Contemporary terrorism challenges and responses in the Indo-Pacific

ABSTRACT

Since the seminal terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the emergence of the new terrorism has been epitomised by rise of radical Islamist terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. Through the use of new terrorism techniques and strategies, such movements have been able to transform themselves into worldwide, global jihadist movements. While the Islamic State appeared to have gained the upper hand over Al Qaeda in the competition over the radical Islamist cause due to its successes in Iraq and Syria in 2014, analysts believe that in the long-run, Al Qaeda remains the greater danger. While both Al Qaeda and the Islamic State have suffered greatly from vigorous and sustained global counter-terrorism operations led by the United States, their local affiliates in the Indo-Pacific, as well as other local radical Islamist and non-Islamist groups not affiliated to either, have continued to pose serious terrorist challenges in the region. While the threat has somewhat abated in recent times in Southeast Asia, the terrorist threat remains very serious in South Asia.

KEYWORDS:

• Terrorism
• counter-terrorism
• Indo-Pacific
• South Asia
• Southeast Asia

The new terrorism, Al Qaeda and the Islamic State

The seminal terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 (or 9–11), in which the World Trade Towers, the iconic symbols of Western finance and economic domination, were attacked and demolished with just under 3,000 killed, galvanised radical Islamists throughout the world. The attacks were unprecedented in their impacts as well as lethality (Tan, 2008, pp. 1–2). They demonstrated what was possible: that it was in fact possible to strike at the most powerful perceived enemies of the faith, which radical Islamists hold responsible for the many political, economic and social travails in the Muslim world.¹

It also highlighted the arguably ‘new’ terrorism that now emerged, one that was different from past terrorisms due to its unique and innovative features. This included its sheer lethality that Bruce Hoffman had argued was without precedent (Hoffman, 2002, p. 31). According to Steve Simon and Daniel Benjamin, the string of terror attacks before 9–11, such as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1998 East Africa bombings and the Tokyo sarin nerve gas attack in 1995, were all ‘unmistakably harbingers of a new and vastly more threatening terrorism, one that aims to produce casualties on a mass scale’ (Simon & Benjamin, 2000, p. 59). Kevin O’Brien also drew attention, writing in 2002, to the revolution in computing, telecommunications, and data-transference capacities, or the ‘Information Revolution’, that has immense implications for global security. This has, for instance, enabled terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda to coordinate and plan activities around the world. Thus, O’Brien observed the ‘ability of terrorists, organised criminal groups or other sub-state malicious actors to use the … information and knowledge resources available in the Information Society to plan and organize, finance and communicate, and ensure command and control (C2) over real-world operations’ (O’Brien, 2002, pp. 78–79).

In addition, the increased pace of globalisation, which has led to the ‘democratization of finance, technology and information’ has in turn resulted in the creation of flexible and diffused organisational structures in terrorist groups. Hoffman therefore argued that Osama bin Laden functioned like a ‘terrorist CEO’, presiding over a flexible organisational structure and strategy that has enabled it to function at multiple levels, through top-down and bottom-up approaches. While Al Qaeda has planned strategic terrorist attacks such as those on 9–11, it has also taken a venture capitalist approach in supporting local regional initiatives and proposals. Thus, it has utilised a professional cadre, local regional radical groups, like-minded insurgent movements and trained amateurs (Hoffman, 2002, pp. 38–40).

Al Qaeda had therefore arguably pioneered new terrorism techniques and strategies, enabling it to transform itself into a worldwide, global jihadist movement. The Islamic State (IS) that emerged following its spectacular territorial gains in Syria and Iraq in 2014 has followed a similar template, exploiting the transnational opportunities afforded by globalisation, the use of modern communication and information technology, as well as organisational flexibility resulting in networked trans-national operations around the world.

In particular, the IS has proven very adept at using information technology, particularly social media, as well as other forms of mass communication to effectively spread its radical Islamist ideology and message around the world. Daniel Byman thus noted its ‘impressive social media efforts and overall appeal’, concluding that Al Qaeda has become ‘weaker and less dynamic than the Islamic State’ (Byman, 2015). The IS also differed from Al Qaeda in that it was able, at least initially, to wage war on the central state in both Syria and Iraq, capturing large swathes of territory, and achieving what Al Qaeda could not, i.e. the proclamation of an actual caliphate, in 2014. In doing so, the IS proved itself to be a worthy successor to Al Qaeda, which had suffered enormous losses since 9–11 in the face of sustained worldwide security operations led by the United States against it.

Since 2014, Al Qaeda and IS have been locked in a global competition for regional affiliates throughout the Muslim world, including in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. However, the IS has had the upper hand in this competition, as ‘local groups seem to want to attach themselves to a brand that has caught the attention of jihadists worldwide’ (Byman, 2015). Yet, it is noteworthy that this competition between Al Qaeda and IS has not led to an escalation of terrorism. Tore Hamming has argued that this is due to the ‘pre-conflict methodological re-orientation within Al Qaeda and in the pacifying role played by influential Al Qaeda-affiliated ideologues’ (Hamming, 2020, p. 20). He explained that the

absence of competitive escalation or outbidding in the relationship between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State illustrates how Al Qaeda successfully stuck to its analysis of what works in a long-term perspective and did not react to the initial provocation and success of its competitor. (Hamming, 2020, p. 32)

The IS used brutal terror tactics in the territory it has controlled, carrying out mass executions, public beheadings, rape and symbolic crucifixion displays to terrorise the population into submission. Al Qaeda, in contrast, has been critical of such tactics as it feels that this would turn the population against them as well as alienate the broader Muslim community. Instead, Al Qaeda has paid greater attention to proselytisation and persuasion, rather than the use of force, to convince local Muslims of the justness of its cause (Byman, 2015). This suggests, at least to some countries surveyed in a UN Security Council report in July 2021, that while IS is an immediate threat, Al Qaeda remains the greater long-term radical Islamist threat (United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 2021, p. 5). Thus, the UN Security Council assessed in 2021 that ‘the international context is favourable to Al Qaeda, which intends to be recognised again as the leader of global jihad’, and that ‘Al Qaeda propaganda is now better developed to compete with the Islamic State as the key actor in inspiring the international threat environment, and it may ultimately become a greater source of directed threat’ (UNSC, 2021, p. 6). This is also due to the territorial defeat suffered by the IS in Syria and Iraq in 2019, when it lost its last major stronghold, Baghouz, to the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, proving to radical Islamists worldwide that its strategy has not worked (BBC, 2019). Another recent development that could potentially lead to Al Qaeda’s revival has been the return to power in Afghanistan of the Taliban following the US withdrawal and subsequent swift collapse of the Western-backed regime in Kabul in 2021 (CNN, 2021). As a result, Al Qaeda now enjoys greater freedom of movement within Afghanistan, since it has remained close to the Taliban and reportedly plays an advisory role to it (UNSC, 2021, p. 16).

The new terrorism and South Asia

The events of 9–11, the emergence of the new terrorism in the form of Al Qaeda and the subsequent rise of IS from 2014 had immense impacts on the Indo-Pacific region. 9–11 and the caliphate declared by IS galvanised radical Islamists around the world, including in North America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia. The IS attracted large numbers of volunteer fighters to fight on its behalf to defend its caliphate in Syria and Iraq. Both Al Qaeda and IS also inspired terrorist attacks around the world.

In the Indo-Pacific, the impacts have been felt in South and Southeast Asia, where large numbers of adherents to Islam reside and where several countries continue to face serious governance issues. In South Asia, the radical Islamist threat has steadily become more serious since 9–11. From 2002 to 2020, an estimated 21,753 people in Pakistan and 9,685 in India were killed due to terrorist attacks (Ritchie, Hasell, Mathieu, Appel, & Roser, 2013). The threat from radical Islamist groups remains strong in Pakistan. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an alliance of militant networks formed in 2007 to unify opposition against the Pakistan government and military, has aimed to expel the central government’s influence over the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the setting up of an Islamic state in Pakistan, and the expulsion of Western troops from Afghanistan (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, n.d.). In recent years, the TTP has carried out several deadly terrorist attacks, such as the December 2014 attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar that killed around 150 people in the single deadliest attack in the history of Pakistan. The government’s response to this attack was to implement a National Action Plan to combat terrorism and extremist ideology across the country, as well as counterinsurgency operations in the FATA region. An estimated 3,500 militants and 500 military personnel were killed in the subsequent two-year operation (Council for Foreign Relations, 2023).

However, deadly terrorist attacks have continued. In 2016, a series of spectacular attacks took place. In March, a bombing in Lahore was carried out by the Taliban-linked Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), itself a splinter from the TTP, killing 74 people. In August, a bombing claimed separately by the JuA and the Islamic State’s local affiliate, namely, the Islamic State Khorasan Province, of a gathering of lawyers in Quetta killed 70 people. In October, a bomb attack carried out by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and IS at a police college in Balochistan killed 60 people (Department of State, 2016). In July 2018, an attack by the IS on an election rally in Mastung in July 2018 claimed the lives of 149 people (BBC, 2018). Another deadly attack, claimed by the JuA, took place in January 2023, when a police mosque in Peshawar was targeted in a suicide bombing that killed 100 people (Aljazeera, 2023).

The string of deadly terrorist attacks demonstrates Pakistan’s continuing failure in counterterrorism. This has been attributed to the lack of a coherent counter-terrorism strategy and the lack of a national consensus on how to deal with the militants. As Ahmad Rashid observed, Pakistan uses militants as an appendage to foreign policy, with the army and the civilian government having different agendas towards the militant groups. The result has been the ‘failure of the state to adopt a common strategy and a believable narrative’, which in turn ‘is emboldening the terrorists, weakening the state and making solutions harder to find’ (Rashid, 2017). The problem is that the terrorist threat to Pakistan has serious and obvious implications for regional and global security. A destabilised Pakistan will also have serious consequences for international security, given that it is a nuclear-armed state.

The collapse of the Western-supported government in Afghanistan in 2021 and the return to power of the Taliban has now enabled militants from Pakistan to establish safe havens in Afghanistan. From there, they could plan and carry out further attacks against the government, further destabilising the Pakistani state, which has been facing on-going political instability as well as serious economic issues in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. In particular, the emergence of the IS in Pakistan, in addition to the long-running terrorist threat from Al Qaeda linked militants with ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan, has also worsened the terrorist challenge in Pakistan. Indeed, the return to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2021 could have serious long-term consequences for regional and global security, given the close links between the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda could pose a renewed global terrorist threat from Al Qaeda if it re-establishes a safe haven in Afghanistan. Vast stocks of US-supplied military equipment (eg ammunition, guns, night-vision equipment and mortars) could also now fall into the hands of terrorists. Afghanistan’s instability and weakness also enables militant groups to flourish, in turn destabilising neighbouring countries such as Pakistan and India.

India too has had to deal with terrorist and insurgent challenges. In December 2001, an audacious attack by the Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) on the Indian Parliament took place, killing 14 people, including the 5 terrorists (Josh, 2021). The JeM, founded in 2000, aims to separate Kashmir from India and had joined the Afghan Taliban in attacks against government and Coalition forces in Afghanistan (Parliament of Australia, n.d.). In October 2005, bomb attacks attributed to the LeT took place at a market in Delhi, killing 66 people. In 2006, train bombings in Mumbai were carried out by the LeT and the Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), killing 209 people and injuring over 700. In May 2008, terrorist attacks in the city of Jaipur killed 80 people. This was followed by the widely-publicized Mumbai attacks in November, when 10 terrorists killed 166 people at five different locations. In 2016 and 2019, the Pakistan-based JeM also carried out attacks targeting the Indian army, killing a total of 57 soldiers (Josh, 2021).

Thus, the bulk of radical Islamist attacks have largely emanated from Pakistan-based militant groups, which have carried out attacks particularly in Jammu and Kashmir – territories which Pakistan also claims. However, the inroads being made by the Islamic State into India itself has been a concerning recent development. Indians had joined the Islamic State Khorasan Province in Afghanistan, though only very small numbers of Indian Muslims have been receptive to radical Islamist propaganda. Nonetheless, the increasing Hindu-Muslim polarisation in India could yet pave the way towards greater radicalisation, especially given that there remain a large number of fundamentalist Muslim religious schools or madrassas in India from which to recruit, the ease of access to IS propaganda online, and the ongoing Muslim separatist violence in Jammu and Kashmir (Sarker, 2020).

Apart from radical Islamist-inspired and/or separatist terrorist attacks, India has also faced left-wing extremist violence carried out by the Communist Party of India (Maoist), though concerted counterinsurgency operations have resulted in the threat becoming much reduced by around 2017 (Aljazeera, 2017). Elsewhere in South Asia, radical Islamist terrorism has also emerged in countries such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. This was epitomised by the Dhaka café attack in 2016 in Bangladesh that killed 22 people, mostly foreigners, and the deadly attacks carried out in Sri Lanka in 2019 that killed around 260 people (Department of State, 2019; Reuters, 2019).

The new terrorism and Southeast Asia

Compared to South Asia, the situation in Southeast Asia has been less serious, with 648 people in Indonesia and 19 in Malaysia killed in terrorist attacks from 2002 to 2020 (Ritchie et al., 2013). The figures for Indonesia are significant, as Indonesia does have the largest Muslim population in the world, estimated at 229.6 million in 2020, indicating that while it does face terrorism challenges, it has somehow been less serious and appears to have been better managed (Statistica.com, 2020). The caveat is the largest single terrorist incident in the region, which took place in 2017 when IS-linked local extremists occupied Marawi in the southern Philippines, raised the IS flag over the city and executed civilians. Philippine security forces took months to finally regain control of the city but by then, much of the city had been destroyed, resembling the conflict zones in Iraq and Syria where Western-backed forces had battled the IS. A total of 1,132 people were killed, including 920 militants, dealing a major blow to the IS (Amnesty International, 2017).

Over the same period from 2002 to 2020, 2,503 people were killed in Thailand and 5,035 were killed in the Philippines in terrorist attacks (Global Terrorism Database, n.d.). However, there have been active Muslim separatist insurgencies in both countries and the bulk of the insurgents have in fact distanced themselves from both Al Qaeda and the IS (Tan, 2013, p. 242). In the case of the Philippines, some attacks have also been attributed to the Maoist New People’s Army (Global Terrorism Database, n.d.). This suggests that in evaluating terrorism in the Indo-Pacific, the threat landscape is somewhat more complex than the threat emanating from radical Islamist ideology in the form of Al Qaeda and the IS. There remain non-radical Muslim separatist insurgent groups as well as non-Muslim insurgent movements, such as Maoist communist insurgents in the Philippines. As a side observation, as China is not a Southeast Asian country, 839 people were killed in terrorist attacks in China between 2002 and 2020 (Global Terrorism Database, n.d.). However, the bulk is attributed to attacks by Uighur separatists and the extent of radical Islamist penetration of the separatist movement is unclear (Chung, 2019, pp. 119–132).

What is obvious is that sustained and robust counter-terrorism efforts by Southeast Asian governments against local groups affiliated with IS and the Al Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiah resulted in a fall in terrorist incidents and deaths as a result of terrorism. By 2022, member states reported to the UN that the threat from groups affiliated with both IS and Al Qaeda had largely receded in the region, although there could still be lone-actor attacks as well as remaining pockets of activity in the Philippines. Indeed, in the southern Philippines, the IS reportedly had, in 2021, an estimated 200 fighters capable of carrying out small-scale attacks (UNSC, 2021, p. 18). Another caveat concerns the fears raised over the potential future threat to the region from the Al Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiah. After it carried out its last terrorist bombing in 2009 in Indonesia, the JI has adapted. It has since refrained from directly confronting the state, focusing instead on dakwah activities, such as religious education and proselytising in order to build grassroots support. With an estimated membership in 2021 of between 6,000 and 10,000, there remain relatively large numbers of radical Islamist individuals who could potentially be involved in terrorist activities (Channel News Asia, 2021).

From the short survey above, it is thus clear that terrorism threats remain very serious in South Asia. Whilst somewhat under control in Southeast Asia, terrorism continues to be a security challenge. How states in Asia have responded to contemporary terrorist challenges is the subject of this Special Edition, which consists of articles written by scholars and analysts on the evolving terrorist threats and the state’s responses to them. The analyses in these articles will contribute greatly to the sharing of experiences and strategies, helping to improve counter-terrorism in the region and beyond.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Radical Islamists refer to the fringe extremist elements who advocate the use of violence to establish a state ruled strictly according to Islamic laws as interpreted by them. It is not a reference to Islam or adherents to the religion. The overwhelming majority of Muslims do not subscribe to radical ideology and indeed, have been the main victims of radical Islamist terrorist violence.