Conspiracy theorists in policing: causes, challenges, and considerations

ABSTRACT

There has been little empirical or conceptual work on conspiracy theories within a policing context. This gap is concerning given emerging evidence suggesting that conspiracy beliefs can have significant consequences in several important personal, social, and political dimensions. Some of these consequences may also impact both the operational environment of policing and the police workforce. To address the research gap, this study reviewed research into conspiracy antecedents applicable to police work conditions, the nature of police, and police officers to identify a core set of antecedents which may lead to conspiracy thinking in policing. To account for the often context dependent nature of policing, case studies were drawn from the Australian and New Zealand context, identified using the open-source intelligence (OSINT) method. 12 case studies were ultimately identified as suitable for inclusion. Applying the core set of antecedents to the case studies through content analysis revealed that cynicism related to policing organisations or police work is a key antecedent, alongside the ‘social function’ antecedent where conspiracy theories serve to protect a group from perceived threats. Lastly, to provide practical guidance to police organisations and leadership, the article proposes four possible intervention strategies against conspiracy theories in policing.

KEYWORDS:

• conspiracies in policing
• police management
• police cynicism
• extremism
• conspiracy intervention strategies

Introduction

Research indicates that there is a certain prevalence of conspiracy thinking among the public (Marques, Ling, Williams, Kerr, & McLennan, 2022). Based on this, it is likely that a percentage of police officers would also hold conspiratorial views. However, little is known about conspiracy theories within police organisations due to an absence of research into the subject. More specifically, it is unclear whether policing itself impacts conspiracy prevalence among officers and what the content of conspiracy theories within policing looks like. This knowledge gap is concerning given what is known about challenges posed by conspiracy theories among the public (van Prooijen & Douglas, 2018), let alone among those who wield the special powers of detainment and arrest granted to the police.

To address this gap, this article has three primary aims. Firstly, it seeks to understand whether conspiracy theorising in policing could be related to features of policing or police officers. Conspiracy antecedents relevant to the policing context are identified from the broader conspiracy literature and applied to case studies generated through the open-source intelligence (OSINT) method. Due to the often context dependent nature of policing, given different structural characteristics, authorising environments, police management styles, and organisational culture (Cordner, 2017), case studies drawn from similar policing contexts are preferable in such research. Consequently, the case studies are restricted to the Australian and New Zealand policing context, chosen due to the relative similarity between jurisdictions across both countries.

Four sets of antecedents are identified which may explain why some police are susceptible to conspiracy theories, with the case studies showing strong support for two of the four sets. Demographic antecedents, such as gender, show conflicting results in policing. While there are strong links between psychological injury and conspiracy theories, and between psychological injury and certain occupational and organisational stressors in policing, evidence from the case studies is limited. Stronger evidence is found for the presence of cynicism in the case studies. Alongside paranoia, cynicism is an important conspiracy antecedent also common to ‘police personalities’ or at the very least an identified attitude some police develop, i.e. one not necessarily inherent to those who join policing. Similarly, research has identified that conspiracies may serve an important social function in protecting groups from perceived outsider threats. Evidence from the case studies suggests that perceptions of politicisation and interference in policing’s sphere of expertise may count as perceived outsider threats, providing a further possible antecedent of conspiracy theories in policing.

Relying on the case studies as examples, the second aim of this article is to identify and analyse potential challenges caused by conspiracy theorists in policing. The identified challenges fall into two broad categories: challenges for policing’s operational environment and challenges for the police workforce. The final aim of the article is to explore possible interventions against conspiracy theories in policing. Four broad strategies are identified and discussed.

Definitions and research context

Definitions

For the purposes of this study, a conspiracy theory is understood as a belief or set of beliefs – usually contrary to official accounts or received facts – that a powerful individual or group is secretly manipulating, distorting, or covering up actions or events for their own (usually malevolent) ends (Bale, 2007; Douglas et al., 2019; Levy, 2007).

To account for conspiracy theories which may amount to nothing more than harmless speculation, the study aims to capture a subset of conspiracy theories which may be harmful within the context of policing. Those of particular concern are conspiracies about governments, ‘protected characteristics’ (like race or religion), and the eco-system of conspiracies around COVID-19.

A further kind of conspiracy that should be of concern to policing are ‘Organisational conspiracies’. According to van Prooijen and de Vries (2016) organisational conspiracies are ‘explanatory beliefs among employees who suspect their managers, supervisors, or colleagues to meet in secret in order to achieve goals that are widely seen as malevolent’ (p. 480). Douglas and Leite (2017) similarly define organisational conspiracies as beliefs that ‘powerful groups (e.g. managers) within the workplace are acting in secret to achieve some kind of malevolent objective’ (p. 487). Within a policing context, organisational conspiracies could be defined as belief(s) held by a police employee that their leaders, supervisors, or unions are acting in secret to further what are perceived as malevolent ends.

In short, the focus is on both a subset of conspiracies which take as their content matters primarily external to police, and on those conspiracies which are believed to take place within the institution of policing.

Challenges for researching conspiracy theories in policing

While some early scholarly interest in conspiracy theories emerged in the 1990s, a significant research agenda only began to develop in the late 2000s (Douglas et al., 2019; van Mulukom et al., 2022). Within this research agenda, most studies focus on conspiracy antecedents and underlying beliefs. Comparatively fewer studies focus on the consequences of conspiracy beliefs and available intervention strategies (Krekó, 2021). Research which does examine intervention strategies tends to be domain specific, focusing on areas like climate change (Biddlestone et al, 2022) or public health (Leonard & Philippe, 2021; Oliver & Wood, 2014).

Even less consideration has been given to whether (and if so, how) police ought to respond to conspiracy theories. Some earlier research examined broader state responses to conspiracy theories which may be applicable to policing (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009). Later research more directly relevant to policing has focused on the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and intentions to engage in crime (Jolley, Douglas, Leite, & Schrader, 2019) and on the link between conspiracy beliefs and violent extremism (Jensen & Kane, 2021; Krouwel, Kutiyski, van Prooijen, Martinsson, & Markstedt, 2017). However the focus of this research tends to be on establishing the causal links between conspiracy beliefs and the behavioural outcomes rather than on intervention strategies per se. Moreover, while important, countering violent extremism and terrorism are relatively small capabilities in policing, at least within general duties policing agencies (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009).

Research into the challenge posed by conspiracy theorists within policing is even more limited, addressing the topic only tangentially. Extremism researchers for instance, have recently examined the threat posed by right-wing extremists within policing (German, 2020; Johnson, 2019; Koehler, 2022; Parkin, Mills, & Gruenewald, 2021). While there are links between extremism and conspiracy theories (as noted and explored further below), it is clear that not all conspiracy theorists are extremists. The research that most directly addresses conspiracy theorists in policing focuses on policing responses to – and in some cases promotion of – the ‘Satanic Panic’ conspiracy theories of the 1980s (Hicks, 1991; Victor, 1990). While undoubtedly valuable, this work preceded much of the contemporaneous research on conspiracy antecedents.

The absence of available research is partly due to the relatively recent maturation of conspiracy research. However there is also a methodological challenge faced by attempts to gather primary data on conspiracy theories within policing, similar to challenges faced by research into other sensitive areas such as corruption or (mis)use of force. The existence of conspiracy theories in policing is sensitive as conspiracy theories are often characterised and perceived as ‘stigmatised knowledge’, namely knowledge claims that have not been accepted by institutions commonly relied on for truth validation (Barkun, 2015). Voicing conspiratorial views within policing may also constitute breaches of certain organisational policies, leading to risk averse attitudes toward external research into such topics. Moreover, even if this initial barrier is overcome, officers may be reluctant to express their true opinions if conspiratorial views are indeed perceived as breaches of conduct or as being career limiting in other ways. Given the above, prospective research within the policing context has few existing conceptual frameworks to draw on, few studies to replicate, and few clear cases to analyse.

In lieu of research directly into conspiracy theories in policing, the most relevant conspiracy antecedents to police work conditions, and the nature of police and police officers are identified through a review of the conspiracy antecedent literature. To determine relevance to the focus areas in policing, antecedents are analysed against key findings from the policing research literature. Case studies are then analysed using the final set of policing relevant antecedents.

Conspiracy antecedents

Demography

The first area of conspiracy theory research relevant to the goal of this article concerns demographic variables and their relationship to conspiracy thinking. Gender, ethnicity, and educational attainment are the most tested variables. Studies have shown conflicting results for gender as a conspiracy antecedent (Barron et al., 2018; Brotherton & French, 2015; Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010). However, men are possibly more likely to believe COVID-19 related conspiracies than women (Cassese, Farhart, & Miller, 2020). Ethnicity on the other hand has proven to be a more consistent indicator of conspiracy thinking. Minority ethnic groups for example, tend to express greater degrees of belief in conspiracy theories (Freeman et al., 2022; Freeman & Bentall, 2017; Hogg, Abrams, & Brewer, 2017; Romer & Jamieson, 2020). A strong link has also been established between educational attainment and conspiracy beliefs, with lower levels of education being linked to higher belief in conspiracy theories (Goertzel, 1994; Mancosu et al, 2017; Oliver & Wood, 2014).

Psycho-socio connections

Research into the psychology and sociology of conspiracy theories has identified antecedents which could help explain susceptibility in policing. In response to evidence that one of the best predictors for belief in a conspiracy theory is belief in another – even if they are contradictory or unrelated – researchers have suggested that there exists a kind of ‘conspiracist ideation’ (Brotherton & Eser, 2015, p. 1) or ‘conspiracism’ (Swami et al., 2011). A key element of this ideation is likely a kind of sub-clinical variety of paranoid cognition. Those relatively higher in paranoia are more likely to endorse conspiracy theories (Ibid, p. 3). Low trust, suspicion of others (Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999; Goertzel, 1994), and cynicism (Swami et al., 2010; 2011) have also been linked to this kind of conspiracist ideation.

Research into the so-called ‘police personality’ (i.e. a personality fostered by the role, organisation, and culture of policing) has similarly identified suspicion, paranoia, and cynicism as constituent elements (Twersky-Glasner, 2005, p. 61). Police suspicion was explained by Skolnick (1966, 1977) as being partly due to the inherent dangers of police work. Officers constantly seek to identify potential dangers through situational cues and are wary about the behaviour of others. Moreover, the need to interrogate suspects and scrutinise their stories is probably assisted by maintaining a degree of suspicion. While psychometric testing of police applicants and recruits should exclude individuals showing signs of paranoia, the experience of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) – particularly cumulative PTSD – or other stressful incidents on the job may cause some degree of paranoia. Some have also noted that certain training can cause officer hypervigilance about safety, sometimes at the expense of accounting for the risk of mistaken threat identification (Stoughton, 2014). One consequence of this may also be elevated levels of paranoia.

There has also been a rich seam of research into the prevalence and causes of cynicism in policing. This research was largely kickstarted by Niederhoffer (1967) who found that cynicism tracks the realisation among officers as to the scope of change they can realistically implement within the justice system. The disconnect between an officer’s expectations and the reality of the job was also discussed by Björk (2008) who found that over-enthusiasm in some early career officers focusing on ‘grand’ police theories in their daily routines may quickly lead to cynicism. Graves (1996) on the other hand saw cynicism as primarily developing from the ‘harsh reality’ of crime and the subsequent management of it within the justice system. This can lead to officers withdrawing from society, turning instead to each other for companionship and support. An ‘us versus them’ mentality can subsequently develop, deepening distrust of outsiders (Osborne, 2014, p. 625). Caplan (2003) points out that police generally see ‘the worst of society on a daily basis’. Criticism levelled at police by laypeople unfamiliar with, or uninterested in these challenges can cause disillusionment and cynicism. Sobol (2010) also found that departments with the highest levels of major crime suffer from the highest levels of police cynicism, lending further support to some of the hypotheses relied on by Graves and Caplan.

In short, the antecedents of conspiracist ideation appear closely linked to the constituent elements of the ‘police personality’. If this is indeed the case, then it is at least plausible to suggest that police officers may be particularly susceptible to conspiracy beliefs.

Another area of research into psycho-socio conspiracy antecedents relevant to policing’s operational environment concern the relationship between conspiracy theories and group conflict. Research has shown that conspiracy theories are associated with motivations that also often drive intergroup conflict (van Prooijen & Douglas, 2018). One such social motivation is the desire to protect a group against those suspected of being hostile. Those perceived as threatening to the group in question tend to be seen as possessing threating qualities such as power, which can explain why common targets for conspiracy theories are often politicians or managers (van Prooijen & Douglas, 2018).

As discussed above, a strong ‘us versus them’ mentality can develop alongside, but also as an outcome of police cynicism. A further observation made by Caplan (2003) on the sources of police cynicism (and disillusion) worth noting is that police ‘are specially trained to do a job, yet their jobs are controlled and criticised by those who have no real understanding of police work. Laws are made by legislators who may have no background in criminal justice policies and practices’ (p. 306). In other words, police cynicism and an ‘us versus them’ mentality may also be influenced by encroachments into their sphere of expertise. Such concerns are also captured by research into police politicisation and police independence. Concerns about ‘politicised’ policing focus on the influence of partisanship (i.e. party politics, populism, or both) in policing (Reiner, 2010). Closely related to ‘politicised’ policing are also concerns about the erosion of police independence. While contested, and context-dependent there is some consensus that police areas of independence include the enforcement of law, operational decisions, promotions, and a sphere of policing expertise (Bayley & Stenning, 2016, p. 186).

Drawing these threads together, a strong ‘us versus them’ or in/out group mentality can develop alongside, but also as an outcome of police cynicism. In turn, an important predictor of both are perceptions of inappropriate encroachments into areas of policing expertise, often seen as an important sphere of police independence. If conspiracies serve a social function in protecting a group from those seen as threatening, then actual or perceived politicisation and interference may also contribute to conspiracy thinking in policing.

Links to psychological injury

Stress and anxiety have both been identified as possible psychological antecedents for conspiracy theory beliefs. One reason for this is based on the power of conspiracy theories to offer neat, causal explanations for otherwise complex, distressing events (Hofstadter, 2008). On this view conspiracy theories provide a sense of control and order following such an event, allowing believers to regulate negative emotions and restore their sense of agency (Swami et al, p. 72). While research is mixed on the role anxiety plays (Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013; Swami et al., 2016) psychological stress appears to be positively associated (Swami et al, p. 74).

Emerging evidence also links psychological injury with a willingness to act on conspiratorial beliefs. Jensen and Kane (2021) found that 60% of QAnon adherents¹ who committed crimes before, and after the January 6th Capitol insurrection had documented mental health conditions like PTSD, paranoid schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder (p. 3). They also found that 44% of these individuals had become radicalised after experiencing a traumatic event (Jensen & Kane, 2021, p. 4). These cases are particularly instructive as they aren’t hypotheticals which aim to link susceptibility to conspiracy with various scenarios but are real-world cases (albeit mostly not involving police officers).

The link between police work and psychological injury is well established through research into both organisational and occupational stressors (Kleim & Westphal, 2011; Purba & Demou, 2019). PTSD, anxiety, and acute stress disorder have all been found as prevalent psychological injuries resulting from the two identified stressors (Jetelina, Molsberry, & Gonzalez, 2020; Lees et al., 2019). In short, certain mental health conditions (or injuries) may be important predictors of conspiracy beliefs. Officer susceptibility to some of these (such as stress, and PTSD) may provide further evidence of susceptibility to conspiracy theories in policing. Importantly, this is not to say that an officer experiencing the above will therefore believe certain conspiracies. Rather, the experience of psychological injuries may render officers more susceptible to conspiracy beliefs.

Methods

Despite the relative absence of academic research on conspiracy theories in policing, media reporting and investigative journalism have identified cases of conspiracy theorists in police organisations² through publicly available sources, otherwise referred to as ‘open-source information’. If appropriately collected and analysed, such open-source information can also be used for case studies within academic research. In the present study, the OSINT cycle described by Williams and Blum (2018) is leveraged. As its namesake suggests, OSINT is an intelligence gathering methodology which relies on drawing insights from publicly available, rather than confidential or classified sources. Numerous sources can be used for OSINT, including traditional media, long and short form social media, websites, blogs, forums, and other online platforms. The method is based on the assumption that in isolation, information from these sources is of little value, but when systematically collected and aggregated, it can be valuable to research and intelligence. The cycle laid out by Williams and Blum (2018) consists of collecting, processing (verifying and validating the information), exploiting (analysing the value of the information) and producing (rendering the information usable).

The collection phase was restricted to a period of five years. Case studies were primarily identified through media reporting, and then through associated social media pages – including Facebook, Telegram, and YouTube – of the identified conspiracy theorists. Through this process, further case studies could be identified on the social media platforms.

Collection was restricted to the Australian and New Zealand policing context, chosen due to the close similarities between the nine jurisdictions across both countries. While varying in size, there is a high degree of similarity between their respective legislative and operational environments, a history of inter-jurisdictional co-operation through national forums, strong inter-agency movement of police personnel, and similar organisational profiles. This makes it easier to generalise findings from the case studies but also increases the applicability of possible interventions.

To verify and validate potential cases, at least 3 independent sources per case study were identified.³ Ultimately this yielded 12 cases suitable for analysis where either serving, or recently retired officers expressed conspiratorial views. The production phase included storing the identified sources for each case study as plain text files, transcribing videos through the Otter.ai platform, before exporting the files to NVivo. Content analysis was then applied to the text corpus through coding the identified antecedents.

Case studies

The following section analyses the case studies using the four identified antecedents to draw together some key features of conspiracy theories in Australian and New Zealand jurisdictions. A brief assessment of prevalence is also made. The table below maps each of the key antecedents against the case studies.

Table

Identifier^4	Jurisdiction	Year	Demographic variable(s)	Psychological injury	Cynicism and paranoia	Social function	External conspiracy	Internal conspiracy	Key source(s)
Case 1	NSW	2020	Ethnicity, Gender	Unknown	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	(Bosi, 2021; Cooney, 2020; Smit, 2022a, 2022b)
Case 2	NSW	2021	Ethnicity, Gender	Unknown	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	(The Brave Australian, 2021; CFCT, 2021)
Case 3	NSW	2021	Gender	Unknown	No	Yes	Yes	No	(CFCT, 2021a, 2021b; Smit, 2022b)
Case 4	NSW	2022	Gender	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	(Aussiechatandtruth, 2022)
Case 5	NZ	2021	Gender	Unknown	No	No	Yes	No	(Baker, 2021)
Case 6	QLD	2021	Ethnicity, Gender	Unknown	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	(Thomson, 2021)
Case 7	VIC	2021	Ethnicity, Gender	Possibly	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	(Backman, 2021; Day, 2021)
Case 8	VIC	2021	Ethnicity, Gender	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	(Discernible, 2021; Estcourt, 2021)
Case 9	NT	2021	Gender	Unknown	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	(Wood, 2021)
Case 10	WA	2021	Ethnicity, Gender	Unknown	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	(Hastie, 2022; McDonald, 2022)
Case 11	WA	2022	Unknown	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	(McDonald, 2022)
Case 12	WA	2021	Ethnicity, Gender	Unknown	No	Yes	Yes	No	(Mann, 2022)

Demographic variables

Examining the demographic variables of the case studies yielded conflicting results. The case studies had a slightly higher proportion of men than is representative of Australian and New Zealand policing which is on average 65% male, 35% female (Australian Productivity Commission, 2022). Only two subjects within the case studies were women. Given the mixed results in the literature regarding gender and conspiracy belief, little can be drawn from this. Where ethnicity could be identified, all cases were Caucasian officers. To an extent this mirrors the ethnic makeup of Australian and New Zealand policing which is predominantly Caucasian despite ongoing efforts to diversify (Miles-Johnson & Fay, 2022). On this measure alone, it could be expected that prevalence of conspiracy theories in policing remains low.

While policing in Australia and New Zealand continues to professionalise, sworn officers are not always required to have a high degree of educational attainment. New South Wales is the only jurisdiction in Australia which requires a tertiary qualification for acceptance into the academy. While there are no pre-academy tertiary prerequisites, Tasmanian police recruits’ graduate with a bachelor’s degree earned through the University of Tasmania. Some jurisdictions (e.g. Tasmania and Victoria Police) also partner with universities to deliver managerial training. Besides these exceptions, recruit level preparation for policing is centred on a practitioner-oriented skills and training environment (Green, 2018). Consequently, based solely on the noted links between educational attainment and conspiracy susceptibility, the education and training arrangements across Australasian policing may suggest some level of susceptibility to conspiracy theorising.

Limited information was available on the academic qualifications of the case study subjects, although it could be assumed that officers from New South Wales may have some level of academic qualification prior to entering police, while the officer in Case 8 may have had tertiary managerial training given they were an acting Senior Sargeant during the capture period.

Taken together, the ethnicity of the case study subjects (where identifiable) would suggest that while they may be representative of policing’s demographic profile, they are less representative of conspiracy susceptible demographics. Conversely, the academic antecedents would suggest that the case study subjects are both reflective of policing’s demographic profile and of conspiracy susceptible demographics.

Psychological injury

Despite the strong links between psychological injury and conspiracy theories identified in the research literature, evidence for this antecedent could only be found in three case studies. In Case 8, the officer gave an interview to an ‘anti Covid-19 lockdown’ webshow where they revealed that they suffer from PTSD and explained that this is why they had refused to wear a facemask (Discernable, 2021). Case 11 is drawn from a survey of officers in Western Australia, conducted by an officer suspended for refusing to get vaccinated (Case 10). The officer raised mental health concerns both in reference to perceived increases over COVID-19 but also in discussing personal experience. However the clearest evidence for this antecedent was found in Case 4 where the officer discussed being committed to a mental health unit where they were diagnosed with ‘paranoid delusions’ following a breakdown.

One explanation for the relative absence of this antecedent may be due to methodological limitations. The personal and sometimes stigmatised nature of psychological injury can lead to individuals being unwilling to disclose this information, particularly in public fora. Given that the subjects weren’t interviewed or surveyed, there was also no way to further explore the relationship between organisational and occupational stressors on the psychological injuries and mental health concerns.

Police personality, cynicism, and in/out-group mentality

There is stronger evidence for the antecedents of police personality, cynicism, and in/out-group mentality in the case studies. Specifically, the kind of cynicism discussed by Niederhoffer (1967) and Björk (2008) is identifiable. It is a cynicism driven by a perceived gap between the (often) idealistic reasons officers may have had for joining the police, and the reality they believe they have found themselves in. For example, in Case 1 a (now ex) senior constable published an ‘open letter’ addressed to the police commissioner, containing a long list of conspiratorial claims about COVID-19 and police enforcement of measures to counter the spread. Elaborating on their views in an interview, they claimed that ‘there is a global agenda at play here and we are going to be used as the tool, as police […] to do potentially dire things to people in the name of health’. The officer also implicated senior leadership by claiming that ‘what you are being fed inside the police force in relation to COVID-19 is false’ (Bosi, 2021). In a further video, the subject explained that by ‘standing up’ to their organisation, officers like them were ‘bringing integrity back, they’re bringing honesty back, they’re bringing back the purpose they joined which is to serve the community, to do the right thing’ (Smit, 2022a, 2022b). In short, the values which attracted the officer to the job, have been eroded by the alleged conspiracy.

In Case 2 the officer (a former senior Sergeant) similarly claimed that measures intended to slow the spread of COVID-19 are pretences for ‘a broader agenda involving the removal of our right to freedom of speech, movement, and assembly’ (The Brave Australian, 2021). They further allege that these measures are ‘the product of the pharmaceutical driven, biosecurity agenda that will enslave the entire human race and plunge us into a dystopian nightmare’ (Ibid). As with Case 1, the senior Sergeant prefaced their remarks with the idealistic reasons they had for joining the organisation, claiming that they ‘joined the NSWPF to make a positive difference in people’s lives and to protect and serve our community’ (ibid). Experience has left them cynical about the direction of the organisation. In Case 7, the officer expressed disillusionment with both policing’s ‘tactics’ during the pandemic, as well as concern about the inadequacy of a key policing competency. They argued that every rank and role within policing ‘attends to jobs that require investigative ability’. However, because policing was allegedly unable to ‘see that the narrative used by the Government, did not and does not match the evidence on the ground’, this demonstrated for the officer ‘an abject failure in our ability, as professional investigators’ (Backman, 2021). This may demonstrate a cynicism caused by a gap between what the officer views as a key policing capability and its perceived absence within the organisation.

Present in several of the case studies are also allegations that government has been politicising the police or encroaching on their area of expertise. For example, in Case 11 when asked about the direction they believed their organisation was headed, the officer claimed that ‘we are no longer law enforcement or a police force, we are slaves to the government and political puppets’ (McDonald, 2022). The claim that government is using police as a political tool was also expressed by the subject in Case 7 during an interview with a fringe political party. The officer claimed that ‘the government is absolutely steamrolling [people] and they’re using, clearly, they have been using police to do so’ and that this was possible due to a ‘far too close a tie from the police to the government’ (AustraliaOne Party, 2021). In Case 2, the since retired officer drew an explicit link between the cynicism discussed above and politicisation. Speaking at a rally, they claimed that ‘the police force I joined 28 years ago stood for integrity, justice, transparency, and fairness. But the appointment of [ex-police commissioner] Michael Fuller completely changed our organisation, and we became political’ (CFCT, 2021a, 2021b).

The above examples are possible demonstrations of the social function’s conspiracy theories may play in protecting a group from those seen as threatening. Perceived politicisation and interference are taken as evidence of threats to policing, with the resultant conspiracy theorising subsequently reflecting these kinds of fears.

Prevalence

The case studies may also lend some insight into the prevalence of conspiracies within Australian and New Zealand policing. Present in many of the identified case studies is a claim that support for the views being aired is extensive, but that for various reasons others cannot speak out. The officer in Case 1 for example, published a second public letter several months after the first, wherein they claimed that an ‘overwhelming number of comrades in the force’ had reached out in support of their views (Cooney, 2020). One of these supporters also wrote their own open-letter (Dawson, 2020). Following numerous references to the ‘scamdemic’, ‘the deep state’, and to QAnon, the officer in Case 6 claimed at an anti-vaccination rally that ‘there are hundreds and hundreds of police officers who see the same things I see. There is an awakening’ (Thomson, 2021).

Some of the identified cases are also linked through both organised, and quasi-organised networks. Cases 1-3, 6, 9, 10 are all linked to a network called ‘COPS for Covid Truth’ (CFCT). The group’s leadership (referred to as the ‘truth squad’) identify themselves as serving, or recently retired officers from four different Australian police jurisdictions, a fact they emphasise via appearing in uniform on the site. Cases 1 and 3 are also linked to a broader global network called ‘police for freedom’. The membership consists of serving, retired, and policing-adjacent practitioners from jurisdictions across Australia, New Zealand, Europe, and North America. The material hosted by the site and posted by members to its official channels make it clear that the network endorses outright conspiracy theories (Police for freedom, 2021).

It could be inferred from both the claims of support and the ties between these groups that conspiracy theories in policing are more common than an analysis of open-source information would suggest, with some degree of organisation (at least around particular issues). Scepticism should of course be maintained around unverified claims of support. However, it is also reasonable to assume that the case studies only capture a small subset of a larger group, given the risks to careers and reputations posed by publicly expressing conspiratorial views.

Potential challenges

Conspiracy theories aren’t just harmless – albeit faulty – speculation. As articulated by van Prooijen and Douglas (2018), conspiracy thinking is consequential. This may also be true in policing. The main challenges posed by conspiracy theories within a policing context fall into two broad categories: challenges for policing’s operational environment, and challenges for the police workforce.

Challenges: operational environment

Increasing public conspiracy beliefs

When officers openly or publicly espouse conspiracy theories, this may sway the opinions of the undecided or harden the beliefs of ‘soft adherents’. These can all make the job of policing more difficult. For example, the perceived support of officers may carry weight when it comes to conspiracies around measures designed to counter the spread of COVID-19. As police have been at the forefront of efforts to encourage and enforce such measures, perceived support may be taken by some members of the public as strong evidence in favour of a given theory. Such attitudes can clearly be seen on social media where posts, purportedly from sympathetic officers, garner thousands of interactions and reshares. For example, a video included in Case 5 of officers ‘speaking out’ about New Zealand’s vaccine and COVID-19 policies clocked up 256 thousand views, 11 thousand positive interactions and 9 thousand shares at the time of capture (Baker, 2021). This may be enough to convince some individuals of a theory’s validity. Police efforts to push back against certain conspiracy theories may be similarly hampered if some officers are themselves perceived as being supportive.

Trust and confidence in policing

Officers promoting conspiracy theories may also impact public trust and confidence in police. In particular, such views may damage perceptions of police fairness and effectiveness, two important dimensions of public trust in police (Evans, 2022). In terms of fairness, the public may begin to believe that they won’t be treated fairly during interactions with police if they have reason to suspect that some officers may believe conspiracies involving claims about protected characteristics. For instance, several COVID-19 conspiracies link COVID-19, or alleged overzealous government responses, to malevolent Jewish plots (Mulhall, 2021). If police are seen as aligned with such conspiracies, subjects of the conspiracy may believe that they won’t be given fair treatment at the hands of officers. This is important as perceptions of fairness are one of the most important factors in predicting trust in police, particularly from minority groups (Tyler, 2005).

Alignment with certain conspiracies may also damage perceptions of police effectiveness. This is particularly the case when it comes to encouraging and enforcing public health measures. If police are themselves perceived as supporting views suggesting COVID-19 is a hoax as notably present in Case studies 1 and 2, then it follows that members of the public not inclined towards these views may call into question how serious police are about encouraging and enforcing public health orders.

Challenges: police workforce

Workforce capability

Organisational conspiracies may also impact police workforce capability. Research by Douglas and Leite (2017) found that believing conspiracies occur in an organisation, being exposed to a climate fostering conspiracy belief, and being exposed to the idea of organisational conspiracies may diminish positive feelings – like commitment and job satisfaction – about an organisation’s working environment. In turn this may lead to higher levels of organisational turnover, including otherwise valuable employees. Such turnover may subsequently require the retention of dissatisfied employees (Douglas & Leite, 2017, p. 500). Given existing recruitment and retention challenges in policing (Evans, 2022), policing can ill-afford further turnover.

Radicalisation and extremism

Conspiracy theories in policing may also render some officers susceptible to radicalisation and grooming by extremists, or to extra-judicial violence. Extremists (of the ideological, political, or religious kind) are both more inclined to believe conspiracy theories than moderates, and often incorporate conspiracy theories into their broader belief systems (Bartlett & Miller, 2010; Krouwel et al., 2017). This is partly psychological as conspiracies can validate their (often) Manichean worldviews, but also strategic as conspiracy theories can be used as a recruitment tool (Rois, 2020).

Conspiracy theorists are vulnerable to this kind of recruitment (or grooming) as extremists tend to focus on conspiracies which address causes with strong emotional appeal, such as paedophilia, or the struggle for freedom (Mohammed, Garry, Mohamed, & Andray, 2020, p. 23). Indeed, the officers in case studies 1- 3, 7 and 8 publicly expressed support for conspiracies with strong appeals to freedom. Police are already ‘high value’ targets for recruitment by extremists on account of their access to non-public tradecraft and information (Margolin, 2021). Conspiracy theories may therefore increase the likelihood of an officer being successfully recruited into an extremist movement by acting as a kind of ‘first step’ on the path to radicalisation. Some researchers have specifically called for conspiracy theories to be included in frameworks to prevent and counter violent extremism (Basit, 2021) to address this risk.

Moreover, conspiracy theories can radicalise groups not yet considered extremist and increase their propensity for violence. This occurs as conspiracy theories tend to ‘other’ certain groups of people, painting them as dangerous or using them as scapegoats. Together this can motivate ‘apocalyptic aggression’ and helps legitimise the use of indiscriminate violence (Berlet, 2009; Mohammed et al., 2020). In 2019, the Federal Bureau of Investigation highlighted this risk in a (leaked) bulletin which identified ‘fringe conspiracy theories’ as a possible motivator in the ‘targeting of specific people, places, and organisations, thereby increasing the likelihood of violence against these targets’ (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2019). Serving officers may already be involved in movements not yet considered extremist, but which may radicalise over time with the incorporation of conspiracy theories. In the most severe cases this can even lead police to commit acts of extra-judicial violence.⁵

Interventions

If conspiracy theories are indeed consequential as discussed above, police organisations require suitable intervention strategies. Krekó’s (2021) conspiracy intervention typology is a useful framework for exploring possible intervention strategies in policing as it goes further than just delineating interventions according to their temporal dimension (i.e. whether they are preventative or responsive). The typology includes a second dimension capturing the targets of the intervention, namely the suppliers of conspiracies or their consumers. Together these dimensions yield four different intervention strategies:

• Pre-emptive strikes: target the supply side of conspiracies to prevent them.

• Immunisation: targets the consumer side of conspiracies to prevent them.

• Counter-strikes: target the supply side in response to conspiracies.

• Alleviating⁶: targets the consumer side in response to conspiracies.

Based on these four strategies, some possible interventions against conspiracy theories in policing are explored below.⁷

Pre-emptive strikes

The most straightforward pre-emptive strikes seek to restrict or remove content circulating online and by extension, those who promote it. Such an approach is often taken by technology companies to deal with mis/dis information on their platforms (Mohan, 2022). For police, this approach is of limited use. It would be both impractical and disproportionate to address conspiracies within policing by issuing takedowns on external social media sites.

A more promising approach is regulatory (or policy) based pre-emptive strikes within policing. One such example is restricting or monitoring the use of certain social media platforms for work duties. Throughout the late 2010s the use of instant messenger WhatsApp became controversial in policing, due in part to the sharing of inappropriate material in private chat groups. For example, a police WhatsApp group chat was subject to a corruption investigation by the New South Wales Law Enforcement Corruption Commission after it was discovered that officers had engaged in behaviour that could constitute harassment and bullying toward women, as well as potential criminal conduct (CDLA, 2021). While this kind of content isn’t necessarily conspiratorial, research has found that use of instant messaging apps like WhatsApp and Facebook messenger for news has a positive relationship with conspiracy beliefs (Theocharis et al., 2021). If officers routinely use these applications in a workplace setting and instances of misconduct have already been identified, targeting ongoing use as part of a pre-emptive strike intervention may also help prevent the spread of conspiracy theories.

Immunisation

Immunisation targets consumers before conspiracies take hold, often by reinforcing defences against conspiracies or by improving the conditions under which they thrive.

The use of early intervention systems (EIS) may serve as such a defence. EIS are structures which aim to identify officers exhibiting signs of behaviour not yet serious enough to warrant disciplinary measures but sufficiently concerning to require intervention (Alpert & Walker, 2000, p. 60). EIS are commonly used to pick up on ‘red flags’ for officer corruption (Punch, 2012, p. 240) but also on indicators of inadequate training or procedural knowledge. Gibbs and Kendrick (2011) also point to a third category of EIS behavioural indicators, namely ‘transitory behaviour’ such as 'out-of-character-conduct' or declining work performance. This category may align well with conspiracy theory antecedents like cynicism or paranoia. As EIS indicators rely on combinations of data elements, a ‘conspiracy indicator’ could be generating by flagging behaviours linked to these antecedents, such as reticence to complete tasks or discontent with work. Given the links noted in this article around PTSD, stress, and conspiracy theories, attending critical incidents could also be included alongside prolonged periods of personal leave. When indicators of conspiracy belief are triggered, intervention would be suggested. Besides those discussed below (like debunking), stress therapy or related assistance may help stem the formation of conspiracy beliefs (Swami et al., 2016, p. 75).

Individuals may also be immunised against conspiracies. Focusing on improving certain skillsets is one such approach. Swami et al (2014) found that certain tasks designed to elicit analytical thinking (the careful, deliberate processing of information) helped reduce conspiratorial beliefs. Lantian, Bagneux, Delouvée, and Gauvrit (2021) also found an association between critical thinking (the disposition to evaluate, review, and situate information) ability and belief in conspiracy theories. An emphasis on teaching these within police academies may therefore help inoculate future officers. Indeed, police practitioners have increasingly noted the utility of analytical and critical thinking within police work (Whitson, 2019). Teaching these skills as part of a broader strategy to reduce conspiracy susceptibility may therefore already have some institutional buy-in.

Several immunisation strategies may also be useful in addressing organisational conspiracies. These strategies rely on incorporating procedural justice principles into workplace practices. Empowering employees ‘voice’ (a key principle of procedural justice) in the decision-making process for example, can give a sense of ownership over the decisions as well as promote autonomy. Research by van Prooijen and de Vries (2016) suggests that leadership styles which incorporate procedural justice principles like voice may help reduce the potential for conspiracy formation. The principles of procedural justice are already well known and increasingly popular within policing organisations given the demonstrated benefits produced by incorporating these principles into everyday policing (Wood, Tyler, & Papachristos, 2020). Police leaders will likely already have some familiarity with these principles and so incorporating them into internal workforce management strategies (where not already in use) should be a relatively seamless process.

According to Whitson et al. (2019) certain structural environments may also assist in immunising employees against conspiracies. They base this on the observation that a perceived lack of control is often a key factor in the formation of conspiratorial thinking. Enhancing perceptions of control requires priming and encouraging ‘promotional mindsets’ (aspirational and goal orientated) and shifting away from ‘preventative mindsets’ (protective and conserving). The former they argue, enhances perceptions of personal control by focusing on the shaping of a future (Whitson et al., 2019, p. 11). To operationalise this, Whitson et al. (2019) suggest creating structured environments by facilitating and leading open conversations, as well as setting clear expectations about work performance.

Counter strikes

Similar to pre-emptive strikes, counter-strikes have a more limited application within policing as the suppliers of conspiracies are often external to police organisations. However, individual officers or networks (such as the CFCT) may also become suppliers of conspiracies both internally and externally to police organisations. Police organisations and police leaders could use existing legislation and policy to pursue a counter-strike strategy. Legislation governing the oversight and administration of policing and other public services often contain clauses aimed at constraining what officers can say in their capacity as police employees. For example, s. 95 of the Victorian Constitution Act (1975) requires that ‘A person employed in any capacity (whether permanently or temporarily) in the service of the State of Victoria shall not […] publicly comment upon the administration of any department of the State of Victoria’. Commenting in their capacity as a police employee, in support of conspiracies theories relating to government handling of COVID-19, could see an officer breach such a clause for instance.

Throughout the 2010s jurisdictions in Australia and New Zealand began to implement policies regulating the use of social media. Many of these policies aim to balance the rights officers have as private citizens, to express their beliefs, against the possible harm the expression of these may cause to their organisation, professional duties/responsibilities, and their own careers (Goldsmith, 2015, p. 263). The most common constraints on social media use tend to include the following:

• Compromise of duty: commentary that may compromise policing’s ability to serve government in an impartial manner, or impede its efficient operations (APSC, 2018).

• Professionalism: where comments or material shared are so ‘harsh or extreme’ that they raise doubts as to an employee’s capacity to work ‘professionally, efficiently or impartially’ (NSWPF, 2015, p. 8)

• Bringing into disrepute: commentary or material shared that may bring police into disrepute, cause embarrassment, or undermine public confidence (New Zealand Police, 2017, p. 2).

Constraints like the above may very well already capture the kind of conspiracy theories this article is concerned with. For example, the conspiracy theories in Cases 1–3 question the legitimacy of measures intended to slow the spread of COVID-19. These kinds of views may infringe on the compromise of duty principle as policing organisations have been the institution charged with enforcing such orders in the first place. These may therefore serve as useful interventions to prevent further dissemination of conspiracies from serving officers.

Alleviating

Alleviating interventions attempt to limit further damage once conspiracies have already gained some purchase. The most common form of alleviating intervention is ‘debunking’ (Krekó, 2021, p. 249). Debunking can be separated into perspective taking, rationality, and ridicule-based approaches. Avoiding directly challenging the conclusions of a conspiracy theory underpin many of these approaches. Instead, many suggest posing questions to lead the conspiracy theorist toward interrogating the conclusion themselves, or what the conclusion entails.

‘Empathic reasoning’ is a perspective taking approach which suggests that individuals should try to understand the reasons why someone believes a particular conspiracy theory to facilitate reasoning with the individual on shared ground (van Prooijen & Dijk, 2014). By contrast others like Orosz et al. (2016) found that focusing on the rationality of a conspiracy theory tends to have greater impact than trying to engage empathically. Other studies have made similar findings, namely that focusing on the internal logic of a conspiracy theory or on integral facts is an effective debunking strategy as the adherent may begin to question their own conclusions (Wood & Porter, 2018). Ridiculing approaches also have some evidentiary support (Orosz et al., 2016, p. 7). Ridiculing relies on highlighting the deficiencies of a believers’ thinking by drawing certain links between the object of the belief and its attributes. A change in belief can occur as adherents may wish to distance their views from the more ‘ridiculous’ attributes of the same theories promoted by other adherents.

An organisational setting which already incorporates procedural justice initiatives will ideally have helped prevent conspiracy formation in the first place. However, if some do gain traction, the procedural justice approach (particularly its emphasis on voice) can incorporate emphatic reasoning to assist in debunking conspiracy theories. In this sense the two interventions are complimentary. Rationality based debunking could also be incorporated along the same lines.

While there may be some evidence to support ridiculing as an intervention, it is a high-risk strategy to deploy as it is particularly threatening for individuals who hold strong beliefs in conspiracy theories (Orosz et al., 2016, p. 7). Its use by police leaders or workplace colleagues against those professing conspiracy beliefs is likely to cause further friction and will therefore be seen as a politically insensitive, unpopular approach.

Research limitations

There are several limitations to the present study that should be noted.

OSINT has an important limitation when used as a research method. Given that it relies on open-source information, social media habits and privacy concerns of the subjects can pre-determine the amount of information the method can produce for each case study. This variance may then potentially over or under emphasise certain variables in the resulting analysis, as possibly seen with the psychological injury antecedent.

The main data collection phase also took place across the pandemic, resulting in a strong presence of COVID-19 conspiracies within the case studies. This is perhaps unsurprising as large-scale crises like pandemics tend to increase belief in conspiracy theories (Uscinski & Parent, 2014; van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017). Policing may similarly have experienced a spike in conspiracy theorising, which may subsequently wane in the aftermath of the pandemic.⁸ Based on this, concluding that the prevalence of these conspiracy theories is generally representative of conspiracy theorising in policing could be too hasty.

However, even if some level of conspiracy theorising within policing dissipates post-pandemic, evidence suggests that COVID-19 alone is unlikely to account for conspiracy theorising in policing. While in jurisdictions outside the scope of the current study, media reporting has identified conspiracy theorising within policing which predates COVID-19 (Mackey, 2015; Wise, 2018).

Moreover, as already noted, belief in one conspiracy theory tends to predict beliefs in other conspiracy theories (Brotherton & Eser, 2015). Consequently, it is possible that the officers in the case studies already harboured conspiratorial views prior to COVID-19 but may not have voiced them publicly. In other words, officers who espoused COVID-19 conspiracies may have just been more inclined to speak out than those who believed other conspiracy theories. The desire to speak out could be explained by the often-overlapping beliefs in COVID-19 and anti-vaccination conspiracies, evident in at least seven of the case studies. As many of the jurisdictions included in this study implemented vaccine mandates, officers who believed COVID-19 conspiracies may have felt compelled to go public with their views. A desire to prevent what they perceived as impending harm may have outweighed the consequences of publicly expressing conspiratorial views. Ultimately, to fully control for the effects of COVID-19, a follow-up study would need to be conducted in several years’ time.

Conclusion

This study explored four possible antecedents of conspiracy theories in policing and found support for two within the case studies. Cynicism, in relation to policing organisations or police work, was present in eight of the case studies. As this antecedent directly corresponds with ‘police personalities’ or at least with an identified attitude some police develop, it may be an antecedent endogenous to policing itself. The case studies also supported the social function antecedent, as perceptions of politicisation and interference in policing’s sphere of expertise may be perceived as threats to the group (i.e. to policing and police officers). These antecedents suggest that police work conditions, and the nature of police may contribute to conspiracy thinking in policing. While determining statistical prevalence is challenging, evidence from the case studies also suggests that conspiracy thinking – at least in the Australian and New Zealand context – may be more organised and widespread than publicly available information suggests.

These findings are important for several reasons. Conspiracy theories can impact both the operational environment of policing and the police workforce. Understanding why they might emerge in policing is an important step in understanding how to counter them. The four intervention strategies identified in the article may prove helpful in this regard with immunisation and alleviating interventions being of the most use.

The findings may also provide a framework for further empirical work on conspiracy antecedents in policing outside the Australian and New Zealand context. Research has examined police cynicism in both the U.S (Caplan, 2003) and Europe (Björk, 2008). Future such research could purposely test for links to conspiracy theories. Intervention strategies discussed within this article could also be adjusted to fit other jurisdictional contexts where conspiracy theories (or its antecedents) are identified. For instance, a review by the United Kingdom’s Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) was launched after investigations found instances of misogyny, homophobia, and racism in private chat groups (Dearden, 2021). Given the noted connections between conspiracy theories and such groups, police in the U.K could also consider restricting the use of such groups or developing further usage policies.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 QAnon is an alt-right leaning, U.S-centric political conspiracy theory originating from the image-messaging board 8Chan. Among its key tenets is that a ‘cabal’ of elites (usually depicted as being liberal or progressive) operate from within the ‘deep state’ for various malevolent ends (like child trafficking).

2 See for example Breland, A. (2020). ‘QAnon Is Attracting Cops.’ Mother Jones. https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2020/09/police-officers-qanon/

3 This was to ensure some degree of verification that the case study subjects were indeed serving or recently retired police officers. For Cases 4 and 11 there were only linked (i.e., non-independent) sources available. However, the key source for Case 4 includes a large volume of messages, while the key source for Case 11 was a survey sent only to police employees.

4 To avoid drawing attention to specific individuals, case identifiers are necessary. However, in the interests of transparency and further assessment, key primary source(s) for each case study are provided.

5 See for instance United States of America v Joseph W Fisher [2021] 1:21-cr-234

6 Krekó uses the term ‘healing.’ However, this arguably implies that there may be a ‘cure’ to conspiracy theories which isn’t clear. Alleviating is perhaps the more appropriate term as it can capture views being softened (but not removed) as well as limiting further harm (rather than eradicating it).

7 The proceeding section also leverages elements of analysis from Evans (2021). ‘What can police do about conspiracy theories?’ Policing Insight

8 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this consideration.