Spiritual Authority versus Secular Authority: Relations between the Maronite Church and the State in Postwar Lebanon: 1990–2005

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Notes

¹ Colonel Charles Churchill (1853) Mount Lebanon: A Ten Years' Residence from 1842 to 1852, Vol. 1 (London: Saunders and Otley, republished in 1994 by Garnet Publishing, Reading, and printed in Lebanon), pp. 58–59.

² This literature has focused mainly on political Islam, primarily the Islamization of public space, the origins of Islamist movements, the reasons behind their appeal, their ideologies, views of the West, strategies for gaining influence, and relations with each other and with the state.

³ See Sami E. Baroudi, Divergent Perspectives among Lebanon's Maronites during the 1958 Crisis, Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, 15(1), pp. 5–28.

⁴ The Maronite church returned to political activism following the election of Patriarch Sfeir in 1986. Not only did Sfeir exhibit greater political activism (and acumen) than his predecessor, but his election took place against the backdrop of mounting divisions among the Christians and an overall deterioration in their military situation. This combination propelled the church to the center of the political stage.

⁵ As in every large organization, one cannot deny the presence of dissenting voices within the Maronite church. Nevertheless, these voices are too faint to enable one to speak of any resistance from the Maronite clergy to the positions adopted by the Patriarch and the Council of Maronite Bishops. In his important work on church–state relations in Latin America, Anthony Gill notes that: ‘Despite the many changes in Catholicism since Vatican II, the Catholic Church remains a very hierarchical organization and power still flows from the top down.’ See Anthony Gill (1989) Rendering Unto Caesar: The Catholic Church and the State in Latin America (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), p. 5. His observation applies well to the Maronite church.

⁶ Although in union with Rome, and hence subject to the authority of the Pope, there has been little intervention from the Vatican in the affairs of the Maronite church, at least in the postwar era.

⁷ In this article, the term Bkirki is used to connote the office of the Maronite Patriarch, just as the term White House signifies the office of the US President.

⁸ There is considerable controversy over the number of adherents and relative weight of any of the sects of Lebanon. We rely here on the figures used by Carole Dagher (2000) Bring Down the Walls: Lebanon's Post-War Challenge (New York: St. Martin's Press), pp. 70–71. Using a range of figures, she estimates that the Christians make up 40 percent of Lebanon's population and the Maronites represent 65 percent of the Christian population; which means that the Maronites represent around 26 percent of the total population. In any other Middle Eastern country the Christians (of all denominations) represent a far lower percentage of the population. Dagher also provides figures on the numbers of the different Christian communities in the Middle East, p. 70.

¹² Dagher, Bring Down the Walls, p.138.

⁹ See, in particular, Kamal Salibi (1965) The Modern History of Lebanon (Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan Books), esp. pp. 12–13, 153–154; and Kamal Salibi (1988) A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Revisited (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press), esp. pp. 25–27, 33–35.

¹⁰ In the spring and summer of 1958, Lebanon witnessed an armed insurrection against President Camille Chamoun. The rebellion was led by Muslim and leftist figures who were disgruntled by Chamoun's foreign and domestic policies. The insurgents had the backing of the then Egyptian President Jamal Abdel Nasser, who at that time was the President of the United Arab Republic that comprised Egypt and Syria (1958–1961). During the events of 1958, the Maronite Patriarch, Boulos Meouchi, sided with the opponents of Chamoun. His anti-Chamoun stance, while not popular in most Maronite circles, reduced the sectarian dimension of the crisis. See further Baroudi, Divergent Perspectives among Lebanon's Maronites, pp. 5–28; Irene Gendzier (1999) Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945–1958 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press), pp. 230–363; Fawaz Traboulsi (1993), Identités et Solidarités Croisés dans les Conflicts du Liban Contemporain, 2 vols., PhD Thesis, University of Paris VIII, pp. 376–383; and James Jankowski (2002), Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic (London: Lynne Rienner), pp. 137–138, 145–151.

¹¹ The principal Maronite leaders at the time (Pierre Gemayel, Chamoun, and Father Charbel Kassis, Supervisor of the Permanent Congress of Lebanese Monks) founded the Lebanese Front in 1976. It received a severe blow when former President Franjieh abandoned it in 1978, and was marginalized further by Bashir Gemayel's rise to power in the Christian heartland. By the early 1980s, the Lebanese Front fell under the dominance of the Lebanese Forces.

¹³ For the coverage of Sfeir's election see Al-Nahar (Beirut), April 20, 1986, pp. 1, 8.

¹⁴ For coverage of Israel's tacit alliance with Bashir Gemayel and his Lebanese Forces see inter alia, Yair Evron (1987) War and Intervention in Lebanon: The Israeli-Syrian Deterrence Dialogue (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), esp. pp. 105–159; Avi Shlaim (2000) The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (London: Penguin Books), pp. 395–399, 407–418; Joseph Abou-Khalil (2002) Pierre Jemayel: Qisat Rajul wa Watan [Pierre Gemayel: The story of a Man and an Nation] (Beirut: Sharikat Fan lil-Tiba'ah,), esp. pp. 218–245; and Elizabeth Picard (2002) Lebanon: A Shatterd Country: Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon, revised edn, Franklin Philip (Tran.) (New York: Holmes & Meier,), esp. pp. 125–126.

¹⁵ Meir Zamir also traces the beginning of the Maronites' downfall to Bashir Gemayel's assassination; see Meir Zamir (1999) From hegemony to marginalism: the Maronites of Lebanon, in: Ofra Bengio & Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds), Minorities and the State in the Arab World (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers), pp. 111–128. For a detailed account of military developments in Lebanon between the summer of 1982 and 1986, see Tabitha Petran (1987) The Struggle for Lebanon (New York: Monthly Review Press), pp. 275–383.

¹⁶ The ‘Mountain war’ has been covered extensively in most accounts of the Lebanese War; see, for example, Theodor Hanf (1993) Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (:Center for Lebanese Studies & I.B. Tauris), pp. 275–279, 285–293; and Tabitha Petran (1987) The Struggle over Lebanon (New York: Monthly Review Press).

¹⁷ According to Elizabeth Picard, 300,000 Christians fled from Chouf and Aley in 1983 and another 70,000 abandoned their villages to the east of Sidon in 1985; Picard, Lebanon, p. 168.

¹⁸ According to Elizabeth Picard, 300,000 Christians fled from Chouf and Aley in 1983 and another 70,000 abandoned their villages to the east of Sidon in 1985; Picard, Lebanon, pp. 127–128.

¹⁹ Al-Nahar, April 9, 1986, pp. 1, 5.

²⁰ The agreement dubbed the Tripartite Agreement was signed in December 1985 in Damascus between Hobeika, Walid Jounblat and Nabih Berri, head of the Shiite Amal movement. It sought an end to the civil war via constitutional reforms aimed at reducing the powers of the Lebanese president, abolishing political confessionalism, electing members of parliament on the basis of parity between Christians and Muslims, and strengthening Lebanon's ties to the Arab region, particularly Syria. For a brief description of the domestic reforms called for by the Agreement, see Ghassan Salame, The Lebanese crisis: interpretations and solutions, in: Nadim Shehadi & and Bridget Harney, Politics and the Economy in Lebanon (Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies, 1989), pp. 51-67. The most controversial aspects of the Tripartite Agreement had to do with solidifying Lebanon's ties to Syria, effectively putting Lebanon in Syria's orbit. For a critical overview of the Agreement see Hanf, Coexistence, pp. 307–309; and Albert Mansour (1994) Mawt Jumhuriyyah [Death of a republic] (Beirut: Dar al-Jadid), pp. 206–208. See also Robert G. Rabil (2001) The Maronites and Syrian withdrawal: from ‘isolationists’ to ‘traitors’, Middle East Policy, 8(3), p. 23; and Eric Thompson (2002) Will Syria have to withdraw from Lebanon, The Middle East Journal, 56(1), pp. 78–79.

²¹ Hanf, Coexistence, pp. 309–310.

²² Assad's position was conveyed during his meeting with US special envoy Richard Murphy; see Al-Nahar, April 13, 1986 pp. 1, 8; and Mansour, Mawt Jumhuriyyat, p. 209.

²³ Many astute Christian politicians, such as Fouad Boutros who served as foreign minister between 1976 and 1982 shared that view; see Fouad Boutros (2007) al-Muzhakarat [Memoir] (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar), esp. p. 577.

²⁴ For the circumstances surrounding Aoun's appointment as prime minister see Carole Dagher (1992) Genral wa Rihan [A general and a bet] (Beirut: Malaf al-'Alam al-'Arabi), pp. 104–121; Sarkis Na'oum (1992) Michel Aoun: Hilm au Wahm [Michel Aoun: A dream or an illusion] (Beirut, Matba'at al-Mutawasit), pp. 53–62.

²⁵ The agreement, called Wathiqat al-Wifaq al-Watani (the Document of National Understanding), was reached after intense negotiations among Lebanese deputies who were assisted by Arab and US diplomats. The agreement was based on a draft prepared by the Higher Tripartite Arab Committee that was made up of Morocco, Algeria and Saudi Arabia. For a legal and political analysis of the Document of National Understanding, see Joseph Maila (1992) The Document of National Understanding: A Commentary (Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies). See also Albert Mansour (1993) Al-Inqilab ‘ala al-Ta'if [Turning against Ta'if] (Beirut, Dar al-Jadid,); and Farid el-Khazen (2001) Lebanon: Independent No More, Middle East Quarterly, 8(1), pp. 43–50.

²⁶ According to reports, Sfeir was in almost daily contact with the Christian deputies who took part in Ta'if and he tried, through contacts with the French, the Americans and the Vatican, to improve the conditions of Ta'if for the Christians. Sfeir and most of the Christian deputies mainly sought to preserve some of the powers of the presidency, keep that office in the hands of the Maronites on at least a provisional basis, set a timetable for the redeployment of Syrian troops to the Biqa’ valley and North Lebanon, and include in the agreement an explicit reference to the rejection of the permanent settlement of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. See the profile of Sfeir published by Al-Diyar, December 7, 2001, p. 4; and Al-Diyar, February 1, 1997, p.3.

²⁷ According to reports, the angry demonstrators insulted Sfeir, forcing him to kneel down before a portrait of Aoun; Al-Diyar, December 7, 2001, p. 4.

²⁸ Dagher, Genral wa Rihan, pp. 15–151.

²⁹ Sfeir's support for the Ta'if Accord did not diminish in the postwar era. Sfeir continued to maintain that the problem was not with Ta'if but with the selective and biased manner in which it was implemented by successive postwar governments.

³⁰ Ilyas Hrawi & Camille Menassa (2002) Awdah al-Jumhuriyyah min al-Duwaylat ila al-Dawlah [The return of the republic from the mini-states to the state] (Beirut: Dar Al-Nahar), p. 127.

³¹ Dagher, Genral wa Rihan, pp. 195–196.

³² Dagher, Genral wa Rihan, p. 176.

³³ Promoting Lahoud to the rank of general and appointing him army commander instead of Aoun was the first major decision of newly elected President Hrawi and his Prime Minister Salim Hoss. For Lahoud's appointment see the memoirs of Ilyas Hrawi co-authored with Camille Menassa, ‘Awdah al-Jumhuriyyah min al-Duwaylat ila al-Dawlah, p. 127.

³⁴ Rabil, The Maronites and Syrian Withdrawal, p. 27.

³⁵ The statement was issued on October 17, 1990. The text of the statement was obtained from the archives of the Catholic Information Center at Antilyas, Lebanon.

³⁶ See the second part of the profile of Sfeir that appeared in Al-Diyar, December 7, 2001, p. 4.

³⁷ Hrawi and Menassa, ‘Awdah al-Jumhuriyyah, p. 231.

³⁸ Omar Karami is the younger brother of former Prime Minister Rashid Karami who was assassinated on June 1, 1987. The government he formed on December 24, 1990, included 30 ministers, seven of whom were militia leaders; for the names of the ministers in Karami's government, see Ibid., pp. 231–232.

³⁹ For a brief summary of the Treaty's provisions see Rabil, The Maronites and Syrian Withdrawal, p. 28.

⁴⁰ Al-Shu'lah (Beirut), July 6, 1991, p. 9; Al-Nahar, May 23, 1991, p. 4. Sfeir was to go back to the issue of the Lebanese-Syrian Treaty in September 1993, describing it as unbalanced. He further noted that the conclusion of a treaty between Lebanon and Syria should have been postponed until after the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. See Al-Anwar, September 22, 1993, p. 3.

⁴¹ (‘But what could the frail voice of the Head of the Maronite Church do facing the Syrian oppressor?’) Le Point (Paris), June 27, 1991, p. 24.

⁴² For the events of May 9, 1992, see Sami E. Baroudi (1998), Economic conflict in postwar Lebanon: State-labor relations between 1992 and 1997, Middle East Journal, 52(4), pp. 531–550.

⁴³ At that time the three principal Maronite leaders in exile were: Raymond Edde, head of the National Bloc; former President Amin Gemayel; and, former Army Commander and head of the military cabinet, Michel Aoun.

⁴⁴ For the 1992 electoral law see Farid el-Khazen (1993) Al-Intikhabat Al-Niyyabiyyah Al-Oula fi Lubnan Ma Ba'ad al-Harb [The first parliamentary elections in postwar Lebanon: Barricades of the new democracy], in: Farid el-Khazen and Paul Salem (eds), Al-Intikhabat Al-Oula Fi Lubnan Ma Ba'ad Al-Harb: al-Arqam Wa Al-Waqai’ Wa Al-dalalat [The first parliamentary elections in postwar Lebanon: The numbers, facts and implications] (Beirut: Al-Markaz Al-Lubnani Lil-Dirasat and Dar Al-Nahar), pp. 29–116.

⁴⁵ According to one editorial, Sfeir's opposition to the 1992 election partly stemmed from a study that was presented to him and which showed that under the 1992 electoral law the fate of two-thirds of the parliamentary seats would be decided by Muslim voters. For the study see Al-Diyar, July 8, 1992, p. 10. See also Antoine Saad (2005) Al-Sadis wa al-Sab'oun: Mar Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir [The Seventy-Sixth [Patriarch]: Mar Nsrallah Boutros Sfeir], Part 2, 1992–1998, (Beirut: Saer al-Mashraq lil-Nashr wa al-Tawzi’), pp. 13–25.

⁴⁶ El-Khazen, Lebanon: Independent No More, p. 47.

⁴⁷ Translated from Arabic by the authors; quoted in Al-Nahar, November 2, 1992, p. 4. Saad also refers to the warm personal relationship between the two leaders (dating back to 1986) which always was characterized by mutual trust; see Saad, Al-Sadis wa al-Sab'oun, Part 2, pp. 48–49, 65.

⁴⁸ Hariri's first government was formed on November 1, 1992. For its composition see Hrawi and Menassa, Awdah al-Jumhuriyyah, pp. 317–318.

⁴⁹ Frem was dismissed on August 11 after he refused to resign or to remain in the cabinet as minister without portfolio. The portfolio of Water and Electricity was taken from Frem following a clash with Hariri in June over the signing a US$250 million contract with the Italian company INSALDO to revamp the electricity sector. Hariri backed the contract while Frem opposed it on the ground that the price charged by INSALDO was very high. For details about Frem's dismissal see Hrawi and Menassa, ‘Awdah al-Jumhuriyyah, pp. 336–342

⁵⁰ Nida’ al-Watan (Beirut), December 23, 1993, p.2. See also Saad, Al-Sadis wa al-Sab'oun, Part 2, pp. 76–77.

⁵¹ Nida’ al-Watan (Beirut), December 23, 1993, p.2. See also Saad, Al-Sadis wa al-Sab'oun, Part 2, pp. 76–77

⁵² Al-Diyar, November 8, 2001, p. 4.

⁵³ Nida' al-Watan, February 27, 1995, p.2.

⁵⁴ The text of Sfeir's message as published in Al-Diyar, April 2, 1994, p.2. All translations from Arabic are by Baroudi.

⁵⁵ Al-Safir, April 5, 1994, p. 3; and Al-Diyar, April 5, 1994, p. 23.

⁵⁶ Deputy and Minister Jean ‘Ubayd, for example, criticized Sfeir's statement on the steps of Bkirki following a heated meeting with the Patriarch; see Al-Diyar, April 5, 1994, p. 23; Al-Nahar, April 6, 1994, p. 4; and Al-Diyar, April 6, 1994, p. 5. Another strong critic of Sfeir's message was Deputy and Minister Suleiman Franjieh.

⁵⁷ Al-Safir, July 12, 1994, p.4.

⁵⁸ During his visit to Paris in late October – November 1994, Sfeir met with Amin Gemayel and Raymond Edde. He also had a phone conversation with Michel Aoun. See Al-Nahar, November 1994, p. 4. During a subsequent visit to Paris (December 1997), Sfeir met Aoun for the first time since 1990; see Al-Nahar, December 5, 1997, p. 1.

⁵⁹ The second clause of Article 49 of the constitution bars the President of the Republic from serving a second presidential term before the lapse of six years from the end of his first term.

⁶⁰ Sfeir expressed his opposition to amending Article 49 of the constitution in a statement to the French press agency, France Press; see Al-Diyar, April 2, 1995, p. 5; Al-Hayat (London), April 8, 1995, p. 8; and Al-Nahar, April 12, 1995, p.3.

⁶¹ Al-Nahar, April 8, 1995, p.1.

⁶² Al-Liwa’, April 12, 1995, p. 2.

⁶³ For the minutes of the meeting of the Council of Ministers at which the constitutional amendment was proposed see Hrawi and Menassa, ‘Awdah al-Jumhuriyyah, pp. 407–420.

⁶⁴ Al-Hayat (London), October 29, 1995, p. 2.

⁶⁵ The initiative for convening the Synod came from Pope John Paul II in June 1991; see Dagher, Bring Down the Walls, p. 94.

⁶⁶ For the work of the Synod see ibid., Chapters 6 & 7, pp. 91–121.

⁶⁷ For the work of the Synod see ibid., Chapters 6 & 7, p. 119.

⁶⁸ For the work of the Synod see ibid., Chapters 6 & 7

⁶⁹ For the work of the Synod see ibid., Chapters 6 & 7, p. 120.

⁷⁰ Except for the two governorates of the South and Nabatieh which (as in 1992) were merged into one electoral district.

⁷³ Al-Nahar, September 5, 1996, p. 2

⁷¹ See Al-Anwar, August 8, 1996, p. 4.

⁷² Al-Nahar, September 5, 1996, p. 2.

⁷⁴ Under the Lebanese constitution, a new government has to be formed after every parliamentary or presidential election.

⁷⁵ The government included only seven new ministers, while 15 ministers from the previous government retained their portfolios. See Al-Nahar, November 8, 1996, p. 1; and Al-Hayat, November 8, 1996, p.1.

⁷⁶ Quoted in Al-Nahar, November 25, 1996, p. 8.

⁷⁷ In the summer of 1997, Hariri and Berri clashed over Hariri's plans to reshuffle the cabinet in order to remove some of the ministers who were loyal to Hrawi or Berri and who opposed his proposals to raise indirect taxes (mainly the price of gasoline) in order to finance a salary increase for public-sector employees. Relations remained strained between Hariri and Berri (and to a lesser extent) between Hariri and Hrawi until the election of a new president in October 1998 and Hariri's exit from the premiership in November 1998. For coverage of the row between Hariri and Berri see Monday Morning (Beirut), October 20, 1997, p. 5; Monday Morning, November 24, 1997, p. 5; Al-Nahar, July 28, 1998, p. 2; Al-Safir, August 4, 1998, p. 2. For a discussion of the difficulties that faced Hariri in 1997 and 1998, see Sami E. Baroudi (2002) Continuity in economic policy in postwar Lebanon: The record of the Hariri and Hoss governments examined, 1992–2000, Arab Studies Quarterly, 24(1), pp. 63–90.

⁷⁸ Between July 21–23, 1997, Hariri and several of his ministers met with the leaders of business groups in what was dubbed al-Khulwah al-Iqtisadiyyah (the economic enclave); see Al-Nahar, July 22, 1997, p. 10; Al-Nahar, July 23, 1997, p. 9; and Al-Nahar, July 24, 1997, p. 10. See also Baroudi, Continuity in economic policy in postwar Lebanon, pp. 66–67.

⁸⁰ For the text of the memorandum see Al-Nahar, March 7, 1998, p. 5

⁷⁹ For the text of the memorandum see Al-Nahar, March 7, 1998, p. 5.

⁸¹ George Bkasini (2008) Al-Tariq ila al-Istiqlal: Khams Snawat ma’ Rafiq al-Hariri [The road to independence: Five years with Rafiq Hariri] (Beirut: N.A.), p. 57.

⁸² For a summary of Sfeir's criticisms of Hrawi, see Al-Diyar, April 18, 1998, p. 2.

⁸³ As a result of this collision, Hariri stepped down from the premiership and was succeeded by Salim Hoss who formed a new government in November 1998.

⁸⁴ Al-Nahar, April 26, 1999, p. 4.

⁸⁵ Al-Diyar, June 14, 1999, p. 2.

⁸⁶ A-Massirah (Beirut), February 7, 2000, p. 10. See also the April statement of the Council of Maronite Bishops quoted in Al-Nahar, April 6, 2000, p. 5.

⁸⁷ See, for example, the July 2000 statement of the Council of Maronite Bishops quoted in Al-Nahar, July 6, 2000, p. 2.

⁸⁸ For a good discussion of the dispute over the ownership of the Shebaa [Shib'a] farms, see Asher Kaufman (2002) Who owns the Shebaa farms?” The Middle East Journal, 56(4), pp. 576–595.

⁸⁹ For Lahoud's refusal to send the Lebanese army to South Lebanon, see Al-Nahar, December 9, 2000, p. 3; Al-Safir, October 27, 2000, p. 2; Al-Nahar, May 28, 2001, p. 2; Al-Nahar, May 29, 2001, p. 2; Al-Nahar, August 3, 2001, p. 2; and Al-Nahar, August 1, 2001, p. 2; See also Sami E. Baroudi (2005) US-Lebanese relations in twenty-first century: A view from Beirut, Arab World Geographer, 8(4), pp. 196–219.

⁹⁰ Al-Nahar, June 1, 2000, p. 5.

⁹¹ This was Sfeir's position from the date Israel announced its intension to end its occupation of South Lebanon. See Sfeir's interview with Al-Hiwar (Beirut), April 15, 2000, p. 5.

⁹² In its December 2000 monthly communiqué, the Council of Maronite Bishops referred to the subject of the families who fled to Israel. The communiqué urged the ‘Lebanese government to look into their situation with justice, fairness and compassion.’ It went on to note that those who fled ‘did not abandon their government as much as their government abandoned them.’ The English text of the communiqué was provided courtesy of the Catholic Information Center.

⁹³ President Lahoud first advanced this position on April 21, 2000, following a tour of Arab capitals. He subsequently repeated this position several times; see, for example, Al-Safir, September 21, 2000, p. 2; and Al-Wasat (Beirut), April 8, 2001, p. 20. The same position was expressed in the ministerial statement of Hariri's fourth government and defended by Hariri before parliament; see Al-Mustaqbal, November 1, 2000, pp. 16, 17; Al-Safir, October 31, 2000, pp. 4, 8; Al-Diyar, November 7, 2000, p. 17; and Al-Sharq, November 7, 2000, p. 7.

⁹⁴ For Sfeir's criticisms of the 2000 electoral law see Al-Mustaqbal, December 3, 1999, p. 2; and Al-Nahar, June 1, 2000, p. 5.

⁹⁵ More than a year before the 2000 election, a group of Christian (mainly Maronite) deputies, former ministers and other figures began a series of meetings at Qurnet Shihwan (the summer residence of the Maronite diocese of Antilyas) under the patronage of Bishop Youssef Bishara. In June 1999, they visited Bkirki where they received Sfeir's blessings for a document that stressed the need to participate in the upcoming election; see Al-Nahar, June 15, 1999, p. 6.

⁹⁶ Al-Diyar, August 2, 2000, p. 4; Al-Nahar, August 3, 2000, p. 3; and Al-Nahar, August 19, 2000, p. 2.

⁹⁷ The Qurnet Shihwan group includes the following Maronite deputies: Mansour al-Boun, Boutros Harb, Naseeb Lahoud, Nayla Mouawad, Ni'mat Allah Abi-Nasr, Pierre Amin Gemayel, Antoine Ghanem, Salah Honein, Farid El-Khazen and Faris S'aid; the group also includes several other Christian politicians. See Al-Safir, April 30, 2001, p. 4; Al-Safir, May 10, 2001, p. 2; Al-Nahar, August 23, 2001, p. 3; Al-Safir, August 23, 2001, p. 4; Al-Nahar, August 24, 2001, p. 4.

⁹⁸ See Al-Nahar, September 6, 2002, p. 3.

⁹⁹ The quotation here, and all subsequent quotations from the appeal, are extracted from the English translation supplied courtesy of the Catholic Information Center. When necessary, we have changed a few words to reflect more accurately the original Arabic text. For the Arabic text of the appeal, see Al-Safir, September 21, 2000, p. 4; and Al-Nahar, September 21, 2000, pp. 4, 14.

¹⁰⁰ Text of UN Security Council Resolution 520 (1982). Available at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/435/44/IMG/NR043544.pdf?OpenElement.

¹⁰¹ The words Syria and Syrian appeared 13 times in the appeal.

¹⁰² The harshest criticisms of Bkirki's appeal came from Agriculture Minister Suleiman Franjieh (a Maronite). Franjieh accused the Maronite bishops of ‘falling under the influence of religious opportunists who are controlled by foreign intelligence services.’ Quoted in The Daily Star, September 21, 2000, p. 1; see also Al-Safir, September 21, 2000, p. 18. President Lahoud criticized Bkirki without naming it: ‘The recently adopted positions do not reflect the spirit of a true national dialogue … they stir religious and sectarian instincts.’ He went on to note: ‘It is neither logical nor right to point a finger at Syria, while turning a blind eye to Israel's crimes against Lebanon.’ Quoted in Al-Anwar, September 22, 2000, p. 1; and Al-safir, September 22, 2000, p. 2.

¹⁰³ In a joint communiqué, the Mufti of Lebanon (Sheikh Ahmad Rashid Qabbani) and the Vice-President of the Higher Islamic Shi'ite Council (Sheikh ‘Abd al-Amir Qabalan) expressed their surprise at the appeal and reaffirmed their support for the position of President Lahoud on this matter, namely that the Syrian presence in Lebanon is legitimate and temporary; see Al-Safir, September 21, 2000, p. 4. In his Friday sermon, two days later, Sheikh Qabalan used far harsher language to attack the appeal. Denouncing the appeal of the Council of Maronite Bishops took the greatest part of the Friday sermons on September 22. For a summary of the references to the appeal in the Friday, September 22, sermons see Al-Safir, September 23, 2000, p. 4.

¹⁰⁴ See, in particular, the remarks of the Maronite deputies Wadih Akl Abdo Bajjani, Boutros Harb, Neamatallah Abi Nasr, Mansour Bonne, and Faris Saeed quoted in The Daily Star, September 23, 2000, p. 2; Al-Safir, September 23, 2000, p. 4; and Al-Nahar, September 23, 2000, p. 3. Greek Orthodox deputy, Albert Mokhaiber, even went beyond his Maronite colleagues in embracing the appeal of the Maronite bishops; see Al-Nahar, September 23, 2000, p. 4.

¹⁰⁵ Mokhaiber's remarks were made during the parliamentary sessions that were devoted to discussing and voting on the ministerial statement of Hariri's fourth government. See The Daily Star, November 3, 2002, p. 1.

¹⁰⁶ Al-Nahar, October 2, 2000, p. 4.

¹⁰⁷ Patriarch Sfeir (like Pope John Paul II) had made more foreign trips than all of his predecessors. In addition to his annual trips to the Vatican, he had visited literally every major city of the world in which the Maronites had established a large presence.

¹⁰⁸ See, for example, Al-Nahar, March 24, 2001, p. 5; Al-Hayat (London), March 27, 2001, p. 6; Al-Diyar, May 27, 2001, p. 6; L'Orient Le-Jour (Beirut), June 9, 2001, p. 3; Al-Nahar, June 9, 2001, p. 3; Al-Masirah, July 23, 2001, p. 8; and Al-Diyar, September 27, 2001, p. 4.

¹⁰⁹ Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), November 14, 2000, p. 5.

¹¹⁰ Quoted in Al-Nahar, November 25, 2000, p. 4.

¹¹¹ See Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, November 27, 2000, p. 5. Syria's foreign minister, Farouq al-Shar’, also noted that the question of the Syrian presence in Lebanon was to be handled exclusively by the governments of the two countries and that no third party (i.e., Bkirki) should have a say in the matter; see Al-Kifah Al-'Arabi (Beirut), November 27, 2000, p. 3.

¹¹² For the coverage of Sfeir's reception, see Al-Nahar, April 28, 2001, pp. 1, 13; Al-Safir, March 28, 2001, p. 4; Al-Liwa' (Beirut) March 28, 2001, p. 4; and Al-Sharq (Beirut) March 28, 2001, p. 4.

¹¹³ Al-Nahar, March 28, 2001, p. 13.

¹¹⁴ Al-Nahar, March 28, 2001, p. 13; and Al-Sharq, March 28, 2001, p. 4.

¹¹⁵ Al-Nahar, March 30, 2001, p. 1.

¹¹⁶ See Al-Nahar, August 8, 2001, p. 3.

¹¹⁷ See, inter alia, Bkasini, Al-Tariq ila al-Istiqlal, pp. 111–116.

¹¹⁸ The Daily Star, March 28, 2001, p. 2.

¹¹⁹ Text translated from Arabic by authors; quoted in Al-Mustaqbal, April 5, 2001, p. 15. See also The Daily Star, April 5, 2001, p. 1.

¹²⁰ Al-Mustaqbal, April 7, 2001, p. 1. According to Bkasini, Hariri (who was becoming increasingly weary of Syria's role in Lebanon) intervened with the Mufti to tone down his statement; see Bkasini, Al-Tariq ila al-Istiqlal, p. 105.

¹²¹ The Daily Star, April 12, 2001, pp. 1, 3.

¹²² Al-Nahar, April 28, 2001, p. 2. Sfeir visited Lahoud on June 7, 2001, to continue the direct talks; see Al-Safir, June 8, 2001, p. 3.

¹²³ Dismissing his criticisms of Syria's role in Lebanon, Tlas accused Sfeir of having sought, back in 1983, Israeli intervention on behalf of Lebanon's Christians. Tlas's remarks were published in Al-Diyar, May 11, 2001, p. 1; see also The Daily Star, May 14, 2001, p. 2.

¹²⁵ Al-Masirah, July 23, 2001, p. 8.

¹²⁴ Al-Nahar, June 27, 2001, p. 3; and The Daily Star, June 16, 2001, p. 2.

¹²⁶ Al-Safir, September 6, 2001, p. 4.

¹²⁷ Al-Safir, September 6, 2001, p. 4

¹²⁸ Boutros paid two visits to Syria in late 2000 and 2001, where he met with ranking Syrian officials including, at one point, President Bashar Assad; see Al-Diyar, January 19, 2001; Al-Safir, March 31, 2001, pp. 2, 3; and Al-Hayat (London), April 10, 2001 p. 4. See also Fouad Boutros (2007) Al-Muzhakarat [Memoires] (Beirut: Dar Al-Nahar).

¹²⁹ See, in particular, the March and April statements of the Council of Maronite Bishops, quoted respectively in Al-Safir March 6, 2003, p. 3, and Al-Nahar, April 4, 2003, p. 4; see also Al-Safir, March 5, 2003, p. 4; Al-Nahar, April 2, 2003, p. 3; and Al-Safir, April 4, 2003, p. 2.

¹³⁰ Al-Nahar, February 7, 2003, p. 4; and Al-Safir, February 18, 2003, p. 2.

¹³¹ See, for example, the remarks of Former Minister Mouhsin Dalloul in Al-Nahar, August 5, 2003, p. 5.

¹³² See for example the statement of Minister Suleiman Franjieh in Al-Nahar, April 7, 2003, p. 4; and Michael Murr in Al-Nahar, July 4, 2003, p. 5.

¹³³ President Bashar al-Assad praised the March statement of the Maronite Bishops in his 9 March address to a large crowd of Lebanese who traveled to Damascus to protest the war against Iraq and voice their support for Syria's stance; see Al-Nahar, March 10, 2003, p. 6.

¹³⁴ Al-Nahar, March 17, 2003, p. 5.

¹³⁵ Al-Nahar, September 4, 2003, p. 3. A few days after the 4th appeal, Sfeir noted in his September 7, 2003, Sunday Sermon that ‘had Lebanon established its relations with other states [i.e., Syria] on the basis of safeguarding its dignity and love [sic], we would not be complaining about hegemony and the erosion of our sovereignty.” Quoted in Al-Nahar, September 8, 2003, p. 3.

¹³⁶ Bkasini, Al-Tariq ila al-Istiqlal, pp. 153–192.

¹³⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 1559. Available at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/498/92/PDF/N0449892.pdf?OpenElement.

¹³⁸ For coverage of the patriarch's visit, see Al-Nahar, March 17, 2005, p. 19; Al-Nahar, March 18, 2005, p. 6; Al-Nahar, March 21, 2005, p. 5; Al-Nahar, March 22, 2005, p. 4.

¹⁴¹ Quoted in Al-Nahar, November 3, 1994, p. 4.

¹³⁹ Sfeir clarified his position with regard to Ta'if on numerous occasions both at the time of the Agreement and later. In a March 1997 interview with the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International (LBCI) he noted: ‘The Ta'if Accord did not satisfy anyone completely, but it was the only way to restore normalcy to the country.’ Quoted in Al-Nahar, March 13, 1997, p. 7. Sfeir made similar remarks in an earlier interview; see Al-Nahar, November 3, 1994, p. 5.

¹⁴⁰ See, for example, Al-Anwar, June 25, 1994, p. 3; Al-Nahar, November 25, 1994, p. 2; and Al-Nahar, March 1, 2001, p. 5.

¹⁴² Al-Safir, April 11, 2001, p. 4.

¹⁴³ For the formation of the Constitutional Council, see Al-Nahar, April 13, 1994, p. 4. For the formation of the Economic and Social Council see Al-Nahar, September 10, 1999, p. 5; Al-Mustaqbal, September 18, 1999, p. 12; and Al-Anwar, December 12, 1999, p. 10. The formation of both councils was agreed upon at Ta'if; see further, Joseph Maila (1992) Prospects for Lebanon: The Document of National Understanding: A Commentary (Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies).

¹⁴⁴ For Berri's position see: Al-Nahar, February 1, 1995, p. 2; Al-Safir, February 20, 1995, p. 2; Al-Nahar, September 2, 2002, p. 1; and Al-Safir, September 13, 2002, p. 3. For Bkirki's negative reaction to proposals for eliminating political confessionalism, see Al-Nahar, February 1, 1995, p. 2; Al-Safir, February 20, 1995, p. 2; and Al-Safir, March 21, 1998, p. 3. The demand for eliminating political confessionalism is an old one, predating the Lebanese civil war. During the war, Muslim-dominated and leftist groups and militias made repeated calls for political de-confessionalization. As Joseph Maila writes: ‘It is a known fact that political deconfessionalisation was the quasi-unanimous demand of the leftist parties and Islamic groupings. The National Movement, Amal, the PSP, SNSP [Syrian National Social party], PC [Communist Party], the Ba'ath and the Islamic religious and political authorities were united on this demand.’ Maila, Prospects for Lebanon, p. 20.

¹⁴⁵ See Sfeir's remarks to the press quoted in Al-Diyar, October 5, 2000, p. 3.

¹⁴⁶ In the aftermath of the 1992 election, president Hrawi harshly criticized Bkirki's role in spearheading the campaign to boycott the election; see Al-Diyar October 19, 1992. For the allegation that Bkirki's support for a boycott contributed to the erosion of Christian political influence, see the editorial by Sarkis N'oum in Al-Nahar, January 13, 1993, p. 2. See also Al-Safir, November 25, 1992, p. 3. Similar, but less intense criticisms were leveled against Bkirki during and following the 1994 election; see Nida’ al-Watan, July 5, 1996, p. 3.

¹⁴⁷ For Sfeir's criticisms of the treatment of Christian detainees see, inter alia, Al-Nahar, November 2, 2000, p. 4. The conduct of security agencies also was strongly condemned by the Council of Maronite Bishops in its August 2001 statement. See Al-Nahar, August 8, 2001, p. 3.

¹⁴⁸ See, for example, Sfeir's remarks during his March 1999 visit to France, quoted in Al-Nahar, March 3, 1999, p. 3.

¹⁴⁹ In one of his sermons Sfeir observed, ‘freedom of expression is the ideal way for checking the tendency towards tyranny.’ See Al-Nahar, August 12, 2002, p. 3. See also Sfeir's interview with Nahar al-Shabab) (Annex to Al-Nahar), July 23, 1996, p. 8. See also the eighth article of the statement issued by the Assembly of the Maronite Bishops, following their 1995 annual meeting. Quoted in Al-Nahar, June 12, 1995, p. 4.

¹⁵⁰ Sfeir's statement was quoted in Al-Nahar, September 9, 2002, p. 2. The statement was translated from Arabic by authors. MTV was closed on September 4, 2002, by security forces on court order for violating section 68 of election law no. 171 (issued February 6, 2000), which bans political advertisements in the media. MTV strongly backed the candidacy of Gabriel Murr (one of its owners) against the government's candidate (Mirna Murr) in the Metn by-election that took place on June 2, 2002. For coverage of the closure of MTV and the reactions to the step, see Al-Nahar, September 6, 2002, pp. 4, 6; Al-Safir, September 6, 2002, p. 5; and Al-Nahar, September 9, 2002, pp. 4, 6.

¹⁵¹ Quoted in Al-Safir, August 13, 2002, p. 3.

¹⁵² In his speech before the June 2002 International Maronite Conference that was held in Los Angeles, Boulos Mattar, the Archbishop of Beirut, pointed to the shared values between the Maronites and Latin Europe, namely, respect for individual freedom, human rights and the rights of citizens. For text of speech see Al-Nahar, July 5, 2002, p. 14.

¹⁵³ During his North American tour (February–March 2001), Sfeir described the US system in very positive terms, highlighting what he saw as its features: extensive powers of elected local governments, respect for the basic rights of the individual, separation of powers at the federal level and the use of single member districts in congressional elections.

¹⁵⁴ This social conservatism is reflected in several of Sfeir's sermons. For quotes from these sermons see, Al-Nahar, December 24, 2001, p. 3; Al-Safir, June 29, 2002, p. 5; and Al-Nahar, August 12, 2002, p. 3.

¹⁵⁵ Bkirki's opposition of al-tawteen is phenomenal. See, for example, Sfeir's remarks during his March 1999 visit to France, as quoted in Al-Nahar, March 3, 1999, p. 3. For other statements by Sfeir against al-tawteen, see Al-Anwar, October 27, 1993, p. 6; Nida' al-Watan, September 9, 1994, p. 2; and Al-Nahar, May 17, 2001, p. 1.

¹⁵⁶ For works that deal with the Maronite Church's union with the Catholic Church (formally entered into around 1180) and its historic ties with the Vatican and Western Europe, see Kamal Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon; Kamal Salibi (1988) House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered (Berkley and Lose Angeles: University of California Press); Iliya Harik (1968) Politics and Change in a Traditional Society: Lebanon 1711–1845 (Princeton: Princeton University Press); and Leila Fawaz (1994) An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860 (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press), esp. p. 18.

¹⁵⁷ For the January 2007 clashes see Al-Nahar, January 24, 2007, p. 6.

¹⁵⁸ For discussions on the electoral system at Doha see Al-Nahar, May 20, 2008, pp. 1, 17; May 22, 2008, p. 10; Al-Safir, May 20, 2008, pp. 1,17.

¹⁵⁹ Meir Zamir, The Maronites of Lebanon, p. 126.

¹⁶⁰ For Hariri's statements see Al-Mustaqbal, May 8, 2009, pp. 1 & 19; June 5, 2009, p. 19; and June 6, 2009, p. 19; Al-Nahar, May 8, 2009, p. 4. For Berri's statements see Al-Nahar, May 9, 2009, p. 12; and May 11, 2009, p. 12;