Mass-casualty terrorism and strategic surprise in Mumbai and Paris: understanding the Islamist perspective

ABSTRACT

The Mumbai and Paris attacks are representative cases of mass-casualty terrorism due to the number of casualties and the level of devastation they caused. This type of terrorism has often been the result of strategic surprise resuting from intelligence failure. In both India and France, security agencies were taken by surprise and failed to respond promptly. Although the concept of strategic surprise has been largely explored by Western scholars, there is an Islamist perspective that has not received any attention. The article claims that strategic surprise can be understood as a cultural particular leading to mass-casualty terrorism. Finally, it examines the implications for intelligence and deterrence which need to adapt accordingly.

KEYWORDS:

• Mass-casualty terrorism
• strategic surprise
• religious intelligence
• deterrence
• ISIS
• Lashkar-e-Taiba

The September 11 attacks in New York and Washington DC signified the beginning of a new phase of terrorist violence. The massive killing of civilians has initiated a scholarly debate on the quantitative transformation of terrorism. It is not easy to define mass-casualty terrorism because there are different perceptions of ‘massiveness’, depending perhaps on the size of the affected population and previous experiences. Several scholars have offered their own definitions of mass-casualty terrorism (Bowen, 2004; Kim, Jeong & Lee, 2022; Quillen, 2002; Raf, 2003). In this article, mass-casualty terrorism is defined as a series of well-organised and well-executed attacks overwhelming first responders and resulting in hundreds of people killed, injured, and traumatised.

Mass-casualty terrorism is a low probability but high impact threat. According to the Global Terrorism Database, 70,335 terrorist attacks with at least one fatality took place worldwide during 2001–2020; yet, only around 137 of them (0,19 percent) caused more than 100 deaths (Global Terrorism Database, 2022). During that period only 24 mega attacks were launched by non-Islamists; the other 113 were acts of Islamist terrorists.

In the post-9/11 period, two attacks can be singled out as exceptional in their level of organisation and impact. In late November 2008, members of Lashkar-e-Taiba (‘Soldiers of the Pure’, hereafter LeT) stormed South Mumbai targeting various places. Seven years later, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) launched a series of bloody terrorist attacks against Paris. Surprise has always been a key part of terrorist planning and execution but usually only at the tactical level. However, the scale of Mumbai and Paris attacks was unprecedented and stunned policymakers and the public alike. They took place in two major cities, known for their cosmopolitanism and business sectors. The two cases are comparable because they yielded similar outcomes in terms of surprise and civilian casualty.

The article first describes the research literature on mass-casualty terrorism and strategic surprise. The empirical part of the article examines the Mumbai and Paris attacks as surprises, with the help of Thomas Copeland’s framework. Next the article explores the Islamist perspective on surprise by offering a new approach that privileges religion as a contextualised form of culture. In Mumbai and Paris, religious beliefs, practices, and interpretations were instrumentalized to define strategic and operational goals which then were translated into an action plan. Hence, the article claims that this variation of strategic surprise is a cultural particular leading to mass-casualty terrorism. Finally, it discusses the importance of religious intelligence and the utility of deterrence by denial against such attacks.

The research literature

The term mass-casualty terrorism was rarely used before the 9/11 attacks (Foxell, 1999). The tragic events changed fundamentally threat perceptions and research priorities. The fact that al-Qaeda was able to launch such a lethal attack against civilians was viewed as a dire warning for a darker future. Since then, many works have focused on the potential use of weapons of mass destruction against civilians in North America and Europe (Allison, 2004; Frost, 2005). Western governments have been increasingly preoccupied with the possibility of such catastrophic event. The term implicitly reflects a Western perspective that is not applicable in other parts of the world (Raf, 2003, p. 114).

In addition, there is a school of thought claiming that the West has been confronted by a new terrorism which has different characteristics from the old terrorism (Duyvesteyn, 2004; Tucker, 2001). Nationalist and revolutionary Marxist groups like the Irish Republican Army and the Italian Red Brigades had either limited capabilities or avoided, most of the times, the intentional targeting of civilians. In contrast, the new terrorism does not have hierarchical organisational structures and seeks to launch indiscriminate attacks against civilians (Kurtulus, 2012, pp. 43–45).

Indeed, a few years before 9/11 attacks, Bruce Hoffman had noted that some terrorists seek to perpetrate massive killing as a divine duty (Hoffman, 1998, p. 15). Bruce Lincoln later claimed that the motives of the 9/11 hijackers were profoundly religious as indicated by Osama bin Laden’s statements (Lincoln, 2006, pp. 9–12). Jonathan Fine has showed that religious groups have interpreted and manipulated religious sources to justify the use of violence (Fine, 2015). Scott Atran has coined the term ‘devout actors’ to describe groups which are mobilised for collective action to protect transcendental values (Atran, 2016). Consequently, the use of religion can prolong a conflict by demonising opponents and promising a total victory through divine help (Juergensmeyer, 2017, p. 20). Although this literature recognises the role of religion, it does not elaborate on which beliefs and interpretations might influence terrorist strategy.

On the other hand, many critics dispute the relevance of religious ideas to terrorism. For instance, Stephen Holmes has argued that the ‘purported causal relation between extreme religious views and the political violence committed in their name is easier to assert than to demonstrate’ (Holmes, 2007, p. 13). Moreover, Jeff Goodwin has claimed that there is no simple mechanism connecting ‘general religious beliefs and feelings with particular strategies and tactics’ (Goodwin, 2012, p. 172).

Irrespective of this theoretical debate, there is a lesson to be learned from the 9/11 events.

Terrorists have the advantage of choosing soft targets that cannot be easily protected by security agencies for a long period of time. They are usually conscious of their military inferiority that hinders prospects for success. This fact provides them the impetus to surprise their enemies that cannot be challenged otherwise.

The concept of surprise was widely discussed in the security studies community during the Cold War. In what eventually became known as the Pearl Harbor syndrome, Washington feared that a Soviet surprise nuclear strike would destroy U.S. capabilities on the ground (Wohlstetter, 1962). According to Michael Handel, strategic surprise ‘could be achieved simultaneously on several levels: in timing, the place of attack, rapidity of movement, the use of new technologies delivery and weapons systems’ (Handel, 1984, pp. 231–232). Therefore, the U.S. formulated nuclear deterrence strategies to avoid another strategic surprise (Miller, 1984).

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union the term became obsolete, but the 9/11 attacks prompted analysts to study mass-casualty terrorism as a strategic surprise (Byman, 2005). For example, Aviva Guttmann holds the opinion that the rise of ISIS constitutes a partial strategic surprise for Western observers (Guttmann, 2023). As it has evolved, the concept of strategic surprise has come to include both state and non-state actors.

The rationalist assumption is often that the decision to surprise is based on cost–benefit calculations. Bryan Caplan has argued that ‘terrorists do not assume high risks for their own sake’ (Caplan, 2006, p. 94). Although terrorism is a form of asymmetric warfare, defined as the use of radically different methods by non-state actors against much stronger opponents (Thornton, 2007, pp. 1–2), the Mumbai and Paris events were unusual in two respects. First, the two groups organised a succession of quasi-independent attacks with their own operational objective (e.g. random killings, hostage-taking) that entailed a higher degree of difficulty. Second, the perpetrators attacked a wide variety of targets that had different characteristics and operational requirements jeopardising effectiveness and success. This overextension of human resources, combined with the plethora of objectives and tactics, exceeds previous levels of asymmetric warfare against state actors.

What is missing from the literature is a culturalist explanation of strategic surprise leading to mass-casualty terrorism. In fact, the role of religion as a contextualised form of culture is clearly undertheorized and neglected in the study of surprise. Next the article provides an overview of the attacks of 2008 and 2015 as representative cases of mass-casualty terrorism.

The Mumbai and Paris attacks

On 26 November 2008, members of Lashkar-e-Taiba attacked multiple targets in Mumbai. The militants travelled in a boat from Karachi to Mumbai by hijacking an Indian fishing vessel to avoid detection. The raid started as a night attack at 9:38 pm For three days, five pairs of assailants launched 12 shooting and bombing attacks against multiple soft targets in South Mumbai. Most of the killings took place in the five-star Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, the Trident Hotel, the Leopold Café, the Metro Cinema, and the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus railway station. The perpetrators also attacked a Jewish community centre in the area and took hostages. In total, 166 people were killed and hundreds were injured (Tankel, 2018).

The attackers were all Pakistani citizens who had received military training in their country by LeT and the Inter-Services Intelligence (Fair, 2019, pp. 98–99). Two Indian operatives offered crucial support by supplying the group with maps and information regarding local targets (Rajesh & Chowdhury, 2023). Each attacker had a Kalashnikov, a pistol, hand grenades, food, and an IED (Acharya & Marwah, 2010). The assailants were equipped with satellite and mobile phones to receive instructions from unknown handlers in Pakistan.

The Indian police could not respond quickly due to lack of resources and staff shortages. Nine of the attackers were killed by the Indian special forces, but the tenth was captured alive. Although LeT did not formally claim responsibility, there is compelling evidence that the group was behind the attacks (Tankel, 2018). After weeks of denial, Pakistan’s national security adviser Mahmud Ali Durrani admitted that the lone surviving attacker was a Pakistani citizen (Oppel & Masood, 2009). In January 2021, a Pakistani court sentenced Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, a senior member of the LeT and major suspect in the attacks, to five years in prison for supporting terrorism (BBC News, 2021).

Seven years after the 2008 attacks, the French capital experienced a Mumbai-style assault with multiple victims. On 13 November 2015, ISIS assailants launched coordinated attacks on civilian targets in central Paris. The assault started at 9:16 pm and finished at 12:12 am Three teams of nine gunmen killed 130 people and injured 350 (Deutsche Welle, 2021). The first team of three suicide bombers blew up themselves outside the national sports stadium during a friendly match between the national soccer teams of France and Germany. They had tried unsuccessfully to enter the stadium and killed only one passer-by. Then, the second team shot at people outside several cafes and restaurants in central Paris, killing instantly 34 and injuring tens. Finally, the third team of gunmen entered the Bataclan concert hall and killed 89 people before either getting shot or detonating their suicide vests. More attacks were planned, but they did not materialise (Brisard, 2015). It was a night attack, sudden and unexpected. The French police was overwhelmed and called for reinforcements from the army.

The gunmen were French citizens, apart from the ringleader Abdelhamid Abaaoud who was a Belgian national. They had travelled to Syria to join ISIS and receive training. Next day, a video was posted on the Internet by the information bureau of ISIS congratulating ‘the Islamic nation for this high-profile attack, which was successful with the help of Allah’. (Memri TV, 2015a) In another video produced by ISIS’s Dijlah province, a fighter asked ‘What do they expect from the nation of Islam, other than more of these strikes. We bring Hollande and the people around him the good tidings … of more of these strikes’. (Memri TV, 2015b) The French government immediately declared a state of emergence and the army was called to patrol the streets of big cities.

Both attacks are representative cases of mass-casualty terrorism for three reasons. First, the number of people killed exceeded the threshold of 100 with hundreds wounded and thousands traumatised by the assailants. Second, the attacks consisted of different episodes of violence carried out by the attackers to maximise casualties. On both occasions, six targets were selected by the assailants; as a result, the first responders were overwhelmed by the situation. Third, plenty of evidence points to serious preparation and planning of the assaults against the two cities. In the subsequent section, the article examines Mumbai and Paris attacks as surprises.

The attacks as surprises

Despite some tactical differences (e.g. the use of suicide vests in Paris), the two attacks were based on the same operational strategy: small teams of heavily armed militants simultaneously attacking many soft targets (Riedel, 2015). The Mumbai attacks involved 10 assailants, whereas 20 individuals participated in the Paris attacks. Hostages were taken in the two cities. Beyond the operational phase, it is important to understand what factors have determined the level of surprise the two countries experienced.

In his book Fool Me Twice: Intelligence Failure and Mass Casualty Terrorism, Thomas Copeland argued that strategic ‘surprise can happen in method, in place, and in time’ at a higher level that just tactical (Copeland, 2007, p. 2). More importantly, he suggested a framework to evaluate surprise which includes five sets of questions (Copeland, pp. xii-xiii): 1. What is the nature of surprise? What was the national and global impact of the surprise? 2. Were details of the event foreseeable? 3. What was the threat environment like at the time? Was the threat recognised? 4. Was it an intelligence failure or a policy failure? What factors contributed to either of them? And 5. Was the surprise avoidable? His framework is a useful method to explore whether the Mumbai and Paris attacks constituted a strategic surprise, despite some flaws in the conception of intelligence failure.

First, the nature of surprise is a relative concept and differs from place-to-place and time-to-time. Innocents were shot and killed or wounded in Mumbai and Paris, much like other attacks in the post-9/11 period. Both events took place during the night when security agencies were perhaps less vigilant, and the attackers were able to sow confusion. While there must have been a predetermined list of targets, they attacked random crowds of people in random places. In essence, they attempted to target as much of the city as possible.

The impact was tremendous, both nationally and globally. The Indian parliament passed a new antiterror law to establish the National Investigation Agency, as the country’s primary counterterrorist agency (BBC News, 2008). More importantly, New Delhi’s relations with Islamabad soared dramatically once the identity of the attackers became known (Gupta, Kalyanaraman & Behuria, 2009, pp. 319–323). The Indian leadership even considered a range of military options, including air strikes and special forces missions, against LeT in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (Unnithan, 2015). Following the Paris attacks, President Hollande announced a plan to increase intelligence capabilities by allocating financial resources and recruiting more officers (BBC News, 2015). French warplanes bombed the Syrian city of Raqqa by targeting ISIS positions (Doherty, 2015). The Mumbai and Paris events shocked the world and drew the attention of many law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

Second, the details of the events were not foreseeable in their actual scope. India and France had experienced single-target attacks for years. In December 2001, for instance, five Kashmiri assailants managed to penetrate the Indian parliament and killed four people (The Hindu, 2011). In July 2006, LeT operatives together local militants bombed the Mumbai’s Suburban Railway killing at least 187 people (Fair, 2009). In the case of Paris, the attacks took place against a backdrop of terrorist shootings. In January 2015, assailants targeted the offices of the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo which had published cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. Two gunmen, the Kouachi brothers, murdered 12 people and injured several others (Chrisafis, 2015). Amedy Coulibaly also killed five people and took several hostages in a kosher supermarket in east Paris (L’ Express, 2015). Clearly, there was a certain pattern of attacks in the immediate period before the Mumbai and Paris events that had intensified in frequency but not in complexity. Nothing really indicated that a more sophisticated attack was coming. Despite being non-state actors, LeT and ISIS managed to launch attacks in unexpected places by deploying small, fast-moving teams of assailants, equipped with heavy firearms, explosives, and encrypted technology to communicate.

Third, the threat environment was changing in the immediate pre-attack period. The security situation in the Muslim-majority state of Kashmir worsened in the months leading up to the Mumbai attacks. In June 2008, massive protests took place across the province because the Indian governor gave some land to Hindu pilgrims (Associated Press, 2008). As a result, tens of protestors were killed by the police and Kashmir was put under curfew for months. Yet, the Indian intelligence community did not comprehend the new threat environment due to bias explained in the last section.

In the case of ISIS, the establishment of the Global Coalition against ISIS in September 2014 changed the group’s priorities. The official spokesman Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani delivered a speech asking followers to ‘strike the soldiers, patrons, and troops of the tawaghit [disbelievers] … If you can kill a disbelieving American or European – especially the spiteful and filthy French … or any other disbeliever from the disbelievers waging war … ’ (Official Spokesman for the Islamic State, 2014, p. 9). It was the first time that ISIS openly stated its intentions to attack France. Some French officials did understand the gravity of the situation. In September 2015, for example, the former antiterrorism judge Marc Trévidic stated, ‘the men of Daesh [Islamic State] have the ambition and the means to reach us much harder by organising large-scale actions, incomparable to those carried out so far … The real war that ISIS intends to wage on our soil has not yet started’ (Borredon, 2015). However, this view did not prevail among analysts and policymakers because of certain bias outlined in the last section.

Fourth, both attacks were an intelligence failure in that Indian and French agencies failed act on warning information. Paul Staniland has blamed the fragmentation of the Indian intelligence community for the apparent failure to prevent the attacks (Staniland, 2009). The Intelligence Bureau is under the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Central Bureau of Investigation operates under the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) is directly answerable to the prime minister. The Pradhan Committee, established by the Government of Maharashtra State where Mumbai is located, discovered that during August 2006 and November 2008 there were at least 20 intelligence warnings; six of them regarding a sea-born attack, 11 on multiple and coordinated attacks and three on the possibility of commando attacks (Ashraf & Sarker, 2016, p. 251). The authorities took some preventive measures, but none of these threats were materialised. In January 2014, during a conference, the then National Security Advisor Mayankodu Kelath Narayanan admitted that ‘the intelligence agencies … were anticipating an attack. Even the targets, to some extent, we had some idea … the Taj Hotel and others. The real failure on our part was to assess in what form the attack would take place’ (Sharma, 2014). This statement suggests that the intelligence failure was operational in nature rather than the strategic. Nevertheless, the country’s inability to monitor its coastline effectively indicates serious policy failures at the federal and state levels (Rabasa, 2009, p. 9).

Some of the ISIS attackers were known to French authorities; yet they did not identity these individuals as an imminent threat. According to press reports, the Paris Police Prefecture’s Intelligence Unit (DRPP) had some information about a cell of six people working on ‘something big’ but did not inform the General Directorate for Internal Security (DGSI) (France 24, 2015). Moreover, the Turkish security services gave information about Omar Ismail Mostefai, one of Bataclan bombers, to their French counterparts but it was ignored (MacAskill, 2015). During the trial of 20 men accused of providing planning and logistical support to the perpetrators of the 2015 Paris attacks, former president Francois Hollande admitted that security services knew that ISIS was sending fighters to Europe. However, the French government ‘did not know where, when, or how they would strike’ the country (Chrisafis, 2021). The assailants in Paris were able to travel freely across the Schengen Zone, although most of them had fought in Syria and Iraq as members of ISIS. Despite the mistakes of the intelligence community, French policymakers deserve some of the blame for failing to promote cooperation against terrorism across the Schengen Zone.

Fifth, it is debatable whether the surprises could have been avoided. LeT and ISIS were viewed as localised groups capable of conducting operations in Kashmir and Syria-Iraq respectively. This assumption lowered vigilance and the potential awareness of security agencies which did not really foresee such a scenario. India and France did not understand the new modus operandi of the two groups. Hence, authorities were not well prepared to respond efficiently to mega attacks within the city boundaries.

LeT had been evolved into a sophisticated organisation developing its own military doctrine. Christine Fair argues that LeT was specialised in fidayeen missions which aimed at inflicting casualties and draw publicity (Fair, 2009, p. 8). Mariam Abou Zahab explains that in a typical LeT mission fighters had learned to fight long battles without reinforcement (Zahab, 2007). In other words, LeT had adopted a new doctrine that the Indian authorities ignored or overlooked.

Likewise, the threat of ISIS was underestimated by the French intelligence community. However, from the very beginning, ISIS endorsed terrorism as a strategy against its enemies. The group had sought to establish a caliphate in Iraq and Syria but eventually shifted its attention towards Western targets. In June 2015, for example, an ISIS-affiliated gunman had killed 38 people, mostly British, on a Tunisian beach (BBC News, 2019). Most French analysts and policymakers did not interpret the event as an indication of ISIS transformation into a global organisation capable of spreading terror outside its home base.

Overall, the Mumbai and Paris attacks came as a strategic surprise despite some evidence pointing merely to the operational level. The national and global impact was enormous; the details of the events were not foreseeable; the threat environment was changing in the immediate period before the attacks, but security agencies apparently failed to recognise it; it was both an intelligence and policy failure; and the surprises were not avoidable.

Nonetheless, the two groups took significant risks and invested valuable resources in launching attacks without an apparent endgame. The LeT assailants were asked by Indian media to specify their demands but appeared unsure about them; some mentioned the liberation of Kashmir and the release of (unspecified) fighters held at Indian jails (Editor, 2008, p. 2). The ISIS assailants in Paris made no demands and continued the killings without contacting authorities. Both LeT and ISIS were aware of the strength of the target country and could not reasonably expect a major foreign policy change to occur as a result of their actions. India and France had been hit by terrorism again and again but did not amend their positions on Kashmir and the Middle East respectively. A 9/11-like response to the attacks was also highly unlikely given Indian’s limited military options against nuclear Pakistan and France’s inability to project power on the ground in Syria. The article now turns to a new perspective that can explain strategic surprise leading to mass-casualty terrorism as a cultural particular.

The Islamist perspective on surprise and terrorism

With no clear strategic calculus, the decisions to assault two major cities are puzzling. In the eyes of most Western citizens and policymakers, the attacks appeared irrational and divorced from political realities. Here it is important to understand the roots of Western incomprehension of Islamist terrorism.

In his breakthrough book Orientalism, Edward Said claimed that the West has long perceived the Orient as inferior, weak, and irrational (Said, 2003). He claimed that the cultural representations of Middle Easterners, North Africans and Asians have been essentially imperialistic in the sense of reconfirming Western hegemony over the Orient. Thus, orientalism provides a biased perspective on the Muslim world. Said’s book paved the way for the foundation of post-colonial studies. Their emergence has inevitably influenced the study of Islam in the Western academic world. For instance, Talal Asad has claimed that Muslim societies can be understood only when situated in their reality (Asad, 1993).

However, the intellectual dominance of post-colonialism has been challenged by a new generation of scholars. Religious beliefs, practices, and interpretations can be brought into the equation to explain terrorist inspiration and motivation. In Theorizing Islam: Disciplinary Deconstruction and Reconstruction, Aaron Hughes offers a critique of those scholars who seek to ‘normalise’ Islam (Hughes, 2014, pp. 1–33). Therefore, Hughes proposes a New Islamic Studies which ‘privileges the examination and analysis, not the mere description, of Islamic data’ (Hughes, 2014, p. 118).

Islamists identify themselves as devout Muslims who follow the tenets of the Qur’an and the Sunna (i.e. teachings and practices of the Prophet Muhammad). The linkages between Islam and political Islam are debatable but undeniable, at least for political scientists. Bassam Tibi, for instance, has defined political Islam as the ‘mobilisation of religion for political ends’ (Tibi, 2001, p. 3). Mohammed Ayoob has viewed political Islam or Islamism as the ideologization of Islam that has ceased to be religion or theology (Ayoob, 2011, p. 2).

In Mumbai and Paris, religion as a contextualised form of culture was utilised to inspire actions and motivate the attackers. During the siege of the Jewish Centre at the Nariman House in Mumbai, for example, the following conversation was intercepted between an assailant and his Pakistani handler: ‘Brother, you have to fight. This is a matter of prestige of Islam … Be strong in the name of Allah. You may feel tired or sleepy but the Commandos of Islam have left everything behind. Their mothers, their fathers. Their homes. Brother, you have to fight for the victory of Islam’ (Government of India, 2008, p. 51). Following the Paris attacks, an editorial from ISIS magazine Dabiq accused France that ‘did not grasp that its mockery of the Messenger would not be left unavenged. Thus, the Islamic State dispatched its brave knights to wage war in the homelands of the wicked crusaders, leaving Paris and its residents ‘shocked and awed’. The eight knights brought Paris down on its knees … ’ (Dabiq, 2015, p. 2).

These words revealed a commitment and motivation that cannot be easily dismissed as bravado or macho prowess. The attacks were framed as a cultural duty of Muslims defending their faith against enemies. After all, many Islamist groups seek to imitate the example of the Prophet as a military leader because he represents the ultimate victor. Before the conquest of Mecca, the military strategy of the Muslim forces was largely based on deception and surprise. Initially, the Prophet and his followers launched raids against caravans to gain booty and harm the Meccan economy. In 626 CE, Muslims made a surprise attack on the Banu Mustaliq, allies of the Quraish of Mecca, to neutralise them (Hamidullah, 1992, p. 63). Also, early Muslims mounted a surprise attack against the Jews of Khaybar, an oasis located 93 miles from Medina in 628 CE. Despite its numerical inferiority, the Muslim force surprised the people of Khaybar and finally defeated them (Kathir, 2001, pp. 125–132). These examples could offer some insights into the Prophet Muhammad’s operational art based on surprise.

The permissibility of night attacks (al-bayat) is a religious belief with military practicability. At the time of the Prophet Muhammad, such operations were a common practice leading to the death of many non-combatants. Since the two armies were unable to fight physically, they preferred to use indiscriminate weapons (e.g. mangonels) to attack enemy positions at night (Al-Dawoody, 2017, p. 1006). Even though it is generally not permissible for Muslims to initiate hostilities, a surprise attack under darkness is rather acceptable if the enemy has refused to accept Islam or conclude a peace treaty with the Muslims (Al-Dawoody, 2011, pp. 118–119).

Indeed, ISIS has contextualised this tradition to justify its night attack in Paris. A long essay published by its French-speaking ISIS magazine Dar al-Islam cited a hadith about the permissibility of night attacks: ‘Imam Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr said: As for the Romans, there is no harm to attack them at night by surprise [emphasis added] because the message of Islam has reached them and their land is close to ours. Anyone who refuses to embrace Islam or pay jizyah (poll tax) is fought’ (Al-Hayat Media Centre, 2015, p. 35). While it is not known whether LeT has examined the permissibility of night attacks, it is safe to assume that Islamic history and tradition have inspired at least some of its actions as well.

Moreover, there is a radical literature that could explain the Islamist perspective on mass-casualty terrorism and surprise. In 1979, Pakistani Brigadier General S. K. Malik published the book The Quranic Concept of War offering a faith-based approach to terrorism. In his view, the Quranic military strategy seeks to ‘strike terror into the heart of the enemies, known or hidden’ because God commands ‘And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know [but] whom Allah knows. And whatever you spend in the cause of Allah will be fully repaid to you, and you will not be wronged’ (Malik, 1979, p. 58). Malik chooses this Qur’anic verse [8:60] that could provide religious legitimacy to the use of political violence.

Malik largely dismisses the clausewitzian understanding of warfare as too Western-centric, but he ends up embracing part of it. The Prussian theorist stressed the importance of ‘moral forces’ (e.g. motivation, will) in the final outcome of the war (Clausewitz, 1993, pp. 216–222). Likewise, Malik argues that ‘our objective is the opponent’s heart or soul’ because war has a spiritual dimension that cannot be ignored. From his point of view, the soul is the enemy’s centre of gravity to exploit and assault (Gorka, 2016, pp. 362–363). Malik does not view the use of terror only as a means since ‘it is the end in itself’ (Malik, 1979, p. 59). His work clearly offers a theoretical justification of attacks against civilians.

Additionally, three works that were published online in 2004 can shed light to Islamist thinking of mass-terrorism and surprise. They were written by members and affiliates of the al-Qaeda network to initiate a debate within the jihadi community and offer guidance to its members.

In the Management of Savagery, an al-Qaeda manual about strategy uploaded to the Internet in 2004, the anonymous author who called himself Abu Bakr Naji explained that the plan ‘is to prolong the period of the battle by opposing the goals of the enemy and surprising him with strong, painful strikes … Then after a period of time, if we are successful, our actions will only be surprise strikes against him because … his days in the second stage (of the battle) are spent resisting our attacks until we arrive at the stage of his collapse’ (Bakr Naji, 2006). Hence, the al-Qaeda theorist envisioned a strategy of surprise attacks to bleed the enemy to exhaustion. Yet, this is not just an Ends-Ways-Means strategy to defeat the enemy. Naji clarified that ‘our policies in any jihadi action are Sharia policies’ which invokes a claim to religious legitimacy. The text draws parallels between early and contemporary Muslims in the field of warfare. It has certainly influenced many militant Islamists, including ISIS (Hassan, 2015) and probably LeT (The Soufan Centre, 2019).

At the same year, another important work on military strategy was published by the branch of the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin’s A Practical Course for Guerilla Warfare explained the advantages of urban operations, including to ‘raise the ummah’s and the mujahidin’s morale’, ‘to highlight the meaning of the creed ‘there is only one God and Muhammad is the prophet of God’ and bringing about the worship of one God’, and ‘prepare the ummah and individuals within the group for the confrontations and fierce battles that the Prophet spoke of’ (Al-Muqrin, 2009, p. 131). However, al-Muqrin was a militant with a thin understanding of warfare in Islam. He did not provide strong Islamic evidence supporting urban combat operations, but his analysis offers a religious rationale that would justify attacks against civilians in cities.

Finally, the leading theorist of al-Qaeda Abu Mus'ab al-Suri produced the 1,600 page-long report on the future of jihadi campaigns. The author of The Call of Islamic Global Resistance described the ultimate logic of terrorism as follows: ‘The jihad of individual or cell terrorism, using the methods of urban or rural guerrilla warfare, is fundamental for exhausting the enemy and causing him to collapse and withdraw, Allah willing’ (Stalinsky, 2011). Thus, he envisioned a perpetual war against the perceived enemies of Islam that is not bound by time and geography. Furthermore, Al-Suri attempted to demonise the Western way of life. In one of his lectures in Afghanistan under the Taliban, he denounced the ‘degeneracy of the Western world’ with ‘its sins, gays and lesbians’ (Rej, 2016, p. 9). In this way, he offered a basis of legitimacy for attacks against civilians as a form of moral responsibility.

These works reflected different experiences and conditions even though they were written in the same period. Still, the underlying logic is the same. The success of this kind of strategic surprise is measured by the number of casualties; the more people are killed, the more successful the attack is. Most of the times, but not always, early Islamic history and traditions are utilised to give meaning to violence (Nanninga, 2017, p. 175). What is common is their references to God and the Prophet Muhammad which manifests an aura of religious sanctity and dedication.

In summary, there is an Islamist perspective on mass-casualty terrorism that is distinct and culturally influenced by contextualisation. Strategic surprise is a crucial aspect of achieving success against enemies, as it has always been. Attacks must be indiscriminate and massive since they served a higher purpose.

Implications for intelligence and deterrence

The concept of strategic surprise is closely linked to intelligence. Richard Betts has argued that ‘the principal cause of surprise is not the failure of intelligence but the unwillingness of the political leaders to believe intelligence or to react to it with sufficient dispatch’ (Betts, 1982, p. 4). In contrast, Jones and Silberzahn have observed that sometimes the problem lies with the intelligence community itself which cannot produce the intelligence that decision makers need (Jones & Silberzahn, 2013). Hence, there are two schools of thought seeking to explain why intelligence officers and policymakers fail to prevent an attack: the traditional and the reformist. The former tends to be more pessimistic and views intelligence failures as unavoidable, whereas the latter focuses on organisational and bureaucratic limitations of the intelligence community (Dahl, 2013, pp. 9–11). The reasoning in both schools is inductive since intelligence failure is viewed as the cause of strategic surprise. Indeed, Dina Rezk has observed that ‘most of the literature has positivistic objectives: to establish causation; to determine ‘successes’ or ‘failures’; and to learn lessons’ (Rezk, 2017, p. 473).

The Indian and French intelligence communities had clearly miscalculated the level of threat from militant Islamists. Avi Shlaim has argued that images, beliefs, bias, and certain attitudes (e.g. optimism, ethnocentrism) play an important role in affecting analysis (Shlaim, 1976, p. 357ff). Due to the prevalence of rationalist assumptions, religion is often downplayed from the analysis of terrorism. This is probably more true in countries like France and India, where secularism is conceived as progress against religion’s backwardness. The French laïcité has shaped counterterrorism policy, which traditionally overlooked the role of religion in terrorism (Ragazzi, 2022, p. 709). Indian secularism has become a nationalist ideology banning political mobilisation of religious groups (Brass, 1998, p. 494), particularly non-Hindus. It is possible that the intelligence communities of the two countries suffered from cognitive bias at the process data stage. Despite the fact that the ‘raw’ data was there, they were not able about to connect the dots due to cultural misunderstandings. Consequently, they underestimated intentions and capabilities.

Arguably, religion as a form of culture incorporates beliefs, practices, and interpretations that provide meaning to circumstances. Leonard Weinberg and William Lee Eubank have argued that there are ‘significant differences in the way terrorism manifests itself depending upon the cultural background of the perpetrators’ (Weinberg & Eubank, 1994, p. 3). Indeed, militants superciliously have claimed to represent the authentic Islam of the Prophet Muhammad. Since his military genius led the early Muslims to victory, true believers are bound to win again. The Islamists’ adherence to authenticity has important implications for intelligence.

In a scholarly article published in 2011, Ron Hassner proposed an innovative intelligence approach towards the new terrorism. He argued that the intelligence community should offer ‘an assessment of how rituals and symbols will affect operations’ (Hassner, 2011). In his opinion, there are four indicators that must be examined by religious intelligence analysts: the prominence of religious factors in a conflict; the centrality of the sacred for the execution of combat operations; the salience of a religious factor in a contextualised environment; and the impact of religious beliefs on combat operations. Practically speaking, religious data is too important to be ignored by intelligence analysis. While religion is a multifaceted construct, it can also function as a source of inspiration and motivation. Islam is not inherently more political than other religions, but militants have drawn on interpretations of tradition and history to strategically surprise and commit acts of mass-casualty terrorism.

The organisation and execution of such mega attacks have called into question the effectiveness of deterrence. Deterrence against non-state armed actors is no longer considered an absolute concept, but a relative one. It is not possible to prevent all terrorist attacks (MCDC, Countering Hybrid Warfare Project, 2019). However, some studies have argued that even terrorists consider the potential costs of an attack. Thus, there is a fourth wave of deterrence theory that emerged following the 9/11 attacks (Knopf, 2010). In this regard, Glenn Snyder’s earlier distinction between deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial remains relevant (Snyder, 1961).

There is a consensus that deterrence by punishment is not usually feasible for two reasons. Not only it is very difficult to punish transnational militant groups which have a diverse network of members, but punishment is rarely effective in changing behaviour. The example of al-Qaeda after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2002 indicates the near-impracticability of deterrence by punishment in the context of counterterrorism. Additionally, punishment can prove counterproductive in the long term. A military response could have what Clark McCauley called a jujitsu effect by producing collateral damage and thus create a new momentum for terrorists (McCauley, 2017).

On the contrary, deterrence by denial could be more efficient in deterring major attacks (Dutter & Seliktar, 2007, p. 438). James Smith and Brent Talbot have suggested three levels of deterrence by denial: strategic, operational, and tactical (Smith & Talbot, 2008). At the strategic level, the ‘intelligence dominance’ of a state could contribute to deterrence against terrorism; for instance, Israel has built an image of an intelligence superpower which can successfully stop attacks most of the times (Riemer & Sobelman, 2019). The larger an attack is, the more vulnerable a terrorist group is to infiltration. Although the 2023 Hamas surprise attack has challenged this image (Indyk, 2023) intelligence dominance remains an important objective for states. Operationally, the main aim of deterrence is to stop logistical and financial support for terrorists. That means that intelligence agencies need more intelligence-sharing and data-transfer. Tactically, deterrence by denial could be achieved by implementing security and protection measures in places of attraction. For example, the visible presence of police could deter terrorists from resorting to violence.

Both Mumbai and Paris attacks indicate that deterrence by denial was possible at all three levels. Strategically, there was some intelligence indicating that the two groups were planning to attack major cities in India and France respectively; intelligence agencies should have recognised the development of a new terrorist strategy of attacking cities. Operationally, LeT and ISIS were able to build a logistical network to support the assault teams; yet Indian and French security agencies failed to stop the perpetrators. Tactically, the two countries were not prepared for such massive assaults; better equipped and trained first responders could have stopped the attacks.

In the past few years, LeT and ISIS have become less active and dangerous. India and France have not experienced another surprise attack leading to mass-casualty attacks since 2008 and 2015 respectively. This is either coincidental or illustrates the effectiveness of various post-attacks counterterrorism and intelligence reforms undertaken by the two countries (BBC, 2008; BBC, 2015).

In any case, intelligence and deterrence need to go hand in hand. The success of the latter depends on the accuracy of the former. The attacks under study have showed that the relationship between intelligence and deterrence communities is critical. Therefore, the institutionalisation of cooperation must be understood as a necessary component in the battle against terrorism.

Understanding the Islamist perspective on surprise could be the first step towards a more convincing critique of positivist understandings of mass-casualty terrorism. Religion as a contextualised form of culture can create a set of options for action that is deemed to appear irrational. Therefore, more emphasis is needed on religious data that could provide some insight about preferences and directions. In this context, strategic surprise can be conceived as a cultural particular based on certain interpretations of Islamic history and tradition.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Clark McCauley and Michele Groppi for their detailed comments on the manuscript. He also wishes to thank the reviewers and the editors for their thoughtful and helpful comments and suggestions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).