On war, hegemony and (political) masculinities

Ukrainians awoke on the 24th of February 2022 to find themselves in a conflict over which many had been dreading but which almost as many had also thought impossible. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has also meant that we, non-Ukrainian Europeans, find ourselves in a time in which the term ‘crisis’ has taken on a much more direct presence. After over 20 years in which the so-called ‘War on Terror’ wrought death and destruction ‘elsewhere’,¹ the actual conflict between sovereign nation-states, with the prospect of spilling over into yet another European war involving multiple nation-states is now a reality. The horrors of war are happening closer to our own countries than many of us have experienced in our lifetimes.

The gender dynamics of the invasion of Ukraine are impossible to ignore. War re-installs gendered demarcation lines that many of us, naively, thought was a relic from the past. Masculinity is mobilized as a rhetorical figure and symbolic resource in the brutal reality for all these young men and women that have to go into a war declared by older men. In the character of the fascist strongman who has become a cult figure in the global far-right, we can see someone who has been valued at home and abroad precisely for his compensatory masculinism (Löffler, Luyt, & Starck, 2020) as well as ridiculed in Western media (Wiedlack, 2020). Then there is the resilient, David-esque figure who has been championed for his intransigence and refusal to give up in the face of insurmountable odds. Caught in-between these political leaders are the military conscripts of all genders who are putting their lives at risk, as well as women and children who are being forced to flee as a result of imperialist aggression. On social media, people are celebrating the loss of human life and glorifying militarist responses from political leaders whilst those of us in Finland and Sweden find ourselves closer to NATO membership than at any point during our intertwined histories. It is a new formative moment that most of us wish could have been avoided.

Putin and hegemonic masculinity

We at NORMA have been sickened and appalled by what we have all seen in the last 2 months. Critical studies on men and masculinities could not be more relevant for analyzing the intentions and the appeal of political leaders as well as the consequences of their decisions. Two of NORMA’s recent special issues were focused on political masculinities and militarized masculinities but neither we, the editors, nor possibly the special issue editors (Christensen & Kyed, 2022; Löffler et al., 2020) could have foreseen how timely these related issues would be. Indeed, militarism and the responses to militarism must be understood in terms of characteristics we tend to ascribe to masculinity/masculinities. As Christensen and Kyed (2022, p. 1) highlight ‘the male soldier, represented as the hero and the warrior, is one of the most fundamental representations of masculinity’ (see also Enloe, 2000). We see this playing out today in constant coverage of the invasion as well as in the portrayal of political leaders in the years prior.

In the last decade, a handful of social scholars analyzing the nexus between Putin’s masculinity and his governance style have come to an agreement that he represents ‘an alpha male in the international arena’ (Romanets, 2017), a radical version of hypermasculinity, machismo or masculinist type of gender performance (Novitskaya, 2017, p. 160), which eventually can be described as a perfect example of hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 2005). This is exemplified in the images of Putin presenting physical strength, e.g. portraying him as stripped to the waist while riding a horse and being captured on film while engaged in typical ‘male’ activities such as fishing, riding a Harley-Davidson, playing hockey, operating a firefighter’s helicopter, fighter jet or shooting, as well as doing judo (Romanets, 2017). These, combined with his hyper-heterosexuality, unlimited power over Russian society, as well as the need to subordinate all others (men, women and children) leave few doubts, that not only he can be seen as a typified personification of hegemonic masculinity but also that this particular type of gender ideology is one of the main factors that have led to the current invasion of Ukraine. According to Riabov and Riabova (2014), Putin’s regime is based on creating images of national masculinity and attributing masculine characteristics to the country, where militarization and heterosexualisation are the most profiled elements, and their ultimate embodiment have been Russian ‘war with terrorism’ (Riabov & Riabova 2014, p. 45); other acts of political violence ‘(…) such as the 2008 war with Georgia, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, continuing attempts to destabilise Ukraine through the military intervention in its Eastern territories, and the controversial intervention in Syria’ (Novitskaya, 2017, p. 314) and finally, the current invasion of Ukraine. As Wiedlack (2020) noted, the portrayal of Putin as a figure for homophobic ridicule in US Media affirmed Putin’s status in Russia as a bearer of hegemonic masculinity by seeking to undermine this very public presentation of hypermasculinity.

The non-hegemonic Cossack masculinity of Zelensky

In this context, the masculinity performed by Volodymyr Zelensky, the president of Ukraine and the ultimate adversary of Putin, seems to be created on rather oppositional foundations. In his previous career (as an actor and entertainer), Zelensky was engaged in several projects, where not only the traditional, patriarchal imaginaries of Ukrainian masculinities were criticized, but he also utilized the strategies aimed at deconstructing traditional gender order, that are characteristic of queer activists. One of such project is the video ‘Cossacks Made in Ukraine, a parody of 2014’ where using the same esthetics that Ukrainian queer boys-band ‘Kazaky’ is famous for (wearing black crop-tops, high heels and latex-like outfits), together with three other male artists, he performs the parody of classic Ukrainian lyrics about Cossacks, which in the local social perceptions are symbols of hegemonic masculinity themselves. The video starts with the image of the artists in ‘traditional Cossack clothing, which they then rip off to reveal their sassy outfits’ (Newsweek, 03. March 2022) and can be interpreted as an attempt to queering the most traditional and still desired form of Ukrainian masculinity. According to Bureychak, the Cossacks, a militaristic community that operated in todays’ Ukraine between the 15th and 17th centuries, were impersonations of heroism, courage, male bonding and independence (Bureychak, 2009; Bureychak & Petrenko, 2015). They were the ‘perfect’ patriots who fought against Russian occupation and for country autonomy. They are, therefore, a Ukrainian exemplification of hegemonic masculinity. This particular type of masculinity seems not to be in line with Zelensky’s ideals.

Another sign of Zelensky’s non-hegemonic performance can be traced in his leadership style, which can be described as rather flat and significantly less hierarchical than other male presidents that are currently in power prefer. He tries to be seen as a politician who is always with the people, prefers to use direct communication and promotes cooperation rather than one-man governance, which is a clear contrast from Putin’s ruling style. Finally, unlike Putin, he values diplomacy over violence, which can be seen as an additional trait of non-hegemonic vision of (gendered) political communication style.

However, despite presenting particular distance to the hegemonic characteristics of male gender performances, the war and war-like discourses seem destined to impose hegemonic characteristics on him. In the (social) media, Zelensky is portrayed as a ‘man with iron balls’, a ‘man with huge balls’, or a ‘real man’ who is an object of affection of heterosexual women, who buy pillows with his image as a sign of their ultimate devotion. Moreover, within the time, the personal cult of Ukrainian presidents is becoming stronger, suggesting that he is the only one responsible for Ukrainian resistance to Russian invasion. Such attempts aimed at portraying Zelensky as the newest ideal of hegemonic masculinity seem to be made against his ways of understanding masculinity, are counterproductive and (unconsciously?) reproduce and praise type of masculinity embodied by Putin, the perpetrator of the violence, that Zelensky acts against.

In the current conflict, much has also been made of the female masculinities (Halberstam, 1998) of Ukrainian women who have been soldiers and politicians. For instance, Kira Rudik, a member of the Ukrainian parliament was interviewed by right-leaning Fox News and left-leaning MSNBC alike, proudly brandishing a Kalashnikov rifle whilst there is a morbid curiosity around the Ukrainian sniper codenamed ‘Charcoal’ who has drawn comparisons to a Soviet sniper nicknamed ‘Lady Death’ (Sullivan, 2022). Nevertheless, despite exceptional media portrayals, war generally tends to polarize genders and turns back the efforts on creating gender-equal societies (Romanets, 2017). Images of warrior men are counterposed with that of supportive women who take care of their children and stock munition factories (the iconic image of Rosie the Riveter during the Second World War is the most famous). When the work of rebuilding damaged infrastructure is undertaken, it is generally men working in construction industries who will undertake these jobs. On the other hand, the vulnerability of young men is on display daily. The invasion has given us images of frightened teenage boys on both the Ukrainian and Russian side, forced into conscription and a war that neither thought they would ever be fighting in. Ukrainian men of ‘fighting age’ have had to transform into protectors of the nation (with or without their consent) and they cannot leave the country – which is a very radical example of the gender-based violence inflicted on men by political leaders. Though, as noted elsewhere, whilst it is true that men die more often in direct combat situations, women are more likely to die as a result of the consequences of war (Ormhaug et al., 2009: 3). Ukrainian women have been, by contrast, allowed to leave, and their caring role (mothers protecting children) seems to be the one that gives them acceptance in the host societies receiving refugees but this too has brought into sharp focus ‘who deserves to be a refugee’ – only (white) women and children, with men – and especially men of colour – prevented from crossing over into other countries either by state representatives or by neo-Nazi militias (Lindberg at al., 2022).

The current issue

It is clear that militarism and militarization are fundamentally intertwined with political masculinities; militarism is the outcome of decisions where masculinity is deployed as a symbolic resource. This is the defining feature of political masculinities (Löffler 2020:, p. 11). However, this resource can be used to differing ends. This is either in the mobilization of public support for an invasion or as a means of mobilizing resistance to it; to the reproduction of or changes in the exercise of social, political or economic power by men. The current issue of NORMA touches on issues of nationalism, militarism and political masculinities in different ways. In looking at pro-austerity rhetoric in Greece Petrogiannis and Freidenvall demonstrate how easily nationalist rhetoric around ‘protecting the state’, as a means of imposing economic austerity, invokes the spectre of militarism; what they call ‘war–nationalist–heroic discourse’. In the article, they also demonstrate how integral images of war are to supporting the notion of the politician as a soldier and how the notion of economic ‘discipline’ is charged with the language of weaponry (in much the same way as Putin has labelled economic sanctions against Russia a declaration or weapon of war).

Encinas-Franco, using feminist critical discourse analysis, explores discourses around another populist rightwing strongman, namely the Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte. Encinas-Franco focuses specifically on how Duterte burnished his image amongst Filipino migrant communities, with whom Duterte won a substantial majority. The events, and subsequent media debate, surrounding Duterte kissing a migrant Filipino woman were construed as supporting Duterte’s reputation as simultaneously a passionate father figure, a normal Filipino guy and a ladies man. Again, it is clear how a certain vision of hegemonic masculinity is mobilized as a resource to enhance Durterte’s support both at home and abroad.

In the final article, Zhao focuses on how discourses around masculinity have been mobilized as part of the nation building project in post-Soviet Uzbekistan. Drawing on a review of Russian and English-language publications from 1991 to 2020, Zhao demonstrates how ideas of responsibility, both in relation to the family and the state, have been mobilized in the project of nation-building. Specifically, Zhao notes how themes of migration and migrant labour, primarily to Russia and Kazakhstan, have been regarded as integral to the construction of Uzbek masculinities after the fall of the Soviet Union. However, Zhao also highlights how the project of nation-building has been a specifically gendered phenomenon with the creation of national heroes, who have been primarily identified as men. However, Zhao also draws attention to the invocation of masculinity in long-running border disputes in Uzbekistan following the breakup of the Soviet Union, noting that ‘masculinized and nationalistic Uzbek identity is embedded and solidified within the dispute of borders, both as a material and discursive space’.

Notes

1 As various commentators have pointed out, the language used in coverage of the invasion of Ukraine has either explicitly invoked racial profiling of the victims or failed to acknowledge that there has been an ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001 and 2003 respectively which was initiated by another sovereign nation state.