American business interests meet air pollution transport science: understanding the US response to trans-Pacific air pollution

Abstract

Since the discovery of air pollution traveling from China to the US during the late 1990s, trans-Pacific air pollution (consisting of a range of non-CO₂ greenhouse gases) has been an emerging global environmental issue. But how has it been addressed, how does it relate to the existing multilateral air pollution regime, and who are the interested parties? This article addresses these questions by examining the evolution of the science of trans-Pacific air pollution, discussing the way in which this science has been made policy-relevant by researchers working under the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, and by illustrating how American economic interests concerned with the effects of trans-Pacific air pollution on American land values and industry have used this scientific knowledge to lobby the US government for regulatory relief. Trans-Pacific air pollution arguably causes regions of the US to violate National Ambient Air Quality Standards, resulting in unwanted federal involvement in local decision-making and tighter regulatory standards, which impedes local economic development and lowers property values. At the same time, laxer environmental standards in China result in increased pollution and lower American industrial competitiveness. The result has been that the US Chamber of Commerce and the Alliance for American Manufacturing have begun to develop policy alternatives.

Keywords:

• trans-Pacific
• air pollution
• US Chamber of Commerce
• LRTAP
• smog
• greenhouse gases
• Alliance for American Manufacturing

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Erratum

Introduction

As developing nations in Asia have grown substantially in recent years and the science of the long-range transport of air pollution has developed, intercontinental (and, especially, trans-Pacific) air pollution has gradually emerged as a political issue. Local governments and industrial interest groups have taken note of this research and, regardless of the extent to which they actually experience air pollution from foreign sources, have lobbied for regulatory relief on that basis. The US has responded to the problem of intercontinental air pollution by funding scientific research through the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and by translating this science to policy-relevant knowledge through the multilateral air pollution regime to which it is a party. Thus, in the process, the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) has gained renewed importance to US policy-makers as the regime's Task Force on Hemispheric Transport of Air Pollutants (TF HTAP) has served as the country's primary policy discussion forum addressing the matter. Cochaired by a senior official at the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the TF HTAP released its final report in August 2011, calling for a “global federation” of air pollution regimes to facilitate a global response to the intercontinental transport of air pollution (Task Force on Hemispheric Transport of Air Pollution 2011c, p. 42). At the same time, US businesses are cognizant of the costs caused by the pollution and the lax standards in other countries (especially China) which provide the conditions for the pollution's existence. Subsequent to localities in non-attainment of National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) under the Clean Air Act (CAA) bringing the issue to the attention of US business groups, both the US Chamber of Commerce (US Chamber) and the Alliance for American Manufacturing (AAM) have lobbied the US government and the latter has released a report about the problem.

This paper seeks to explicate the US policy and science response to the emerging issue of trans-Pacific air pollution, a phenomenon consisting of the long-range transport of airborne pollutants from the countries of East Asia (most notably China) to North America. To date, no international agreements have been reached between the US and China to address this, yet steps are being taken by the US government to lay the groundwork for what might eventually be a multilateral response to intercontinental air pollution. As this work is occurring through the LRTAP regime, the first section discusses theories of environmental regime evolution and air pollution governance. This is followed by an overview of efforts by scientists to understand and provide an account of the intercontinental and, in particular, trans-Pacific transport of air pollution. My objective here is not to present a comprehensive literature review representing the present state of the science of air pollution transport. These exist elsewhere; besides, it is doubtful that the fine details will find relevance in the policy process. Rather, I wish to briefly introduce to the non-climate scientist the most politically relevant US government-financed studies conducted over the past decade. Next, I present the specifics of the multilateral policy response – to the extent that one has occurred – by discussing the evolution of the issue as it has been addressed through LRTAP. The actions of the US Chamber and the AAM in attempting to place the issue on the federal government's policy agenda and contribute to the development of that policy are discussed in the following section. As this section shows, a disconnect exists between the TF HTAP and the business interests in terms of what the policy response to trans-Pacific air pollution should consist of. I then finish with a discussion of the possibilities moving forward and propose an explanation of why, presently, trans-Pacific air pollution is arguably ungovernable.

As this paper represents an attempt to pull together for explanatory purposes the politically relevant elements of trans-Pacific air pollution, the data used derive from a wide variety of sources. During the first half of 2011 I collected journal articles on air pollution science; newspaper articles; a file from TF HTAP cochair Terry Keating providing a time line of events leading to the formation of the task force; press releases, newsletters, congressional testimony, and reports from influential policy discussion groups; and engaged in conversations with a handful of people involved in the governance and study of the issue. The articles and documents were analyzed to form the basis for the account below, with each telling some part of the political and scientific story of trans-Pacific air pollution, and often pointing the way to other sources. The personal communications focused on clarifying timelines, the importance of specific events, and confirming that I accurately understood the positions of these individuals and the organizations they represent on the issue. In general these conversations steered me toward other fruitful sources of information; in some instances they also served as primary sources and are thus cited accordingly.

Environmental regime formation and evolution

A considerable amount of literature exists on the conditions that lead to the formation of environmental regimes, their failure to form, and the creation of hollow multilateral institutions serving no purpose other than to maintain the appearance of action (Young 1998; Young and Levy 1999; Dimitrov 2005b). Much of this literature acknowledges that often environmental regimes begin with few meaningful commitments, but strengthen as they encourage the development of scientific knowledge and a shared understanding of the problem the regime was designed to address. However, little has been written about the plight of states’ involvement when a state becomes a party to a regime even though the regime was not designed for it and its government had little interest in the environmental issue in the first place. It is no wonder – such a state of affairs runs counter to the assumptions of the rational and science-based approaches that dominate the study of environmental regimes. Dimitrov (2005a) shows that sometimes states commence arrangements as a substitute for regimes, ostensibly when the political will to address the issue multilaterally does not exist, but in these situations state leaders are guided by norms suggesting that they should do something about the matter. Yet the circumstances of the LRTAP regime are different, as it is a successful multilateral regime in which states have financed scientific research and made binding commitments to abate pollutants on the basis of this research. If the US is unconcerned with European air pollution, what is it doing in the regime1? Or, expressed differently, how has LRTAP facilitated North American air pollution governance?

One possible means already discussed in the international relation literature is policy learning (or elite learning; Checkel 1997; Price 1998). Here, participation in a regime leads to ideational change on the part of negotiators and national leaders, such that either (a) ideas about how to achieve existing policy objectives are changed as new information is learned; or (b) a deeper change takes place, tantamount to a change in values, as state and government officials internalize the norms of the regime, thus affecting their identities (Fearon and Wendt 2002; Eckersley 2004). The former tends to be discussed more by rationalists, who model the behaviour of ideationally static actors given the information available to these actors. The latter, on the other hand, is the exclusive domain of constructivists, who are primarily concerned with where preferences come from and discuss this in terms of the constitutive effects of shared ideas.

In the late 1970s, no scientific consensus maintained that the US contributed to the acid rain problem in the Nordic countries, Germany, or anywhere else in Europe. But it ratified the framework convention nonetheless, thus committing itself to at least participate in scientific research about air pollution (albeit, research about European air pollution). This “foot in the door,” however, arguably enabled policy learning to occur such that, according to the rationalist understanding of policy learning, the science generated by the regime has affected the way that the American government views the problem in terms of potential solutions and policy mechanisms. There is also the possibility that the constructivist view of politics is relevant here, namely, if science revealing a global dimension to the problem has caused the US to re-evaluate and redefine the objectives of air pollution policy, this might indicate a shift in values. (Although Fearon and Wendt (2002) admit that such norm internalization is difficult if not impossible to operationalize for empirical research.)

Much of the existing global environmental politics literature suggests that a robust scientific foundation on the consequences of air pollution is a necessary (if not sufficient) condition for policy learning to occur in this way (Haas 1990; Litfin 1994; Hajer 1997; Lidskog and Sundqvist 2002). While the relative importance given to the state of scientific knowledge versus the other factors varies, there is a consensus that the relationship between the production and framing of science, on the one hand, and the interests of the actors involved, on the other hand, is dialectal. In discussions of the other necessary factors for air pollution governance to occur, some studies have focused on the interests of place-based businesses as the most important. Gonzalez (2005) has shown this convincingly in his study of American air pollution politics. Here he argues that, in the US, property-based interests provide the political incentive to govern air pollution – not scientists, non-governmental organizations, or the information they create and disseminate. Another study has shown a similar dynamic occurring in Canada. In Temby's (2012) analysis of Toronto's air pollution politics of the 1950s, scientific knowledge was used to back up the arguments of the property-based interests who had a preexisting concern with cleaning up air pollution.

These studies draw on the “political economy of place” by urban theorist Harvey Molotch, who explores the political influence of land-based elites in localities. Molotch (1976, pp. 309–310) states that “the political and economic essence of virtually any given locality, in the present American context, is growth.” However split they may be on other issues, the common interest in growth is an overriding concern for the elites in any locality. As this applies to air pollution, Gonzalez (2005, p. 2) argues that “clean air policies are functional to the operation of the market and to the realization of profit.” Furthermore, Molotch (1976, p. 311) is clear that his theory is not one merely of cities, but of any circumscribed locality:

We need to see each geographical map – whether of a small group of land parcels, whole city, a region, or a nation – not merely as a demarcation of legal, political, or topographical features, but as a mosaic of competing land interests capable of strategic coalition and action.

Thus, the behaviour of landed interests in seeking to maximize the land-use potential of their property scales, for air pollution abatement, depending on the source–receptor relationship.

A focus on the behaviour of landed interests suggests that, while science is important in encouraging substantive policy for air pollution relief, its importance is complex and problematic. Scientific knowledge of air pollution is important in the American regulatory context because it designates regions in terms of whether they are attainment areas under the CAA, affecting their economic prospects. Furthermore, it informs individuals and firms whose property is affected by the pollution of the causes and sources of the damage. Yet without actors who have an economic interest in clean air, the impetus for action is arguably lacking since regimes need actors with the will to engage in the regime's ongoing implementation to be effective. Without this, environmental regimes have, at times, become collusive, pretending that members are honoring their commitments when in fact they are not (Munton 2007).

What makes this relevant to trans-Pacific air pollution is that, for the first time in the history of North America's involvement with LRTAP, the scientific knowledge and the realization by landed interests that trans-Pacific air pollution is a threat appear to be aligning. And while the US government has yet to take concrete actions to address the matter, the preconditions for some type of intervention are arguably coming into place in the form of US business lobbying and a renewed interest in the existing regime.

Development of trans-Pacific air pollution science by the US federal government and LRTAP regime

The history of the science of the global transport of airborne substances dates back to the 1800s, at which time scientists explored the effects of deserts and volcanoes on the global distribution of fine particulate matter (PM; Wilkening 2011a). By the early- to mid-twentieth century, scientists were tracing the trans- and intercontinental trajectory of dust released by storms from over-farmed land (notable among these events was the American Dust Bowl of the 1930s). This was followed by the discovery and investigation of anthropogenic fine PM in the Arctic – known as “Arctic haze” – during the 1970s and 1980s (Wilkening 2011b). Yet with transborder air pollution politics and science focused on acid rain and later stratospheric ozone depletion during the 1970s and 1980s, the intercontinental transport of PM went off the scientific agenda and was largely forgotten.

Nevertheless, in the late 1990s trans-Pacific air pollution was rediscovered, and it quickly became clear that a large and growing source of air pollution in the US did not come from the US itself, or even Canada or the other parties to LRTAP, but from developing countries an ocean away. Jacob et al. (1999) published an influential paper showing that anthropogenic emissions from China would triple by 2010 (from 1985 levels) and discussing the implications on West Coast ozone levels. He showed that offsetting the eventual Asian contribution to California's pollution levels would require 25% reductions in anthropogenic pollutants across the board. In practical terms, this meant that any additional abatement efforts which could be taken in California would be more than offset by pollution from Asia.

Around the same time, in 1997, Jaffe et al. (1999) conducted studies on the northwest coast of Washington state and discovered ozone elevated levels of ozone precursors which they calculated to have come from the eastern coasts of Asia. They showed that the specific conditions of low pressure over the Aleutian Islands and high pressure over Hawaii, when consistent for a few days, act as a conveyor belt transporting air pollution over the Pacific. In describing one particular transport event, Jaffe et al. (1999, p. 713) report:

The similarity of the Cheeka Peak [the observatory at which the observations were taken] NMHC2 data on 3/39/97 with the observations off the coast of Asia add further evidence that the CPO [Cheeka Peak Observatory] site was sampling air that had been influenced by Asian emissions only a few days earlier. In fact the similarity of NMHC concentrations is striking and would imply that on 3/29/97 an east Asian airmass had been transported to the coast of North America with only modest losses due to dilution or chemical removal.

Following these early studies, many others followed which provided more evidence for trans-Pacific transport. Most of this has come from studies led by NOAA. Among the findings of these studies are that air pollutants move efficiently from East Asia to the West Coast of the US with little diffusion, and that they react during transport to produce ground-level ozone and fine particles (Cooper, Forster, Parrish, Dunlea, et al. 2004; Cooper, Forster, Parrish, Trainer, et al. 2004).

Another step toward establishing a solid understanding of intercontinental transport took the form of a couple of large studies led by NOAA and NASA. The first one, named INTEX-NA was conducted by scientists from the NOAA and five other countries (including Canada) working under the name, the International Consortium for Atmospheric Research on Transport and Transformation (ICARTT). This was a 2004 study on the transport of air pollution from the US to Europe, published mostly in 2006 (Fehsenfeld et al. 2006). The second study, INTEX-B, examining the transport of pollution from Asia to the US, was conducted in 2006 (with most publications in 2008).3

The first was the most resource-intensive study of the issue that had ever occurred. To the surprise of the scientists, they discovered during the summer of 2004, for the first time, pollution from Asia over New England. This attracted the attention of the Boston Globe, to which several of the investigators spoke (Ebbert 2004, p. A1). One study leader commented that their models had indicated that pollution could travel from Asia to the Northeast during the spring, but they did not expect it to happen during the summer and in such magnitude. He added that “pollution is traveling from continent to continent and there may need to be some new agreements put into place.” Another researcher on the study commented that “right now, there's a lot of interest in the community about this influence of Asian pollution and whether it can compromise our ability to achieve regional air quality objectives.” He expressed concern that the growing pollution from Asia may eventually offset the advantages of domestic regulation, saying that, “at some point, it may be cheaper to sell pollution control equipment to China.”

One year after the INTEX-B study was conducted, during late spring and early summer 2007, the Pacific Dust Experiment (PADEX) took place. The latter was funded by the NSF and was the most in-depth study yet of the transport of air pollutants to North America. While the two studies utilized different technology and focused their attention on slightly different pollutants, their politically salient message was the same: a range of air pollutants – dust, aerosols, black-carbon soot, sulfides, ozone, nitrates, and industrial fumes – cross the Pacific Ocean from China to North America, polluting the air of the West Coast and beyond. In general, the research indicated that the amount of pollution moving east across the Pacific ocean was substantially higher than that moving eastward across the Atlantic or from Western to Eastern Europe and Eurasia (Spotts 2007).4 As one of the primary investigators in the PADEX put it, “In a very real and immediate sense, you can look at a dust event you are breathing in China and look at this same dust as it tracks across the Pacific and reaches the United States” (Hotz 2007, p. B1).

The scientific research on trans-Pacific pollution transport continued and, in early 2010, California Nexus (CalNex) was conducted. Jointly funded by NOAA, the California Air Resources Board, and the California Energy Commission, CalNex was the most advanced examination of pollution in California yet to take place. Although many of the objectives of the research relate to improving the scientific foundation for the state's clean air policy, one of the central research questions stated in the 2010 CalNex White Paper is “What is the relative roles of regional (North American) sources and long range transport (from East Asia) on aerosol forcing over California?” (CARB et al. 2008, p. 8). As of early 2012 the data gathered are still under review, and thus the study's findings are only beginning to be announced.

Policy response to the scientific evidence

International environmental policy to address intercontinental transport followed the scientific developments. This process began in 1998 during the negotiations for the LRTAP Gothenburg Protocol, at which time the UK wanted to have included language that would identify the US as a source of air pollution within Europe.5 The British negotiators pointed to a paper by Derwent et al. (1998) backing up their argument, and the Norwegian negotiators similarly advocated for language in the protocol accounting for intercontinental transport. Having seen the recent studies on trans-Pacific pollution, US negotiators were aware that they had a long-range transport problem too, but claimed to not know enough about either trans-Atlantic or trans-Pacific transport to justify strong language in the protocol. Instead, as a compromise, the parties agreed to language identifying transcontinental air pollution as a research objective to be addressed within the LRTAP regime (February 2011 conversation with Terry Keating; unreferenced).

The Gothenburg Protocol was signed in 1999 and, the following year, the European Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (LRTAP's scientific research branch) met and formally adopted intercontinental air pollution as a research objective. Also in 2000, diplomats from Sweden organized the Workshop on Needs for Future Revisions of Protocols and Strategies on Transboundary Air Pollution, held in Saltsjobaden, Sweden. Bringing together the LRTAP negotiators (and featuring a breakout session on the topic of intercontinental transport), its purpose was the review the direction of air quality policy in Europe. At the time a consensus developed that they were coming into a new phase for the convention – one that would somehow address intercontinental air pollution. An understanding was reached to wait for the Gothenburg Protocol to come into force and then decide on the next step (February 2011 conversation with Terry Keating; unreferenced).

Around the same time, a series of meetings and conferences aimed at promoting the policy-relevant scientific research of trans-Pacific pollution occurred. In an early one, over 100 climate experts assembled in Seattle during July 2000 for the First International Conference on Trans-Pacific Transport of Atmospheric Contaminants, a conference organized jointly by the EPA and the Nautilus Institute on the topic of trans-Pacific air pollution (Wilkening et al. 2000). The EPA also organized a meeting in New York City during June 2001 on intercontinental transport, and another in Bad Breisig, Germany, during October 2002 (Keating 2011). By then the Saltsjobaden workshop had become a regular event (under the name, the Intercontinental Transport and Climate Effects of Air Pollutants Workshop), and at the October 2004 gathering in North Carolina the idea to create a task force on hemispheric air pollution within the LTRAP regime gained popularity. The issue was voted on at a LRTAP workshop in Gothenburg the same month, and the TF HTAP was created in December 2004 with the objective of generating scientific knowledge of the transport of air pollution across the northern hemisphere. This working group seeks to bridge scientific research on air pollution with policy-making by generating and addressing policy-relevant research questions and publishing their findings in assessment reports (TF HTAP). These reports, thus, frame the scientific knowledge on intercontinental air pollution transport that the LRTAP member states are able to make decisions from, including decisions about the implementation of domestic programs or the need for (or design of) additional protocols. The TF HTAP is chaired by two scientists, one from the US and one from Europe.

The TF HTAP has conducted annual planning meetings and occasional scientific workshops aimed at informing scientists studying the long-range transport of air pollution about its research and making progress toward its scientific assessment reports, originally planned for release in 2007 and 2010. These reports state the findings of experiments conducted by the TF HTAP, review the existing state of knowledge about hemispheric transport, highlight needed areas for additional research, and offer policy recommendations to LRTAP parties. Both are edited by the two cochairs of the TF HTAP. The HTAP 2007 report is an interim report on the ongoing scientific analysis of the transport of ozone and PM, released in anticipation of the final report. The HTAP 2010 report (actually released in August 2011) is more exhaustive and complete, also covering persistent organic pollutants (POPs) and mercury, and consisting of five volumes (three on technical scientific evidence, an executive summary, and a summary for policy-makers).

The scientific content of the reports does not feature much new data that are not published in peer-reviewed journals by scientists studying intercontinental transport. Rather, they are largely summaries of the existing state of knowledge regarding the various chemicals that travel across and between the continents. What renders them politically significant is that they are aimed at informing policy-makers of what is known, and point out to scientists which knowledge would be helpful in terms of policy. While scientists consult a range of sources when deciding what to study, some consulted HTAP 2007 for this purpose (February 2011 conversation with Robert Talbot; unreferenced).

With the goal of providing policy-relevant information, the TF HTAP employs the concept of “Relative Annual Intercontinental Response” (RAIR), which it describes as “a measure of how much benefit a region may receive from emission reductions in other regions when emission reductions are coordinated on an intercontinental scale” (Task Force on Hemispheric Transport of Air Pollution 2011a, p. 269). In a specific region, as the regional release of pollutants goes down (perhaps due to existing regulations) and the importation goes up, RAIR increases. It is an example of a policy-directed and -relevant scientific concept – its design is to identify the need for emission controls that are intercontinental in scope.

Among the findings of HTAP 2010 are those related to the disproportionate growth in emissions on the two sides of the North Pacific. Using global emission scenarios created for the next Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change assessment, the HTAP 2010 report estimated the reductions in PM and ground-level ozone (O₃) that will occur over the next several decades. It states:

the regional distribution of emissions in the Northern Hemisphere is expected to shift, with steeper and earlier declines in Europe and North America and shallower declines or actual increases in South and East Asia. Under the lowest emissions scenario, NO_X emissions between 2000 and 2050 decline by 78%, 63%, and 48% in North America, Europe, and East Asia, respectively, but increase in South Asia by 42%. Under the highest emissions scenario, NO_X emissions peak in 2030 with decreases of 43% and 16% in North America and Europe respectively, and increases of 65% and 91% in East Asia and South Asia, respectively (Task Force on Hemispheric Transport of Air Pollution 2011b, p. 27).

This has substantial implications for American and Canadian air pollution policy: “For North America ground-level O₃ concentrations, the RAIR is estimated to increase to around 50% … suggesting that, in the future, changes in emissions of O₃ precursors outside the region may be as important as changes within the region” (Task Force on Hemispheric Transport of Air Pollution 2011b, p. 27). When discussing the implications of ozone transport, the report further states that “As public health-based air quality standards continue to be tightened based on new health effects research, the contribution of intercontinental transport to concentrations that exceed such standards will continue to increase” (Task Force on Hemispheric Transport of Air Pollution 2011b, p. 23).

In addition to modeling the extent of the intercontinental transport of various pollutants, the report also discusses the effects on human health and natural ecosystems. Some highlights include the assertion that the intercontinental transport of air pollution contributes between 20% and greater than 50% of the ozone-related mortalities in the receptor region, and that sometimes the health impacts in the receptor region are greater than in the region creating the ozone and ozone precursors in the first place (Task Force on Hemispheric Transport of Air Pollution 2011b, p. 23). The report also says that the extent of ozone-related crop damage (costing tens of billions of dollars every year) is a “food security” issue; “intercontinental transport [of O₃] may be responsible for about 5% to 35% of the estimated crop yield losses depending on the location, crop, and response function used” (Task Force on Hemispheric Transport of Air Pollution 2011b, p. 23). Also discussed are the climate risks associated with trans-Pacific black carbon and the problem of lead deposition in aquatic ecosystems posing health risks related to fish consumption.

Another of the most important findings of the report regards methane (February 2011 conversation with Terry Keating; unreferenced). A potent greenhouse gas (GHG), methane also contributes to photochemical smog (itself a GHG). Most significantly, its long lifetime of nearly 10 years means that smog is an emerging global (not merely urban) air pollution problem, which cannot be addressed locally and which exists to an extent irrespective of local emissions. The report states that “Roughly 40% of the O₃ increase since the preindustrial period is believed to be due to anthropogenic CH₄ [methane],” and that the future scenarios predict that O₃ from methane will offset regional and local abatement efforts in some instances (Task Force on Hemispheric Transport of Air Pollution 2011b, p. 28). This is especially problematic for California, which could see methane offset its attempts to combat smog with regional solutions, such as stricter emission standards on automobiles and a variety of commercial practices.

Thus, the HTAP 2010 identifies intercontinental and trans-Pacific air pollution as an emerging problem for North America, one with substantial environmental and health-related consequences. The concluding portion of the report uses these findings as a basis for political prescriptions, arguing that “further international cooperation to mitigate intercontinental flows of air pollution” is necessary, otherwise “many nations will not be able to meet their own goals and objectives for protecting public health and environmental quality over the next 20 to 40 years” (Task Force on Hemispheric Transport of Air Pollution 2011b, p. 41). The authors point out that air pollution abatement is mutually beneficial for source and downwind countries, and that among the benefits to downwind countries is that less pollution importation reduces the costs of pollution control necessary to meet policy goals (including the mandated ambient air quality standards under the CAA).

Since the four classes of pollutants addressed by HTAP 2010 are dealt with differently through multilateral political arrangements, the authors separate them in terms of what further political action they prescribe. Persistent organic pollutants are being addressed with the global 2001 Stockholm Convention and negotiations have been underway since 2009 for a global treaty on mercury. Thus, these pollutants have made the leap from being addressed regionally to globally and no new political arrangements need to be made outside of the processes presently underway. But for PM and O₃, only LRTAP and a few less-developed regional initiatives exist. If air pollution travels not only within these regions, but between them, what can be done politically to address it?

The finding about methane has left the TF HTAP and LRTAP at a turning point: should LRTAP address this global pollutant through the regional air pollution regime, or hand it to existing political arrangements aimed at reducing GHGs (in particular, the international climate change regime; February 2011 conversation with Terry Keating; unreferenced)? If this happened, it would arguably blur the lines between two issues – air pollution and climate change – which have so far been addressed separately. Yet the maturing science on the long-range transport of air pollution is developing an account of the phenomenon which may point to the need for a different way to conceptualize these problems, namely, that smog and climate change are two sides of the same coin, distinguishable by being two manifestations of (mostly) the same pollutants.

The possibility of addressing methane through the international climate change regime is part of a larger issue, namely, how can East Asian (and, to a lesser extent, African) polluters be addressed politically? And this is part of an even larger issue of how the US will confront China, a rising superpower and economic partner. Since 1998, China has participated (along with Japan, Russia, and nine other East Asian nations) in the Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET). The fact that this region appears to be developing its own air pollution regime centered on the priorities of its members indicates a motivation to address the issue, but on the terms of the EANET's members. Similarly, the Malé Declaration on Control and Prevention of Air Pollution and its Likely Transboundary Effects for South Asia has existed since 1998 and has eight parties; and Africa and South America have also begun to develop regional cooperative programs.

In light of this reality, there are several policy options for the development of LRTAP which have been discussed for the better part of the 2000s (Holloway et al. 2003; Brachtl 2005). These include (1) expanding LRTAP to parties not presently members and binding them to existing protocols; (2) developing cooperative programs (potentially instituted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe [UNECE]) to share abatement technology with countries upwind of LRTAP members; (3) negotiating a new global agreement for PM and O₃; (4) addressing PM and O₃ through an existing global air-related regime; and (5) establishing a global oversight framework under which LRTAP, EANET, and other regional arrangements would fall.

The policy option that presently has the most support is the latter one. In their September 2010 newsletter, the influential and quasi-governmental Global Atmospheric Pollution Forum argued that this is the most realistic possibility, and that an associated “global framework agreement” could address “monitoring, reporting, access to information, and co-operation on research” (Global Atmospheric Pollution Forum 2010, p. 7). More importantly, HTAP 2010 endorsed this approach. The report says that such an approach would be mutually beneficial since, on the one hand, LRTAP could support the developing regions with a host of scientific knowledge about modeling and monitoring, as well as the abatement technology itself and enforcement techniques; on the other hand, the developing regions “could provide better information about the sources, character, and flow of pollutants originating in or affecting their regions” (Task Force on Hemispheric Transport of Air Pollution 2011b, p. 42). What HTAP 2010 calls a “global federation” could facilitate connections among other air-related regimes such as those for climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, POPs, and the potential regime on mercury, while also formally linking the various regional arrangements. One possibility for the organization of the global federation would be to give the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) the oversight role – LRTAP could be moved from the UNECE secretariat to UNEP or the World Meteorological Organization, which would also oversee the others. The authors feel that, overall, a global federation would enable each region to make advances in finding solutions to air pollution problems while enabling them to maintain the “autonomy and flexibility for regions to develop policies and programs appropriate for their circumstances” (Task Force on Hemispheric Transport of Air Pollution 2011c, p. 42).

More than simply stating that a multi-region regime is a worthwhile goal, the TF HTAP has taken concrete measures in developing relationships with the other arrangements. The forms this has taken have been the involvement of experts from non-LRTAP countries in the TF HTAP's meetings; the exchange of scientific information with EANET, including a joint workshop with its Science Advisory Committee; and the TF HTAP claims to have “reached out to the Malé Declaration” (Task Force on Hemispheric Transport of Air Pollution 2010, p. 33). These efforts are part of a larger objective by the LRTAP members and its leaders to expand the global air pollution regime so that LRTAP's objectives can be met. It is both based on a developing a robust scientific consensus about long-range transport of air pollution, and contributing to the development of this science for political ends. However, the views of international negotiators and climate scientists may not be sufficient to encourage the US to push for substantial concessions by upwind polluters. In the following section, I explore the way in which business interests have responded to the science of intercontinental transport and the extent to which they have lobbied the American government to address it.

Response of politicians and business to transcontinental air pollution

During the latter half of the 2000s, some of the US's most powerful labor and business interests pressed for efforts to address the implications of air pollution from Asia (China and, to a lesser extent, India and others). The arguments of one of these groups centered on the unfair cost advantage enjoyed by Chinese industry, while another discussed means by which American laws could take into account foreign pollution when determining compliance. Yet both of them highlighted the costs of the pollution to health and the environment, particularly sulfur dioxide, PM, and carbon dioxide.

The US Chamber was the first national business interest to mention trans-Pacific air pollution and its implications for CAA compliance. In April 2006, it sent a letter to the EPA lobbying against the proposed NAAQS revision for fine particulates (PM_2.5) on the basis that Chinese dust storms account for much of the pollution in parts of the US, and that such a revision would make it even more difficult for these areas to comply (Kovacs 2006). It also recruited stakeholders to testify before Congress in July 2006, including a county commissioner who claimed that the non-attainment status of her county under the existing PM_2.5 NAAQS was “almost entirely due to outside influences” and that it “has serious [economic] consequences right now” (Heiskell 2006). Later, observing that “the impact of foreign emissions poses problems for business and industry stakeholders in localities affected by such emissions,” yet “EPA has stated it has no position about how to address the problem,” the US Chamber took its effort to address the issue a step further by proposing a regulatory program to the EPA (Kovacs 2007). In December 2006, the US Chamber petitioned the EPA to “implement section 179B of the CAA and develop a comprehensive regulatory program that fully addresses the influence of foreign emissions emanating from outside the United States on domestic air quality and air quality compliance” (US Chamber of Commerce 2006). Specifically, the US Chamber requested that the EPA share data with states so that they could account for foreign air pollution in the creation of the State Implementation Plans required from each state. The measures that states would propose in pursuance of NAAQS compliance would presumably target modified NAAQS, with higher allowed pollution limits accounting for the amount of foreign pollution present. The head of the US Chamber's Environment, Technology, and Regulatory Affairs Division said: “As economies in China and India continue to grow, so will emissions resulting from this economic growth. Governments and businesses seeking to comply in good faith with clean air rules shouldn't be penalized because emissions migrate from overseas” (US Chamber of Commerce 2006).

Another mention of trans-Pacific air pollution by a US business interest was made in March 2009, at a time when US industry was already concerned with a record-size trade deficit with China and what it considered to be unfair currency manipulation by the country. The AAM, arguably one of the US's most powerful industrial groups, released a report about the costs of the China's lax environmental standards, which it argued were making the American steel industry less competitive. This report was endorsed by another interest group, the AFL-CIO, which reported its findings on the organization's website (Parks 2009). The report found that China's laws for air and water pollution are weak and hardly enforced, that its steel industry spends little on abatement technology, and it also highlighted the environmental problems for the US caused by this. It discounted the argument that China's practices are comparable to the US while it was industrializing: “Environmental technology that is in widespread use today has made the human and environmental impacts of industrial pollution both quantifiable and controllable” (Alliance for American Manufacturing 2009, p. x). The report concluded by stating that US industry, scientists, engineers, and the US government should help China adopt existing and new abatement technologies.

During the press conference held for the release of the report, Leo Gerard, president of the United Steelworkers (which is a member of the AAM), commented that China's weak enforcement of environmental laws was both hurting the environment and damaging the American steel industry's competitiveness. He continued, “This report should be used as a guide for China and the US to make Chinese pollution standards and enforcement efforts more consistent with programs in other steel-producing countries” (Parks 2009). In the same press conference, Paul Scott, executive director of the AAM, commented that China is “spreading pollution around the world and contributing to global warming” in addition to creating an unfair competitive advantage for itself (Parks 2009).

Thus, while the US Chamber frames the issue of trans-Pacific air pollution as one in which regulation-violating localities are disadvantaged competitively within the US, the AAM frames it as one in which a US-wide industry is placed at a competitive disadvantage relative to upwind polluters. In the case of the former, the proposal is to regulate air pollution less stringently, yet with the latter the proposal is for more regulation (albeit overseas). In either instance, the problem for American business is that it is spatially bound. Being on the receiving end of the source–receptor relationship has made the locality – whether an air quality region under the CAA or industry within the nation as a whole – less amenable to economic development and growth.

Although the efforts of the TF HTAP are occurring at the same time as those of the US Chamber and the AAM, it is not clear that they are in any way coordinated or mutually reinforcing. This is not surprising given that the TF HTAP is cochaired by a member of the EPA, an organization which the US Chamber contends is arrogant and does not take “foreign emissions” seriously. When asked about the HTAP 2010 recommendation of forming a global federation to oversee the various regional air pollution governance arrangements, an executive at the US Chamber said that he viewed it as an unsatisfactory alternative (March 2011 conversation with William Kovacs; unreferenced). He added that trying to address the matter though the UN in any way, such as by placing the federation under UNEP, is “foolhardy” and a “bubble gum” solution. Rather, foreign emissions are an issue of international competitiveness and should potentially be addressed through the World Trade Organization. Yet there appears to be more common ground between the AAM and the TF HTAP. Specifically, both propose the sharing of abatement technology with China, a recommendation which could possibly be facilitated through the global federation suggested by the TF HTAP.

Conclusion

Trans-Pacific air pollution has emerged as a salient political issue as the following processes have unfolded: the intercontinental flow of air pollution has increased; climate science indicating the extent, causes, and consequences of these flows has become widely accepted; place-based economic interests have recognized the damage done to their operations as a result of this pollution, and have expressed this concern to the US government; and ambient air pollution standards have become stricter in the US. Unlike carbon dioxide, which is odorless, invisible, and does not have a direct impact on health, the US standards for the chemicals of trans-Pacific air pollution were put in place and tightened over a half century of hard-fought political disputes among property interests, industrial interests, and the officials representing them. As long as these processes continue, our existing science-based and property interest-based theories of environmental governance suggest that we can reasonably expect to see heightened political efforts to address the matter.

While it is unclear what will occur internationally to address the long-range transport of air pollution, the creation of a global federation is one event that is within the realm of possibility. In an exploration of the possibility of such an arrangement, Brachtl (2005) points out that such an arrangement would have the advantage of citing LRTAP as a model while being flexible to the circumstances of particular regions and facilitating the transfer of technology. Nevertheless, our existing theories of environmental governance also give us reason to doubt that a political solution to trans-Pacific air pollution is imminent. Science-based theory maintains that knowledge of the consequences of an environmental problem is decisive in motivating political action to address it by enabling cost–benefit calculations for the range of options available (Dimitrov 2005a). Yet the negative consequences of the incremental pollution transported across the Pacific remain mild relative to local sources, while the costs – both political and economic – of confronting China over the matter are relatively high.

Property interest-based theory claims that spatially bound economic interests provide much of the political incentive for clean air policy since doing so is a precondition for economic growth (Gonzalez 2005). However, on this issue, the context in which this would normally occur appears to be one lacking a sufficient amount of institutional trust to move beyond policy gridlock. The US business interests (especially industrial groups), whose support a substantive political effort arguably needs, are skeptical of the UN, EPA, and environmental regimes in general. It appears that the US Chamber, in particular, is unaccustomed to viewing itself as a spatially bound economic interest. In order for trans-Pacific air pollution to be addressed politically, US business lobbies and the US federal government will need to agree on not only what the policy response will be but – to start with – the more basic question of what the appropriate multilateral forum is.

Acknowledgments

This article represents an attempt by a political scientist to piece together disparate political and scientific discourse into a convincing narrative. Discussing the science of intercontinental air pollution led me outside my area of expertise. To the extent I got it right, it is due in no small part to the comments I received from Alexandre Couture Gagnon, Russ Dondero, and two particularly incisive anonymous reviewers. Thank you. I also thank Terry Keating for his assistance in constructing a time line of the development of the TF HTAP, and the individuals who found time to discuss the topic with me from their standpoint; namely, Bebe Heiskell, Bill Kovacs, Eileen McCauley, and Bob Talbot.

Notes

1. I distinguish the question of “what is the US doing in LRTAP?” from the related but analytically separate question of “how did the US come to be involved in the first place?”For an account of the US participation in LRTAP as a way of furthering détente and easing cold war tensions through this “low politics” forum, see Munton et al. (1999).

2. Literally, non-methane hydrocarbons. These are volatile organic compounds other than methane, and are ground-level ozone precursors.

3. For a list of ICARTT and INTEX-B publications, see INTEX-B's website at http://www.espo.nasa.gov/intex-b/.

4. For an extensive review of the recent science on trans-Pacific air pollution, see Global Sources of Local Pollution by the National Research Council (2009).

5. The 1999 Gothenburg Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone requires reductions in sulfur, nitrogen oxides, ammonia, and volatile organic compounds. The US formally accepted the Gothenburg protocol in 2004, but it did not agree to binding commitments on ammonia, and specified its sulfur, nitrogen oxide, and volatile organic compound reduction commitments at the time of acceptance so that they would reflect preexisting domestic programs (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 1999).