Technological construction as identity formation: building Taiwan's high-speed rail during the 1990s state transformation

Abstract

This article examines the construction of the Taiwan high-speed rail (HSR) as a vehicle for Taiwanese identity formation. The Taiwan HSR is the product of a hybridization of designs from Japan and Europe. Japanese and European engineers transferred HSR technology to Taiwan, but Taiwanese policy actors and engineers localized and assimilated this technology to the island's politics, society and history. They reconstructed the meaning of HSR technology through the dual processes of indigenization (bentuhua; ) and democratization that unfolded during the two decades of HSR planning and construction. While Taiwanese politicians attempted to advance competing political interests through the project, leading local engineers used it to reconstruct their professional identity from an international perspective. Both groups had their agendas. Taiwan's HSR project involved a technopolitical process in which identity formation and technological construction were mutually constitutive.

Keywords:

• large technology systems
• Taiwan high-speed rail
• identity formation
• technopolitics
• co-production

Acknowledgements

I need especially to thank Gary Downey for his insightful advice. I am also grateful to the interviewees for their precious time and stories. My study benefits from the comments and suggestions of Chyuan-yuan Wu, Saul Halfon, Daniel Breslau, Matthew Wisnioski, Matthew Goodrum and the referees.

Notes

¹Downey and Lucena, “Knowledge and Professional Identity in Engineering,” 394.

²Chang, “Technological Construction as Identity Formation”; Chang, “Pursuing Independent Engineering Design.”

³Harrison and Johnson, “Introduction.”

⁴Hecht, The Radiance of France.

⁵Carroll, Science, Culture, and Modern State Formation.

⁶Mrázek, Engineers of Happy Land.

⁷Downey and Lucena, “Knowledge and Professional Identity in Engineering,” 393.

⁸United Nightly, “First Time”; Economic Daily, “European Countries Playing Political Cards to Earn Stake in 6-Year Plan.”

⁹Economic Daily, “Germany Decides to Establish Federal Office of Foreign Trade Information in Taiwan”; United Daily, “French Minister of Industry.”

¹⁰United Nightly, “French Minister of Industry Coming to Visit for Taiwan HSR Project, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”

¹¹United Daily, “After French Minister, Germans Coming for Taiwan HSR, Ministry of Foreign Affairs”; Economic Daily, “Benz Group Pushing German Politicians to Visit Taiwan for Taiwan HSR Project”; United Nightly, “Americans Concerned with French Activities for 6-Year Plan”; United Daily, “Italian Minister of Public Works Coming after French”; Economic Daily, “Why Japanese Not Like French Approaching Us”; Economic Daily, “French Teach Japanese a Lesson.”

¹²Legislative Yuan, Highspeed Trains; United Daily, “Five County Mayors against HSR Planning Policy Change”; Central Daily, “We Will Regret Tomorrow If We Don't Build the Taiwan HSR Today”; Central Daily, “Southern Counties Protest Taiwan HSR Budget Cut”; Central Daily, “Save Taiwan HSR Budget.”

¹³Hau, Intrepidness, 368–9.

¹⁴Lee, With the People Always in My Heart.

¹⁵Lee, With the People Always in My Heart; also see Times, “Strait Talk.” In this interview, President Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui's successor, described the influence of Lee's definition of Taiwan's relationship to the Republic of China on his own policy:

A simple way to describe the status quo of Taiwan is this: first, the Republic of China was on mainland China; then the Republic of China moved to Taiwan; then the Republic of China was on Taiwan, and now the Republic of China is Taiwan.

¹⁶Lee and Kobayashi, Lee Teng-hui School’s Wisdom; Lee and Nakajima, Asia’s Wisdom and Strategy; Lee, The Road to Democracy; Lee, With the People Always in My Heart.

¹⁷Lee, The Road to Democracy.

¹⁸Lee, The Road to Democracy, 181.

¹⁹The HSR core system basically refers to its electrical and mechanical systems, which include the subsystems of power supply, rolling stock and signaling system.

²⁰Interview with senior THSRC engineer and manager, RW.

²¹Interviews with THSRC engineers. In fact, the decision to switch systems caused THSRC to delay completion of the Taiwan HSR project by one year. See Central News Agency, “Nita Ing”. Ing explained that the delay was due to general considerations by THSRC regarding construction progress, system testing and operation preparation. However, the specific reason for the delay was believed to be that THSRC needed more time to integrate the Shinkansen core system with the European designs. See United Daily, “Delay Due to Serious Hold-Ups in Core System Work”; Liberty Times, “Ministry of Transportation Criticizes Japanese for Taiwan HSR Delay”; Central News Agency, “Taiwan HSR Core System Progress Less than 40%”; Chinatimes, “THSRC Complains about Taiwan Shinkansen Altitude”. Liberty Times, “Nita Ing”.

²²Interview with senior THSRC engineer and manager, VY.

²³Interview with senior CECI engineer, KL.

²⁴HSR Bureau, Visiting Report on the German and French HSRs, 42.

²⁵Interview with Tong Ping. Also see Tseng, The Vietnam War, 315–58.

²⁶Chang, “Technological Construction as Identity Formation”; Chang, “Pursuing Independent Engineering Design.”

²⁷Chang, “Technological Construction as Identity Formation”; Chang, “Pursuing Independent Engineering Design.”

²⁸Taiwan Railways, The Year-1975 Work Report of the Research Project on the Development of Constructing Super Railway; Taiwan Railways, Centennial_History of Chinese Railway Construction; Taiwan Railways, Visiting Report on French, German, South African and Hong Kong Railways; Ministry of Transportation, “File Number: 0671010103/0005/0001/001.”

²⁹These reports also covered analyses of Taiwan's socio-economic environment, the Super Railway's route design and traffic capacity, and some estimates of Taiwan's future traffic demand.

³⁰When the Super Railway team submitted its first report to Taiwan Railways and Ministry of Transportation in 1975, the Tōkaidō Shinkansen had been running for 10 years. ‘Although the cost of the construction of the (Tōkaidō) line ended up being nearly double the amount initially forecast, the revenue from it had already surpassed this figure by the time the Sanyō Shinkansen (; from Osaka to Fukuoka, 553.7 km) opened (March 15, 1975).’ See Hood, Shinkansen, 106.

³¹Taiwan Railways, The Year-1975 Work Report of the Research Project on the Development of Constructing Super Railway, 226–7.

³²Taiwan Railways, 1975,1976,1978 Work Report of the Research Project on the Development of Constructing Super Railway; Taiwan Railways, Centennial History of Chinese Railway Construction; Taiwan Railways, Visiting Report on French, German, South African and Hong Kong Railways.

³³The Executive Yuan made the decision at its 2025th meeting on 2 April 1987. See Ministry of Transportation, West Taiwan High Speed Rail Feasibility Study, Final Report; Ministry of Transportation, Research Report on Constructing the HSR in Taiwan West Coast Corridor.

³⁴President Chiang Ching-kuo died in January 1988 and was succeeded by Vice President Lee Teng-hui.

³⁵Chang, “Technological Construction as Identity Formation”; Tu, “Finance and Public Finance,” 268.

³⁶The Republic of China government has five branches called Yuan. The Executive Yuan is the main administrative branch which includes more than 95% of the bureaucracy.

³⁷Ministry of Transportation, West Taiwan High Speed Rail Feasibility Study, Final Report; Ministry of Transportation, Research Report of Constructing the HSR in Taiwan West Coast Corridor.

³⁸Wen, “Detouring High Speed Rail in Taiwan.”

³⁹Wen, “Detouring High Speed Rail in Taiwan,” chap. 2, 32; Jacoby, U.S. Aid to Taiwan.

⁴⁰CECI () was the abbreviation for China Engineering Consultants Incorporated. Since 2007, CECI and China Engineering Consultants Incorporated have referred to separate entities. CECI Engineering Consultants, Inc., Taiwan was formed in May 2007 as a new company inheriting the duties, responsibilities and all project experience of China Engineering Consultants, Inc., which was originally established in 1969. CECI refers to the past history of China Engineering Consultants, Inc., as well as the present and future operations of CECI Engineering Consultants, Inc., Taiwan (see http://www.ceci.org.tw/english/index.htm, accessed August 25, 2011). China Engineering Consultants Incorporated was established by the Ministry of Transportation in 1969 with the help of U.S. economic aid. Due to changes in relevant laws, it established CECI as a new entity. In Chinese, the name CECI drops reference to China and places Taiwan as the first word in the company's title.

⁴¹Ministry of Transportation, Research Report of Constructing the HSR in Taiwan West Coast Corridor.

⁴²Interview with Liao Chin-Lung, former director general of the HSR Bureau.

⁴³HSR Bureau, West Taiwan Corridor HSR Construction Plan,11–12.

⁴⁴The annual budget of the central government was approximately 1064.77 billion NTD. See http://win.dgbas.gov.tw/dgbas01/83ctab/83c101.htm (accessed August 25, 2011).

⁴⁵After six supplementary elections held from 1969 to 1989 in order to fill those seats occupied by the deceased congressmen elected in 1948 in mainland China, the Second Legislative Yuan was elected by the Taiwanese population in 1992 according to the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China passed in 1991. Legislative Yuan, “Concise History.”

⁴⁶Wen, “Detouring High Speed Rail in Taiwan.”

⁴⁷The HSR Bureau commissioned forty-eight HSR research projects from engineering consulting companies, universities and other professional institutes from its establishment in 1990 until it signed the privatization contract with THSRC. In addition, the HSR Bureau continued sending its engineers and managers abroad to study other foreign HSR systems in the world such as the Spanish AVE. See the HSR Bureau website, http://www.hsr.gov.tw/homepage (accessed August 25, 2011).

⁴⁸Interview with Liao Chin-Lung, former director general of the HSR Bureau. Also see HSR Bureau, General Planning Report on the Taiwan HSR and Development of the Taiwan Western Coast Corridor, volume I and II; HSR Bureau, Taiwan HSR Construction Plan; HSR Bureau, West Taiwan Corridor HSR Construction Plan.

⁴⁹Ministry of Transportation, Research Report of Constructing the HSR in Taiwan West Coast Corridor.

⁵⁰Interview with Tong Ping. Also see Ministry of Transportation, Visiting Report on the Japanese Shinkansen; HSR Bureau, West Taiwan High Speed Rail General Planning, Final Report; HSR Bureau, General Planning Report on the Taiwan HSR and Development of the Taiwan Western Coast Corridor, Volume I and II; HSR Bureau, Taiwan HSR Construction Plan; HSR Bureau, Internal Report on French and German HSRs’ Civil Engineering; HSR Bureau, West Taiwan Corridor HSR Construction Plan.

⁵¹Interview with Liao Chin-Lung, former director general of the HSR Bureau.

⁵²The higher density of population distribution in Japan and Taiwan also requires a HSR with a sharper and steeper linear shape.

⁵³According to the final report of West Taiwan High Speed Rail General Planning (HSR Bureau, 1991), HSR passengers would suffer serious injury if the air pressure suddenly reached 8000 Pa/sec. and would feel discomfort if it reached 400 Pa/sec. Also see National Center for High-performance Computing, Research Report on Micro Pressure Wave in HSR Tunnels; Chien ed., World HSR Technologies, 90, 522; United Daily, “Japanese or Euro Core HSR System.”

⁵⁴Enlarging HSR tunnel size was not the only option for reducing sonic boom and heavy air-pressure. Beveled tunnel exit, for example, was one design that could effectively alleviate these negative effects. Building ventilation shafts is another effective method for reducing sonic boom and heavy air-pressure. See HSR Bureau, West Taiwan High Speed Rail General Planning, chap. 6, 19–21; Chien, ed., World HSR Technologies, 90, 522.

⁵⁵Ishizuka, “The Rolling Stocks for the Taiwan High Speed Rail.”

⁵⁶Chang, “Technological Construction as Identity Formation”; Chang, “Pursuing Independent Engineering Design.”

⁵⁷Tanaka, “Present Taiwan HSR ()”; United Daily, “Japan Professionals”; Central Daily, “Central JR Refuses to Endorse the Taiwan HSR.”

⁵⁸Hood, Shinkansen.

⁵⁹Interview with Liao Chin-Lung, former director general of the HSR Bureau.

⁶⁰Hood, Shinkansen. Interviews with THSRC engineers.

⁶¹Hood, Shinkansen, 205.

⁶²Hecht, The Radiance of France.

⁶³Hecht, “Technology, Politics, and National Identity in France,” 256.

⁶⁴Jasanoff, “The Idiom of Co-production”; Jasanoff, “Ordering Knowledge, Ordering Society.”

⁶⁵Jasanoff, “The Idiom of Co-production”3.

⁶⁶According to data in the opinion survey research ‘Taiwanese/Chinese Identification Trend Distribution in Taiwan, 2013’ conducted by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University, 57.1% (17.6% in 1992) of Taiwanese identify themselves as Taiwanese, 3.8% (25.5% in 1992) as Chinese and 35.8% (46.4% in 1992) as both Taiwanese and Chinese. See http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=166 (accessed on June 16, 2014).

⁶⁷For instance, Taiwanese were forced to speak the ‘National Language’ (), Mandarin Chinese; those who spoke their mother languages, such as Hokkien/Holo (), Hakka (), Japanese or aboriginal languages. See Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism; Jacobs, “Taiwan's Colonial History and Postcolonial Nationalism.”

⁶⁸Examples of Lee's localization discourse include ‘living community’ (), ‘developing great Taiwan and building it as a new mother land’ (), ‘Republic of China on Taiwan’ (), ‘new Taiwanese’ ()”; the most controversial concept in this discourse was Lee's definition of cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan as ‘special state-to-state relations’ (), which he introduced in 1999 near the end of his second and final term: See Lee, The Road to Democracy; Lee, With the People Always in My Heart; Lee, Managing Great Taiwan; Tsai, Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity; Huang, Lee Teng-hui’s Political Thoughts and Policies; Lee and Kobayashi, Lee Teng-hui School’s Wisdom; Lee and Nakajima, Asia’s Wisdom and Strategy.

⁶⁹Tsai, Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity.

⁷⁰This phrase is derived from ‘states are made of knowledge’ in Jasanoff, “The Idiom of Co-production,” 3.

⁷¹Tsai, Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity; Huang, Lee Teng-hui’s Political Thoughts and Policies.

⁷²The terms of the privatization policy stipulated that the private company that won the HSR contract would be responsible for paying for construction of the Taiwan HSR. The government's role, among others, was to acquire the land needed for the Taiwan HSR and to monitor the elected private company, but not to offer any budget or other resources to the HSR's equipment, systems and construction. The company would be allowed to operate the HSR for a certain period of time in order to get its investment back and earn a profit. The commission awarded to THSRC allows it operate the Taiwan HSR for a period of the fifty years, after which it must transfer the HSR to the government. See HSR Bureau, Memorial Collection for the Taiwan HSR Open to Traffic, 2–8.

⁷³HSR Bureau, “Qualification Examination for HSR Private Investment (BOT) Project Completed,” 3.

⁷⁴Economic Daily, “Three Foreign HSR Consortia Suspicious of Bid Program.”

⁷⁵Economic Daily, “Three Foreign HSR Consortia Suspicious of Bid Program.”

⁷⁶Economic Daily, “Foreign HSR Consortia Actively Conducting Integration for Taiwan HSR Project.”

⁷⁷Economic Daily, “China Development Taking on THSRC”; Economic Daily, “Taiwan Star Tested”; United Daily, “German Locomotives Pull and Push French Trains.”

⁷⁸See Economic Daily, “China Development Leads Bidding for Taiwan HSR Project” 1997; Economic Daily, “Euro and Japan Competing For HSR Project.”

⁷⁹Hsu, “The Logic of Political Domination or the Logic of the Market?”; Chen, Faction Politics and Political Changes in Taiwan; Chen et al., Disintegrating KMT-state Capitalism.

⁸⁰Kastner, Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond.

⁸¹Economic Daily, “Two Consortia Compete for Taiwan HSR Project”; Economic Daily, “HSR Project Draws New Business Generation.”

⁸²HSR Bureau, “Selection and Evaluation of HSR Private Investment Applications.”

⁸³THSRC asked the government to invest 105.702 billion NT dollars (3.69 billion USD). Most of this requirement involved the costs of land appropriation for the project. The amount was modified slightly to 108.0 billion NTD (3.77 billion USD) in the HSR privatization contract. The Comprehensive Selection and Evaluation committee members agreed unanimously that THSRC was the Best Applicant and China Development was the Second Best Applicant. See HSR Bureau, “Selection and Evaluation of HSR Private Investment Applications.”

⁸⁴Economic Daily, “Taiwan HSR Corporation Upper Hand on Financial Plan”; United Daily, “HSR Project Changing Taiwan Business”; United Daily, “Taiwan HSR Corporation”; United Daily, “HSR Privatization Contract Signed.”.

⁸⁵United Daily, “Editorial Colum.”

⁸⁶Control Yuan, Review on the Effect of the Taiwan HSR BOT Policy Strategy and Implementation.

⁸⁷This phrase borrows from the Jasanoff's assertion that ‘knowledge is constituted by states’ in Jasanoff, “The Idiom of Co-production,” 3.

⁸⁸HSR Bureau, “Information on the Contract to Build, Operate, and Transfer the Taiwan North–South High Speed Rail (HSR).”

⁸⁹Basically, the Taiwan HSR was divided into several subsystems, including the rolling stock, signaling system, civil construction, track style, etc. Rolling stocks and electrical-mechanical equipment and systems were known as the HSR core system.

⁹⁰Also

Taiwan HSR Corporation, a private company with concession right, is responsible for overall construction of the HSR project, including the selection of mechanical and electrical systems. All systems chosen by THSRC are required to meet the standards of function, quality, safety, etc. specified in the contract and must be approved by the Ministry of Transportation. (See HSR Bureau, “Selection of HSR Mechanical & Electrical Systems,” 7)

⁹¹HSR Bureau, “Progress of the Taiwan HSR Project.”

⁹²HSR Bureau, “Progress of the Taiwan HSR Project”; HSR Bureau, “THSRC Signs Memorandum to Adopt Japanese Shinkansen System”; Control Yuan, Review on the Effect of the Taiwan HSR BOT Policy Strategy and Implementation, 57–8.

⁹³Economic Daily, “Taiwan Star Tested.”

⁹⁴United Nightly, “Eurotrain Might Ask for Compensation”; United Daily, “Taiwan HSR Corporation Negotiates with Eurotrain for Compensation.”

⁹⁵Economic Daily, “Lee.”

⁹⁶United Daily, “French, German and British Representatives in Taiwan Concerned about Core System Bidding.”

⁹⁷Interview with Liao Chin-Lung, former director general of HSR Bureau.

⁹⁸Tang, The Spring of Peace in Taipei, 336–7; United Daily, “Japanese Press Reports Taiwan HSR Expected to Adopt Shinkansen before Result Announced”; United Daily, “Politics Mattered?”; United Daily, “Something Needs to be Checked”; United Daily, “DPP Legislator Chen Chao-Nan.”

⁹⁹Tang, The Spring of Peace in Taipei; Hood, Shinkensen. Also see United Daily, “Japan Economic Times”; United Daily, “Iwasato Masao in Japan.”

¹⁰⁰United Daily, “Nikkei.”

¹⁰¹United Daily, “Final Count Down on Core System Tender.”

¹⁰²Central News Agency, “THSRC Has No Comments on Lee-Ing Meeting.”

¹⁰³United Daily, “Japan Minister of Transportation”; United Daily, “Ing.”

¹⁰⁴United Daily, “Ing.”

¹⁰⁵Economic Daily, “Eurotrain Wins Superficially.”

¹⁰⁶Interviews with THSRC engineers. Also see Economic Daily, “Taiwan HSR Reliable?”

¹⁰⁷Control Yuan, Review on the Effect of the Taiwan HSR BOT Policy Strategy and Implementation, 61–3. Also see Economic Daily, “THSRC Required to Compensate Eurotrain 2.4 Billion NTD”; United Daily, “Business Negotiation 3 More Years.”

¹⁰⁸Control Yuan, Review on the Effect of the Taiwan HSR BOT Policy Strategy and Implementation, 61–3. Also see Economic Daily, “4 Years Later, THSRC Settles with Eurotrain for 65 Million USD.”

¹⁰⁹Wu, “Behind the Taiwan HSR Controversy,” 168.

¹¹⁰Interview with a senior THSRC engineer and manager, RW.

¹¹¹Tu, “Finance and Public Finance,” 268. Also see Kao, “6-Year Plan, a Necessary Surgery.”

Additional information

Funding

The Taiwanese Ministry of Science and Technology supports some parts of this research, project No. 102-2410-H-002-086-MY2.