Involving the Finnish public in nuclear facility licensing: participatory democracy and industrial bias

Abstract

The participatory turn in nuclear facility licensing produced the general aim to involve citizens in more direct ways in planning and decision making. However, purposes of public participation may be as manifold as actors involved. In Finland, the dominance of the proponent in the environmental impact assessment has produced forms of participation that may be functional in terms of their ability to inform citizens, to take their worries and concerns into account and subsequently to alleviate conflict. It is arguable whether this counts as “meaningful” participation as promoted by participatory democracy theories. Purposes need to be defined as well as the means to achieve meaningful public input. In addition, the empirical material for this study and contextual examples from Canada and Sweden hint at an associated problem concerning the absence of supervising institutions in assessment procedures.

Keywords:

• nuclear energy
• public participation
• Finland

“Smooth siting” in Finland

Planning processes and licensing procedures of energy projects in Finland provide for public participation, aiming to satisfy demands for “enhanced democracy” and the democratisation of expertise (Nowotny 2003) in order to build trust in risk decisions as well as decision makers (Petts 2008). Various laws support public participation as a “self-evident and trouble-free part of democracy” (Hokkanen 2001, p. 111) throughout the assessment of environmental impacts and in the course of decision making. In the case of nuclear power, the latest decisions on additional plants and a final repository for spent fuel created the image of a “smooth siting” procedure being employed in Finland, and international comparative studies aim at the creation of a transferable concept of stepwise and participatory decision making, in order to allow “smooth siting” elsewhere (Nuclear Energy Agency 2004a; International Energy Agency 2008; Kojo 2008). Prolonged and interrupted planning processes, slowed down by environmental activists and local protesters, then followed by hotly debated decision making and appellate procedures, are costly for nuclear power companies in Europe and North America. As there seems to be little opposition to nuclear expansion in Finland, it is widely believed that there are lessons to be learned. Accordingly, the “smooth siting” is interpreted as a successful example of citizen involvement in planning and decision making. Fading public opposition in the aftermath of governmental decisions on nuclear facilities is conceived of as a sign of high satisfaction with participatory procedures and trust in authorities. However, as this article will argue in a closer examination of participatory practices, the absence of an unbiased facilitator, reluctant authorities and an unbalanced set of consultation practices in the Finnish licensing procedure actually undermine a transparent, open and democratic process. It will be stated that Finnish participatory procedures are unlikely to further “meaningful”, or effective participation in the siting of nuclear facilities. 1

This article will discuss the institutional settings of the Finnish licensing procedure against the background of selective features of nuclear facility licensing in other countries of the democratic circumpolar North, i.e. Sweden and Canada. As the empirical material collected by the author mainly supports conclusions in the Finnish case, the practices in Sweden and Canada will help to illuminate the case on a conceptual level, tentatively indicating issues to consider in nuclear facility planning and decision making in Finland. Theories of participatory democracy will be discussed as the ideological background to participatory planning and decision making.

This article is based on research concerning the negotiation of Northern energy systems with a focus on Finland. The empirical data informing the following analysis consists of policy papers, legal texts, and publications by the nuclear industry, environmental movements and local authorities from the circumpolar North. Around 30 open interviews have been conducted with Finnish officials, politicians, managers, movement members, locals and scientists. In Canada, interviews have been conducted with farmers and activists of the Peace River region in Alberta. All interviews were conducted by the author in the English language (except for one with a Finnish politician). At this point of the research project, interpretations of the Swedish case mostly rely on personal communication with Finnish and Swedish scientists and a literature review.

Nuclear facility licensing in the circumpolar North and the ideal of deliberation

The circumpolar North, including its Arctic and Subarctic zones but also lower latitudes, is a region with a highly vulnerable environment. As the natural environment recovers slower than in lower latitudes, adverse effects of energy mega projects, such as the discharge of cooling water into rivers and lakes, have a higher impact when compared to for instance central European or American areas. While scientific research has highlighted the adverse effects of a warming climate on this region, the effects are perceived as an opportunity by industrial proponents, and the northern resource frontier is moving further North (Bone 2008). This also holds true in the case of nuclear power. In Finland, the small community of Simo, situated 100 km below the Arctic circle, is one of the potential sites for a new nuclear power plant recently assessed in an environmental impact assessment (EIA) (Fennovoima Ltd. 2008).

Democratic countries of the circumpolar North 2 frequently explain their relatively high energy consumption with long, cold winters and sparsely populated areas that increase the cost of transportation. In an attempt to reduce emissions, nuclear power is promoted as a means to maintain high living standards while at the same time reducing impacts on the environment and mitigating global warming. The impact of the nuclear power industry and especially nuclear new build in sparsely populated areas, however, cannot be underestimated, as for instance the massive influx of work force and material changes small communities significantly during construction. The Finnish community of Simo and the Canadian community of Peace River in the province of Alberta struggle with plans for nuclear development. Both are situated in the far North and have no previous experiences with nuclear facilities.

Sweden and Finland are the first democratic countries to successfully negotiate a final repository for spent nuclear fuel. Currently, Finland is preparing the construction of the final repository while at the same time building the 5th nuclear power plant. Two plants and the one currently under construction as well as the future final repository are situated at the west coast of Finland on the peninsular of Olkiluoto. Two more nuclear power plants are located on the south coast of Finland, in the municipality of Loviisa. In addition, two plants have recently been approved by the government (Finland May 6 2010), one at Olkiluoto and one at a site still to be chosen. 3 And although Sweden's government decided to phase out nuclear power by 2010, it has recently revoked this decision, thereby accrediting a continuously expanding domestic nuclear production. However, a ban on new sites for nuclear power plants continues to be valid (Michanek and Söderholm 2009). The expansion is further restricted as a new plant may only be build upon permanent shut down of an existing plant. 4

It is assumed that extensive public participation in licensing procedures aims to solve the problem of diminishing legitimacy of decision making in western democratic societies. This is particularly so in cases which pose high risks to the living environment, such as nuclear power production and other stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. After the accidents on Three Mile Island in 1979 and in Chernobyl in 1986, many national governments refrained from licensing new facilities, while the search for final repository sites continued out of necessity. Since first efforts were undertaken to deal with these residues of civilian nuclear power, the siting of final repositories for spent fuel has become an ever greater challenge for proponents and governments world wide. While the production of electricity through nuclear fission continued, nuclear legacies increasingly became problematised. Eventually, Finland and recently also Sweden negotiated storage of spent fuel in deep bedrock along the coast of the Baltic Sea. In both cases, a change of siting strategies regarding public involvement has been observed (Kojo 2005). In Canada, a proposal for nuclear waste management before the Seaborn Panel in 1997 did not gain public approval because it neglected social dimensions (Durant 2009a), and subsequently the Canadian government drafted the Nuclear Fuel Waste Act (2002), demanding an organisation that takes the public into account (Leiss 2008). Following an initial 3-year study, the Canadian Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) recommended an extensive, “deliberate and collaborative” (NWMO 2005, p. 2) procedure for the siting of a final repository for spent fuel. During phase 1 of the projected three phases of the siting procedure, special emphasis lies on the engagement of citizens, who collaboratively develop an “engagement programme” (NWMO 2005, p. 4) in order to allow for a “fair process” (NWMO 2009, p. 15).

It is crucial to ask whether the resulting practices of the participatory turn in siting strategies have strengthened democratic decision making and thus increased legitimacy and acceptance of nuclear energy decisions in Finland and elsewhere. In regard to the actual participatory practices in Finland, I suggest discussing them in the light of theoretical drivers and international experiences that have promoted the implementation of EIA across nations.

Experiments with different forms of public participation in technology assessment have produced a burgeoning literature (for an overview, Abels and Bora 2004). More specific and applied to projects rather than policies, certain forms of public participation have emerged in environmental planning (Dietz and Stern 2008). Apart from a nowadays rather traditional form of public participation in administrative procedures, the public hearing, new methods have been developed and tested for their practicality. Behind the efforts of scholars to conceive of institutions for more acceptable decision preparation and making stands the belief that the involvement of citizens in scientific and political assessment produces higher degrees of legitimacy and, subsequently, leads to the acceptance of decisions on controversial issues. With the objective of instituting a participatory democracy comes the expectation that consensual decision making is possible, even in areas of high uncertainty and a long history of conflict, such as nuclear power production. Deliberative democracy, as initialised by Rawls (1997, 2007) and Habermas (1984, 1987), and advanced by Dryzek (2002) and Benhabib (1996), aims to engage citizens beyond their vote for representatives and to teach them to veil their personal interest in order to consider opposing world views. Other theorists, like Mouffe (2009), argue that democratic communication will always be adversarial, even in non-coercive contexts. The fundamental objective of participatory, or in particular, deliberative democracy is to facilitate communication free of coercion and to reach (or prepare) a consensual decision that may not be in the interest of participants but is yet accepted. Despite different interpretations on the possibility of consent, deliberative settings are considered a fundamental element of “meaningful” citizen involvement (cf. Sinclair et al. 2008, p. 417).

In the following, the ideal of engaging individuals in their capacities as politically mature citizens with the aim of producing consensual decisions and higher degrees of acceptance will serve as the theoretical or discursive background for a study of nuclear facility licensing in Finland. The following sections will describe the procedural settings with an emphasis on possibilities for citizens to participate. Contextual examples do not claim to describe the Swedish and the Canadian settings in any exhaustive way. The juxtaposition will, however, assist in the identification of institutional problems and possible solutions.

The legislative context of the stepwise procedure

The legislative context outlines participatory elements in planning and decision-making processes. Finnish legislation emphasises the need to consult citizens in project planning and implementation. However, the legislative environment structures processes only to some degree, as a high degree of discretion is left to implementers.

The Finnish licensing procedure for nuclear facilities is regulated by the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) and Decree (161/1988) and the Act on EIA Procedure (468/1994) and Decree (713/2006). Further legislative requirements are laid down in the Environmental Protection Act (86/2000), the Nature Conservation Act (1096/1996), the Water Act (264/1961), the Land Use and Building Act (132/1999) and the various other acts and decrees depending on the specific features of a proposed project and its site.

Around 15% – approximately 50,000 km² – of Finland's surface area is protected through the European network Natura 2000, which is based on the Habitat (92/43/EEC) and Birds Directives (79/409/EEC). Additionally, in accordance with the Espoo Convention, 5 neighbouring countries that would be affected by a nuclear accident must be notified and offered consultation during planning and construction stages. Thus, all relevant publications must be issued in at least the country's official languages, Finnish and Swedish, and additionally in English. Furthermore, the proponent is obliged to organise public hearings in neighbouring countries on request.

According to the Nuclear Energy Act and the EIA Procedure Act, the siting procedure of a nuclear facility commences with the submission of an EIA programme, which is to be put on public display by the coordinating authority for a certain length of time. After the proponent receives a statement on the EIA programme, the assessment may begin. One should note that it is not possible to decline an EIA as such, even in cases where legal obstacles would prevent the licensing of a project. An EIA report by the proponent is to be submitted to the coordinating authority, which prepares a public hearing in the potential host municipality while the EIA report is on public display. The coordinating authority compiles received comments on the report and forwards a statement to the proponent, who may then submit an application for a decision-in-principle to the government. Before debates in the government begin, the suggested candidate municipality (or municipalities, in case more than one site has been considered) is consulted.

According to strong principles of local self-government in Fennoscandian countries, municipalities in Finland hold an absolute veto right on the siting of nuclear facilities. In early planning stages, municipalities willing to host a nuclear facility usually outline possibilities for local nuclear development in their land use plans (regional plan, local master plan and local detailed plan). 6 These plans are not binding, rather they attract businesses to the region and facilitate the licensing process. In fact, land use plans may be amended ex post to an EIA 7 and ex post to the negotiation of compensation for suffered losses between the municipal council and the nuclear power company. Compared to EIA procedures, opportunities for the public to participate in land use planning processes are less clearly delineated and exhibit great variations across municipalities. In particular, the differences in public consultation are especially great between rural and urban communities (Norland et al. 2003), due to administrative capacities and political ideologies (Niemi-Iilahti 1999). Moreover, cities are more often able to employ an environmental board and to consult citizens on land use plans than rural municipalities.

Following the approval by the candidate municipality, the government assembles for a discussion regarding whether or not the building of a nuclear facility furthers the “overall good of society” [s 14, NEA 990/1987]. The act defines the “overall good of society” at first in economic terms, second in terms of suitability of the site, and third in terms of waste management, thereby rendering the seemingly fundamental debate as a rather “rationalistic” evaluation of an application. The evaluation should especially focus on the country's projected energy needs, which are, however, far from an agreed fact, and if anything a constantly debated issue. A nuclear power company manager confirmed in an interview that the biggest part of the debate is focused on economic questions.

Only after a positive decision-in-principle and its subsequent ratification by the parliament – which is not able to amend the decision, but may reject the decision as such – the proponent may take an investment decision and invite contractors to make their bid. Two permits have to be obtained pursuant to the Environmental Protection Act and the Water Act, and, in addition, a building permit is required before licenses can be applied for. In the case where the decision-in-principle has approved the application and permits have been granted, separate construction and operation licenses are required. Affected parties and registered environmental movement organisations hold the right to appeal the construction license to the high administrative court.

Legal opportunities to participate in the licensing of nuclear facilities are indicated in Table 1, which does not claim to be exhaustive in terms of actors involved and stages of the procedure.

Table 1. Actors and course of the Finnish licensing procedure according to legal requirements.

Proponent	Authorities^a	Government	Parliament	Public	Municipal council
EIA programme proposal	Public display of proposal; collecting of  comments; statement on report			Submission of  comments, orally or in writing
Realisation of EIA	Supervision			Participation in events
EIA report submission	Public display of report			Submission of comments, orally or in writing
Public hearing	Public hearing			Participation, comments
	Collecting of comments; statement on EIA report
Application for decision in principle including EIA report and statement		Decision-in-principle	Ratification/rejection of decision-in-principle		Veto right
Investment decision; call for bids
Application for construction license		Construction license		Possibility to appeal to the high administrative court
Application for operation license		Operation license
^aCoordinating authority: Ministry of Employment and the Economy.
Regulatory authority: Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority STUK.

Included in this table are only official ways to participate as outlined in legislative texts. Despite these, individuals and organised groups may lobby in local councils and national parliaments, organise public protest and publish in various media at all stages of the licensing procedure. In addition, opinion polls are frequently collected and subsequently discussed in regional newspapers. Not required by any law, but equally important is the work of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as watchdogs during the assessment process. Bird watchers, local fishery associations, environmental movement organisations and the like thoroughly review and comment on the programmes and reports of an assessment procedure. Usually, proponents seek the expertise and participation of environmentalists in the course of the procedure, not least to access their often extensive databases in order to shorten periods of environmental investigation. Environmentalists, usually aware of their crucial role, often refuse to engage and publish their data until assessment reports have been submitted. 8 Opportunities to participate are discussed further below.

The role of authorities and governmental decision makers

The role of authorities in the procedure is crucial not only in terms of environmental indicators and safety measures, but also in respect to the choice and supervision of participatory practices. It is thus important to identify the actors, their official and their actual duties, including their degree of involvement in the process.

The Nuclear Energy Act appoints the Ministry of Employment and the Economy (formerly, the Ministry of Trade and Industry) as the coordinating authority (yhteysviranomainen). The regulatory authority is the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, Säteilyturvakeskus (STUK), which is responsible for technical and safety issues. Notably, energy projects other than nuclear facilities are under the supervision of the Ministry of the Environment. Naturally, the Ministry of the Environment furthers environmental protection, whereas the Ministry of Employment and the Economy is dedicated to promoting industrial development. In his analysis of the Finnish licensing procedure for a final repository, Hokkanen (2001) argued that the main coordinating authority, the Ministry for Trade and Industry (today Ministry of Employment and the Economy) is “regarded with suspicion by other actors, and that its competence and neutrality are questioned” (Hokkanen 2001, p. 114), while the regulatory authority, the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority STUK, refrained from engaging in the procedure despite assessing safety issues. A direct translation of the Finnish term yhteysviranomainen describes the ministry as the “contact authority”, rather than “coordinating authority” as it is officially termed in English documents. This direct translation is often preferred by administrative staff, simply because it claims less involvement with the issue to be handled, emphasises administrative rather than political tasks and comes closer to what this agency actually does. 9

The licensing of nuclear power plants in Sweden is similar to the Finnish procedure, but decisions following a public referendum in 1980 to phase out nuclear power are still in place and nuclear new build would require a new policy (Elam and Sundqvist 2009; Michanek and Söderholm 2009). The Finnish way of handling applications emphasises the role of executive authorities, the government and the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, and the legislator to decide in principle on a nuclear facility. This is similar in Sweden, where the government decides on the permissibility of a nuclear project. However, in Sweden the objectives for a governmental decision are outlined in the Environmental Code, whereas the Nuclear Energy Act defines the content of the “overall good of society” in Finland. Further, the decision by the Swedish government may be appealed for judicial review (Michanek and Söderholm 2009). This option is not available in Finland, but could be a possibility to let citizens and environmental groups participate in more strategic considerations.

The Canadian case greatly differs from the Swedish and Finnish cases, as an independent 10 agency, though appointed by the federal government, regulates the procedure and grants licenses (Bredimas and Nuttall 2008; for a detailed overview on the development of Canadian institutions in nuclear waste management, see Durant 2009b). Nevertheless, a fundamental decision by the federal government is necessary to pursue the licensing procedure after an environmental assessment report has been submitted. However, the governmental decision receives less emphasis compared to the Finnish and the Swedish cases. Barriers are relatively low regarding a judicial review of decisions in Canada (Bredimas and Nuttall 2008). Comparable to the Swedish organisation of EIA, the Canadian Minister of the Environment is involved in outlining and scheduling the environmental study, whereas in Finland, the Ministry of Employment and the Economy is the main regulator for nuclear facilities.

Public participation methods and their purposes

As Bredimas and Nuttall (2008, p. 1344) remark, “[a]t the heart of the [siting] process, public acceptance is a prerequisite”. The Finnish EIA Procedure Act (468/1994) defines the aims of the act in the following way:

“The aim of this Act is to further the assessment of environmental impact and consistent consideration of this impact in planning and decision making, and at the same time to increase the information available to citizens and their opportunities to participate.”

Despite public hearings, to be held by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy after the report has been submitted, it is not further specified how participation should be arranged in regard to timing, methods, supervising responsibilities, and purposes. Nor is an evaluation of participatory methods demanded. Merely, it is laid down by decree that “an explanation of the various stages of the assessment procedure including the participation procedure” should be given in the assessment report [s 10(10), EIA 731/2006]. In general, the Finnish Environment Institute, a government-funded research institution, is obliged to “assist in obtaining the expertise needed in the assessment procedure” [s 3(2), EIA 731/2006], and to “monitor and gather experience on the application of the Act on EIA Procedure and this Decree” [s 3(4), EIA 731/2006]. As their comments mostly focus on biophysical assessment practices, the knowledge transfer from the institute to practitioners concentrates on scientific questions rather than procedural ones, although there is ongoing research on the matter.

Environmental legislation and the Nuclear Energy Act emphasise the responsibility of the proponent according to the polluter-pays principle, which has traditionally been strong in Finnish history (cf. Laakkonen 1999). From the planning stage until decommissioning of a plant, it is the proponent's duty to realise an EIA, to compensate for losses and damages caused by the new facility, to contribute to research on safety measures, and to contribute to the Waste Management Fund that provides for the handling of radioactive wastes. The conduct of the EIA is left to the proponent who employs seemingly approved practices. It is then common that nuclear energy companies as experts in terms of nuclear technology hire consultants offering expertise in energy project planning and consultation of the public. In cooperation with the consultant, the proponent suggests participatory elements for the assessment. 11 These are usually approved by the coordinating authority and subsequently put into practice. The public rarely comments on participatory practices that are suggested in EIA programmes. Only in one of the recent EIA report appendices does a public comment relate to the participatory settings. 12

Considering information of the public, nuclear power companies are very active nowadays – and this has changed remarkably over recent decades. However, it is questionable whether information of the public counts as participation in planning and decision making as it is a one-way form of communication (cf. Dietz and Stern 2008). In addition to the information available in the extensive EIA programmes and reports, which are on public display for several weeks, companies provide the public with press releases in major newspapers and extensive online information. Residents of the affected area are further provided with information bulk mail. Regular information events are arranged for the interested public, either on company grounds or in public spaces, and local contact offices are established. Further, audit group meetings, including a range of representatives from invited institutions, 13 and small group meetings take place several times during the assessment (Fennovoima Ltd. 2008; Fortum Power and Heat Ltd. 2008; Teollisuuden Voima PLC 2008). Since the company is responsible for the realisation of these participatory elements, company-owned facilities are often used for meetings. These start with presentations by company managers, who will also explain the purpose of the meeting and define the scope of issues to be addressed during discussion. Coffee and cake are offered to participants, brochures and information leaflets are usually provided. Residents and interested persons from outside the affected area can express their views and, in specific arrangements, encouraged to discuss the issue at stake with fellow participants. 14

In addition to participation in public hearings and the interaction offered by the proponent-consultant, the public is encouraged to participate in the national debate preceding the decision-in-principle, for instance via letters to the editor of regional newspapers. 15 To publish in a regional newspaper is, however, highly demanding and opportunities are limited. Letters to Members of Parliament or the Prime Minister's office are further considered available as a means of voicing concern. Barriers to writing such a letter may be equally high, if not higher.

When the decision has been made, no right of appeal is given. However, the construction licence required in the following may be appealed by individuals or parties affected by the decision. This includes NGOs with the status of a registered organisation – a status comparable to charities in the UK – which have been granted the right to appeal licenses in the reformed Environmental Protection Act [s 97(2) EPA, 86/2000]. 16

These procedures entail a series of shortcomings in relation to the participatory intention of the EIA Act. As stated above, the legal aim of the EIA is to “increase the information available to citizens and their opportunities to participate” [s 1, EIA 468/1994, see above] and to assess environmental impacts including the natural, human and cultural environments. Modes of participation are not specified, nor are the function of participation. Legislation does not indicate how outcomes of public participation should feed into planning and decision making. Despite the proponent's aim to “collect data”, i.e. information about people's fears and concerns (Hokkanen 2002; Väätäinen 2002), it is unclear how public input will be taken into account.

The proponent, in cooperation with the consultant, employs a set of participatory methods in the course of the assessment procedure which are neither scrutinised in terms of their appropriateness for facilitating meaningful participation nor is efficiency evaluated on a wider scale. 17 Not surprisingly, concerns have been raised by participants that a somewhat neutral, unbiased institution should organise and moderate public participation in the assessment. 18

Concerning the transparency of the process, no information is available on how company representatives and the municipal council negotiate the terms of compensation in closed sessions (Kojo 2006, 2008), although residents may be aware of private meetings – or at least suspect them. The importance of these bargains for the actual outcome of decision making stands in stark contrast to the relevance of public input.

Previous analyses of the Finnish case further indicate that there is a missing link (Paldanius 1997; Hokkanen 2001; Pölönen 2006), which has been termed a classic problem of public participation, in the sense that there is no concept of how assessments are to feed into decision making (Bora 2005, p. 19). Due to a missing selection or election procedure of participants, there is a lack of representativeness or mandate among participants. Renn (2004) further discusses the problem that the public is not a homogenous group and that participation processes usually do not prepare for differences among the public. The inclusion of a minority of citizens – who may take very different stands on an issue – is not conceptualised, neither is the relevance of their often diverse statements for the decision-making process.

One may thus contemplate possible functions of citizen participation in the licensing of nuclear power facilities in Finland. While participatory procedures may indeed be a useful mechanism for disclosing citizens' preferences to decision makers, the expectations on the part of civil society are much wider. And the expectations resemble what has been brought forward in theories of participatory democracy, i.e. to engage those concerned in their capacities to prepare reasonable or rational decisions. The Finnish licensing procedure with its focus on information dissemination resembles the “deficit model” as discussed in the debate on public understanding of science (PUS) (Irwin and Michael 2003). In the case of public participation in biotechnology assessment in Finland, this approach has been called the “enlightenment paradigm” (Rask 2003), and could be set in contrast to an “engagement paradigm”. Further, the bias towards project implementation does not allow for deliberation as rehearsed in citizen juries or consensus conferences. The discussion group, which could function as a central deliberative tool in the procedure, is a special arrangement suggested and conducted by the consultant. With a company presentation as stimulus and coffee and cake offered to participants, the discussion further taking place on company grounds, certain paths are paved for the discussion. More fundamental, the method is highly exclusive as opponents, in particular, will not seek participation in this event. In this coercive, or persuasive context, consensus is indeed aimed for, however, participants are unlikely to reach it via a “reasonable” debate that allows for consideration of diverse interpretations.

Considering the “traditional” form of public participation, public hearings have often been criticised as arenas of confrontation (Senecah 2004). Reasonable dialogue seems unlikely as hearings are often used as one of the rare possibilities to voice protest in face-to-face interaction with decision makers. This fact leads to the preliminary conclusion of this article. The physical absence of the coordinating and regulatory authorities and its reluctance to engage in more direct methods has often been criticised by participants and observers of EIA procedures in Finland. 19 These people would appreciate an active and relatively unbiased authority that can be addressed directly without input being mediated through the proponent. Other means to engage in the decision-making process are challenging as they require legal or academic literacy, time and financial resources to appeal a permit, publish in a newspaper or write a personal letter to decision makers.

Thus, this conclusion is two-fold. On the one hand, seemingly open practices of Finnish nuclear facility licensing do not allow for engagement of citizens as deliberative approaches suggest. It is further arguable whether the EIA procedure with its strong focus on public participation prevents citizens from developing other means of protest or general political engagement, for instance through the organisation of local initiatives and the mobilisation of unorganised citizens via the collection of signatures for local referenda. This point needs further investigation.

Specific features of the Canadian and the Swedish licensing procedures

In their comparison of licensing procedures in seven countries – France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, Canada, United States and Great Britain – Bredimas and Nuttall (2008) recommend public involvement following the Canadian and Swiss paradigms of extensive consultation. Following the authors, the Canadian licensing procedure benefits from an independent regulator who aims at high quality standards by making detailed suggestions of how the assessment should be conducted, including use of a review panel, whose members are appointed by the Minister of the Environment. In addition to hearings by a review panel, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission organises information sessions, open houses and workshops in the communities where nuclear development is taking place in addition to the formally required public hearings.

Public consultation before the environmental assessment commences is recommended (CNSC 2006, p. 15) and the International Energy Agency (2007, p. 183) commends the Canadian practice of “synergies groups” which may grant a “social license” to the proponent. 20 This model, to engage with concerned communities even before an application has been submitted, is strongly encouraged by the provincial regulator, who is supposedly present during negotiations. In Alberta, the provincial regulator is known for its closeness to industry. Consequently, locally organised information sessions, preceding the commencement of an environmental assessment without supervision by the independent agency, do not always raise sympathy among residents (e.g. Bruce Power LP 2009). Thus, the realisation of “synergies groups” may be beneficial for proponents as they facilitate early conflict resolution. There is, however, a need to also scrutinise these forms of public involvement in regard to the question whether this kind of pre-assessment negotiation actually strengthens democratic decision making. Facts, i.e. an industry-community bargain, may be produced before an official application has been submitted, which makes it difficult for other stakeholders to become part of an unbiased process. A social divide and thus an intensification of social conflict may be produced prior to the official start of the procedure.

Public consultation in the Swedish licensing procedure is outlined in the Environmental Code. Similar to the regulations in Finland and Canada, the public shall be given notice and the opportunity to comment on EIA programmes and statements. The Environmental Code recommends, similar to the Canadian case, the proponent to interact with the municipal council and concerned citizens at an early stage, even before an application or EIA programme has been submitted. During the EIA for the final repository of spent fuel, which was conducted by the EIA unit of the proponent Svensk Kärnbränslehantering Ltd. (SKB), two different methods of consultation had been chosen – public consultations in the concerned municipalities, and consultation meetings with representatives of the regional and municipal councils, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, and the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority (the two authorities merged into the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority in 2008). Notes and minutes of these meetings were signed by participants and subsequently put on public display. Citizens were able to comment on the discussions in the meetings. During the first years of consultation with these public institutions, SKB explains, the county administrative board held the chairmanship, but in February 2008 SKB “took full responsibility as the activity operator for driving the work of the group” (Svensk Kärnbränslehantering Ltd. 2009, p. 11). In the same publication, the importance of the regulator's presence during consultation meetings was emphasised by candidate municipalities for the final repository for spent fuel:

“Östhammar Municipality noted that they, along with Oskarshamn Municipality, have written to the Government and pointed out that it is important that the regulatory authorities be given sufficient resources to carry out their duties.”

When compared to the Finnish case, the Swedish example of consultation with municipal and regional administration members is more likely to satisfy expectations towards democratic representation and accountability of representatives. Further, the quoted remark hints at the need to involve an unbiased regulator, as is conceptualised in the Canadian licensing of nuclear facilities, although the Canadian regulator has not been able to establish communication to a satisfying degree with the residents of Peace River. Generally in both Sweden and Canada early, pre-procedural and unsupervised consultation of potentially concerned citizens, NGOs and municipal councils is recommended to the proponent. As argued above, this may be an early occasion to foster conflict rather than to produce suitable sites.

Discussion and conclusions

After decades of trouble, the recipe for “smooth” siting of nuclear facilities and final repositories for spent fuel is still being searched for. Extensive, “stepwise” procedures (Nuclear Energy Agency 2004b) have been developed, including varying degrees and forms of public participation. The proceduralisation of facility licensing coincides with a general shift toward negotiating decisions at various levels of the political system (Martinsen 2006). In the circumpolar North, where nuclear facilities are likely to have higher impacts on vulnerable social and natural environments, Finland, Sweden and Canada employ licensing procedures that aim at wide public consultation to ensure public and local approval of siting plans.

The aim of this article was to describe, on the one hand, legal requirements shaping a participatory procedure, and on the other hand, to identify actors and actual practices that allow for public participation in Finland. Contextual examples from Canada and Sweden indicated slightly different approaches, however, the overall conclusion argues that there are similar drawbacks in these examples hindering effective participation. When compared with normative expectations towards public participation, current practices are far from facilitating a deliberative democratic decision-making process.

During the licensing of nuclear facilities in Finland, those who are likely to be affected by the siting decision are encouraged to participate in information sessions and discussion groups, to observe the assessment of impacts and to comment on the results of the study. From an analytical point of view scholars have confirmed that continuous participation is a prerequisite for the acceptance of decisions (e.g. Luhmann 1983), and the measures undertaken by industrial proponents and their consultants to engage citizens in the process appear thus justified. Due to a heavy bias towards project implementation, however, it is questionable to what degree individuals are able to engage “meaningfully”, i.e. in their capacities as politically mature citizens. The goals of participatory democracy, as for instance brought forward in the concepts of deliberative democracy (Habermas 1984; Rawls 1997; Dryzek 2002), to provide non-coercive contexts in which citizens are able to consider different opinions on the matter, cannot be achieved within the structures of nuclear facility licensing in Finland. The examples from Canada and Sweden support the understanding that residents prefer supervision of participatory procedures by unbiased authorities. Participation is further in danger of being rendered meaningless as long as the purpose of public input remains unclear. Instead of fostering trust in authorities and decision makers, the dominance of the proponent turns public consultation into a “theatre play” 21 and causes participants to drop out (see Hokkanen 2001, for diminishing interest), while still others decide not to participate at all because of the danger that their participation is interpreted as approval of the proposed facility. 22

Despite biases in the assessment process, the emphasis on the “overall good of society” – the general reference point for the Finnish decision making on nuclear facilities – is an attempt to sustain traditional values as guiding principles (cf. Martinsen 2006). But rather than resolving political contingency and the complexity of decision making through a set of values, the formula of the “overall good” serves as an almost empty container to be filled with meaning (Neidhardt 2002). Nevertheless, it is successful, perhaps because of its vagueness and openness to different interpretations. Thus, during the procedure, the “overall good” functions as a guiding, impartial principle, causing the Nuclear Energy Agency to refer to the Finnish approach as “a noble evaluation to bestow, [which] leaves little room for partisanship” (Nuclear Energy Agency 2005, p. 9). One can conclude that although current participatory methods of EIA are unlikely to produce a high degree of acceptance, the decision-in-principle about the project's relevance for the “overall good of society” makes up for a biased participatory assessment, and thus constitutes the central element of the procedure. Trust in the authorities and the representative government continues to be high despite the described drawbacks of participatory practices. Moreover, it could be argued that high degrees of trust in authorities prevent wider forms of active opposition against industrial dominance in a democratic procedure. As long as the expectation prevails that authorities and the national government are capable of straightening potentially distorted results of participatory assessments, the public may not conceive of a need to demand a review of current practices.

Beside the central function of the decision-in-principle, one should carefully look at the role of the municipal vote, which is sought in advance of the governmental debate. In this context, private negotiations between company and municipality go way beyond consultation and become a central feature of the decision-making process. And although company-municipality arrangements cannot forestall the decision-in-principle, upon publication they may easily turn the participatory elements of the assessment into a farce.

In Canada, an independent authority for nuclear facility licensing suggests, supervises and reviews methods and aims of public involvement, whereas in Sweden and Finland, the proponent has free reign over methods and timing. While the independent authority may be able to enforce the quality of public involvement on a conceptual level, it has not achieved the status of an unbiased, approachable institution to residents of Peace River. 23

The Canadian, and to a certain degree also the Swedish, approach presented in this article has yet another major drawback in regard to public involvement. The private–community partnership for the siting of nuclear facilities through early information and consultation has contradictory implications. The advice by the independent regulator that proponents should start communicating about their plans before the commencement of an environmental assessment obviates an open-ended, inclusive procedure from following. Social conflict and a community divide over the issue at stake may already have manifested during stages of early consultation. Participants may have dropped out or developed feelings of dissatisfaction before the procedure has started.

In general, extensive responsibilities of an independent regulator or authority during environmental assessments have been identified as a possibility to increase accountability and quality of public involvement (cf. Bredimas and Nuttall 2008). In the analysis of this article, it has been claimed that participatory practices employed in Finnish EIA are unlikely to further trust in authorities and to raise acceptance of decisions significantly, especially outside the host community because of the absence of unbiased supervision. 24 Hence, in conclusion, public participation in nuclear facility licensing procedures needs an accountable, open-minded authority that is responsible for, present and approachable during the conduct of public consultation. Retreating public authorities further diminish confidence into traditional ways of interaction with representatives and decision makers. A methodical review and a careful conceptualisation of roles and purposes of public participation in licensing procedures, as well as a strengthened position of a less biased, accountable and approachable supervisory authority, could help to achieve the various goals that public participation generally aims at.

Acknowledgements

The work for this article has been funded through the Finnish Distinguished Professorship programme by the Academy of Finland and is part of the project “Human-Environment Relations in the North” at the Thule Institute, University of Oulu, Finland. The author thanks the reviewers for comments on earlier versions of this article.

Notes

 1. The term “meaningful participation” is a mere container for different expectations towards the effectiveness of public participation in licensing procedures. It is assumed that meaningful participation is achieved when the results of public consultation are considered in the wider planning and decision-making process, “rather than [being] a limited, self-contained experience” (de Marchi 2003).

 2. The Russian situation has not been investigated in the project this analysis is based on. The project focus lied on a comparison of licensing procedures in similar democratic settings. A comparison with Russian practices is however intended as a point for further research.

 3. The nuclear power company Fennovoima plans to decide on the site in early 2011 provided the recent governmental decision-in-principle receives parliamentary approval. The choice is between Pyhäjoki in Northern Finland and Simo in Finnish Lapland (Available from: http://www.fennovoima.com/en/project/site-selection [cited 2010 June 28]).

 4. “New phase for Swedish nuclear” Available from: http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP_New_phase_for_Swedish_nuclear_1806101.html (World Nuclear News, June 18 2010 [cited 2010 June 28]).

 5. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Espoo, Finland 1992.

 6. A nuclear power plant at a new site in the municipality of Simo, Finnish Lapland, has been outlined in the “Regional Plan for nuclear power plant Kemi-Tornio area, Finland” (Lapinliitto 2008 < http://www.ymparisto.fi/download.asp?contentid=93045&lan=en> [cited 2010 Jan 12]).

 7. The local movement Pro-Hanhikivi in Northern Finland complains: “Vuonna 2005 vahvistetussa Pohjois-Pohjanmaan maakuntakaavassa ei ole varausta ydinvoimalalle.” – “In 2005 the land use plan of the Oulu Region did not include areas designated for nuclear development.” [my translation, H.S.] http://www.hanhikivi.net/kulku.php? sivu=kaavoitus [retrieved 2010 May 5].

 8. Interviews with Finnish environmental movement members, October and November 2007, February 2008, April 2009.

 9. Interviews with an official from a Regional Environment Centre (May 2009) and a nuclear power company manager (August 2008).

10. The degree of independency has been heavily criticised by members of the Peace River community in Alberta. The absence of the independent authority and the strong presence of the power company in the communities of Peace River have cast doubt on the intentions of the authority (interviews with farmers and activists).

11. Interviews with nuclear power company managers and a local politician (November 2007).

12. In the case of the nuclear power company Fennovoima, comments on the environmental impact assessment programme related to the selection process for audit groups. Fennovoima replied to the request by disclosing the information in the environmental impact assessment report (Fennovoima Ltd. 2008, p. 60).

13. Participating institutions are listed by name in the EIA report. Many groups refrain from participating because they fear that their participation signals approval of the results of the report.

14. Interviews with nuclear power company managers and a local politician (November 2007, May 2008).

15. Interviews with company managers (November 2007, May 2008).

16. Concerns about adverse consequences of the reform – environmental NGOs purposefully slowing down the licensing process by utilising appellate procedures – have not come true (Similä et al. 2008). Misuse of the right to appeal environmental permits has been noted by court personnel only in “very few cases” (Similä et al. 2008, p. 415). Similä et al. argue that given a generally short duration of trial procedures, the right to appeal licenses improves the environmental quality of projects in terms of tighter permit conditions.

17. As part of the programme “Environment and Law”, funded by the Academy of Finland, researchers studied “The Effectiveness of Environmental Impact Assessment (EFEIA)” in Finland, aiming at a multidisciplinary approach. Available from: http://www.jyu.fi/bio/ymp/efeia/efeia.html [cited 2010 Jan 12].

18. Interviews with locals and environmental activists (October 2007, December 2008, April 2009).

19. Interviews with locals and environmental activists (October 2007, December 2008, April 2009).

20. “Essentially, this is a mechanism through which the public, landowners, industry, and the provincial regulator can come together to discuss energy development issues and develop local solutions. The goal is to use interest-based negotiation to resolve the community's issues and concerns regarding a particular energy project.” (International Energy Agency 2007: p. 183).

21. Interview with local resident (November 2011).

22. Interviews with environmental activists (October 2007, December 2008, April 2009).

23. Interviews with farmers of the Peace River region and an environmental activist, February 2010.

24. This is not to say that political and administrative institutions are unbiased, but their mandate forces them to consider both industrial development and the interests of civil society.