When Tribesmen do not act Tribal: Libyan Tribalism as Ideology (not as Schizophrenia)

Abstract

The article seeks to problematize recent studies on Libyan tribalism. It argues that tribal identity is not, as some commentators suggest, a static reality that stands in opposition to ideological discourses like national identity. Rather, Libyan tribalism is an ideology in itself, and one that is compatible with national aspirations. The article offers also an analysis of the recent rise of tribal identity in Libya. In particular, the author suggests that Libya is not struggling to become a nation because of ingrained tribal identity. On the contrary, tribalism is growing stronger due to the legacy left by Qadhdhafi and the failure of the ‘new’ Libyan state to provide social security for its citizens.

Keywords::

• Identity
• Ideology
• Libya
• Nationalism
• Tribalism

Acknowledgements

The research was partly supported by ERC-2013-CoG [617970, CARP ]. My last trip to Libya was made possible by Prof. Jan Michiel Otto ( the Van Vollenhoven Institute, Leiden ), whom I wish to thank.

Notes

¹ T. Friedman (2011) Tribes with Flags, The New York Times, March 22, 2011; and B. Barber (2011) Yes, Saif is a Qadhdhafi, but there is still a real Reformer inside, The Guardian, April 13, 2011. Tribalism is a recent ‘discovery’ in Western media, see further I. Cherstich (2011) Libya's Revolution: Tribe, Nation, Politics, Open Democracy, October 3, 2011. Available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/igor-cherstich/libyas-revolution-tribe-nation-politics, accessed June 19, 2014.

² R. B. St John (2013) The Post-Qadhafi Economy, in: J. Pack (ed.) The 2011 Libyan Uprisings and the Struggle for the Post-Qadhafi Future, pp. 100–101 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

³ W. Lacher (2013) The Rise of Tribal Politics, ibid, pp. 152, 158, 166, 168.

⁴ Ibid, p. 163.

⁵ BBC News (2011) Libya Protests: Second City Benghazi hit by Violence, February 16, 2011. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12477275, accessed February 9, 2014.

⁶ In a 1994 survey conducted in Libya, A. Obeidi found that 43% of the urban interviewees were very attached to a tribe, 47% were attached to some degree, and only 10% were not attached at all; see A. Obeidi (2013) Political Culture in Libya, p. 122 (London: Routledge). On tribes and cities in Libya, see also A. Ahmida (2005) Forgotten Voices: Power and Agency in Colonial and Postcolonial Libya, pp. 19–34 (London: Routledge).

⁷ Curiously, W. Lacher admits that his dichotomy tribes/cities is an oversimplification (Lacher, The Rise, p. 167), but that does not prevent him from using it as his main argument. Furthermore, he describes the rise of tribal politics in post-Qadhdhafi Libya as an ascendency of the periphery (the ‘local level’) against old centres of power (ibid, p. 152). This analytical lens, however, does not make much sense because Muammar Qadhdhafi (the ‘centre of the centres of power’) was, among other identities, a member of the Qadhafa tribe. Tribesmen are also many of the leading political figures of the pre and post Qadhdhafi era. Contrary to what Lacher implies, therefore, Libyan tribalism never has been a ‘peripheral phenomenon.’ Since Qadhdhafi and some of his ‘free officers’ belonged to minor tribes, their rise to power in 1969 could be read as an ascendency of peripheral tribes against more influential tribal groups, but even this reading would be partial. Today many social scientists prefer to adopt a multi-centered approach rather than a strict dichotomy of centre/periphery. This approach takes into account the fact that the narrative of ‘center' and periphery’ often is designed according to the specific point of view of power-holders and does not necessarily reflect reality in all its complexities; see further M. Carrin & L. Guzy (2012) Voices from the Periphery (London: Routledge).

⁸ Lacher, The Rise, p. 166.

⁹ Among the militias with a tribal component one can mention the Zintan militias (some of which have cooperated with the former national government), and the Misurata militia. The latter, in particular, has strong relations with the Muslim Brotherhood [ikhwan al muslimin]. It might be argued that the Brotherhood is not, technically, an Islamist organisation. However, in Libya it is perceived as such. My Libyan informants often use the term ikhwan al muslimin, or simply ikhwan as a synonym for ‘Islamists.’

¹⁰ D. Nobus (2000) Jacques Lacan and the Freudian Practice of Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge); A. de Wahelens & W. Ver Eecke (2001) Phenomenology and Lacan on Schizophrenia, p. 23 (Leuven: Leuven University Press). For a different take on the topic see G. Deleuze & F. Guattari (2007) A Thousand Plateaus (London: Continuum); and for a critique of Deleuze's & Guattari's approach, see M. Recalcati (2013) Il Complesso di Telemaco (Milan: Feltrinelli).

¹¹ Wahelens & Ver Eecke, Phenomenology, p. 23.

¹² Lacher, The Rise, p. 166.

¹³ Ibid, p. 151.

¹⁴ Ibid, pp. 152, 167.

¹⁵ This article is informed by three research trips to Eastern Libya (Cyrenaica) between 2002 and 2003; 15 months of fieldwork, mainly in Western Libya (Tripolitania) but also in the eastern region, between 2006 and 2008; and a shorter fieldwork study in Tripoli and Benghazi during 2012. In addition, I have had extensive ongoing conversations with Libyan friends since 2012. All interviews were conducted in Arabic. To protect privacy of my informants, I use pseudo-names and omit tribal membership.

¹⁶ Lacher, The Rise, p. 152.

¹⁷ In the first half of the twentieth century the tribes of Eastern Libya unified under the leadership of the Sanusi Sufi order, and fought against the Italian invaders. This phenomenon shows that Libyan tribes are capable of inclusive social membership other than the tribe, although scholars have debated the degree to which the Sanusi leaders were able to unify the tribal groups effectively; see E. Evans Pritchard (1949) The Sanusi of Cyrenaica (Oxford: Oxford University Press); N. Ziadeh (1958) Sanusiyah: A study of a revivalist movement in Islam (Leiden: Brill); E. Peters (1990) The Bedouin of Cyrenaica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). What is certain is that tribal politics played a role in the vicissitudes of the Sanusis. According to some of my informants, the choice of renowned Sanusi leader Omar al Mukhtar as head of the anti-Italian guerrillas was because he belonged to the Amnifah, a small tribe unrelated to any of the larger tribal groups of Eastern Libya, and this enabled him to act as an impartial commander.

¹⁸ Descriptive accounts of the tribes' political role under the regime and during the 2011 revolution can be found in Lacher, The Rise, Families, Tribes and Cities in the Libyan Revolution, in: Middle East Policy, 18(4), pp. 140–154; and G. Joffe (2013) Civil Activism and the Roots of the 2011 Uprisings, in: J. Pack (ed.) The 2011 Libyan Uprisings and the Struggle for the Post-Qadhafi Future (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). What it is missing in these analyses is the notion that tribalism is an ideology, not a detailed description of the facts. Hence, in this article I concentrate on the former rather than on the latter. For an account of tribal politics before Qadhdhafi's rise to power, see A. Ahmida (1994) The Making of Modern Libya (Albany: State University of New York Press).

¹⁹Jamahiriya loosely translates as state of the masses. Qadhdhafi envisaged it as embodying anti-institutionalism, Nasserist socialism, textual Islam and politics without representation; see further D. Vandewalle (2006) A History of Modern Libya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). In adopting an initial anti-tribal attitude, the regime aimed to remove tribal leaders from offices and substitute them with political figures loyal to the Jamahiriya. These loyalists, however, often were members of Qadhdhafi's tribe or of other loyal tribes; See further Obeidi (2013) Political Culture, p. 117; and J. Davis (1987) Libyan Politics: Tribe and Revolution, p. 23 (London: I. B. Tauris).

²⁰ Davis, Libyan Politics, pp. 40–44.

²¹ Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, p. 158.

²² Many tribal leaders acted as the longa manus of the regime forcing people to recurr to tribal means in their everyday life. According to M. Ouannes (2012) ‘A tribal society absolves the power from the obligation to recognise civil society and democratic politics.’ in idem, Sociologie d'une revolte Armee: Le Cas de Libyein, African Sociological Review, 16, p. 31 [quote translated from French by author].

²³ According to anthropologist S. Caton (1990) ‘when the state is powerful, it will tend toward direct tribal rule by circumventing, or perhaps even eliminating, the tribal elites; when it is vulnerable to external aggression and internal strife, the state …will rule indirectly through them.’ Anthropological Theories of Tribe and State Formation, in: P. Khoury & J. Kostiner (eds), Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, p. 100 (Berkeley: University of California Press).

²⁴ Obeidi (2013) Political Culture in Libya, p. 118.

²⁵ Davis, Libyan Politics, pp. 40–44.

²⁶ According to M. Bamyeh (2011) ‘A sample of 28 tribal declarations, issued between 23 February and 8 March 2011, reveals that the vast majority highlighted national unity or national salvation rather than tribal interests.’ in: Is the 2011 Libyan Revolution an Exception?, Jadaliyya, March 25, 2011. Available at http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/1001/is-the-2011-libyan-revolution-an-exception. accessed June 19, 2014).

²⁷ For an analysis of the focus on violence in the anthropology of tribalism see L. Abu-Lughod (1989) Zones of Theory in the Anthropology of the Arab World, Annual Review of Anthropology, 18, p. 286.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 281.

²⁹ See further P. Dresch (1969) The Significance of the Course Events Take in Segmentary Systems, American Ethnologist, 13(2), p. 309; E. Gellner (1969) Saints of the Atlas (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson); E. E. Evans-Pritchard (1974) The Nuer (Oxford: Oxford University Press); and H. Munson (1993) Rethinking Gellner's Segmentary Analysis of Morocco's Ait ^cAttain, Man, 28(2), pp. 267–280.

³⁰ T. Barfield (1990) Tribe and State Relations: The Inner Asian Perspective, in: P. Khoury & J. Kostiner (eds) Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, p. 160 (Berkeley: University of California Press).

³¹ M. Fried (1975) The Notion of Tribe (Menlo Park: Publishing Company).

³² P. Khoury & J. Kostiner (1990) Introduction: Tribes and the Complexities of State Formation, Khoury & Kostiner (eds) Tribes and State Formation, p. 5.

³³ W. Lancaster (1981) The Rwala Bedouin Today, pp. 35, 151 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

³⁴ M. Meeker (1979) Literature and Violence in North Arabia, p. 15 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

³⁵ Dale Eickelman (1981) The Middle East: an Anthropological Approach, p. 98. (London: Prentice Hall)

³⁶ Dresch (1986) The Significance of the Course Events Take in Segmentary Systems, pp. 309–324.

³⁷ A. Hammoudi (1980) Segmentary, Social Stratification, Political Power and Sainthood: Reflections on Gellner's Theses, Economy and Society, 9(3), pp. 279–303.

³⁸ L. Rosen (1979) Social identity and Points of Attachment: Approaches to Social Organization, in: L. Rosen et al. (eds) Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society, p. 20 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

³⁹ A. Lughod (1989) Zones of Theory, p. 269; Rosen, Social identity, pp. 19–111; S. Caton (1987) Power, Persuasion, and Language: A Critique to the Segmentary Model in the Middle East, International Journal of Middle-East Studies, 19(1), pp. 77–102; and Geertz (1979) The Meaning of Family Ties, in: L. Rosen et al. (eds) Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society, pp. 315–391.

⁴⁰ Khoury & Kostiner, Introduction, p. 13.

⁴¹ Ibid, pp. 3–4; R. Tapper (1990) Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East, in: Khoury & Kostiner (eds) Tribes and State Formation, pp. 69–70.

⁴² Tapper, Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople, p. 69.

⁴³ D. Sneath (2007) The Headless State (New York: Columbia University Press).

⁴⁴ Deleuze & Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 208–231.

⁴⁵ R. Behnke (1947) The Herders of Cyrenaica, p. 93 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press).

⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 105; Peters, The Bedouin of Cyrenaica, pp. 70, 81; and Davis, Libyan Politics, p. 93.

⁴⁷ As for instance, L. Anderson (1990) Tribe and State, Libyan Anomalies, in: Khoury & Kostiner (eds) Tribes and State Formation.

⁴⁸ Peters, The Bedouin of Cyrenaica, p. 81.

⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 70; and Davis, Libyan Politics, pp. 191–196.

⁵⁰ Davis, Libyan Politics, p. 43.

⁵¹ See earlier on in the article, and Ibid. p. 43.

⁵² Obeidi (2103) Political Culture in Libya, pp. 108–133.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ The regime opposed the creation of parties and associations, seen as an obstacle to direct political participation.

⁵⁵ Obeidi (2013) Political Culture in Libya, ‘We should remember that people identify with the tribal system in a society in certain circumstances. Many who do identify with it in such circumstances might prefer to live in a society where tribe did not matter, and would therefore be willing in principle to drop their identity.’ p. 131.

⁵⁶ The same is true for all ideologies; see S. Ortner (2006) Anthropology and Social Theory, pp. 4–16 (London: Duke University Press).

⁵⁷ L. Althusser (1971) Lenin and Philosophy (London: Monthly Review Press); A. Gramsci (1971) Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 374 (London: Lawrence); and C. Geertz (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures, pp. 55–83 (New York: Basic Books).

⁵⁸ S. Hall (1980) Encoding/Decoding, in: S. Hall et al. (eds) Culture, Media, Language, pp. 107–116 (London: Routledge).

⁵⁹ M. Sahlins (1981) Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities (Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press); and Ortner, Anthropology and Social Theory, p. 15.

⁶⁰ Pierre Bourdieu (1990) The Logic of Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press).

⁶¹ As the classical Marxist analysis of ideology might suggest. M. Barrett (1991) The Politics of Truth – from Marx to Foucault (Stanford: Stanford University Press).

⁶² As the post-modernist reflections on ideology infer; see ibid.

⁶³ G. Lukàcs (1971) History of Class Consciousness (Berlin: Merlin Press).

⁶⁴ S. Žižek (2006) Introduction, in: S. Žižek (ed) Mapping Ideology (London: Verso); Žižek (1987) The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso). According to post-Marxist philosopher Alain Badiou. ‘Truth’ becomes discernable from ideology in some specific ‘events’ like ‘politics’ (understood, amongst other things, as the contextual—and often peculiar—conditions in which an individual lives in). These philosophical reflections urge us to contextualise tribal practice within the practical and political situation of the tribesmen, rather than essentializing tribalism as Lacher does. See A. Badiou (2007) Being and Event (London: Bloomsbury).

⁶⁵ According to Lacher, ‘tribal politics was particularly important only in the hinterland.’ See Lacher, The Rise of Tribal Politics, p. 166.

⁶⁶ BBC News (2011) Libya Crisis: Misrata Tribes may fight Rebels, April 23, 2011; Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13173628, accessed May 15, 2014.

⁶⁷ All Libyan tribes have an ancestral homeland constituted by a specific region, area or town. At times this connection is clear in the nomenclature of the tribe itself, as in the above-mentioned case of Misurata, home to a group of sub-tribes indicated by the umbrella term of Misrata tribe.

⁶⁸ At the time of my 2006–2008 fieldwork Libyans could have their passports issued only in Tripoli, and the same applied for almost all other bureaucratic aspects of their lives.

⁶⁹ According to many Cyrenaican friends, Eastern Libya always has been characterized by a general anti-Qadhdhafi attitude. Some told me that Qadhdhafi's choice to marry a member of the Brahasa tribe, one of the most important tribal groups in Eastern Libya, had the purpose of helping solve this antipathy. In my experience, police forces in Cyrenaican towns and cities always had some representatives either of Qadhdhafi's tribe, or of one of the tribes loyal to him.

⁷⁰ Tripoli is the site for the graves of several important tribal figures. Sidhi Sulayman, for instance, the ancestral progenitor of the Fwatir tribe (discussed later in text) is buried in the capital, and his tomb hosts a mazar, an annual festival in his honour that is very popular among the Fwatir.

⁷¹ A friend from Tripoli (a lawyer in his sixties) told me in 2008: ‘We are civilised people. We do not have tribes.’

⁷² Under Qadhdhafi thefts and crimes often were punished using a complex mixture of state law and tribal law. Often a judge would produce a verdict only after tribal representatives of the parties involved had reached an agreement. Naturally, if people were not happy with tribal law justice, they could call for the application of state law, and vice versa. Often this was a way to compensate for the strong deficiencies in the Libyan court system.

⁷³ According to some informants, tribesmen can benefit from the fund only in cases of unexpected hardship. I was told that in the case of a car accident, a tribesman can benefit from the fund only if his car regularly is insured and the insurance does not cover the damage.

⁷⁴ Note that in some tribes there are assemblies of tribal leaders rather than a single tribal head.

⁷⁵ Peters, The Bedouin of Cyrenaica, p. 95.

⁷⁶ Lacher is aware of these dynamics. However, he does not consider that similar aspects of tribal practice indicate the ideological nature of tribalism (and that therefore, contrary to what he suggests, tribalism cannot be understood as a well-defined reality opposed to ideological discourses); see Lacher, The Rise of Tribal Politics, p. 153.

⁷⁷ Evans-Pritchard, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica, pp. 65–70; Peters, The Bedouin of Cyrenaica, pp. 40–83. Very often members of marabitin tribes described their status in ironic terms, such as this comment by one of my informants: ‘Can you believe that I actually come from a tribe of saints?’.

⁷⁸ J. Clarke reported a similar case in his study of the Siaan, a well-known tribe in Western Libya. Although divided into four main sub-tribes during the twentieth century, the Siaan have developed more sub-divisions. Interestingly, members of the original Siaan sub-tribes consider the tribe as descendants of a saint, but one of the most recent sub-groups does not. See further J. Clarke (1960) The Siaan: Pastoralists of the Jefara, in J. Clarke (ed.) Field-studies in Libya, pp 52–59 (Durham: The University of Durham).

⁷⁹ Lacher, The Rise of Tribal Politics, p. 157.

⁸⁰ Ouannes, Sociologie d'une Revolte Armee, p. 32.

⁸¹ In 1993, members of the Warfalla were involved in an unsuccessful attempt to depose Qadhdhafi. An understanding of tribal fluidity can help us to comprehend, how Qadhdhafi, member of a minor, and historically unimportant tribe, has been able to gain power.

⁸² All Cyrenaican tribal leaders have expressed support for Gen. Khalifa Haftar who in 2014 declared ‘war’ against Islamists and engaged in battle with Cyrenaican militias. See further Al Jazeera (2014) Hundreds rally in support for Libya's Haftar. Available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/05/rally-support-libya-haftar-2014530174849451933.html, accessed June 25, 2014.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ The debate on federalism has characterised the politics of post-Qadhdhafi Libya. According to Lacher, tribesmen tend to be federalists, but I do not think this is true. See Lacher, The Rise of Tribal Politics, p. 166. I have noticed confusion about the term in Libya. When I talked in detail with Libyans who advocated federalism (‘federaliya’), I realized that what they actually wanted was decentralization.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Obeidi, Political Culture in Libya, p. 125.

⁸⁸ Private 2014 email, here quoted with Mohammed's permission.

⁸⁹ February 17, 2011, is deemed the symbolic beginning of the Libyan revolution, although a number of meaningful anti-Qadhdhafi acts were performed on February 15.

⁹⁰ The ‘personalized’ character of the army forces becomes clear if one looks at the recent events involving General Khalifa Haftar. See note 82.

⁹¹ A deeper exploration of this phenomenon can be found in I. Cherstich (forthcoming) ‘Now I want the Law!—Libyans seeking ‘Non-State Justice’ in the hope of ‘State-Justice’ (an Ethnographic take), Law, Social Justice and Global Development.