Economic Profiling of the Lone Wolf Terrorist: Can Economics Provide Behavioral Investigative Advice?

Abstract

Economics has long had a theory of “crime and punishment.” This theory provides predictions about the effects of law enforcement activity on criminals’ actions but can it provide investigative advice? This paper extends the theoretical framework by identifying the possibility of “economic profiling” of criminals and terrorists. Investigative psychologists attempt to derive the characteristics of offenders from the characteristics of the crime to develop an offender profile. The assignment of individuals to a “class” involves the application of a classification scheme or typology. If the characteristics of a crime can be assigned to a particular type, the offender will have certain characteristics. This may assist law enforcement in identifying and finding the offender. A logical extension of the expected utility analysis of crime and terrorist behavior is the development of a methodology of economic profiling based upon an economic-behavioral typology of criminal and terrorist behavior. It is the purpose of this paper to provide some first steps in the development of such a framework. These first steps are cast in the context of an investigative economist seeking to develop an economic profile of a lone wolf terrorist.

KEYWORDS:

• Economics
• crime
• terrorists
• profiling
• offenders
• investigative psychology
• expected utility
• criminal behavior
• terrorist behavior
• typology
• investigative economist
• economic profile
• lone wolf terrorist

Notes

1. See Instituut voor Veiligheids en Crisismanagement (2007).

2. See Ehrlich's (1973, p. 525), especially footnote six for a comment on multiple-periods.

3. If the condition is not met, all empirically observed lone wolf terrorism must be undertaken by risk-seeking lone wolves.

4. This is a feature of the substantively rational economic agent.

5. As wealth increases, relative risk aversion is reflected in the percentage of resources allocated to risky activities. Constant relative risk aversion implies the percentage remains the same. As wealth increases, absolute risk aversion is reflected in the absolute amount of resources allocated to risky activities.

6. This framework may be applied to a crime such as serial murder where the offender may expect a number of victims (perhaps just one) from an attack but with a chance (a risk) that the actual number may be different from this expectation. The metrics are mean and standard deviation. The relevant data may be obtained from law enforcement archives and may include number of attempted attacks, number of victims, and number of survivors.

7. This has caused concern among financial economists. However, like some of the properties of the quadratic utility function, this concern need not necessarily spread to other types of economists.

8. Details obtained from Instituut voor Veiligheids en Crisismanagement (2007).

9. An analogy is the way in which a chess player may work with a computer to choose the best course of action.