Libya's ‘Major Minorities’. Berber, Tuareg and Tebu: Multiple Narratives of Citizenship, Language and Border Control

Abstract

The Qadhdhafi regime neglected ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities by virtue of its conception of the national order of Libya as being a homogenous Arab Muslim nation state. After the fall of the regime, the Berber, the Tuareg and the Tebu started demanding political participation, legal residence, and the acceptance of minority rights. Using examples of citizenship, language and border control, I elaborate how Libya needs to be analyzed through national, transnational, ethnic, and tribal lenses in order to understand its socio-cultural plurality and to grasp the intricacy that characterizes the process of identity-making among these groups.

Keywords::

• Berber
• citizenship
• ethnic and national identity
• language
• Libya
• Tebu
• Tuareg

Notes

¹ Berber, Tuareg, and Tebu are plural forms.

² A. Elumami (2013) Amazigh, Tebu and Tuareg communities threaten boycott of Constitutional Commission, Libya Herald, July 20, 2013.

³ M. Cousins (2013) Amazigh protest outside Congress, Libya Herald, August 13, 2013.

⁴ H. Mzioudet (2013) Sharara oilfield in Obari closed by Tuareg protestors, Libya Herald, October 28, 2013.

⁵ This work was supported by the FWF, Austrian Science Fund, P23573-G17.

⁶ I. Kohl (2005) Nationale Identität, tribale Zugehörigkeit und lokale Konzeptionen [National identity, tribal affiliation and local conceptions], in J. Heiss (ed.) Veränderung und Stabilität. Normen und Werte in islamischen Gesellschaften. Veröffentlichungen zur Sozialanthropologie [Transformation and stability: Norms and values in Islamic societies. Publications in social anthropology, 7], pp. 137–167 (Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences); and I. Kohl (2007) Der Tuareg in Libyen. Identitäten zwischenGrenzen [The Tuareg in Libya: Identity between Boundaries] (Berlin: Reimer).

⁷Cf. H. Mattes (1996) Ausländer und Minderheiten in Libyen: Revolutionäre Ideologie und politische Praxis' [Foreigners and minorities in Libya: Revolutionary ideology and political practice], in: G. Becker & P. Karrer (eds) Fremdsein – hierzuland und anderswo. Ethnologische Perspektiven [Being foreign: Here and there, Ethnological perspectives], pp. 51–79 (Hamburg: Wayasbah); and S. Chaker (2012) Berbères de Libye: Un parameter méconnu, une irruption politique inattendue [The Berber of Libya: An unknown parameter, a sudden political eruption], Politique Africaine, 125, pp. 105–126.

⁸Mattes, Ausländer und Minderheiten, p. 71.

⁹ M. Qadhdhafi (1981) The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory (Tripoli, The Libyan People's Committee), p. 29.

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 20.

¹¹ The Berber language usually is called Tamazight, but in many publications it is referred to as Amazigh. Tamazight is the sing. feminine form while Amazigh is the sing. masculine form; the plural form for both is Imazighen. The Berber's socio-cultural movement also is called the Amazigh movement.

¹² North Africa has a total of 15–20 million Berber speakers. An estimated 40–45 percent (about 10 million) live in Morocco, and 25 percent (6–7 million) in Algeria. In Tunisia, about 1 percent of the population is Berberphone, while in both Mauretania and Egypt there are several thousands of Berber. See further M. G. Kossmann & H. J. Stroomer (1997) Berber Phonology, in A. S. Kaye (ed.) Phonologies of Asia and Africa (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns) p. 461.

¹³ B. Maddy-Weitzmann (2012) The Berber Identity Movement and the Challenge to North African States, p. 139 (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press); Chaker, Berbères de Libye, p. 108; and Kossmann and Stroomer, Berber Phonology, p. 462.

¹⁴Chaker, Berbères de Libye, p. 108.

¹⁵ Often referred to as a khariji sect of Islam. See Tadeusz. Lewicki (1960) Al-Ibadiyya, in: The Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed, vol. 3, pp. 648–660 (Leiden: Brill).

¹⁶ The Ibadi doctrines differ in a number of points from those of both Sunni and Shia Muslims, although these differences have little impact on daily life. In legal matters the Ibadi put more weight on the Qur'an and less on the hadith [traditions of the Prophet] than other branches of Islam; see ibid.

¹⁷ A. Al-Rumi (2009) Libyan Berber struggle to assert their identity online, Arab Media & Society, 8, spring. Available at http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article = 713, accessed November 25, 2013

¹⁸ Tebu is an umbrella term encompassing the Teda in the Tibesti mountains and the Daza in the south. Some clans originate from the Fezzan. Tebu is a term of the Kanuri language and can be translated as ‘the man who lives (bu) in Tibesti (Tu);’ see further C. Baroin (2003) Les Toubou [The Tebu], p. 7 (Paris: Vent de Sable); A. Kronenberg (1958) Die Teda von Tibesti [The Teda of Tibesti], p. 73 (Wiener Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte und Linguistik: Verlag Ferdinand Berger [Viennese contributions to Cultural History and Linguistics]; and V. Beltrami & H. Proto (2005) The Tubus of Central-Eastern Sahara, Africa: Rivista trimestrale di studi e documentazione dell'Istituto italiano per l'Africa, 60(2), pp. 221–259.

¹⁹ Libya is composed of three provinces: Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan. In 1963 the self-administrated provinces were united to form a centrally governed state.

²⁰ J. Oakes (2013) Libya: The Tebu of Kufra, Sebha and Murzuq: A Black people in search of a Nationality,' Libya stories, July 20, 2013.

²¹ C. Ehrhardt (2013) Die Besitzer des Blutes, FAZ, May 22, 2013.

²²The Daily Telegraph (2011) US Embassy cable, March 7, 2008, Libya's Berber still out in the Cold, Wikileaks file, January 31, 2011.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Al-Rumi, Libyan Berber. Berber often interpret Qadhdhafi's hostile attitude toward them as the result of a personal incident. It is widely known in Libya that he wanted to marry a woman from Zuwara, but her family was strictly against it since he was an Arab. Many Berber interpret this as the crucial reason for the harsh policy of repression. Cf. CERD [Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination] (2004) The Berber of Libya (Geneva: United Nations Economic and Social Council), point 4.

²⁵ The prohibitions did not deter Berber activists in the Nafusa mountains from trying to preserve their heritage. See M. Buzakhar (2010) Ancient Amazigh Poems (Np: Tamazight studies group).

²⁶Idem (n.d.) Toponymy of Ancient Kabaw (Np: private study; and idem (2007) Buried Amazigh place names in the Libyan Desert (Np: private study).

²⁷ Al-Rumi describes the case of Mohammed Umadi in Libyan Berber. For general oppression of the Berber, see also Chaker, Berbères de Libye.

²⁸CERD, The Berber of Libya.

²⁹ Al-Rumi, Libyan Berber; J. Hill (2012) Would You Go to Jail to Save Your Language?, The Global Mail, July 26, 2012. I. Kohl & R. Salem (2011) Libyens Berber, ein verleugnetes Volk [Libya's Berber. A denied people], in F. Edlinger (ed.) Libyen – Hintergründe, Analysen, Berichte [Libya – background, analyses, reports], pp. 87–101 (Wien: Promedia).

³⁰ The Amazigh World Congress (CMA, Congrès Mondial Amazigh) is an international non-governmental organization with the purpose of providing a structure and international representation for ethnic Berber interests. It was founded in 1995 in France.

³¹ See Al-Rumi, Libyan Berber; and The Daily Telegraph, US Embassy cable.

³²The Daily Telegraph, US Embassy cable.

³³Kohl, Tuareg in Libyen, p. 113.

³⁴ Qadhdhafi speech of April 24, 2005, in Tripoli and reported in Panapress on April 25, and Jeune Afrique l'Intelligent on April 26. The speech is cited in Kohl, Tuareg in Libyen, p. 101.

³⁵ A. Bourgeot (1995) Les sociétés touarègues: Nomadisme, identité, résistance [The Tuareg Societies: Nomadism, Identity, Resistance], p. 435 (Paris: Karthala).

³⁶ P. R. Baduel (1996) Le territoire d'Etat entre imposition et subversion: Examples saharosahéliens [State territory between imposition and subversion: Saharan and Sahel examples], Cultures & Conflicts, 21–22, p. 10.

³⁷ I. Kohl (2010) Saharan Borderline—Strategies: Tuareg Transnational Mobility, in: T. Grätz (ed.) Mobility, Transnationalism and Contemporary African Societies, pp. 92–105 (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing). I. Kohl (2009) Beautiful Modern Nomads: Bordercrossing Tuareg between Niger, Algeria and Libya, pp. 449–462 (Berlin: Reimer).

³⁸ I. Kohl (2010) Libya, the ‘Europe of Ishumar’: Between Losing and Reinventing Tradition, in A. Fischer & I. Kohl (eds), TuaregSociety within a Globalized World: Saharan Life in Transition, pp. 143–154 (London, New York: I. B. Tauris).

³⁹ The name Tuareg does not derive from the Arabic root t-r-k, whose verbal form means ‘left, abandoned’ and goes back to a folk-etymological idea from Arabs expressing their religious superiority by naming the Tuareg as ‘abandoned by God.’ Rather, ‘the name Tuareg derives from Bedouin Arabic Twareg, a plural of Targi, which is held to be a nisba adjective from Targa, the Berber name for the province Fezzan in Libya, thus meaning a man from Fezzan.’ See K. G. Prasse (1999) Tawariq, Encyclopedia of Islam, p. 380 (Leiden, NL: Brill).

⁴⁰ Speech cited in Kohl, Tuareg in Libyen, p. 101.

⁴¹ I. Kohl (2011) Gaddafi's Instrumentalisierung der Tuareg: Von Rebellen, Banditen und Söldnern [Qadhdhafi's intrumentalization of the Tuareg: Of rebels, bandits and mercenaries], in F. Edlinger (ed.) Libyen—Hintergründe, Analysen, Berichte [Libya—backgrounds, analyses, reports], pp. 71–86 (Wien: Promedia).

⁴² I. ag Maha (2006) Touareg du XXI^esiècle [Tuareg of the 21st century], p. 121 (Brinon-sur-Sauldre: Grandvaux).

⁴³Kohl, Tuareg in Libyen, p. 118.

⁴⁴Mattes, Ausländer und Minderheiten, p. 71.

⁴⁵The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (c) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (UN General Assembly, July 15, 2010).

⁴⁶ M. Galtier (2013) Fezzan: No state, Three peoples, Libya Herald, September 22, 2013. Cf. IRIN Middle East Analyses (2012) Libyan minority rights at a crossroad, May 24, 2103.

⁴⁷Oakes, Libya: The Tebu of Kufra. See Nationality Law #17, dated 1954, and Law #3, dated 1979. Available at http://www.multiplecitizenship.com/wscl/ws_LIBYA.html, accessed November 25, 2013.

⁴⁸Cf. IRIN, Libyan minority rights at a crossroad.

⁴⁹ Many Tuareg provided wrong tribal affiliation, simply because they feared repression by the Libyan state, or because rumour had it that the indication of a specific tribe would simplify the identification process.

⁵⁰Kohl, Beautiful Modern Nomads, p. 53.

⁵¹ See R. B. St John (2000) Libya in Africa: Looking Back, Moving Forward, The Journal of Libyan Studies, 1(1), pp. 18–32; and R. Takeyh (2000) The Evolving Course of Qaddafi's Foreign Policy, The Journal of Libyan Studies, 1(2), pp. 41–53.

⁵²Qadhdhafi, The Green Book, The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory, Chapter Seven, The Blacks (Tripoli: The Libyan People's Committee).

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴Cf. C. Dunton (1988) Black Africans in Libya and Libyan Images of Black Africa, in: R. Lemachand (ed.) The Green and the Black: Qadhafi's Policies in Africa, pp. 150–166 (Indiana: University Press).

⁵⁵Kohl, Nationale Identität, p. 155.

⁵⁶ , Ausländer und Minderheiten, p. 61; and idem, Bilanz der libyschen Revolution: Drei Dekaden politischer Herrschaft Mu'ammar al-Qaddafis [Outcome of three decades of Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi's political leadership], in: Wuquf Kurzanalysen, 11–12, p. 14.

⁵⁷The Interim Transitional National Council (August 3, 2011), The Constitutional Declaration, article 1.

⁵⁸ F. Murphy (2011) Libyan Berber vent rage over cabinet exclusion, Reuters, November 27, 2011.

⁵⁹ The Constitutional Declaration, article 1.

⁶⁰ Mazigh and his twin brother were arrested in 2010 and spent months in prison because of their engagement in preserving Amazigh culture and for attending a Berber conference in Italy. They were freed during the first days of the 2011 upheavals. I met Mazigh in 2004 and was impressed by his meticulous collecting of Berber history. See further Hill, Would you go to jail?

⁶¹ Cited in T. Hume (2012) A Rebirth of Berber Culture in post-Qadhafi Libya, CNN, September 3, 2012.

⁶² See Kohl, Tuareg in Libyen, p. 200, for the elementary school curriculum.

⁶³ Ibid. p. 113.

⁶⁴ C. Moseley (2010) Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger (Paris: UNESCO Publishing). Available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/languages-atlas/en/atlasmap.html, accessed September 17, 2014.

⁶⁵ Radio France International, December 17, 2012.

⁶⁶ The collaboration between Tebu and Tuareg did not last long. In summer 2014 clashes between Tebu and Tuareg started in Sebha and have spilled over to Ubari since the Tebu want to expand their military influence.

⁶⁷ M. Galtier (2013) Southern borders wide open, Libya Herald, September 20, 2013; idem (2013), Fezzan: No state, Three peoples, Libya Herald, September 22, 2013; and M. Keilberth (2013) Die bessere Seite der Sahara' [The better side of the Sahara] taz, October 13, 2103.

⁶⁸ Galtier, Southern borders; I. Kohl (2013) Afrod, le business touareg avec la frontiere, nouvelles conditions et nouveaux défis [Afrod, the Tuareg's business with the border. New conditions and challenges], Politique Africaine, 131, pp. 139–159.

⁶⁹ UNDOC (United Nations Office on Drug and Crime) (2011) The Transatlantic Cocaine Market (Research Paper); and W. Larcher (2012) Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region (The Carnegie Papers, September).

⁷⁰ J. Burbank (2010) Trans-Saharan Trafficking. A Growing Source of Terrorist Financing (Center for the Study of Threat Convergence: The Fund for Peace), p. 7; and M. O. Mohamedou (2011) The Many Faces of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, GCSP Policy papers, Nr. 15.

⁷¹Cf. F. Deycard (2012) Uncertain Times: The Consequences of the Libyan Civil War on Niger, Unpublished Background Paper, Small Arms Survey, Conflict Armament Research and Small Arms Survey (ed.) (2012–2013), Rebel forces in Mali, Documented weapons, ammunition, and related material (London, Geneva).

⁷² Air Info (2012) Qui est derrière le trafic juteux de cartons de Whisky vers la Libye? [Who is behind the profitable traffic of whiskey to Libya?], Nr. 135, p. 9.

⁷³ O. Pliez (2001) Le Fezzan, mutation d'une région saharienne [Fezzan: Change in a Saharan region]; H. Mattes (2011) Arabische Revolten: Der Sonderfall Libyen [Arabic revolts. The special case Libya] (Hanns Seidl Stiftung), pp. 1–3; R. B. St John (2011) Research paper: Libyan Myth and Realities, p. 9 (Royal Danish Defence College); and H. Schiffers (1975) Libyen. Brennende Wüste, blühender Sand [Libya: Burning Sahara, Blooming sand] (Berlin: Safari Verlag).

⁷⁴ L. Anderson (2001) A Last Resort, an Expedient and an Experiment: Statehood and Sovereignty in Libya, The Journal of Libyan Studies, 2(2), p. 19.

⁷⁵ For a stringent definition of ethnicity, see A. Gingrich (2001) Ethnizität für die Praxis [Ethnicity for practice], in K. Wernhart & W. Zips (eds) Ethnohistorie – Rekonstruktion und Kulturkritik. Eine Einführung [Ethnohistory: Reconstruction and cultural critic], pp. 99–111 (Wien: Promedia).

⁷⁶ See Scheele, Smugglers and Saints.