The Indonesian military and counter terrorism in Poso, 2015–2022

ABSTRACT

The Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) has been applauded for its contribution in eradicating the East Indonesia Mujahideen (MIT) networks in Poso Regency, Central Sulawesi Province. The military contributed to the operation in various ways, particularly intelligence gathering, and territorial and counter-guerrilla operations. The operation in Poso is a case whereby the threats are beyond the police’s capabilities. On the one hand, counter terrorism against MIT requires deep involvement of the military primarily due to the strategic and structural challenges surrounding the conflict area. On the other hand, such profound entanglement can produce detrimental impacts toward democratic security arrangement. We argue that TNI involvement is indeed valuable but should be on a case-by-case basis. This article highlights that the operation has been able to nurture coordination between the police and the military. However, there are also potential risks for the future of counter terrorism efforts in Indonesia. Counter terrorism requires a multidisciplinary approach, yet the involvement of TNI in all sectors would only lead to suboptimal achievements of the military. This article also discusses the militarisation approach in counter terrorism is likely to escalate the use of violence.

KEYWORDS:

• Military
• police
• counter terrorism
• Poso
• Indonesia

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is a splinter group of Darul Islam (DI), an Islamist rebellion movement which envisioned the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. JI was formally established in early 1990s by the former DI members, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir who decided to split from DI due to ideological differences. JI was responsible for major bombings in Indonesia in early 2000s, including the 2002 Bali Bombing, the 2003 JW Marriott Hotel Bombing, the 2004 Australian Embassy Bombing, and the 2005 Bali Bombing (Solahudin & McRae D, 2013).

2 The Indonesian government is expected to issue a Peraturan Presiden (Perpres) or Presidential Regulation one year after the ratification of revised law on counter terrorism in 2018. The Perpres would draw the boundaries of TNI’s engagement in counter terrorism operations. It has been five years since the ratification of the law, but the Perpres is nowhere to be seen. It was only in early 2023 that the House of Representatives or Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) brought up the issue of Pepres again. The DPR members urged the government to issue the Perpres due to ‘security disturbance’ caused by the Criminal Armed Group or Kelompok Kriminal Bersenjata (KKB) in Papua.

3 The Syrian civil war outbreak and the declaration of IS has lured the aspiring jihadist in Indonesia to pledge allegiance to IS. It was reported that Santoso’s decision to associate MIT with IS was to attract more Indonesian jihadist to join his forces and to earn financial and material supports from IS. MIT’s ability to conquer a small base in Poso also created an illusion among the other jihadists in Indonesia that it was the first step to establishing a larger Islamic state in Indonesia. Hence, MIT was able to garner support and new recruits from other regions (IPAC, 2015; IPAC, 2016a; Mahar, 2022).

4 At that time, TNI required a formal approval from the parliament to be engaged in a counter terrorism operation which had to go through a lengthy process. The form of exercise allowed the government and TNI to bypass such an extended procedure. President Jokowi at that time showed no hesitation towards the overall situation. It should be noted that the president had a rocky relationship with several political parties at that time. The precarious situation made Jokowi turn to the military for its political support.

5 It was reported that the insulation strategy was implemented firstly in January 2016 (Detik, 2016).

6 The competition occurred during the last phase of the hunt for Ali Kalora. The police and the military competed for the credit of capturing Ali Kalora. However, they failed to capture him alive. The hunt ended with a shootout which led to the death of Ali Kalora (IPAC, 2023).

7 Special Detachment 88 Anti-Terror and the police force in general have been heavily criticised by activists and civil society organisations, including Islamic groups, due to their inhumane treatment of terrorist suspects. Furthermore, several reports mentioned that many of these suspects were wrongly apprehended.