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ABSTRACT
2016 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and thus of the oldest self-standing general right to non-discrimination in international law under article 26. The Human Rights Committee has enforced the right with rigour creating a vast and formidable body of discrimination jurisprudence over the decades. This jurisprudence, though, is doggedly single-dimensional and appears to have given short shrift to discrimination based on multiple and intersecting grounds of article 26, viz race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. This article examines the curious case of missing intersectional discrimination in the ICCPR. It does so by pulling together the dispersed and often unidentified claims based on more than one ground of discrimination. It delineates the pathologies of reasoning in these claims which have overlooked the idea of ‘intersectionality’ understood as disadvantage based on multiple and intersecting grounds, which is both similar to and different from disadvantage based on individual grounds. The article shows that this conceptual reckoning matters in identifying and addressing discrimination, and thus enforcing the commitment in article 26 of addressing not just single-ground discrimination but ‘any discrimination’ against ‘all persons’ on ‘any ground … or other status.’
Acknowledgements
I am grateful for the invaluable feedback on earlier drafts of the article presented at the INTRAlaw Human Rights Colloquium organised at the Department of Law, Aarhus University, Denmark, 29–30 September 2016 and at the Association of Human Rights Institutes (AHRI) Conference, organised by the Netherlands Institute of Human Rights (SIM), Utrecht University, 1–3 September 2016. Many thanks in particular, to Prof Jens Vedsted-Hansen and two anonymous peer reviewers of the article for their helpful comments.
Notes
1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171.
2 The list of state parties to the ICCPR, as of 20 November 2016, is available at <https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en> accessed 20 August 2016.
3 Cf ICCPR, art 2(1), which applies only in relation to the rights guaranteed under the ICCPR and arts 23–25 which guarantee non-discrimination in relation to particular rights.
4 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) (adopted 7 March 1966, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 196.
5 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13.
6 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) (adopted 13 December 2006, entered into force 3 May 2008) 2515 UNTS 3.
7 Cf ICCPR, art 3, which specifically relates to equality between men and women.
8 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171. The Optional Protocol binds 115 State Parties <https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4&clang=_en> accessed 20 August 2016.
9 Aumeeruddy-Cziffra et al v Mauritius (1981) CCPR/C/12/D/35/1978.
10 HRC, ‘General Comment No 18: Non-Discrimination’ (1989) HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol I).
11 ‘The Right to Equality and Non-Discrimination’, Icelandic Human Rights Centre <http://www.humanrights.is/en/human-rights-education-project/human-rights-concepts-ideas-and-fora/substantive-human-rights/the-right-to-equality-and-non-discrimination> accessed 20 August 2016.
12 Broeks v the Netherlands (1987) CCPR/C/OP/2/1984; Zwaan-de-Vries v the Netherlands (1987) CCPR/C/OP/2/209/1984.
13 Toonen v Australia (1994) CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992.
14 Gueye v France (1989) CCPR/C/35/D/196/1985.
15 Love et al v Australia (2003) CCPR/C/77/D/983/2001.
16 Ballantyne v Canada (1993) CCPR/C/47/D/359/1989.
17 Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Commentary and Materials (OUP 2014) [1.72].
18 ibid [1.12].
19 ibid [23.01]
20 Wouter Vandenhole, Non-discrimination and Equality in the View of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies (Intersentia 2005) [36]. The jurisprudential analysis in this article is restricted to decisions under the individual communications procedure and does not span the state reporting mechanism.
21 See nn 69–72 and accompanying text.
22 HRC, ‘General Comment No 28: Equality of Rights between Men and Women (art 3)’ (2000) CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add10 [30].
23 LNP v Argentina (2011) CCPR/C/102/D/1610/2007.
24 Aumeeruddy-Cziffra (n 9).
25 Vos (Hendrika S) v the Netherlands (1989) CCPR/C/35/D/218/198.
26 See discussion in Section 3.2 below.
27 Ange-Marie Hancock, Intersectionality: An Intellectual History (OUP 2016).
28 Kimberlé W Crenshaw, ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color’ (1991) 43 Stanford Law Review 1241.
29 Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought (2nd edn, Routledge 2009) 21.
30 bell hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin To Center (2nd edn, South End Press 2000) ch 2.
31 See for a discussion of intersectionality as ‘travelling’ theory: Helma Lutz, Maria Teresa Herrera Vivar, and Linda Supik (eds), Framing Intersectionality: Debates on a Multi-Faceted Concept in Gender Studies (Ashgate 2011).
32 R Aída Hernández Castillo, ‘The Emergence of Indigenous Feminism in Latin America’ (2010) 35 Signs 539; Patricia Monture-Angus, Thunder in My Soul: A Mohawk Woman Speaks (Fernwood 1995); Elvia R Arriola, ‘Gendered Inequality: Lesbians, Gays and Feminist Legal Theory’ (1994) 9 Berkeley Women's Law Journal 103; Mary Eaton, ‘At the Intersection of Gender and Sexual Orientation: Towards a Lesbian Jurisprudence’ (1994) 3 Southern California Review of Law and Women's Studies 183.
33 Sumi Cho, Kimberlé W Crenshaw and Leslie McCall, ‘Toward a Field of Intersectionality Studies: Theory, Applications, and Praxis’ (2013) 38 Signs 785.
34 Kimberlé W Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’ (1989) University of Chicago Legal Forum 139.
35 DeGraffenreid v General Motors 413 F Supp 142 (ED Mo 1976); Payne v Trevanol 673 F 2d 798 (5th Cir 1982); Moore v Hughes 708 F 2d 475 (9th Cir 1983).
36 DeGraffenreid (n 35) 143.
37 ibid.
38 Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing’ (n 34) 151.
39 ibid 149.
40 Cho, Crenshaw and McCall (n 33).
41 Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing’ (n 34) 150.
42 Angela P Harris, ‘Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory’ (1990) 42 Stanford Law Review 581; Trina Grillo, ‘Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the Master's House’ (1995) 10 Berkeley Women's Law Journal 16; Darren Hutchinson, ‘Identity Crisis: “Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination’ (2001) Michigan Journal of Race and Law 285.
43 Joanne Conaghan, ‘Intersectionality and the Feminist Project in Law’ in Grabham and others (eds), Intersectionality and Beyond: Law, Power and the Politics of Location (Routledge-Cavendish 2009); Robert S Chang and Jerome McCristal Culp Jr, ‘After Intersectionality’ (2002) 71 UMKC Law Review 485.
44 Johanna Bond, ‘International Intersectionality: A Theoretical and Pragmatic Exploration of Women's International Human Rights Violations’ (2003) 52 Emory Law Journal 71.
45 Aisha Nicole Davis, ‘Intersectionality and International Law: Recognizing Complex Identities at the Global Stage’ (2015) 28 Harvard Human Rights Journal 205.
46 Pok Yin S Chow, ‘Has Intersectionality Reached its Limits? Intersectionality in the UN Human Rights Treaty Body Practice and the Issue of Ambivalence’ (2016) 16 Human Rights Law Review 453.
47 The numerical figure relates to cases which were specifically decided on article 26 either alone or in conjunction with violation of other rights.
48 Aumeeruddy-Cziffra (n 9).
49 ibid [6.1].
50 ibid [5.2].
51 ibid [6.2].
52 ibid [9.2 (b) 2 (ii) 2].
53 Zwaan (n 12) [12.1].
54 ibid [2.2].
55 ibid [15].
56 Broeks (n 12) [2.3].
57 ibid [14].
58 Vos (Hendrika S) (n 25) [2.5].
59 ibid [9.1].
60 ibid [12].
61 ibid.
62 ibid (Appendix) [4].
63 See also Cavalcanti Araujo-Jongen v the Netherlands (1993) CCPR/C/49/D/418/1990, which was argued on the basis of ‘sex in relation to (marital) status’: ibid [5].
64 Vos (Hendrika S) (Appendix) (n 25) [3].
65 ibid [4].
66 ibid [5].
67 LNP (n 23) [2.7].
68 ibid [13.3].
69 Danning v the Netherlands (1987) CCPR/C/OP/2/205/1990.
70 Sprenger v the Netherlands (1992) CCPR/C/44/D/395/1990.
71 Hoofdman v the Netherlands (1998) CCPR/C/64/D/602/1994.
72 Derksen v the Netherlands (2004) CCPR/C/80/D/976/2001.
73 See also Schmitz-de-Jong v the Netherlands (2001) CCPR/C/72/D/855/1999 and Jongenburger-Veerman v the Netherlands (2005) CCPR/C/85/D/1238/2004.
74 Ato del Avellanal v Peru (1988) CCPR/C/34/D/202/1988
75 Pauger v Austria (1999) CCPR/C/65/D/716/1996.
76 Vos (AP Johannes) v the Netherlands (1999) CCPR/C/66/D/786/1997.
77 Young v Australia (2003) CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000.
78 X v Colombia (2007) CCPR/C/89/D/1361/2005.
79 Young (n 77) [10.4]; X v Colombia, ibid [7.2].
80 MT v Uzbekistan (2015) CCPR/C/114/D/2234/2013.
81 ibid [2.14].
82 ibid [3.10].
83 ibid [7.6] (emphasis added).
84 ibid (Appendix II) [4].
85 ICCPR, Part IV; First Optional Protocol, arts 1–5.
86 HRC, ‘General Comment No 33: Obligations of State Parties under the Optional Protocol’ (2008) CCPR/C/GV/33 [1.60].
87 ICCPR, art 28(2).
88 Joseph and Castan (n 17) [1.69].
89 General Comment No 33 (n 86) [11].
90 Joseph and Castan (n 17) 26.
91 ibid [1.61].
92 Jongenburger-Veerman (n 73); Derksen (n 72); Vos (AP Johannes) (n 76); Hoofdman (n 71); Cavalcanti (n 63); Zwaan-de Vries (n 12); Danning (n 69); Vos (Hendrika S) (n 25); Broeks (n 12); Sprenger (n 70).
93 Karnel Singh Bhinder v Canada (1989) CCPR/C/37/D/208/1986 (indirect discrimination); Ballantyne (n 16) (affirmative action).
94 Tarunabh Khaitan, A Theory of Discrimination Law (OUP 2015) 165–71.
95 Amanda Jane Mellet v Ireland (2013) CCPR/C/116/D/2324.
96 See esp the discussion in Fiona de Londras, ‘Fatal Foetal Abnormality, Irish Constitutional Law, and Mellet v Ireland’ (2016) 24 Medical Law Review 591.
97 General Comment No 18 (n 10) [7].
98 ibid [13].
99 For a distinction between the two see Titia Loenen, ‘The Equality Clause in the South African Constitution: Some Remarks from a Comparative Perspective’ (1997) 13 South African Journal on Human Rights 401.
100 Catherine Albertyn and Janet Kentridge, ‘Introducing the Right to Equality in the Interim Constitution’ (1994) 10 South African Journal on Human Rights 149, 175.
101 Domestic courts have especially stressed on the importance of conducting impact analysis before pursuing justifications in discrimination claims. See Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) [51]–[52] (Goldstone J); Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1999] 1 SCR 497 (SCC) [81].
102 See for a detailed analysis of proportionality review Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (CUP 2012); Julian Rivers, ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review’ (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 174; Cora Chan, ‘Proportionality and Invariable Baseline Intensity of Review’ (2013) 33 Legal Studies 1.
103 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 182.
104 Muller and Engelhard v Namibia (2002) CCPR/C/74/D/919/2000 [6.7].
105 Derksen (n 72) [4.4] [9.2].