Mission Impossible: Hammarskjöld and the UN Mandate for the Congo (1960–1961)

ABSTRACT

The Congo’s independence in 1960 was followed by unrest, intervention by Belgian troops, and the secession of the Katanga province. The United Nations Security Council authorized Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld to send a peacekeeping force to support the Congolese government, but with the proviso not to interfere in domestic politics. This contradiction created a mission impossible. Conflicting interpretations of the mandate were complicated by the member states’ geostrategic interests at the height of the Cold War. The mandate that Hammarskjöld had boldly secured was contested and led both the Soviet Union and the Western alliances of states to distrust the role of the secretary-general.

KEYWORDS:

• Hammarskjöld
• peacemaking mandate
• Republic of the Congo
• UN secretary-general

Notes

^1. Parts of this article draw on Henning Melber, “Dag Hammarskjöld and Africa’s Decolonization,” in Peace Diplomacy, Global Justice and International Agency: Rethinking Human Security and Ethics in the Spirit of Dag Hammarskjöld, ed. Carsten Stahn and Henning Melber (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 255–279.

^2. Quoted in Kai Falkman, ed., To Speak for the World: Speeches and Statements by Dag Hammarskjöld (Stockholm, Sweden: Atlantis, 2005), 71.

^3. Telegram dated July 12, 1960, from the president and the prime minister of the Republic of the Congo to the Secretary-General. Security Council Official Records, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August, and September 1960, document S/4382, in Andrew Cordier and Wilder Foote, eds., Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations. Volume V. Dag Hammarskjöld, 1960–1961 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1975), 18f.

^4. Ibid., 19. The 1955 Bandung Conference in Indonesia was the first large-scale meeting of African and Asian states.

^5. This article states that “the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.”

^6. Dag Hammarskjöld, “Opening Statement in the Security Council, New York, July 13, 1960,” in Cordier and Foote, Public Papers, 21, 22, 23.

^7. Security Council Official Records, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August, and September 1960, document S/4387, in Cordier and Foote, Public Papers, 25.

^8. Ibid., 26.

^9. Maria Stella Rognoni, “Dag Hammarskjöld and the Congo crisis, 1960–1961,” in Stahn and Melber, eds., Peace Diplomacy, 201.

^10. Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjöld (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1972), 403f.

^11. Dag Hammarskjöld, “First Report on Assistance to the Republic of the Congo, New York, 18 July 1960,” in Cordier and Foote, Public Papers, 29, 30.

^12. Dag Hammarskjöld, “Statement in the Security Council Introducing His Report, New York, 20 July 1960,” in Cordier and Foote, Public Papers, 42.

^13. Ibid.,43.

^14. Ibid., 44f.

^15. Dag Hammarskjöld, “Summary of Composition and Deployment of the United Nations Force in the Congo, New York, 31 July 1960,” in Cordier and Foote, Public Papers, 49f.

^16. Dag Hammarskjöld, “First Statement in the Security Council Introducing His Second Report, New York, 8 August 1960,” in Cordier and Foote, Public Papers, 71.

^17. Ibid.

^18. Cordier and Foote, Public Papers, 76.

^19. Dag Hammarskjöld, “Interpretation of Paragraph 4 of the Security Council’s Third Resolution on the Congo, Leopoldville, The Congo, 12 August 1960,” in Cordier and Foote, Public Papers, 87.

^20. Security Council Official Records, Fifteenth Year, 887th meeting, in Cordier and Foote, Public Papers, 113.

^21. Ibid., 114.

^22. Ibid., 120.

^23. “First Message to Mr. Tshombé,” September 16, 1961. Security Council Official Records, Sixteenth Year, Supplement for July, August, and September 1961, document S/4940/Add.4, in Cordier and Foote, Public Papers, 570.

^24. Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, 443f.

^25. Ryan Irwin, “Sovereignty in the Congo Crisis,” in Decolonization and the Cold War: Negotiating Independence, eds. Leslie James and Elisabeth Leake (London, UK: Bloomsbury, 2015), 213.

^26. “Second Statement After Soviet Demand for His Dismissal,” New York, February 15, 1961. Security Council Official Records, Sixteenth Year, 933rd meeting, in Cordier and Foote, Public Papers, 349f.

^27. Rajeshwar Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld: The Congo Crisis (London, UK: Oxford University Press, 1976), 189–214.

^28. Ibid., 190.

^29. Cordier and Foote, Public Papers, 356f.

^30. Ibid., 358.

^31. “Statement in the Security Council After Adoption of Afro-Asian Resolution,” New York, February 21, 1961, in Cordier and Foote, Public Papers, 359.

^32. “Third Statement,” New York, April 7, 1961, in Cordier and Foote, Public Papers, 433.

^33. UN General Assembly resolution 1599(XV), “The Situation in the Republic of Congo,” April 15, 1961; UN General Assembly resolution 1600(XV), “The Situation in the Republic of Congo,” April 15, 1961.

^34. UN General Assembly resolution 1601(XV), “The Situation in the Republic of Congo,” April 15, 1961.

^35. “Fourth Statement,” New York, April 18, 1961, in Cordier and Foote, Public Papers, 437.

^36. Ibid., 540.

^37. For details see the personal account by Conor Cruise O’Brien, To Katanga and Back: A UN Case History (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1962), 195ff.

^38. Cordier and Foote, Public Papers, 541.

^39. A series of stories and reproduced cables were posted on the website of The Guardian, August 17, 2011. See “UN Cable 7 September 1961: Legal Doubts over Operation Morthor,” http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/aug/17/un-cable-hammarskjold-katanga-operation-morthor?INTCMP=SRCH.

^40. See “UN Cable 10 September 1961: Hammarskjöld Gives the Order for Operation Morthor,” The Guardian, August 17, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/aug/17/un-cable-hammarskjold-operation-morthor?INTCMP=SRCH.

^41. See “Top Secret UN Cable 15 September 1961: Hammarskjöld Rejects American Criticism,” The Guardian, August 17, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/aug/17/un-cable-hammarskjold-american-criticism?INTCMP=SRCH. Sir Roy Welensky was prime minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and a fierce opponent of the UN’s role in the Congo, which he considered a threat to white supremacy in southern Africa.

^42. Timothy Scarnecchia, “The Congo Crisis, the United Nations, and Zimbabwean Nationalism, 1960–1963,” African Journal of Conflict Resolution 11, no. 1 (2011), 65.

^43. O’Brien, To Katanga and Back, 261.

^44. Manuel Fröhlich, Political Ethics and the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld as Secretary-General (London, UK: Routledge, 2008), 191.

^45. Colin Legum, Congo Disaster (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1961), 166ff.

^46. Dag Hammarskjöld, “Last Words to the Staff—from Remarks on Staff Day, New York, 8 September 1961,” in Cordier and Foote, Public Papers, 564.

^47. Ibid., 545.

^48. Sture Linnér, “Dag Hammarskjöld and the Congo Crisis, 1960–61,” in Sture Linnér and Sverker Åström, UN Secretary-General Hammarskjöld: Reflections and Personal Experiences. The 2007 Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture (Uppsala, Sweden: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 2008), 29.

^49. Ernest Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), 30.

^50. Ibid., 220.

^51. “First Statement,” New York, March 29, 1961, in Cordier and Foote, Public Papers, 420.