Defending seabed lines of communication

ABSTRACT

Australia is yet to adequately grapple with the unique challenges that critical seabed infrastructure protection poses to its defence and national security. While the paramount importance of Australia's sea lines of communication are widely understood, Australia's seabed lines of communication are understudied and underappreciated. This article lays the foundation for an Australian strategy to protect critical seabed infrastructure that constitutes seabed lines of communications. The article first overviews critical seabed infrastructure in Australia's immediate region. Second, it examines various suspected cases of seabed warfare in Europe and the Indo-Pacific which targeted critical seabed infrastructure. Third, the article analyses Australia's response to date, before, fourth and finally, outlining how Australia, and in particular the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), ought to respond to the growing threat to seabed lines of communication. By systematically analysing seabed warfare trends since 2021 using reputable journalism, think tank reports and fresh regional responses, this article demonstrates Australia's seabed vulnerabilities, and novel resiliency strategies.

Introduction

Australia is yet to adequately grapple with the unique challenges that critical seabed infrastructure protection poses to its defence and national security. While the paramount importance of Australia's sea lines of communication (SLOC) are widely understood, Australia's seabed lines of communication are understudied and underappreciated. Seemingly first posited by Royal Navy officer and barrister Peter Barker in 2018, the idea of seabed lines of communication highlights that submarine cable data flows are a key element of sea trade between nations (Barker 2018). ‘Strategists have neglected submarine cables’, claimed Barker (2018).

In Europe, critical seabed infrastructure attacks have rattled leaders. In May 2023, NATO's intelligence chief David Cattler warned that ‘there are heightened concerns that Russia may target undersea cables and other critical infrastructure in an effort to disrupt Western life, to gain leverage against those nations that are providing security to Ukraine’, adding that ‘the Russians are more active than we have seen them in years in this domain’ (Siebold 2023). Also in May 2023, another NATO official expressed ‘strong suspicions’, that Russia had mined European seabed infrastructure, adding that ‘somewhere in Moscow there are people sitting and thinking of the best ways they can to blow up our pipelines or cut our cables’ (McNulty 2023). (Figure 1)

Figure 1. Australia's submarine cable connections and landing stations.³

This article lays the foundation for an Australian strategy to protect critical seabed infrastructure that constitutes seabed lines of communications. The article first overviews the critical seabed infrastructure in Australia's immediate region. Second, it examines various suspected cases of seabed warfare in Europe and the Indo-Pacific which targeted critical seabed infrastructure. Third, the article analyses Australia's response to date, before, fourth and finally, outlining how Australia, and in particular the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), ought to respond to the growing threat to seabed lines of communication. As this paper analyses very new and emerging trends, reputable journalism, think tank analysis and government reports are used over scholarly texts, which are only now catching up to the debate. The proceeding examination relies on information in the public domain and available online.

This article limits its analysis to civilian critical seabed infrastructure rather than military seabed equipment and cables. Further, the article engages primarily with the threat posed by hostile states and non-state actors against critical seabed infrastructure. Indeed, submarine cables are routinely severed and damaged by fishing equipment, shipping (both commercial and recreational), and natural phenomena (e.g. volcanic activity and undersea landslides), but those issues have been analysed elsewhere (Bueger and Liebetrau 2021). It also omits analysis of China's role in the submarine cable industry, and associated security implication (Brock 2023a, 2023b). This article engages primarily with the interaction of seabed warfare and critical seabed infrastructure protection.

Seabed lines of communication and Australia's immediate region

A range of critical seabed infrastructures connects Australia to the world. While submarine data communication cables are arguably the most important, Australia's mainland is also connected by gas pipelines and an expanding network of electricity cables. Future offshore renewable energy production will also include various seabed connections and conduits. This section will outline these infrastructures in turn.

Submarine cables

While the seabed hosts a range of critical infrastructures, the most important to modern society are submarine cables. Modern submarine cables contain optical fibres, and consist of multiple pairs of fibres. These cables carry approximately 98% of data communication globally. The 500 plus submarine cables which transit the globe carry all manner of data, including private communications (e.g. email and messaging services), banking data, stock market data, medical data, scientific data, government communications, traffic between data centres, and video streaming. Besides onshore secure data warehouses, it is very difficult to know where data is stored anywhere internationally, underscoring the criticality of submarine cables.

Submarine cables are largely owned and operated by the private sector and routes have generally been determined by commercial considerations. Just as ships follow SLOCs, submarine cables often follow these same routes and transit the same maritime choke points.¹ Although some new cables land in Darwin, Maroochydore, Brisbane and Port Headland, the majority of Australia's submarine cable links land in Sydney and Perth. Being an island nation, Australia is particularly vulnerable to submarine cable disruptions, as terrestrial alternatives are unavailable and satellite data transfer technology cannot handle modern bandwidth requirements. Despite ever improving satellite data transfer capacities, the low latency, speed and relative low cost of submarine cables will ensure these seabed connections remain the backbone of the Internet and digital communications into the future.

Submarine cable technology is constantly evolving, and the data carrying capacity is ever increasing. As of 2023, submarine cables are capable of carrying 1.5 Petabits per second of annual traffic (Tinka 2023). Also, beginning in 2020, rather than improving the optical fibre which was approaching physical technological limits, Spatial Division Multiplexing begun to be implemented, which added fibre pairs to cables (Tinka 2023). By adding fibre pairs, a higher total capacity is achieved. Industry is attempting to create cables with 32 and in some cases 40 fibre pairs. New fibres will also be smaller in diameter, meaning more fibres can fit into existing cable specifications. However, this Spatial Division Multiplexing trend means cable repairs will take longer and redundancy is compromised as more data is concentrated into single cable systems. Also, with so many fibre pairs, transmitting the higher volume of data is more complex and challenging for industry.

Another emerging trend is SMART (Science Monitoring And Reliable Telecommunication) cables, which deploy an array of sensors on the cable itself (Howe et al. 2022). These sensors are able to monitor cable performance and physical integrity with greater accuracy at various location points, but also monitor environmental concerns, such as climate and ocean observation, sea level changes, Earth structure observation, as well as hazard monitoring and detection (primarily tsunamis and earthquakes) (Howe et al. 2022). SMART cables also have naval implications, and can be used to monitor the underwater environment for submarines, supplementing existing naval listening cables, hydrophones and other sensors which have been used to monitor submarine activity since the Cold War (Brock 2023a, 2023b).

Proportionate to global averages, significant sums are invested into submarine networks that connect Australia. Of the US$19 billion invested in new submarine cable networks between 2014 and 2023, US$2.36 billion was spent in Australia, which is 12 percent of the global total (Ruddy 2023). Further, according to Terabit Consulting, of the US$10.5 billion set to be spent on under-construction and high-credibility proposed submarine cable projects, around US$1.12 billion will be spent on Australian cables, which is 10 percent of the global total (Ruddy 2023). Submarine cable networks connecting Australia are ever expanding and the network should not be viewed as a static or fixed infrastructure.

A final key element of submarine cable networks are landing stations. Landing stations mediate data between submarine cables and terrestrial networks or data centres. While the majority of Australia's landing stations are located in Sydney and Perth, in future submarine cables will land at a wider variety of locations around the country, which will add redundancy by avoiding unnecessary concentrations of cables at existing landing sites. While submarine data cables are the most important seabed links between Australia and the world, various other infrastructures are being installed on the seabed.

Other critical seabed infrastructures

Offshore renewable energy farms will soon appear on Australia's coasts and with these, new and unique seabed infrastructures. Six priority areas for offshore wind have been identified, including Gippsland in Victoria, Hunter and Illawarra in New South Wales, the Southern Ocean, as well as the Bass Strait near Tasmania. Considerable progress is being made in the zones off Gippsland and the Bass Strait off Tasmania (ABC News 2023; Duckett 2023). Other projects including solar farms and wave energy connectors are also planned which will introduce even more critical seabed infrastructure, as Australia moves away from fossil fuel energy generation (‘Establishing Offshore Renewable Energy Infrastructure’ 2022). Put simply, the sea and the seabed will house a growing number and variety of green energy generation facilities, and with it, more vulnerable critical seabed infrastructures.

Beyond renewable energy generated at sea, seabed electricity cables will also grow in prominence in Australia, as is the case elsewhere globally. Basslink, a bidirectional high voltage direct current cable links Victoria and Tasmania, enables Hyrdo Tasmania to transmit peak load supply to Victoria. In addition to this existing cable, a planned A$30 billion Sun Cable Australia–Asia PowerLink will connect solar farms in Darwin to Singapore (Terzon 2023). The proposed cable would transit the Lombok Strait to supply Singapore, which relies on gas for the majority of its electricity supply. Lastly, a range of seabed pipelines link the Australian mainland to offshore petroleum extraction facilities, especially in Australia's North West Shelf, in the Indian Ocean. These seabed pipelines are owned and operated by industry, and ensure a steady stream of energy between offshore platforms and the mainland, for domestic consumption and also for export. These infrastructures are vulnerable to the same threats from commercial and recreational maritime activity (anchors and fishing incidents) as submarine telecommunication cables.

Twenty-first century seabed warfare proliferation

Since 2021, a range of critical seabed infrastructure incidents in Europe and the Indo-Pacific have caused alarm due to suspected links to state actors. It's important to note that responsible parties are yet to be publicly attributed to these incidents at the time of writing in mid-2024. Nevertheless, these examples have caused alarm in many capitals and prompted defensive strategies and actions.

Nord stream

In September 2022, Nord Stream 1 and 2 natural gas pipelines were sabotaged. Three explosions were reported, which destroyed three of the four pipelines and released methane into the Baltic Sea. Nord Stream connected Russia with Germany directly, and the natural gas was then consumed in Germany and also piped to other European nations. Over one year on, the perpetrators of this sabotage are yet to be identified, but several major media outlets claim that the United States’ CIA knew of a Ukrainian plan to destroy the pipeline (Faulconbridge 2023). This accusation prompted Russia's Deputy head of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev, a close Putin ally, to state in June 2023 that ‘we have no constraints – even moral – left to prevent us from destroying the ocean floor cable communications of our enemies’ (Faulconbridge 2023). Nord Stream is still not functioning at the time of writing, and the attack proved a catalyst for European nations to proactively protect critical seabed infrastructure.

Balticconnector

Also in Europe, on 8 October 2023, Balticconnector, a bidirectional natural gas pipeline connecting Finland and Estonia, as well as three submarine cables were damaged in the same nine hour window (Trevelyan 2023). Balticconnector is 77 kilometres in length and connects the Finnish city of Inkoo to the Estonian port of Paldiski. Financed by the European Union and commercially operational in 2020, the project cost €300 million to complete. Hong Kong flagged and Chinese owned Newnew Polar Bear cargo ship is suspected of causing the damage by dragging its anchor, as it was in the vicinity of the infrastructure at the time, and its anchor was found on the seabed next to the gas pipeline (Sytas and Lehto 2023). Following the damage, NATO increased patrols in the Baltic Sea and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that if the infrastructure was ‘proven to be an attack on NATO critical infrastructure … it will be met by a united and determined response from NATO’ (Henley 2023). Balticconnector resumed commercial operations in April 2024 (Reuters 2023).

Matsu Islands

Submarine cables connecting Taiwan with its Matsu Islands (located just off China's mainland) have been severed an incredible 27 times in the previous five years. In February 2023, both submarine cables connecting the islands were severed within a six day period. Chinese sand dredgers are often responsible for the cable damage, which routinely dredge Taiwan's waters (Cheung 2023). These outages hamper communications with the outside world and adversely impact the Islands’ economy, which are reliant on tourism. While Taiwan has not accused China of intentionally severing its seabed lines of communication, several have speculated that these outages are grey-zone aggression by China against Taiwan (Braw 2023).

Norway's critical seabed infrastructure

Several suspicious incidents affecting Norwegian critical seabed infrastructure took place in 2021 and 2022. First, in November 2021, the Norwegian Marine Research Institute informed that its Ocean Observatory was out of service after about 4 km of underwater cable was dragged away by a ship (Staalesen 2023). The affected cable was used for both marine monitoring, but also intelligence gathering by the Norwegian Armed Forces. The cable was subsequently found approximately 11 kilometres out of position, probably dragged by a ship (Staalesen 2023). Second, in January 2022, cables connecting Norway's Svalbard Satellite Station were severed. Svalbard Satellite Station houses satellite antennas and is the most northerly cable in existence (Humpert 2022). While ‘human activity’ is believed to have caused this damage, no party has yet been implicated (Staalesen 2023). Some speculate that Russia is behind the cut (Corera 2023), but attribution has not yet been established.

Red Sea 2024

As Middle East instability, in particular the war between Israel and Hamas spilt over into Red Sea, reports spread of Houthi attacks against various submarine cables emerged. On 26 February 2024 Israel's Globes news outlet initially, and subsequently The Jerusalem Post, reported that Houthi rebels had attacked four submarine cables in the Red Sea (Gilad 2024; The Jerusalem Post 2024). The following day the Houthis reiterated their position that the group intends to ‘keep all telecom submarine cables and its relevant services away from any possible risks’, and that it would not block efforts to repair submarine cables (Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology 2024). While indeed these cables were damaged, at the time of writing in mid-2024, the cause is still unconfirmed. Various media outlets reported that the damage could have been caused by the British cargo ship Rubymar, which was abandoned by its crew and let to draft (while dragging its anchor) before sinking after a Houthi attack (Folk 2024). Again, precise attribution is an insurmountable challenge.

Australia's response

Australia has taken various steps to safeguard its critical seabed infrastructure, however further action is needed. Australia's actions have primarily responded to protecting cables off Sydney and Perth, as well as new diplomatic initiatives to improve cable resiliency amongst Indo-Pacific nations. Little has been done to address possible future critical seabed infrastructure damage caused by hostile nations or proxies.

Australia's submarine cable protection regime, which allows the Commonwealth Government to create ‘protection zones’ around submarine cable routes, is considered an international gold standard instrument. Specifically, the Telecommunications Act 1997 has enabled three cable protection zones off Sydney and Perth, which restricts activities that could damage cables, criminalises submarine cable damage and ensures the private sector apply for permits to lay cables connecting Australia (Telecommunications Act 2021). This legislation fulfils various Australian obligations under UNCLOS and potential exists for this legislation to be used as a model internationally (Bhatt 2023). The legislation is an excellent starting point to protect cables from unintentional damage potentially caused by anchors and fishing equipment. In addition, Australia legally denotes ‘communications’ and ‘energy’ infrastructure as ‘critical infrastructure’ as per the Security Legislation Amendment (Critical Infrastructure Protection) Act (Australian Department of Home Affairs, 2023).

Australia is also actively working with Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) partners, in trilaterals and unilaterally to improve cable connectivity and resilience. In 2023, Quad leaders announced the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, which, according to the joint statement, ‘represents a shared commitment to undersea cables as a priority for regional infrastructure’ (Australian Government Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2023). At the time of writing in mid-2024, very little is known about the functions of this partnership beyond the May statement. Also announced in May 2023 was Australia's decision to establish its ‘Indo-Pacific Cable Connectivity and Resilience Centre’, which will provide technical assistance, commission research, convene dialogues and other knowledge sharing initiatives to improve development and management of submarine cable networks across South and Southeast Asia as well as the Pacific (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2024). At the time of writing in mid-2024, with a budget of A$12 million across three years, Australias Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade is moving to establish the Centre, and is seeking a lead contractor to implement the facility (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2024).

Australia is also countering the growing proliferation of submarine cable networks owned by Chinese firms by investing in new cable projects across the Pacific. First, Australia owns a substantial share of the communications cable that connects Sydney with Port Moresby and Honiara (Begley 2019). Second, in 2023, Australia announced a partnership with the United States and Japanese governments to fund the East Micronesia Cable, which will connect the Federated State of Micronesia (FSM), Tarawa in Kiribati, and Nauru to an existing cable system (Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2023). These two projects demonstrate the lengths Australia is willing to go to impede Chinese submarine cable infrastructure projects in the Pacific.

However, despite these positive steps, significant gaps exist in Australia's strategy and doctrine. Indeed, Australia's Civil Maritime Security Strategy is silent on critical seabed infrastructure and its protection (2022). Likewise, both Australia's 2023 Defence Strategic Review and also its 2024 National Defence Strategy focusses on the underwater domain pertaining to (anti) submarine warfare and mines, but no mention is made of seabed lines of communication, despite brief mention of critical infrastructure in both documents (2023, 2024).

According to RAN 2010 Doctrine, the seabed's ‘increasingly important source of [exploitable] resources’ is acknowledged (Royal Australian Navy, 2010). The unclassified Future Maritime Operating Concept – 2025: Maritime Force Projection and Control paper gives the seabed more attention, regarding it as one of seven ‘domains’, being the ‘most opaque and cluttered of the environments’ (Australian Defence Force 2007). While the Future Maritime Operating Concept focuses primarily on undersea mines, its analysis alludes to the seabed's possible ‘future utility as a manoeuvre space, allowing for pre-deployment of mission modules into a theatre of operations and using the seabed as an offshore logistic warehouse’ (Australian Defence Force 2007). The Future Maritime Operating Concept notes that:

In 2025, the seabed will be the most complex domain that an adversary (conventional or non-conventional) may use to deter or destroy maritime forces. Surveillance and disposal of sea mines and other seabed-based threats is a time intensive and complex task. Deploying mine warfare assets ahead of the main force is the conventional way to ensure safe passage of mission essential units (Australian Defence Force 2007).

One component of AUKUS Pillar 2 is collaboration on undersea capabilities and the AUKUS Undersea Robotics Autonomous Systems (AURAS) project. Although no information is currently available to link the AURAS project to critical seabed infrastructure protection, in November 2023 the United Kingdom, United States and Australia jointly conducted its Integrated Battle Problem 23-3 exercise off Australia's east coast, which tested autonomous undersea warfare capabilities (AUKUS 2023). Australia's new ADV Guidance undersea support vessel participated in the exercise. According to the Australian media release, Britain's HMS Tamar offshore patrol vessel ‘used a combination of divers and autonomous underwater vehicles to conduct mine-countermeasure operations and monitor critical infrastructure, including pipelines and communication cables’ (AUKUS 2023). ADV Guidance's role in monitoring critical seabed infrastructure is unclear at the time of writing.

Components of a strategy

For Australia to address the unique challenges associated with protecting its seabed lines of communication, an integrated approach is needed. The French are leaders in strategizing and conceptualising seabed warfare, which culminated in its February 2022 Seabed Warfare Strategy (2022). France's strategy could be a template for an adapted Australian approach. This approach is not the responsibility of RAN alone, but also encompasses many other government and industry capabilities. This section outlays five concrete and actionable recommendations available to RAN, but which would involve a variety of Commonwealth Government stakeholders, including the Department of Home Affairs, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Australian Media and Communications Authority. Some of these recommendations echo those of France's strategy, but are reconceptualised to the Australian context.

First, critical seabed infrastructure protection needs to be integrated into Australia's defence and maritime security strategies. Currently, the unique challenges and threats associated with critical seabed infrastructure protection is not considered in any public Australian unclassified policy document – problematically so due to Australian society's reliance on these critical infrastructures. By considering the challenge and how Australia responds, definitions, frameworks, knowledge and doctrines can be developed and harmonised across government, resulting in a shared threat perception and way forward. In essence, critical seabed infrastructure can no longer be ignored and needs urgent government and military attention. The components of such a strategy are laid out in the subsequent recommendation.

Second, work needs to be done in the Australian context to define critical seabed infrastructure response governance. As the above case studies demonstrate, when a potentially hostile seabed incident occurs, as well as swiftly repairing the damaged infrastructure, urgent investigations must ensue to identify the culprit and attribute the incident. However, both tasks are often complicated by the remoteness of the incident location, of coordination with private industry, by the depth of the break, by jurisdictional issues and by prevailing geopolitical tensions. Incident response governance could be facilitated by a new coordination organisation within RAN or the Department of Home Affairs to guarantee oversight and coherence of response governance. Too, Australia's future Maritime Strategic Fleet² could play a key role in incident response, if submarine cable repair capabilities are incorporated into the eventual fleet composition.

Third, efforts are needed to acquire platforms and capabilities to monitor and protect critical seabed infrastructure and to ensure that ASW capabilities are also capable of protecting critical seabed infrastructure. Indeed, underwater monitoring is a high priority of Australia already due to prevailing ASW requirements. Such capabilities include underwater vehicles, sensors and promoting SMART Cable capabilities. Australia's new ADV Guidance could play an important role in protecting seabed lines of communication, as Britain's similar ships do, although whether such a role yet exists has not been publicly disclosed. In short, Australian efforts at underwater domain awareness need to also consider the unique requirements associated with protecting critical seabed infrastructure. Although these technologies will not render the underwater domain ‘transparent’, and underwater domain awareness will remain immensely challenging (Brixey-Williams 2020), these cutting-edge seabed monitoring technologies will enable a greater ability to monitor activity near seabed lines of communication.

Fourth, as the majority of critical seabed infrastructure is owned, operated and repaired by the private sector, coordination between RAN and government with these industry stakeholders is critical. The submarine cable industry is comprised of many players, and often submarine cable networks are owned by consortia of firms. Increasingly so, so-called ‘hyperscalers’ are investing in submarine cable projects, including Google, Meta, Amazon and Microsoft. While industry prioritises providing its customers a fast, secure and stable data conduit, industry is not as aware of geopolitical nuances, emerging maritime threats and advanced grey-zone tactics now employed in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), founded in 1958, assists industry and governments to improve cable security, and releases a range of policy-informed research (2021). Close engagement with industry and the ICPC is essential to ensure Australia's critical seabed infrastructure is laid, operated and maintained in Australia's interests.

Fifth and finally, due to the interconnected nature of seabed lines of communication, protection is not just a matter for Australia alone. Rather, coordination with international partners is essential, and indeed is already taking place to a limited extent through the Quad, AUKUS and other multilateral forums, as well as Australia's new Indo-Pacific Cable Connectivity and Resilience Centre. Critical seabed infrastructure protection is a shared responsibility by like-minded partners and coordinated responses will be more effective than unilateral efforts. Unlike other infrastructure sectors in which Australia has particular unique skills or expertise, the seabed is a new challenge for all nations, which highlights the need for dialogue and perspective sharing, rather than lecturing or evangelising. As Indo-Pacific great and middle powers, including India, Indonesia and Vietnam begin to think and strategize about how to best protect respective seabed lines of communication, Australia should harmonise approaches and seek synergies. Opportunities are ripe for maritime diplomacy and regional cooperation concerning critical seabed infrastructure protection.

Protecting seabed lines of communication

Australia can no longer take its seabed lines of communication for granted. According to analyst Elisabeth Braw, ‘Given the world's dependence on the cables and the few ships that can service them, the near future offers tempting prospects for any country ready to create a few more “accidents” at sea’ (Braw 2023). By virtue of being an island nation, Australian society's reliance on seabed lines of communication means that such ‘accidents’ could have catastrophic consequences.

This article is intended to prompt thinking amongst maritime security policymakers and the wider Australian Government on how Australia's seabed lines of communication can be protected – not just submarine cables but also other critical seabed infrastructures. Just because these infrastructures are often invisible to the public and policymakers as infrastructure, as in the ground and as in the sea (Bueger and Liebetrau 2021), the issue can no longer be ignored. A range of options are available, in coordination with Australian government agencies, the infrastructure industry and international partners, to improve seabed security and resiliency.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This article was written and received funding as part of the author’s Non-Residential Fellowship with the Royal Australian Navy’s Sea Power Centre – Australia. All views expressed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the Royal Australian Navy or any other organisation.

Notes on contributors

Samuel Bashfield

Samuel Bashfield is research fellow with the Australia India Institute's Defence Program at the University of Melbourne. He is also PhD candidate at the Australian National University's National Security College and Non-Residential Fellow at the Royal Australian Navy's Sea Power Centre – Australia. Sam's research interests include (modern and Cold War-era) Indo-Pacific security, defence and foreign policy, Indo-Pacific security architecture, maritime security, nuclear issues, the rules-based order and technology governance. His thesis examines the British Indian Ocean Territory's Cold War history, focussing on Britain's withdrawal ‘East of Suez’ and the Anglo-US special relationship in the Indian Ocean.

Notes

1 Besides the Suez Canal, where data is generally transmitted terrestrially across Egypt.

2 Australia's planned Maritime Strategic Fleet will consist of up to 12 privately owned and commercially operated Australian flagged and crewed vessels. Once established, these vessels could be requisitioned by the Commonwealth when required in a crisis or emergency to underpin Australia's national resilience and maritime capability.

3 Australia Submarine Cable Map (TeleGeography, June 12, 2024), https://www.submarinecablemap.com/#/.