ABSTRACT
Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception begins with a critique of the philosophical notion of sensation. Even though it is often generally said to be aimed at traditional psychology or empiricism, Merleau-Ponty’s critique is without question also applicable to Husserl’s notion of sensation. The first half of this paper will offer an interpretation of Husserl’s conception of sensation as the stuff of perception and the pregivennesses for all of the Ego’s operations. And then it will attempt to show how Merleau-Ponty’s critique in the Phenomenology of Perception can precisely be viewed as aiming at Husserl. In the end, we should be able to see that Merleau-Ponty’s critique is still relevant today, especially in regard to some recent attempts to put Husserl into the camp of non-representationalism in contemporary philosophy of mind.
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Notes
2 Quotations from Husserl's work are generally cited with German/English page numbers. Findlay's translation of the Logical Investigations is modified where I find it necessary, mainly for the reason of consistency.
3 English quotations from Ideas I in this paper are a modified version of Kersten's translation.
5 Husserl (Citation1984, 34): “Besteht der wesentliche Charakter der Wahrnehmung in dem anschaulichen Vermeinen, ein Ding oder einen Vorgang als einen selbst gegenwärtigen zu erfassen – und ein solches Vermeinen ist möglich, ja in der unvergleichen Mehrheit der Fälle gegeben, ohne jede begriffliche, ausdrückliche Fassung.”
6 See, for example, Smith and McIntyre (Citation1982, 138–9), Mulligan (Citation1995, 182), and Shim (Citation2011, 202). Williford (Citation2013, 512 and following), however, emphasizes that “certain similarities are a least as important as the differences.”
8 Husserl (Citation1984, 361/539) himself in the Logical Investigations admits that he is not using the verb “experience” in its usual sense.
9 Husserl (Citation1991, 336/348) says in Ideas II: “The word ‘impression’ is appropriate only to original sensations; the word expresses well what is ‘there’ of itself, and indeed originally.”
10 Husserl (Citation1969, 89/94): “The sensed color does not refer to something.”
12 For an alternative discussion, see Williford (Citation2013, 505–6).
13 For a “non-representationalist” reading of this passage, see Shim (2001, 206).
14 Husserl (Citation1969, 6/6): “The sensed red is called red only equivocally, for red is the name of a real quality.”
Williford, Kenneth. 2013. “Husserl’s Hyletic Data and Phenomenal Consciousness.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12: 501–519. doi: 10.1007/s11097-013-9297-z Husserl, Edmund. 1984. Logische Untersuchungen, Zweiter Band, Husserliana XIX. Edited by Ursula Panzer. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. [Logical Investigations. 1970. Translated by J. N. Findlay. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul]. Smith, David Woodruff, and Ronald McIntyre. 1982. Husserl and Intentionality. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. Mulligan, Kevin. 1995. “Perception.” In The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, edited by Smith Barry, and David W. Smith, 168–238. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shim, Michael K. 2011. “Representationalism and Husserlian Phenomenology.” Husserl Studies 27: 197–215. doi: 10.1007/s10743-011-9093-y Williford, Kenneth. 2013. “Husserl’s Hyletic Data and Phenomenal Consciousness.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12: 501–519. doi: 10.1007/s11097-013-9297-z Gallagher, Shaun. 1986. “Hyletic Experience and the Lived Body.” Husserl Studies 3: 131–166. doi: 10.1007/BF00156448 Husserl, Edmund. 1984. Logische Untersuchungen, Zweiter Band, Husserliana XIX. Edited by Ursula Panzer. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. [Logical Investigations. 1970. Translated by J. N. Findlay. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul]. Husserl, Edmund. 1991. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie: Zweites Buch, Husserliana IV. Edited by Marly Biemel. Dordrecht: Springer. [Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book. 1989. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic]. Husserl, Edmund. 1969. Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstesens (1893–1917), Husserliana X. Edited by Rudolf Boehm. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. [On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917). 1991. Translated by John B. Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic]. Hopp, Walter. 2008. “Husserl on Sensation, Perception, and Interpretation.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38: 219–245. doi: 10.1353/cjp.0.0013 Shim, Michael K. 2011. “Representationalism and Husserlian Phenomenology.” Husserl Studies 27: 197–215. doi: 10.1007/s10743-011-9093-y Williford, Kenneth. 2013. “Husserl’s Hyletic Data and Phenomenal Consciousness.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12: 501–519. doi: 10.1007/s11097-013-9297-z Husserl, Edmund. 1969. Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstesens (1893–1917), Husserliana X. Edited by Rudolf Boehm. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. [On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917). 1991. Translated by John B. Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic]. Additional information
Funding
This paper is part of the research project: “A study of mental content from the perspectives of phenomenology” (Ref. no.: 16BZX077) sponsored by the National Social Science Fund of China.
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