ABSTRACT
Based on Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger’s sequential reciprocity game model, this study aims to establish the sequential reciprocal game model based on international tourism cooperation and analyzes the game behavior between China and a certain country. The findings indicate that a certain country that is rational or does not have enough reciprocal motivation will adopt the noncooperative strategy when China adopts the noncooperative strategy. A certain country that has enough reciprocal motivation will adopt the cooperative strategy when China adopts the cooperative strategy. Moreover, a certain country will adopt the cooperative strategy with certain probability when their reciprocity motivation lies between the above two cases. The conclusions will provide a positive reference for countries tourism cooperation decision.
摘要
本文以Dufwenberg和Kirchsteiger的序贯互惠博弈模型为基础, 建立了国际旅游合作的序贯互惠博弈模型, 分析中国与丝绸之路沿线某国之间的博弈行为。研究结果表明, 当中国采取不合作战略时, 若某国具有完全理性或互惠动机不够大时, 某国就会采取不合作策略;而当中国采取合作战略时, 如果某国互惠动机足够大, 则某国就会采取合作策略;此外, 当某国的的互惠动机处于两者之间时, 则以一定概率采取合作策略。研究结论将为各国旅游合作决策提供积极参考。
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Correction Statement
This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
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Yihong Li
Yihong Li is a Lecturer of School of Forge Business at Chongqing College of Mobile Communication, Chongqing, China. She conducts research in tourism management and corporate governance (E-mail: [email protected]).
Qiuxiang Zhou
Zhou Xiang is a Ph.D. student of School of Economics and Business Administration at Chongqing University, Chongqing, China. Her research interests include business administration, tourism, management and tourism marketing (E-mail: [email protected]).