The Antarctic exception: how science and environmental protection provided alternative authority deployment and territoriality in Antarctica

ABSTRACT

Antarctica presents an exceptional governance framework. The expansion of sovereignty and territoriality primary institutions demanded a different norm localisation from international society, creating practices and identities unique to the region. In order to preserve peace, delimited territories with exclusive exercise of authority could not be replicated. This conundrum led to the suspension of sovereignty discussions by the Antarctic Treaty, and an emphasis on activities which could accommodate multiple understandings of authority. Scientific research and environmental protection provided the avenue which consolidated the Treaty by reinforcing its exceptional character. Decision-making has been exclusive to Consultative parties, a status awarded for those able to demonstrate substantive scientific research. Likewise, environmental protection has defined Antarctic territorial organisation by creating different protected areas. Nevertheless, joint proposals are still low. Therefore, this work concludes that the institutionalisation of the Antarctic Treaty has stabilised, and concrete cooperation still has a long way to go.

Sovereignty and territoriality: from international society to Antarctica

Sovereignty is generally referred as a final and absolute authority over a territory and population (Biersteker and Weber 2011). This ultimate condition is only possible because being sovereign means an independent exercise of power within territorial boundaries. The deployment of such authority requires the organisation of political power through an institution which would hold the capacity of making binding laws internally; and externally, it would be free from any other source of authority (James 1986, 1999). For this reason, the state becomes a necessary condition for the emergence of sovereignty (Hinsley 1966, 17).

International society was constituted in the seventeenth century when the decline of Christendom and the Holy Roman Empire’s authority turned the sovereign state into the main form of political organisation in Europe (Hinsley 1966; Murphy 1996). The recognition of independent territorial units defined their inter-relationships, setting up the condition for a common identity (Watson 1984; Little 2013). Sovereign states within the European international society would share common values such as peace and independency, and its expansion outside Europe fostered the delimitation of other territories under the same configurations of authority (Bull 1977; Buzan 2004). In the nineteenth century, international society reached the edges of the world, and Antarctica was inevitably included.

But in contrast with other regions, international society’s expansion to Antarctica faced a different norm localisation (Acharya 2004). For more than one century, primary institutions such as sovereignty, territoriality, nationalism, trade, diplomacy, and balance of power (Buzan 2004) were expanded and configured Antarctic identities and practices, but the common goal of peace preservation led to their different arrangement in the mid-twentieth century. The Antarctic Treaty, signed in 1959 and in force in 1961, suspended sovereignty claims in the region, and established scientific research and environmental protection as main practices. If international society has been founded on the sovereignty principle and the territorial ideal since Westphalia (Murphy 1996), in Antarctica, they needed to find different configurations.

Trade, through sealing and whaling, was the first primary institution to establish identities and systematic practices in the region. Balance of power and nationalism followed, as exploring expeditions made Antarctica an object of national dispute amongst main powers, boosting public awareness about the region. As international society was progressively expanding to the region, sovereignty and territoriality unavoidably started to determine further Antarctic practices. The United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, France, Norway, Chile and Argentina asserted their sovereignty rights over territories in Antarctica (Auburn 1982; Beck 1986), which meant the replication of a final and ultimate authority over a specific territory and population. Antarctica, as part of international society, would have its territory mapped and delimited and have independent exercise of authority. However, sovereignty claims have not received overall recognition.

In the history of international society, territorial delimitation facilitated the communication of authority communication and the exercise of power, which increased internal identification and external differentiation in terms of social, economic and cultural patterns (Murphy 1996). As peace preservation is a founding element of international society, maintenance of territorial order has been observed throughout history. But this has not been the case of the sovereignty principle. The Napoleonic period, and the First and the Second World Wars were the culmination of sovereignty states trying to establish hegemonic domains upon other sovereignty states. Therefore, the sovereignty principle has experienced several backlashes, in contrast to the territorial ideal (Murphy 1996; Holsti 2004). General conflict consolidated the principle of autonomy, as the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the Congress of Vienna (1815), the League of Nations (1919), and the United Nations Charter (1945) defined international society’s legitimate actors through the common respect to territorial boundaries and autonomous authority within states. For this reason, common recognition of sovereignty claims is essential to international society, and Antarctica presented a problem to international order.

After the Second World War, attempts to organise Antarctica in terms of sovereignty and territoriality intensified. Antarctica was known for hostile environmental conditions, which prevented permanent settlements for many years (Bernhardt 1974). Therefore, alternatives for authority deployment needed to be employed in order to support recognition of sovereignty claims in the region.¹ The United States, who did not recognise any sovereignty claim and preserved the right to make their own (Auburn 1982; Beck 1986), proposed a condominium and a United Nations Trusteeship in the region in 1948.² Although the proposals were in accordance to international society identities and practices, they were rejected by claiming states, who did not want to waive their sovereignty rights. In response to the deadlock, Chile proposed the Escudero Declaration which postponed diplomatic discussions on the sovereignty issue (Pinochet de la Barra 1987). A precedent was established.

Antarctica was undefined in political terms as much as its isolation precluded a proper understanding of its geophysical conditions and its relationship with the rest of the planet. In the midst of the International Geophysical Year (IGY) preparation in the early 1950s, the necessity to include Antarctica into a comprehensive research effort was acknowledged. At the same time, India tried to bring Antarctica discussions to the United National General Assembly (Chaturvedi 2013). For India, Antarctica had been forged in colonial terms, and a broader participation would protect the region from Cold War disputes (Chaturvedi 2012). Therefore, following the thread left by the Escudero Declaration, the suspension on sovereignty discussions was also adopted by the IGY, promoting a concerted scientific effort which established research stations all around the continent. As science did not necessarily require territorial inviolability and ultimate authority in Antarctica, this effort promoted an avenue for a desired wider engagement.

Although scientific cooperation in Antarctica tried to keep itself distant from political disputes, the successful engagement of states with conflicting interests was only possible because the IGY supported their political aims. For those actors who were already carrying out activities therein, the IGY offered an opportunity to consolidate their presence (Dodds, Gan, and Howkins 2010). Likewise, for those willing to take part, the event also provided a door for a proper engagement. Chaturvedi (2012, 52) points to a ‘knowledge-power nexus’ as science guaranteed a better understanding of the region and safer conditions for human presence. Therefore, the political relevance of any actor in Antarctica became reliable on its capability to understand and conduct activities in the region, turning Antarctic science into a political asset.

As the suspension of discussions on sovereignty issues promoted by the Escudero Declaration and the IGY was temporary, negotiations over a Treaty began in 1958. Following the thread of science prioritisation and controversy avoidance, the Antarctic Treaty was agreed conciliating interests of all those states who participated in the IGY, including claimant and non-claimant states: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Treaty entered into force in 1961, attaching itself to United Nations’ principles, but at the expense of congruent sovereignty and territoriality practices between Antarctica and international society. Article IV states that nothing in the Treaty means the ‘renunciation of asserted rights and claims in Antarctica’, and at the same time ‘nothing asserts or supports such rights and claims either’ (“The Antarctic Treaty” 1959). The framework machination was designed in a manner to avoid definitive solutions or watering down texts in which agreement was necessary (Hanevold 1971; Roberts 1978). Therefore, states with different understandings of sovereignty engaged in Antarctica under the same governing apparatus.

Ambiguous formulations for Antarctic sovereignty is commonly referred to as ‘bifocalism’ (Stokke and Vidas 1996; Haward 2012). On one hand, claimant states were able to maintain their territorial engagement if they wished, as claims are not denied by the Treaty. On the other hand, non-claimants relied on Article IV to engage in the region, as no sovereignty rights have been corroborated by the Treaty either. Therefore, norm localisation for sovereignty and territoriality primary institutions have been changed, differentiating Antarctica from the rest of international society. The Treaty suspended a definition of sovereignty by making any reference to a final and absolute authority unclear. By the same token, standard territorial delimitations have been made just for the Treaty’s jurisdictional area – south of 60° parallel. Following the Escudero Declaration’s and the IGY’s thread, bifocalism represents the diversion from ‘an ultimate authority over a circumscribed territory’, accommodating distinct interests. And ironically, this differentiation of Antarctica from international society has assured peace in the region and the evolvement of the Treaty.

Authority and territoriality deployment in Antarctica

Undefined sovereignty and territoriality did not mean their absence. Karl Schmitt frames sovereignty as ‘the monopoly of decision on the exception’ (Schmitt 2005, 13). Although Schmitt’s idea of exception is derived from a statehood context (Walker 2006), his perspective enlightens the exceptional frame Antarctica received from international society, especially its sovereignty status. Exceptionality represents moments of ‘authentic political creation’ (Huysmans 2008, 170), as decisions generate a political order without a pre-established normative context to inform them. And the Antarctic Treaty embodied this moment of political creation: a governance framework was created by an unprecedented solution to avoid the replication of international society’s sovereignty and territoriality norm localisation. In Antarctica, the Treaty provided a decision-making mechanism where authority can be deployed without requiring a clear definition of whom detains its monopoly. And consensus was the chosen procedure to enable this form of authority deployment. Agreed during the Treaty’s negotiations in 1959 (Roberts 1959), consensus guarantees state-members that their interests would not be jeopardised by the formation of antagonising majorities. Therefore, in consensual decision-making, every Consultative party holds the power to disagree, and reached agreements are necessarily based on their individual consent.

Therefore, in Antarctica authority still relies on nation states to be deployed, but under restricted conditions. Although agreements reached by the Treaty are based on nation states’ decision, the arrangement restricts the freedom ascribed to sovereignty entities in an international space (James 1999). As Consultative parties, national programs operate under and on behalf of the Treaty’s auspices, with consensus guaranteeing that decisions do not go against their interests. Authority is thus transferred from the nation state to the Treaty at the moment they decide to abide by its principles and normative body. And the undefined status of sovereignty by the Treaty only reinforced this diffused source of authority. National programs operate in Antarctica following the Treaty’s framework, at the same time that the Treaty conforms an amalgamation of states’ shared goals to the region.

The exceptional conditions of authority in Antarctica did not stop the consolidation of the Treaty. In fact, quite the opposite. The Treaty has institutionalised throughout the years, with a growing number of parties and a robust normative body (see Figures 1 and 2) being named as the Antarctic Treaty System in 1979 (Stokke and Vidas 1996). Recommendations, resolutions, measures and decisions³ have defined how engagement should take place in the region, and how others could join the arrangement as well. Decision-making became exclusive to ‘Consultative parties’, a status entitled for those who demonstrate ‘substantive scientific research activity’ in the region. Therefore, science started to condition access to decision-making, defining practices and identities at the same time that clear definitions of sovereignty and territoriality were not required.

Figure 1. Growth in accessions to the Treaty. Source: Elaborated by the author (The Antarctic Treaty Secretariat 2018).

Figure 2. Agreements adopted and turned effective throughout the years. Source: Elaborated by the author (The Antarctic Treaty Secretariat 2018).

Along similar lines, environmental protection also became Antarctica’s main institution. In 1964 the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctica Fauna and Flora marked the first concrete movement of the Treaty towards a proper region’s governance. The Agreed Measures recognised the unique character of Antarctica’s fauna and flora, and the urgency of their proper research by science (3rd ATCM 1964). The measures also envisaged to broaden the Treaty’s scope, reassuring more legitimacy from international society as the Treaty was able to advance its joint governance in the region (Roberts 1964) under bifocalism. Throughout the years, several other agreements were based on Antarctica’s environmental preservation,⁴ enabling the Treaty’s consolidation. Preservation implies limitation to activities in the region, which aimed to conserve not only the state of things, but also Antarctica’s political order. Therefore, scientific research and environmental protection have been conditioning the deployment of authority in Antarctica within the Antarctic Treaty System.

Territoriality also received different norm localisation, being determined by scientific research and environmental protection. Facilities such as research stations, camps and refuges have been the main form of territorial occupation in Antarctica, and since the IGY their main purpose has been the support of scientific activities in the region. They not only provide points of observation on the Antarctic environment, but also logistical support. Therefore, it is not possible to identify any territorial delimitation in the same fashion found in international society. Still, criticism has been raised towards the actual scientific productivity of such facilities, as high volume of scientific production does not correlate with an ostensive physical presence (Gray and Hugues 2016). This discrepancy can be understood through the strong historic compound identified in the establishment of stations. During the IGY and before the Treaty’s establishment, claimant states have located their research stations within their territorial claims. On the other hand, non-claimant states such as the United States, the Russian Federation, China, India and the Republic of Korea have chosen to locate their stations in several sectors (Hugues and Grant 2017), directly opposing the replication of international society’s sovereignty norm localisation.

It is still difficult to identify the relative weight of this geopolitical component in Antarctic territoriality. Different political interests in the region, inherited from historical engagements, share space with pragmatism. Parties would choose to operate closer to where they were first established as these areas have been more studied and known. Their proximity to gateways and other facilities also improves safety in operations, reduces costs, and concentrates environmental impact in places already impacted. These same factors also help to understand why parties cooperate with each other and share information of their activities (Elzinga 2012). The Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs (COMNAP) has facilitated national programs in logistical and operational cooperation since 1988. Considering geographical proximity, national programs have organised themselves in regional groupings in order to facilitate cooperation (see Table 1).

Table 1. National programs and COMNAP regional break-out groups.

Peninsula	Ross Sea Region	East Antarctica	Larsemann Hills	Dronning Maud Land
Argentina	China	Australia	Australia	Belarus
Brazil	France	China	China	Belgium
Bulgaria	Italy	France	India	Finland
Chile	New Zealand	India	Russian Federation	Germany
China	Republic of Korea	Italy	Romania	India
Czech Republic	United States	Japan		Japan
Ecuador		Russian Federation		Netherlands
Germany				Norway
Netherlands				Russian Federation
Peru				South Africa
Poland				Sweden
Republic of Korea				United Kingdom
Russian Federation
Spain
Ukraine
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay

Source: Elaborated by the author. Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs – Annual General Meeting (2018).

The break-out groups follow Antarctic gateways and the routes of access to the continent. The Peninsula is the most populated area, as its northern location and close proximity to South America enabled the establishment of facilities in the region. This is also the most visited area in Antarctica, with intense tourism activity during summer (Liggett et al. 2011). As the Peninsula coincides with Argentine, Chilean, and British claims, they all have stations in the sub-region. This is also observed in the Ross Sea with New Zealand; East Antarctica with Australia and France; Larsemann Hills with Australia; and Dronning Maud Land with Norway (with South Africa as the gateway for this sub-region). As previously observed, the United States, Russian Federation, China, the Republic of Korea and India have stations in different regions, which shows a territorial logic which overlooks sovereignty claims.

The foremost point in this singular form of territorial organisation is the role of science, even if intertwined by political interests. Initiated by the IGY in 1957–1958, these facilities promoted a permanent presence in Antarctica and prompted international cooperation therein. Scientific expeditions did not require delimitation of a territory with an exclusive deployment of authority being undertaken. Neither did research stations, as inspections prevented the replication of territoriality practices and identities from international society, securing peace in the region (Jabour 2011). Therefore, the consolidation of the Antarctic Treaty was possible because the Antarctic territorial ideal was increasingly driven by a scientific orientation, maintaining sovereignty perspectives under bifocalism. And throughout the years, environmental protection also became a protagonist. The Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Fauna and Flora inaugurated a form of territory organisation which delimited areas in accordance to their environmental importance and vulnerability.

Specially Protected Areas (SPAs) were the first form of area designation within the Antarctic Treaty, presenting an environmental orientation. In order to ‘preserve their unique natural ecological system’, governments needed to issue permits for those willing to undertake activities with a ‘compelling scientific purpose’ in these spaces (3rd ATCM 1964). Nevertheless, SPAs could not cover areas of non-biological interest which demanded continuing scientific activity. Therefore, Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs) were created by the 7th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (1972) in collaboration with the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR). With the advent of the Environmental Protocol in 1991, SPAs and SSSIs were grouped as Antarctic Special Protected Areas (ASPAs), conforming its Annex V. Through ASPAs, outstanding environmental, scientific, historic, aesthetic, and wilderness values all became determining principles for Antarctic territoriality (“Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty” 1991).

Scientific research and environmental protection consolidated Antarctic territoriality in a very different manner when compared to international society territorial order. Designation of ASPAs do not require clarification of the sovereignty in these areas, neither do they present a geographic delimitation based on some form of authority deployment. Nevertheless, parties are still in charge of their proposition and management, including issuing permits for their nationals willing to visit the area. Currently, there are 72 ASPAs designated, with a concentration of 70% of ASPAs proposed by only 5 Consultative parties (see Figure 3). The number of joint propositions is also very low, with just 8% of the total number of ASPAs. Studies have shown that although joint propositions have almost been the norm since 2006, the number of designations per year have dropped significantly (Hugues and Grant 2017).

Figure 3. ASPAs by proponents in 2018. Source: Elaborated by the author (The Antarctic Treaty Secretariat 2018).

In similar terms to ASPAs, Historic Sites and Monuments (HSMs) also provide a territorial demarcation in Antarctica. Although HSMs can also be proposed by any party, in contrast to ASPAs, there is no form of follow-up once its listing has been agreed. The initiative to protect historic sites was raised for the first time in 1961, and a listing process was agreed in 1968. However, it was only in 1995 that a resolution was agreed with guidelines for HSM propositions, and Annex 5 of the Environmental Protocol includes these sites as protected areas. This loose character in the management of HSMs can be related to its lack of direct impact on science and environment protection, but also with the prevention that HSMs could provide avenues for the replication of international society sovereignty and territoriality. Currently, there are 87 HSMs in Antarctica, also with a low number of joint proposals – only 9% of all propositions (see Figure 4). The level of cooperation in HSM propositions reflects an Antarctic history which was not collaborative in its beginning. The first incursions to the region took place by individual nation states in a context of intense economic and political competitiveness.

Figure 4. Historic sites and monuments in 2018. Source: Elaborated by the author (The Antarctic Treaty Secretariat 2018).

Antarctic Specially Managed Areas (ASMAs) represents the final form of territorial organisation in Antarctica. When multiple activities are concentrated in one area and interfere with each other, coordination by actors is necessary in order to avoid conflicts, improve cooperation, and reduce their environmental impact in a specific area. Annex 5 of the Environmental Protocol foresees the creation of ASMAs in areas where coordination of activities is required, configuring an advanced form of governance in the region. In ASMAs, different actors agree and follow a management plan with codes of conduct and the production of reports about the undertaken activities. But in contrast to ASPAs, ASMAs do not require permits, having a less controlled access. The first ASMAs were created in 2004, with only 7 designated so far (see Table 2). These low numbers can be related to the recent and collective character of ASMAs, especially if compared to ASPAs and HSMs. This need for coordination was raised from the growth in the number of activities in Antarctica and their resulting environmental impact. Therefore, new ASMAs proposals have only been accepted in these terms.

Table 2. Antarctic specially managed areas (ASMAs) in 2018.

ASMAs	Name	Proponent	Year
ASMA 1	Admiralty Bay, King George Island	Brazil, Poland, Ecuador, Peru, and the United States	2006
ASMA 2	McMurdo Dry Valleys, Southern Victoria Land	New Zealand and the United States	2004
ASMA 3	Cape Denison, Commonwealth Bay, George V Land, East Antarctica	Australia (de-designated in 2014)	2004
ASMA 4	Deception Island	Argentina, Chile, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States	2005
ASMA 5	Amundsen-Scott South Pole Station, South Pole	United States	2007
ASMA 6	Larsemann Hills, East Antarctica	Australia, China, India, Romania and Russian Federation	2007
ASMA 7	Southwest Anvers Island and Palmer Basin	United States	2008

Source: Elaborated by the author (The Antarctic Treaty Secretariat 2018).

Facilities, ASPAs, HSMs and ASMAs conform Antarctic territoriality. In common, they present a territorial organisation which does not require an exclusive deployment of authority, thereby sustaining a governance based on bifocalism. The suspension of sovereignty discussions enabled the Treaty to evolve throughout the years, gathering more members and encompassing more norms. Scientific research and environmental protection provided the avenue for keeping Antarctica as an exception in international society, both becoming predominant institutions in its decision-making and territorial organisation. And the Protocol on Environment Protection consolidated this exceptionality. Since 1998, the Committee for Environmental Protection became the forum where the designation and management of ASPAs, HSMs, and ASMAs have been addressed. Even research stations – which represent the closest manifestation of national territoriality in Antarctica – are also deemed to make prior consultations and present environment evaluations to the Committee. If environmental protection was first adopted in order to facilitate scientific activity, in the last decades, environmental concerns demand scientific activities to operate with minimal impact.

This strong environmental orientation configured the Antarctic Treaty (through Consultative parties) as the main authority in Antarctic governance. Although decision-making has not suffered significant changes in the last forty years, this scene is very different when compared to its territoriality. For almost twenty years, decision-making in Antarctica was exclusive to the twelve participants of the IGY who signed the Treaty in 1959. In 1977, the Treaty’s decision-making has been opened,⁵ creating the Consultative status which maintains an exclusive access to decision-making for those who demonstrate substantive scientific research. Although observers and experts have also been allowed to attend the meetings since mid-1980s, they are not entitled to make decisions, neither are they included in consensus. If international society observed much more oscillation in its sovereignty principle evolution (Murphy 1996), in Antarctica, sovereignty suspension and authority deployment have been much more stable.

Territoriality, on the other hand, shows a different picture. In international society, the territorial ideal has progressively evolved without backlashes. In Antarctica, territoriality has also experienced a continuous evolvement. From research stations in the 1950s, Antarctica has been mapped with SPAs, SSSIs, evolving to ASPAs, HSMs, and the most recent ASMAs. And the fact that ASMAs present the most recent and most collaborative arrangement, indicates the direction in which territorial organisation might continue to develop.

In 2013, China proposed the designation of an ASMA for the Antarctic Kunlun Station, in the Dome A area. Parties questioned the proposal, as there was a low level of biodiversity in the region and no other actor was operating in the whereabouts, which would justify the need for coordination. China responded that a precautionary approach was being applied, bearing in mind future activities in the Dome A area. An Intersessional Contact Group (ICG) was established in order to discuss Parties’ questions and China’s reasons. In 2014, China presented the results from the ICG discussion, and raised questions about the use of different interpretations of Annex 5 of the Protocol. Another ICG was agreed with discussions to be resumed in 2015. From 2015 to 2017, China led ICGs and presented its proposal for a Dome A ASMA, but consensus was not reached. In 2017, China agreed to discuss alternative forms for the management of the area. Therefore, during the intersessional period, China developed a draft of a Code of Conduct for Exploration and Research in Dome A, which was presented in 2018. But no definitive decision has been formally reached yet.

Conclusions

The Dome A case illustrates the stage of institutionalisation of Antarctic territoriality and authority deployment. Although nation states hold the ultimate authority in Antarctica, consensus guarantees that individual practices do not take place without peers’ approval. The Treaty still configures the final authority, with decision-making being exclusive to Consultative parties. Territoriality presents a strong environmental component, and the willingness to coordinate different Antarctic national programs in a specific area represents the maturity reached by this governance framework. The low biodiversity and the absence of other actors founded the disagreement with an ASMA designation in Dome A. This does not mean that national interests have vanished. Quite the opposite: they encompass the whole Antarctic governance, which provides the best avenue for their achievement. Bifocalism is the best example. Nevertheless, the low number of multinational research stations, and of ASPA and HSM joint proposals, shows that there is still a long way to go before one sees consolidated cooperation in Antarctica.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Data availability statement

The data that support the findings of this study are available in Antarctic Treaty Secretariat website at https://www.ats.aq/index_e.htm. These data were derived from the following resources available in the public domain:

Antarctic Treaty Database: https://www.ats.aq/devAS/info_measures_list.aspx?lang=e.

Antarctic Protected Areas Database: https://www.ats.aq/devPH/apa/ep_protected.aspx?lang=e.

Notes on contributor

Daniela Portella Sampaio, with a D.Sc. in International Relations (Universidade de São Paulo), has been working with Antarctic Treaty governance since 2012. In 2014, she was awarded a CAPES/Pro-defesa research grant in order to develop her doctoral project ‘The Antarctic exception. Sovereignty and the Antarctic Treaty governance’. In 2015, Daniela was also awarded a CNPq research grant in order to continue her studies at the Royal Holloway, University of London. She was an intern at the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat in 2015, and worked as a Secretariat Advisor for Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings in 2015, 2016, and 2017. In 2017, Daniela was awarded a Marie Sklodowska-Curie Individual Fellowship European, which she currently develops at the School of Earth and Environment at the University of Leeds.

ORCID

Daniela Portella Sampaio http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1400-8957

Additional information

Funding

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation framework programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 750745.

Notes

1 As an effective occupation was extremely difficult in Antarctica at that time, sovereignty ceremonies provided alternative ways for claimant states to strengthen their sovereignty rights assertions. These include planting objects such as crosses, banners and coats of arms; drawing maps; naming places; creating postage stamps, and so forth (Dodds 2011, 383).

2 In a condominium, a group of states manages a region under an international framework of shared duties and rights. Whereas in a United Nations Trusteeship, a concerted effort is deployed for the promotion of political, economic, social and educational advancement of the trustee inhabitants. The main goal is to enable the people of this particular territory to achieve self-government (Jackson 1999).

3 The Decision 1 (1995) agreed that recommendations would be divided into three different instruments: measures, decisions and resolutions. Measures refer to ‘a text which contains provisions intended to be legally binding once it has been approved by all the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties’. Decisions refer to ‘an internal organisational matter to be operative at adoption or at such other time’. And resolutions refer to ‘a hortatory text adopted at an Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting’ (The Antarctic Treaty Secretariat 2018).

4 In 1972, the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS) was signed after informal discussions for a specific regime on seals was raised. This convention is in force, but it has never been operated. In 1980, the Convention on Conservation of Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR 2017) was signed in order to manage conservation and rational use (fishing) in the Southern Ocean. In 1989, the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA) was signed in 1989 but it has never entered into force. Instead, Consultative parties negotiated the Protocol on Environmental Protection, which was signed in 1991 and is currently in force and operation.

5 Although Poland has signed the Treaty in 1961, it was only in 1977 through the I Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting that the state was the authorised to attend the meetings and participate in decision-making. Poland was the first state to be included.