Including or Excluding Civil Society? The Role of the Mediation Mandate for South Sudan (2013–2015) and Zimbabwe (2008–2009)

ABSTRACT

This article examines the role of political mandates in including or excluding civil society in the negotiation processes mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in South Sudan and by the Southern African Development Community in Zimbabwe. It argues that the mandates determined the issue of inclusivity by synthesizing the mediating organizations’ normative considerations and practical requirements and by enabling the organizations’ narrative of the conflict to dominate the negotiations at the expense of other narratives. The article concludes that the mandate led to the inclusion of civil society in the Madagascar case and the exclusion of civil society in the Zimbabwe mediation.

KEYWORDS:

• civil society
• IGAD
• inclusivity
• mediation mandate
• SADC

Notes

1. David Lanz, “Who Gets a Seat at the Table? A Framework for Understanding the Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion in Peace Negotiations,” International Negotiation 16, no. 2 (2011): 275–295.

2. Peter Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 19.

3. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917, 891.

4. Ibid., 891.

5. John Packer, “Challenges and Opportunities of Inclusivity in Peace Processes,” Discussion Paper No. 7, Civil Society Dialogue Network, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, 2013.

6. Amitav Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).

7. Camilla Orjuela, “Building Peace in Sri Lanka: A Role for Civil Society?” Journal of Peace Research 40, no. 2 (2003): 195–212; Thania Paffenholz, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: Beyond the Inclusion-Exclusion Dichotomy,” Negotiation Journal 30, no. 1 (2014): 69–91; Anthony Wanis-St. John and Darren Kew, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: Confronting Exclusion,” International Negotiation 13, no. 1 (2008): 11–36.

8. UN, United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation (New York, NY: United Nations, 2012), 11, 3.

9. AU, African Union Mediation Support Handbook (Umhlanga Rocks, South Africa: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, 2014). This document states that “mediation and negotiations should be inclusive of all significant political actors” and that “civil society must be involved in the mediation and negotiations,” 11.

10. Paffenholz, “Civil Society.”

11. For example, Anthony Wanis-St John, “Peace Processes, Secret Negotiations and Civil Society: Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion,” International Negotiation 13, no. 1 (2008): 1–9.

12. Lanz, “Who Gets a Seat at the Table?” 275.

13. Laurie Nathan, “Marching Orders: Exploring the Mediation Mandate,” African Security, 2017, 155-175.

14. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, January 9, 2005.

15. IGAD, Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, 1996.

16. Ibid., Art. 7.

17. Ibid., Art. 18A.

18. David Francis, Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2005), 235.

19. See, for example, Bruce Byiers, “The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD),” The Political Economy of Regional Integration in Africa (report series), European Centre for Development Policy Management, 2016.

20. Sally Healy, “Peacemaking in the Midst of War: An Assessment of IGAD’s Contribution to Regional Security,” Crisis States Working Papers no. 59 (2009), 7.

21. Afyare Abdi Elmi and Abdullahi Barise, “The Somali Conflict: Root Causes, Obstacles, and Peace-Building Strategies,” African Security Review 15, no. 1 (2006): 32–54.

22. Healy, “Peacemaking,” 6.

23. John Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” Sudan Tribune, May 31, 2007.

24. See Paul Murphy, “South Sudan Cannot Afford Another Exclusive Political Settlement,” http://africanarguments.org/2014/01/25/south-sudan-cannot-afford-another-exclusive-political-settlement-by-paul-murphy; Johan Brosché, Sharing Power—Enabling Peace? Evaluating South Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005 (Uppsala: Uppsala University and Mediation Support Unit, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations); Jok Madut Jok, “Negotiating an End to the Current Civil War in South Sudan: What Lessons Can Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement Offer?” Inclusive Political Settlements Papers no. 16 (2015), Berghof Foundation.

25. IGAD, Communiqué of the 23rd Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Situation in South Sudan, 2013.

26. General al-Dhabi was not named in this communiqué but was mentioned in the Summit’s subsequent communiqué. See IGAD, Communiqué of the 24th Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Situation in South Sudan, 2014.

27. IGAD consultant and IGAD officer, interviews, July 2016, Addis Ababa.

28. Former IGAD senior official, interview, July 2016, Addis Ababa.

29. IGAD, Communiqué of the 23rd Extraordinary Session, 3–4.

30. Ibid., 4.

31. Ibid., 3.

32. Ibid., 4.

33. IGAD officer, interview. See also Isma’il Kushkush, “President Says a Coup Failed in South Sudan,” The New York Times, December 16, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/17/world/africa/attempted-coup-in-south-sudan-president-says.html; Richard Downie, “A Coup in South Sudan?” interview on the Center for Strategic and International Studies website, December 17, 2013, https://www.csis.org/analysis/coup-south-sudan.

34. IGAD consultant, interview.

35. IGAD, Communiqué of the 24th Extraordinary Session, 4.

36. At various points in the mediation, the two warring parties tried to influence which civil society organizations and members would participate in the negotiations. See International Crisis Group, “South Sudan: Keeping the Faith with the IGAD Peace Process,” Africa Report No. 288; Zacharia Akol, “Inclusivity: A Challenge to the IGAD-Led South Sudanese Peace Process,” The Sudd Institute Policy Brief, 2014.

37. Akol, “Inclusivity.”

38. IGAD, Communiqué of the 25th Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Situation in South Sudan, 2014, 4.

39. Emily Fornof, “South Sudan Activists Call for Civil Society Role in Peace Process,” United States Institute of Peace, May 20, 2014, http://www.usip.org/publications/south-sudan-activists-call-civil-society-role-in-peace-process.

40. Akol, “Inclusivity,” 7–8.

41. Akol, “Inclusivity,” 7.

42. IGAD, “Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities,” January 23, 2014, 1.

43. See International Crisis Group, “South Sudan”; Abraham Awolich, “The Mediation Pendulum and the Challenges That Underlie the Peace Implementation in South Sudan,” Policy Brief, Sudd Institute, 2015; Beny Gideon Mabor, “Understanding Arusha Agreement and the IGAD Process for South Sudan,” Sudan Tribune, February 21, 2015, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article54068; Akol, “Inclusivity.”

44. “Ethiopian Leader ‘Threatened to Jail Riek and Kiir’ to Secure South Sudan Ceasefire,” Radio Tamazuj, May 12, 2015, https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/ethiopian-leader-%E2%80%98threatened-jail-riek-and-kiir%E2%80%99-secure-south-sudan-ceasefire.

45. IGAD, “Agreement to Resolve the Crisis in South Sudan,” May 9, 2014, 2.

46. Ibid.

47. “Addis Symposium to Kick Off ‘Inclusive’ Phase of South Sudan Peace Talks,” Radio Tamazuj, June 4, 2014, https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/addis-symposium-kick-%E2%80%98inclusive%E2%80%99-phase-south-sudan-peace-talks.

48. IGAD, Communiqué of the 26th Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 2014.

49. Ibid.

50. IGAD, “IGAD Special Envoys Condemn Continued Fighting in South Sudan,” news release, August 16, 2014, https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B5FAwdVtt-gCVkRFd1AxdFhIc2VkNDlXbGZPc193R2NCMkVv/edit.

51. See British Broadcasting Corporation, “Rebel No-Show at South Sudan Talks in Ethiopia,” August 5, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28669760; Radio Tamazuj, “Kiir’s Negotiators Boycotting S Sudan Peace Talks,” August 20, 2014, https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/kiir%E2%80%99s-negotiators-boycotting-s-sudan-peace-talks.

52. IGAD, Communiqué of the 27th Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 2014.

53. IGAD, “6th Session of IGAD-Led Peace Talks on South Sudan Progresses in Bahir Dar,” http://www.cewarn.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=281:6th-session-of-igad-led-peace-talks-on-south-sudan-progresses-in-bahir-dar&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=82%3E〈=en.

54. IGAD officer, interview.

55. Akol, “Inclusivity.”

56. “South Sudanese Peace Talks Adjourned over Inclusivity Crisis,” Sudan Tribune, June 23, 2014, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article51444.

57. Michael Aeby, “Zimbabwe’s Gruelling Transition: Interim Power-Sharing and Conflict Management in Southern Africa” (doctoral dissertation, University of Basel, 2015).

58. Constitution of the Movement for Democratic Change, Bulawayo, 2000.

59. Aeby, “Zimbabwe’s Gruelling Transition.”

60. Eldred Masunungure, “Zimbabwe at the Crossroads: Challenges for Civil Society,” 2011. http://www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/sup_files/Zimbabwe%20at%20the%20crossroads.pdf.

61. The SADC Declaration states:

Southern Africa has also been an arena of conflict and militarization, associated with the struggle for political liberation and the fight against apartheid and racism, aggression and destabilization… . The countries of Southern Africa will, therefore, work out and adopt a framework of cooperation which provides for … common economic, political, [and] social values and systems, enhancing enterprise and competitiveness, democracy and good governance, respect for the rule of law and the guarantee of human rights, popular participation and alleviation of poverty.

62. SADC, Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, 2001.

63. Laurie Nathan, Community of Insecurity: SADC’s Struggle for Peace and Security in Southern Africa (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2013), 149.

64. See, for example, Laurie Nathan, “Interests, Ideas and Ideology: South Africa’s Policy on Darfur,” African Affairs 110, no. 438 (2010), 55–74. He notes that one of the themes of the anti-imperialist thrust is the view that Western countries adopt a “domineering and hypocritical approach … and chide and bully developing countries” (p. 63).

65. SADC, Communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government, March 28–29, 2007.

66. Ibid., 3.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Former MDC officer, Skype interview, September 2016.

71. Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008 (e-book, Zimbabwe, Weaver Press, 2008), footnote 95 of Chapter 7.

72. For an overview of Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy, see John Akokpario and Tavaka Nyonio, “Reassessing the Politics of Neo-Colonialism and African Solidarity: Contextualising Thabo Mbeki’s Quiet Diplomacy on Zimbabwe,” AFFRIKA Journal of Politics, Economics and Society 1, no. 1 (2009): 117–133; Martin Adelmann, “Quiet Diplomacy: The Reasons Behind Mbeki’s Zimbabwe Policy,” Africa Spectrum (2004): 249–276.

73. McDonald Lewanika, cited in Aeby, “Zimbabwe’s Gruelling Transition,” 137.

74. See Aeby, “Zimbabwe’s Gruelling Transition.” Aeby outlines civil society activities that indicated objections to the GPA. For example, the nongovernmental National Constitutional Assembly held workshops and protests parallel to the GPA negotiations, Women and Men of Zimbabwe (WOZA) conducted street protests and contributed to the People’s Charter, and the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition published assessments of the GPA negotiations and made proposals for a democratic transition.

75. SADC, “Memorandum of Understanding between the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) and the Two Movement for Democratic Change Formations,” Harare, 2008.