surrounded by eleven villages in a total of three parishes. The project is implemented by the Busoga Forestry Company (BFC), the Ugandan subsidiary of Green Resources, a private Norwegian company, which is, according to BFC, East Africa’s largest forest development and wood processing company (Green Resources, no date). It is an afforestation and reforestation project with the general goal ‘to contribute to mitigating climate change while meeting the growing demand for quality wood products from well managed plantation forests and contributing to sustainable environmental management, community development and poverty alleviation in Uganda’ (Busoga Forestry Company Ltd and Green Resources AS, 2012b, p. 4). BFC holds a 50-year contract (with potential for renewal) of over 3890 ha of which around 2060 are registered as a project under the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) since 2012. The project officially started in 2004, which is when first planting began, and the project crediting period (timespan to generate carbon credits) is 42 years. This means that the project ends in 2046 but the developers can apply for an extension if they so wish. According to the project description, the BFP is a commercial forest plantation project that uses carbon finance to provide sustainable timber, a return to its shareholders ‘at a rate reflecting the risk of investing in forestry in East Africa’ and environmental and social benefits locally (Busoga Forestry Company Ltd and Green Resources AS, 2012b, p. 8).

5.2. Conflict and risk-multipliers

Socio-economic impacts of the Bukaleba forest investment include displacement, land dispossessions, loss of livelihood, decreased food security, and increased militarisation and policing of the area (Betsema et al., 2018; Environmental Justice Atlas, 2019; Lang & Byakola, 2006; Lyons & Westoby, 2014; Lyons et al., 2014). Many of the risk-multiplying factors discussed in the theoretical framework were present in the Bukaleba investment. While multiple studies have documented some of them, the 62 household surveys conducted by the Shared Value Foundation (Betsema et al., 2018) provided detailed insight.³ While these studies have not reported deaths related to the investment, community contestation and other forms of violence towards and intimidation of the communities as well as increased militarisation of the project boundaries have been documented: the military has been brought in several times to force people to relocate provoking communities protest and community members are increasingly arrested by the police and soldiers for ‘trespassing’ (Lyons et al., 2014; Walukamba, 2013). Direct violence against the villagers has been documented in the form of forceful evictions from properties and cultivated land: four households confirm that force was used against them to take their land. Furthermore, intimidation takes place in the form of the destruction of crops and confiscation of cattle: one household reported that company employees stole their cattle and only released it after they paid 2M shillings. The confiscation of cattle and the use of direct force against community members was also chronicled by Lyons and colleagues in their extensive report on the Bukaleba forest reserve (Lyons & Westoby, 2014; Lyons et al., 2014).

Severely flawed stakeholder consultations might also be responsible for disputes between the parties. As required by the VCS standard, the project went through a socio-economic and environmental impact assessment (IA) as well as stakeholder consultations that included participatory rural appraisals (PRA) during which the communities expressed their fear of losing access to land and subsequent food shortages. Even though the project developer documented these fears (Busoga Forestry Company Ltd and Green Resources AS, 2012a, 2012b; DNV Climate Change Services AS, 2012), they did not appear to be adequately addressed.⁴ In fact, the household surveys confirmed that this fear became a reality: Almost 30% of the respondents confirmed that they had to give up land because of the project and a staggering 95% responded that the amount of food they have access to has decreased in the past ten years and 65% say the lack of land for cultivation is responsible for that. The promised jobs were not able to make up for the loss of traditional value creation: only 15% of the respondents were involved with the company, mainly through contract work at the time of interviewing in 2017, of which 70% mentioned low salaries. The fact that no evidence of steady and ample work opportunities was documented in the household surveys seems to contradict Green Resources’ claim of 900 employees in the same year (Busoga Forestry Company Ltd and Green Resources AS, 2017). The claim was also not verified by external auditors during the 2018 mandatory project verification (SCS Global Services, 2018). Despite the participatory rural appraisal, the households felt excluded from decision making regarding the investment in their communities, only 14% responded that they were involved in meetings during the projects’ design phase, and over 65% of those households who are in contact with company representatives report that is about cultivation and cattle keeping, mainly to discuss disputes. On a political level, the village government, which the households trust most, was not involved in designing the project.

6. Discussion of findings

This study provides evidence of forest carbon interventions having a strong effect in Sub-Saharan Africa on community contestation (model 2). The absolute effect is the strongest in the widest project landscape (25k buffer), then the effect decreases with a decreased buffer radius. This indicates a significant spill-over of forest carbon interventions into surrounding areas. More ethnic groups may naturally reside in larger spatial areas and this analysis finds support for the idea that ethnic diversity increases the probability of conflict in the widest area measured, seconding the study by Krieger & Meierrieks (2016), which found a similar effect in relation to large-scale land acquisitions. The probability of violent events increases in the widest project area by 12%. It is not surprising that conflict events increase the wider the area: people are pushed out of the forest areas, which increases pressure on the land available around the forests thus also adversely affecting distant land users such as sedentary and nomadic livestock herders. The Bukaleba case study supports these findings: no episodes of violence against the population that would classify as a violent event in the ACLED dataset could be discovered. But contestation against police and military operations, intimidation, and direct force in the form of displacements and evictions were frequently documented. The case also further illustrated many of the potentially risk-multiplying factors discussed in the theoretical framework and reconfirmed the mismatch between claimed and actual socio-economic project deliverables, which in this case was particularly evident in relation to employment opportunities and supports the argument that employment opportunities created through the investment cannot make up for the loss of traditional value creation. People are also gradually pushed out and frequently forced to relocate multiple times, further increasing the threat to their livelihood as the farmers have to replant their crops multiple times and lose their harvests. Neither in the household surveys nor in the secondary literature evidence was found of compensation for destroyed crops or evictions.

In the Bukaleba case, land use rights seem to be an inherent part of this issue. Although there is no disputed land ownership of the land, farmers have used the land over multiple years to settle, graze their cattle, and for agroforestry. Now villagers see ever-shrinking access to land for crops and grazing, which was also the households’ biggest concern. A large number of respondents associate this with the food shortage observed in their villages compared to 2007, which was just three years after the project started. This further supports the case that project developers must consider land relations beyond legal ownership. The failure of the VCS standard’s safeguards is alarming in this case. The fears of the local community of forest land users that the project developer initially documented in the social impact assessment that then turned to a threat to their livelihood were left unaddressed. Social impact assessments, like the ones conducted under VCS, have been widely criticised and some scholars even go one step further and claim that project developers ignore the potential adverse social effects of their actions and potential security implications (e.g. Ruiz-Mallén et al., 2015; Work et al., 2019). The Bukaleba case supports this claim and the safeguards put in place by the VCS standard failed to keep the developer in check.

7. Conclusion: reconsidering the goals of forest carbon interventions

The results of this study paint a daunting picture, suggesting that the findings of case-by-case-based research also apply to the larger picture. This study does not imply a deterministic cause and effect relationship between forest carbon interventions and conflict and while it is not this study’s purpose to discredit forest carbon interventions, it confirms that the win-win notion of multi-lateral organisations and project developers does not seem to reflect local realities. Preserving forests is crucial but forest carbon interventions should not be a mere means to an end to achieve the Global North’s climate goals. There is a fine line between harming and benefitting communities and project developers must take the role they play seriously and be aware that the consequences of their interventions are very context-specific (Oxfam Novib, 2018). Ignoring the unintended effects of climate change mitigation actions can have a major impact on broader development objectives (Koch & Schulpen, 2018). Although ‘mainstreaming’ with development objectives takes place, the primary goal of climate interventions, such as forest carbon projects, is to address climate-related risks. Sustainable socio-economic development in the project landscape is an addition. Van Tilburg et al. (2011, p. 4) define this as the ‘climate-first’ approach as the intervention’s focus is ‘on mitigation policies and measures which are undertaken with the explicit goal to reduce GHG emissions’. This prioritisation results in a system that allows – despite verification and monitoring policies – to ignore or to take flawed actions when faced with the findings of social impact assessments. This ideological prioritisation rooted in forest carbon interventions may limit learning from the negative effects to improve said policies (Koch & Verholt, 2020). However, if a win-win situation is truly desired two policy agendas need to be equally weighted regardless of the fact that this is not fully in line with the economic growth imperative as it will often drive up project development costs.

The need to avoid the unintended consequences of climate mitigation actions has received increased attention in policy debates (Dabelko et al., 2013; Rüttinger et al., 2015) and companies have started to apply concepts such as ‘do no harm’ and ‘conflict sensitivity’ to their intervention planning, which were originally designed for humanitarian interventions (Graf & Iff, 2019). But for climate interventions to have a meaningful development impact, project developers should go beyond conflict-sensitive project design and implementation. Organisations that develop carbon standards have reacted to this constraint by developing additional project certifications for sustainable development such as the Climate, Community, and Biodiversity (CCB) Standard (CCBA, 2017) or the SOCIALCARBON Standard (Ecologica Institute, 2013). The effect these additional efforts have on enhancing the community benefits of interventions remains uncertain (Howard et al., 2015). The necessity of aligning climate change mitigation and sustainable development goals is generally not in dispute but in practice this remains challenging (Horstmann & Hein, 2017). A substantial financial and political commitment is required by the international community to an alignment of these goals to prevent the continuation of spill-overs of climate change mitigation interventions into the social and economic dimensions of the intervention area (Dabelko et al., 2013).

Historically, ecological restoration projects, including forest conservation, have tended to be designed for ecological purposes. Wortley et al. (2013) analysed 301 publications studying the outcome of such projects and found that 94% of articles only used measures of ecological attributes to evaluate the projects’ success. The approach has clearly shifted in recent years towards an increased inclusion of social purposes but many forest carbon interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa largely fail to deliver on the promised benefits and these interventions have security implications that seem to be underestimated by their advocates. The findings of the impact evaluation conducted in this study provide evidence in addition to what has been documented in various small-n studies in the past – forest carbon projects seem to markedly increase community contestation in their surroundings.

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful for comments received from colleagues at Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Utrecht University, particularly Annelies Zoomers and Alberto Alonso-Fradejas, who offered extended input on the manuscript, and Carolina Castaldi and Jorge Rodriguez Menes, who provided guidance on the statistical work. Also, the author thanks Gemma Betsema, Emilinah Namaganda and Romy Santpoort for sharing the data they collected on the Bukaleba case study.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Data availability

The data that support the findings of this study is available on figshare at http://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.16432515.

Additional information

Funding

This work was part of the research project GREEN-MEAN (Green, but Mean? The Relationship Between Ecologically Motivated Land Investments and Conflict in the Global South), funded by the International Catalan Institute for Peace (2019 RICIP 00016).

Notes on contributors

Dominique V. Schmid

Dominique V. Schmid is a doctoral candidate at the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Spain) and a junior researcher at the Department of Human Geography and Spatial Planning at Utrecht University (The Netherlands). Dominique works at the intersection of political ecology, peace and conflict studies, and international development. Her research currently focuses on the social implications of global climate change mitigation policies on communities of the global South.

Notes

1 The author is grateful to have received permission to use the data collected for this study. The data was gathered to start multi-stakeholder learning platforms around land-based investments in Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda by Gemma Betsema, Emilinah Namaganda and Romy Santpoort (2018).

2 Project overview provided in appendix 3. The analysis included projects in Congo, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

3 See appendix 2 for a detailed mapping of the outcomes of the household interviews in line with the theoretical framework. The fieldwork took place in 2017 during a six-week period in the Bukaleba, Nakalanga, and Luwerere villages. In 2018, the management of BFC changed, hence all data presented here was collected while BFC was under former management.

4 See appendix 1 for a detailed mapping of the IA, PRA as well as monitoring and verification reports.

Appendices

Appendix1. IA/PRA and deliverables mapping

Table

Potential negative impact (IA), hopes/concerns (PRA)	Promised measures	Effective measures
Soil and water pollution through the use of herbicides and fertilisers and other forms of land degradation (IA)	To minimise soil erosion on the wetland system, grading of the trees shall only be carried out during dry season.	No mention of deliverables regarding this promised measure.
Provision of employment opportunities for both skilled and unskilled workers (PRA)	Sustainable employment opportunities for over 600 local community members.	Employment of over 900 people.
		Author’s comments: According to the company but not verified by the third party in the verification report.
− Concerns of limited land for agriculture and crop loss (IA)*. − Loss of land for cultivation and grazing (PRA)*. * These concerns are linked to land rights. See elaboration below.	A collaborative forest management framework will be developed with the local communities surrounding the project. Author’s comments: What this would entail is not specified.	No mention of deliverables regarding this promised measure.
– Development of community infrastructure (roads, water points, schools, health centres) (PRA). – Increasing pressure on services and infrastructure because of incoming job seekers (IA)	The developer promised that the social livelihood of the people will be improved by contributing to the development of existing hospitals, schools, and roads and developing the trading centres and settlements through increased employment of the local population. In addition, the following was mentioned specifically: Water Safe water sources for the local Bukaleba village community. Supporting water security by drilling boreholes and maintaining water points. Planting during rainy season to reduce water stress. Health Health care support. Education Various on the job trainings mentioned as completed (fire safety, use of fertilisers, disease and pest control, tree nursery) Roads Maintenance of road networks. Author’s comments: Safe water sources are not mentioned for other villages affected in the project description. Furthermore, the verification report states that ‘the project proponent has not demonstrated that the project has generated net community benefits’ of social and economic well-being for the local communities who derive livelihoods from the project area.	Water – One borehole in Buwerere village – One stand pit latrine at Lwanika primary school Health – Provision of annual counselling and testing services to communities to promote health and prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS in communities in collaboration with other health institutions. – Drugs to Nkombe and Bukatube health centres Education – 501 persons trained from 5 villages to build energy efficient cooking stoves. – Tutoring for four girls and two have graduated from technical institutions. Roads 25 km road is maintained either by grading or manual maintenance.
Food shortage and poverty	‘Better’ agricultural methods to solve food shortage. Provision of agro-forestry and improved agriculture programs. Increasing fuel and timber supply within the communities.	No reference to measures to alleviate food shortages or provision of such programs.
Community participation	Appointment of a community development officer and community mobilisers from each village. Continuous dialogue through meetings and information sharing.	Implementation of a communications and grievance management plan (implemented in 2016) which includes: – Quarterly newsletter – Suggestion box – Email account and telephone line set up – Regular meetings – Complaints addressed within 14 days
Sources: Project description: (Busoga Forestry Company Ltd and Green Resources AS, 2012b)	Sources: Project description and 2012 monitoring report: (Busoga Forestry Company Ltd and Green Resources AS, 2012a, 2012b) 2012 Verification report: (DNV Climate Change Services AS, 2012)	Sources: 2017 monitoring report: (Busoga Forestry Company Ltd and Green Resources AS, 2017) 2018 verification report: (SCS Global Services, 2018)

Appendix 2: mapping household interviews based on theoretical framework

Direct impact

Table

Sub-category	Findings
Income opportunities and working conditions	– ∼25% of the respondents were involved in the past with the project and ∼15% were still involved with the company at the time of interviewing, of which ∼70% mention low salaries. – ∼70% claimed that it is not easy to get a job with the company, ∼45% were turned down after asking for employment, 3 respondents specifically mentioned that the company employees asks for bribes for a job.
Benefits through the project	– ∼50% reported that the investment has brought some benefits to their communities. – Respondents confirmed that roads were built in Nakalanga and that a borehole was drilled in Luwerere. – ∼10% of the respondents reported that BFC sells them fire and construction wood at a reduced price. – Overall ∼70% felt that the existence of the project negatively affects their community, ∼25% felt a positive effect.
Land access	– ∼30% confirmed that they had to give up land because of the project; 4 respondents specifically mention that force was used against them to take the land. – ∼10% specifically mentioned that company representatives asked them to leave the area and one person reported that company employees stole their cattle and that they were only released after they paid 2M shilling. – ∼15% report that traditional land values were lost because of the investment.
Value creation	– ∼30% report that they now have smaller areas to cultivate food, which results in lower yields, and less productivity, which affects the amount of produce they can sell on the market. – ∼10% reported that they could take up new businesses, which they say is due to the investment.
Food security	– ∼95% responded that the amount of food they have access to decreased in the past 10 years. ∼65% felt this was due to land scarcity (lack of land for cultivation) and ∼40% to the change in climatic conditions (drought, land degradation) or the use of pesticides.
Inclusion in ongoing decision making	– ∼70% felt excluded from the decision making related to the impacts of the investment. – ∼75% were unhappy about how the company conducts business in their communities.

Project design

Table

Sub-category	Findings
Inclusion in ongoing decision making and interaction with BFC (after start of the project)	– ∼70% felt excluded from the decision making related to the impacts of the investment. – ∼75% were unhappy about how the company conducts business in their communities. – ∼55% respondents report having had interactions with project representatives. Most reported interacting with the company 1–4 times a year with the most reported purpose being about cultivation and cattle keeping (65%).
Decision making and involvement with the company (in the project design phase)	– ∼14% reported having been involved in meetings where the investment was being negotiated.

Political and societal factors

Table

Sub-category

Findings

Trust

People were asked to rate the trust they have in the national, local, and village governments as well as into the company and NGOs. On average, people trust the village government most: in the interviews ∼65% made positive comments about the village government. It was frequently mentioned that they support them in resolving their issues or advise them with their problems. The people trust the local government the least. During the interviews, the most mentioned complaints were poor infrastructure (health centres, roads, schools, water infrastructure) and that representatives are only present during elections and that they do not fulfil their promises.

Appendix 3: Project list

Table

VCS Project ID	Project Title	Project Country	Project Start Year	Project Size (ha)	VCS Webpage
1047	Carbon Emissions Reduction Project in the Forest Corridor Ambositra-Vondrozo (COFAV), Madagascar	Madagascar	2007	205'302.67	https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1047
1052	North Pikounda REDD+	Congo	2012	101'254.53	https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1052
1201	Gola REDD project	Sierra Leone	2012	164'352.69	https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1201
1202	LOWER ZAMBEZI REDD+ PROJECT	Zambia	2009	43'605.17	https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1202
1215	The Makira Forest Protected Area in Madagascar	Madagascar	2001	663'812.27	https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1215
1311	Carbon Emissions Reduction Project in the Corridor Ankeniheny-Zahamena (CAZ) Protected Area, Madagascar	Madagascar	2007	464'979.94	https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1311
1327	Reforestation of deforested land in Madagascar	Madagascar	2011	11'076.05	https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1327
1340	Bale Mountains Eco-region REDD+ project	Ethiopia	2012	3'860'442.92	https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1340
1343	Kuzuko Lodge Private Game Reserve thicket restoration project	South Africa	2014	23'311.53	https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1343
1359	Isangi REDD+ Project	Congo, the Democratic Republic of the	2009	203'578.28	https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1359
1408	Chyulu Hills REDD+ Project	Kenya	2013	412'322.31	https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1408
562	The Kasigau Corridor REDD Project, Äì Phase I Rukinga Sanctuary	Kenya	2005	30'363.61	https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/562
594	TIST Program in Kenya, VCS 001	Kenya	2004	0.17	https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/594
595	TIST Program in Kenya, VCS 002	Kenya	2004	0.46	https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/595
596	TIST Program in Kenya, VCS 003	Kenya	2004	0.06	https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/596
597	TIST Program in Kenya, VCS 004	Kenya	2004	0.26	https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/597
612	The Kasigau Corridor REDD Project - Phase II The Community Ranches	Kenya	2010	175'475.45	https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/612
799	Bukaleba Forest Project	Uganda	2004	5'723.85	https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/799
825	TIST Program in Uganda, VCS 002	Uganda	2003	18.17	https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/825
826	TIST Program in Uganda, VCS 004	Uganda	2003	18.48	https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/826
902	KARIBA REDD+ PROJECT	Zimbabwe	2011	1'171'769.01	https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/902
934	The Mai Ndombe REDD+ Project	Congo, the Democratic Republic of the	2011	300'130.00	https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/934