Dialogue as nuclear waste management policy: can a Swedish transparency programme legitimise a final decision on spent nuclear fuel?

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to discuss Swedish nuclear waste management policy and assess whether a transparency programme has affected the policy discourse and contributed to legitimatising the forthcoming government decision on a final solution for spent nuclear fuel. The transparency programme implemented by the National Council for Nuclear Waste (NW Council) consisted of two main activities: dialogue meetings and public hearings for deliberating on different aspects of the waste issue. Lessons are drawn from an evaluation of the programme. The article concludes that the NW Council has implemented the government's legitimatisation policy by its existence and through the transparency programme, but achieving long lasting legitimacy is a complicated matter. Dialogue meetings and public hearings are reasonable measures; whether these measures are sufficient to legitimatise the final decision also depends on how the appropriate state agencies and the government justify their assessments and decisions regarding the long-term safety, security and sustainability of the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company's proposed final repository. The dialogue policy and transparency programme, however, has failed to influence the key decisions which remain in the control of the powerful interests, most notable Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB) and the government.

Keywords:

• nuclear waste management
• policy
• transparency
• legitimacy
• power

1. Introduction

Two problems of managing nuclear waste, namely safety and acceptability, have challenged policy makers for a long time. “As well as being scientifically robust to ensure safety, policies for its management must be publicly acceptable” (Blowers and Sundqvist 2010, p. 149). Although policies to deal with the two problems are interrelated, the focus of this article is on policies to gain acceptance for nuclear waste management. More specifically it explores implications of a Swedish dialogue policy and if a transparency programme has contributed to legitimatise a final decision on spent nuclear waste. The article will also look into whether the current power structure has constrained the policy dialogue on spent fuel.

In 2010 the Swedish government opened the door for continuing the nuclear power programme, however, a precondition for continuing the programme is a sustainable and robust solution to managing radioactive waste. The Swedish nuclear power programme is still one of the most controversial in Sweden since World War II (Kaijser 1992; Andrén and Strandberg 2005), and the programme and the waste management policy continues to have a legitimacy deficit to many citizens and stakeholders. The dialogue policy is in this article analysed as a response to a legitimacy problem not only related to the nuclear waste issue, but also to the renewal of the nuclear power programme.

Sweden has developed two forms of nuclear waste management policy, “demonstration and dialogue” (Elam et al. 2010). The main strategy has been to demonstrate the attainability of nuclear fuel safety (Act on Nuclear Activities 1984), for “demonstrations attempt to impress directly upon the mind's eye of their audiences, reducing the need for further discussion and dialogue” (Elam et al. 2010, p. 199). The demonstration policy has been crucial for the completion of 12 Swedish reactors, but has not contributed much to create public acceptance for the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company's (SKB's) nuclear fuel safety programme in the country at large. The demonstration policy, which was mainly implemented through the SKB's safety analyses, was not sufficient (Elam et al. 2010, pp. 199–202).1 One possible explanation is that nuclear waste management has been governed by technocrats, but “the top-down, unconsultative, even arrogant approach of Decide Announce Defend which imposed radioactive waste facilities on unsuspecting communities was rejected by local people and the public at large in the United Kingdom, in Sweden and in Switzerland during the 1980s and 1990s” (ibid., p. 151). The failure of the technocratic policy was followed by a participatory policy turn in many countries (ibid.; Chilvers and Burgess 2008; Strauss 2010). Sweden was one of them.

Initially, also the mediation through dialogue policy, first run by the SKB, was ineffective. “The way that SKB organizes the public consultation process in connection with implementation of its KBS programme (Nuclear Fuel Safety programme) can be said to subdue rather than support broader public dialogue” (Ibid., p. 203). Therefore, a broader dialogue policy was developed by the Swedish government. One of the first measures was to appoint the National Council for Nuclear Waste (NW Council), an expert committee (previously KASAM), to investigate and provide information to the public about such things as nuclear waste and the closing of power plants (Dir 2009, p. 31). The NW Council has a key role in the legitimatisation of a long-term solution to spent fuel, and the council's transparency programme, developed in 2009, is the cornerstone of a new dialogue policy. Elam et al. (2010) maintain that the significance of the programme is difficult to judge. This article will take a closer look at the transparency programme, and is in a good position to do so because the author was commissioned to evaluate the programme (Hanberger and Mårald 2009).

In general, Swedish waste management has been described as successful, compared to that in other countries, and the success has been explained by the “robustness of a particular way of publicly mediating the practical attainability of nuclear fuel safety through demonstration” (Elam et al. 2010, p. 198), and by a high degree of public participation and dialogue (Dawson and Darst 2006; Strauss 2010). Involvement of a large number of stakeholders in the waste management policy process in the UK, is another example of participatory policy deemed a success (Chilvers and Burgess 2008; Blowers and Sundqvist 2010). Although Swedish nuclear waste management has been hailed as a success, there was, and still is, a legitimacy deficit attached to the nuclear power programme and in particular to waste management. The existence of a legitimacy deficit is indicated by the government's dialogue policy, the transparency programme and public polls. In 2006 a strong majority (>80%) of the residents of Östhammar approved to host the repository, but in the country at large the opinion was the opposite (only 12% of the residents were positive) (Berner et al. 2011). After Fukushima, the public support for nuclear power has declined. In fall 2011 44% of the Swedish population was in favour of terminating nuclear power plants and only 35% was in favour of building new or renewing existing power plants (Radio Sweden, April 28 2012 reporting on a national survey of 1500 people).

Swedish environmental organisations have also criticised the lack of a real democratic process and the fact that only the SKB has the mandate and resources to undertake research on a final solution to the nuclear waste problem (Hanberger and Mårald 2009). Some researchers also question whether Sweden as a nation can take responsibility for spent nuclear fuel when the nuclear power industry is privatised and when Sweden is integrated in the EU. There are also worries that the final repository may be used for other countries' nuclear waste (Cramér et al. 2009). As the nuclear power and waste issue splits parties and the population, the decision on a final solution for spent fuel needs to be firmly rooted. The current dialogue policy and transparency programme can be interpreted as aimed at filling a legitimatizing function not only for a decision on a final repository, but also for a renewal of the nuclear power programme (cf. Blowers and Sundqvist 2010).

The purpose of this article is to explore the Swedish nuclear waste management policy, and assess whether a transparency programme has contributed to legitimatising the forthcoming government decision on spent nuclear fuel. Three questions are discussed:

•	How can stakeholders participate in and influence public policy in the existing power structure?
•	How successful is an independent council in promoting public deliberation on the nuclear waste issue?
•	(How) does the transparency programme provide legitimacy for a future government decision?

The article is based on key stakeholders' experiences of dialogue meetings and public hearings arranged between 2007 and 2009.

The article has four parts: The first section introduces the article and describes the methods and theories used. The next section provides a brief history of the nuclear waste issue, describing the power structure in which the nuclear waste issue is embedded and the key actors participating in the dialogue policy. In the third section, the transparency programme is described and in the fourth section the achievements of the programme is analysed and discussed in relation to the three questions. The final discussion interprets the findings.

1.1. Method

The interpretive policy analysis developed in this article seeks an understanding of the dialogue policy, the transparency programme and democratic governance in stakeholders' experiences and interpretation of the policy and programme. The actors' line of reasoning is central and so is the analyst's interpretation of empirical findings (Hjern and Porter 1983; Yanow 2000; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Fischer 2003; Colebatch 2006; Gottweis 2006). “First-level interpretations” (made by actors in the situation) and “second-level interpretations (made by a non-participating researcher)” (Yanow 2000, p. 18) of the implementation of the nuclear waste policy are discussed in relation to a governance structure with uneven distribution of power, and in relation to different ways of understanding the policy problem (cf. Dery 1984; Primm and Clark 1996; Bacchi 1999; Hanberger 2001).

Ten key actors participating in the nuclear waste management discourse were interviewed2 in semi-structured interviews focusing on their concept of the waste issue, and how the NW Council and its transparency program were perceived.

An electronic questionnaire was distributed by email to 442 participants in public hearings arranged by the NW Council. Email to 82 persons was returned, indicating that they had not been reached. A further 240 persons logged in but did not answer the questionnaire. A total of 121 persons responded to the questionnaire (34% of those who received an email invitation to respond, 50% of those who actually logged in). The representativeness of the responses can of course be questioned, but as the responses (of 121 persons) reflect both positive and negative experiences there is no systematic bias in either direction. Some of the interviewees did not respond to the questionnaire. There were also more responses from participants in the hearings arranged in 2009 compared with earlier hearings.

1.2. Theoretical interpretation

This article explores the dialogue policy in a late stage when the policy window (Kingdon 1995) is about to close and the freedom of choice is limited. Whether the policy window is open or not is interpreted from a power perspective. In the rhetoric it could be open, but in practice limited to a few actors.

A policy's own history restricts the freedom of choice for policy making, according to historical institutional theory. It is recognised that choices made early in a policy's history have implications for the way a policy evolves. In particular, choices made when a policy is being formed will have continuing and largely determinate influence over the policy far into the future (Krassner 1988; Pierson 1992; Steinmo et al. 1992; Peters 1999; Bro 2000; Hanberger 2003). A policy is expected to follow a specific incremental pattern, interrupted only at certain formative moments of “punctuated equilibrium” (Krassner 1988). Once on the path, it is difficult to change policy direction. A premise is that ideas and institutions in combination could explain path-dependence, whereas actors, under certain conditions, could change the direction. To enhance the understanding of constrains of policy making the notion of path-dependence and formative moments will be applied.

From the perspective of constructivist policy design, the waste issue and the dialogue policy are understood as being constructed in such a way “that policy actors and the public accept particular understandings as ‘real’” (Schneider and Sidney 2009, p. 106). It is an empirical question if the policy dialogue, the decision process and the final solution to nuclear waste are perceived as real, and if the SKB's construction of a safe and robust repository is accepted by concerned stakeholders and the public.

2. The nuclear waste issue

In the early 1970s all political parties voted for the Swedish nuclear power programme, but soon afterwards (in 1973) two parties (the Center and Left party) changed their views and became opponents of the programme. The programme permitted the building of nuclear power plants and assigned reactor owners responsibility for integrating nuclear waste management into their main business (Sundqvist 2002). In 1977, after intensive research, the nuclear industry presented the KBS programme as a long-standing solution to nuclear waste management. The same year a law (“Villkorslagen”) was enacted, stating that the nuclear power industry has responsibility for developing a safe method for managing spent fuel before giving permission to start new power plants. The law was later modified and integrated into the act on Nuclear Activities, 1984.

After intense political debate in the late 70s, the Swedish political parties decided that a referendum should be held to allow citizens to decide the future of the nuclear power programme. At that time, Sweden had six operational nuclear power plants and six more under construction. Although Swedish referendums are not binding, all parties agreed to abide by the public vote. The referendum, carried out in 1980, offered three alternatives for phasing out nuclear power plants: (1) permit construction of twelve power plants and then close them all once sustainable alternatives became available; (2) the same as the first alternative, but with public ownership of the power plants and (3) gradual termination over a 10-year period. Alternative 2, which gained the most votes, permitted completion of the six power plants under construction, but was also a vote for a responsible and slow termination and planned phase-out of nuclear power.3 Since the referendum only two power plants have been closed down.

Although the 1980 referendum split parties the referendum decision appeared robust and unchangeable for 30 years, but in 2010 the government took a new parliamentary decision allowing for the replacement of old nuclear power plants. (Not all members of parliament voted in favour, including a few MPs from the coalition parties.)

A major policy problem today is to gain acceptance for the upcoming government decision about the final repository. The final solution for spent fuel must be conceived as safe and sustainable, and the decision on a repository firmly rooted to gain acceptance. This is why the NW Council, backed by the government, launched the transparency programme in 2007. At present the nuclear power industry and government are anticipating a new future for the nuclear power programme in Sweden. However, a pre-requisite for continuing the nuclear power programme is a safe and robust solution to the waste problem, that is, SKB's repository need to be conceived as real and sustainable by the general public.

Partly as a result of the demonstration policy, the nuclear waste issue was removed from the political agenda. But it returned in 2009 when the nuclear power industry (SKB) made a decision about the location for a final repository for spent fuel. While a government decision about a final solution for spent fuel is expected in 2013, the planned phase-out of nuclear power is no longer a precondition for the decision. The door for renewal of power plants is currently open, which makes the waste issue an even greater challenge than before.

In March 2011 the SKB submitted a formal application for a final repository. Thereafter the Environmental Court and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) were charged with probing whether the SKB's application is in accordance with the two acts regulating the waste issue. This assessment is expected to take more than two years.

Actors and roles in waste management policy

Today many actors participate in the nuclear waste policy discourse. Besides the government and parliament, the SKB is a key actor4 as it has been commissioned to investigate different final solutions, make suggestions, and submit an application to the government for a final repository. Over the last few years the SKB has devoted time to refining the advocated method (KBS-3)5 that the company considers to be a safe, sustainable final solution for spent nuclear fuel. Only the SKB has had the power, mandate and resources to undertake research and propose solutions to the waste problem, which some stakeholders consider a structural problem in the governance structure set up for managing the waste issue (Hanberger and Mårald 2009).

In order to firmly root and legitimise a final solution and deciding on a sustainable solution for the nuclear waste problem, the government has also appointed the NW Council as its advisor. The purpose of the Council's activities is to give well-founded advice to the Government. The council, an independent committee of researchers from different fields, should also be a resource for other state agencies, local governments and concerned stakeholders. The members of the NW Council are experts on different aspects of radioactive waste, not only with regard to technology and science, but also in regard to ethics and social sciences. The government appoints the members, follows the council's activities, and asks the council for information and advice. The council also has informal meetings with the government and with the key actors mentioned here.

After the SKB submitted its application for a final repository, the Environmental Court and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority also became important actors as they probe whether the SKB's application is in accordance with the Environmental Act and Nuclear Power Act. The agencies' expert assessments are also intended to help the government firmly root a final decision for spent fuel. The government, however, has not declared whether it will follow the agencies' assessments. The government will also ask the NW Council for advice. The municipal council of Östhammar will then vote on whether to approve the building of the repository, after which the government will decide on the issue. The government has thus left open a window for further investigation.

The NW Council also considers two regional organisations, the Regional Council in Kalmar and Uppsala county, and two municipalities, Oskarshamn and Östhammar, to be key actors. They have been invited to participate in the transparency programme and the nuclear waste management dialogue. The regional organisations have a commission to inform the public about the waste issue and the planned decision process.

The government has also asked two environmental organisations, The Swedish NGO Office for Nuclear Waste Review (MKG) and The Swedish Environmental Movement's Nuclear Waste Secretariat (Milkas), to play a role in the policy process. These organisations receive financial support for participating in the deliberation process, present their arguments on the waste issue, and also respond when the matter is being referred for consideration. Although the environmental organisations' position in the decision process has been strengthened, it is not clear whether they will have any real power. One interpretation is that they have been co-opted. By giving NGOs permission to express their arguments, the government avoids criticism for not letting critical arguments and voluntary organisations influence the decision. Another interpretation is that the policy window is still open and that strong and convincing arguments will be considered no matter where they come from, even at this late stage of the policy process.

The fact that the SKB has been given the mandate to manage the waste issue is an example of a quasi-governmental policy which gives the company a key role in the process. Leaving it to the SKB to undertake research and explore alternative solutions and propose a final solution is but one component of the government's nuclear waste management policy. Other components are the establishment of the NW Council, upgrading or co-opting environmental organisations, and facilitating deliberation on different aspects of the issue. The council's transparency programme, which will be described next, fits well with the government's dialogue and legitimisation policy.

3. Programme for transparency and deliberation

The programme had three objectives: improving the council's advice function to the government, developing knowledge on nuclear waste issues where knowledge is insufficient, and being a resource for stakeholders reviewing the SKB's application for a nuclear waste depository. The programme emphasised that key waste issues must be identified from different perspectives, that all arguments and basic data for making a decision must be transparent, and that a dialogue between stakeholders is important for legitimising a final solution. Dialogue meetings and public hearings for deliberating different aspects of the waste issue were developed by the NW Council to achieve these objectives.

Figure 1 summarises the programme theory, that is, the programme's assumptions about how to achieve its objectives. As indicated in the figure, dialogue and public hearings are assumed to bring up critical issues, and facilitate dialogue and deliberation for achieving the objectives. Whether these assumptions have empirical support will be illustrated and discussed below.

Figure 1. The programme theory of the NW Council’s transparency programme.

The power structure and the formal decision process determine how the nuclear waste policy issue is constructed and managed. It also constrains the policy discourse, that is, what aspects of the issue can be deliberated and by whom.

4. Dialogue policy in practice

The Umeå Centre for Evaluation Research, Umeå University, Sweden, was commissioned to evaluate the NW Council's transparency programme in 2009 (Hanberger and Mårald 2009). This section discusses the results of the evaluation in relation to the three questions raised earlier.

The council invited the actors to a dialogue for the purpose of identifying aspects of the nuclear waste issue in need of further investigation, deliberation and public scrutiny. Table 1 indicates that all stakeholders appreciated the dialogue with the council. Milkas, one of the environmental organisations, considered the dialogue a good opportunity for discussion with the council, but emphasised that dialogue could not change anything of major importance. All actors welcomed the NW Council's call for suggestions about issues to be discussed in public hearings and the open attitude and respect that the council showed them.

Table 1. Key actors' experiences of dialogue with the NW Council.

Actors	Experience
Environmental organisation (MKG)	The council is generally doing a good job
Environmental organisation (Milkas)	Appreciates the dialogue, but it does not change anything
Regional organisation, county of Kalmar	Good initiative, no objections
Regional organisation, county of Uppsala	Very good and useful for our own information on the issue in the region
Östhammar municipality	Appreciates the dialogue because it includes different actors' arguments
Oskarshamn municipality	Appreciates the dialogue
Swedish Radiation Safety Authority	Good that the council takes account of aspects of the issue that needs more transparency
Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB)	The council is doing a good job

The council also had informal meetings with a government representative. What kind of information the parties exchanged during these meetings has not been shared with the evaluator. The government only expressed that it was very pleased with the council and its work. Besides setting the rules for the council, appointing the members, the government informally and discreetly steered the council through these meetings. There is no further evidence of informal steering, or that the council is tied behind their backs. Of course there will be no clear evidence of steering an independent council. This is not to say that the council does or will act as a dependent council. As indicated below, the NW council is perceived as an expert committee with high and growing integrity and credibility. The invitation to dialogue can be described as a process of agenda-setting that opened up more arguments to be explored in the policy process. The NW Council had the role of prioritising the suggestions, while the government kept a watchful eye over the council's proceedings.

Besides dialogue meetings, public hearings were the main programme activities. The following seven hearings were arranged by the NW Council:

ˆ	Deep Boreholes. An alternative for final disposal of spent nuclear waste? March 2007
ˆ	Decommissioning of nuclear installations in Sweden, December 2007
ˆ	Systems analysis for final disposal of nuclear waste, April 2008
ˆ	Site selection, June 2008
ˆ	Participation and democracy in the nuclear waste issue, December 2008
ˆ	Copper corrosion in contact with water, November 2009
ˆ	Who speaks truth about nuclear waste?, December 2009 (not included in the evaluation)

The participants' experiences of the hearings were collected with an electronic questionnaire and interviews. Table 2 summarises how the participants experienced the hearings in terms of knowledge generation, identification of arguments and values, and dialogue.

Table 2. Summary of participants' experience of six public hearings as forums for knowledge generation, arguments and values, and dialogue.

Knowledge generation	Arguments and values	Dialogue
Some hearings have provided new knowledge, some have not	The main organisations' and SKB's arguments and values were articulated	A good forum for dialogue thanks to the NW Council's independent role
Participants became more knowledgeable and aware	The breadth of the questions was good	Good opportunity for dialogue during and outside the programme
It is a problem that SKB is the only actor that can generate new knowledge	Critical issues were not given enough room	Contributed to a broad and impartial discussion
Nothing new for us who work with the waste issue on a daily basis	Environmental organisations did not participate in deliberation on an equal footing	The dialogue took place on stage, but the audience was not part of it
Also good for the government	Not much scope for questions	Fair conditions, but it did not get very far
	The main actors' positions are locked in by this stage	Mainly used for repeating known positions
	Arguments and values were not explicated deeply	Better than nothing
	Actors were acting strategically and were too cautious

How can stakeholders participate and influence public policy in an existing power structure? In the governance structure set up for the nuclear waste issue, some actors possess formal power (the SKB, two state agencies, the government, the Parliament and the local government of Östhammar) and others possess informal power (NW council, MKG, Milkas, regional organisations and the media). The hearings are open to the media, and thus indirectly to the public. The environmental organisations have a chance to interrogate those in power, and the NW Council is also expected to do so and to help improve decision-making in general, more or less in line with the assumptions of deliberative democracy (Gutmann and Thompson 2004; Dryzek 2000).

As an independent actor, with high credibility, the council has a unique role as advisor to the government. It possesses more authority than the environmental organisations, but has no veto position. In the established governance structure the mandated actors are supposed to consider the arguments and take action. The transparency programme and the NW Council created the possibility for more actors to participate in the policy discourse and also gave non-mandated actors a chance to influence the waste policy discourse. However, whether the SKB, the NW Council and the government have considered, or will consider, new arguments is not yet clear. The NW Council is supposed to consider all arguments and facts of importance when advising the government. It is also hard to tell whether the deliberation process has had an impact on the government and the SKB. One informant is convinced that the SKB has been affected by new arguments but that it would never admit that openly. The SKB has made minor changes in the way it manages the waste issue, but the reason for the changes is not clear. At the same time, it claims that it has a safe and sustainable solution. An alternative interpretation is that the transparency programme has not made much difference except that it has contributed to paving the way for the upcoming decision.

The government has retained the discretion to approve or veto the SKB's application for a final solution. It has also retained discretion with regard to its reaction to the judgements and advice of the two control agencies and the NW Council on this matter. Thus the government's retained discretion and background action limits the stakeholder's influence on the waste management policy. Since 2010 it has also opened the door for a renewal of the nuclear power programme.

The nuclear power industry (SKB) has participated in consultations, demonstrations and dialogue meetings with stakeholders, including critics to the proposed final repository, and SKB has since its foundation in the 1970s had the role of being the authoritative expert on nuclear fuel safety. The KBS-programme from 1977 and SKB's power for managing nuclear waste has been fundamental to how the process has evolved. SKB has had the power to define the waste problem, undertake research and to determine (or construct) what is to be conceived as a practical, sustainable and legitimate solution for spent fuel (cf. Hjern and Porter 1981; Dery 1984; Bacchi 1999; Hanberger 2001; Colebatch 2006; Schneider and Sidney 2009).

The dialogue policy and transparency programme invited new actors to participate in the policy discourse. However, actors that thought that the policy window was open for changing the proposed repository or revising the decision process were disappointed. The dialogue policy and transparency programme has failed to influence the key decisions which remain in the control of the powerful interests, most notable SKB and the government.

How successful was the NW Council in promoting public deliberation on the nuclear waste issue? Within the existing power structure the transparency and deliberation programme has made a difference. The dialogue with stakeholders and the creation of forums for deliberation (public hearings) contributed to opening up the policy discourse from an inner circle to include environmental organisations, the public and the media. The environmental organisations have been empowered and given authority in the policy discourse. However, it is doubtful whether public hearings have made a difference in how the SKB and the government have acted, and how they will act in the future.

Although the hearings were open to the public, most of the participants came from the organisations mentioned above. What was new was the arena created by the NW Council where the main actors could meet and discuss the waste issue openly and under reasonable conditions. The environmental organisations and the nuclear power industry had not met in the same arena before. The NW Council made this possible because it is highly respected by all stakeholders.

Some participants have gained knowledge from the public hearings, but those working with the issue on daily basis have not. They have, however, picked up something of value. A fundamental problem, underscored by the environmental organisations, is that the SKB is the only actor that has been given the resources to develop new knowledge.

The hearings also contributed to bringing up arguments from different perspectives, but many participants felt that arguments and underlying values were not developed and discussed deeply enough. Some participants felt that the key actors were not deliberating but were simply rehashing well-known arguments.

Dialogue took place between the NW Council and invited speakers, and among panellists. Some participants considered the informal dialogue that occurred during breaks before and after the hearings even more useful because the public dialogue was constrained by the conditions laid down and by the NW Council and the moderator's ability to coordinate the discussion.

The existence of the NW Council and the hearings were appreciated because there was a perceived need for communication and deliberation. However, the actual outcome of the hearings seems modest in the three respects examined in Table 2 (knowledge generation, arguments and values and dialogue). Actors not already engaged have not shown overwhelming interest in the hearings.

The transparency programme also affected the main actors' authority. Table 3 provides a summary of the questionnaires given to attendees of the public hearings arranged by the NW Council. It shows that the credibility of four actors increased while that of four others decreased as a result of the transparency programme. These actors had very different levels of credibility to start with (see key below the table). Confidence in the NW Council and the Radiation Safety Authority increased. These two actors had the highest credibility. Confidence in the two participating municipalities also increased. The picture was mixed for the SKB. In fact, the Environmental Protection Agency and the government (including the Ministry of Environment) lost some credibility in the process. The assessment of credibility was made by stakeholders with great interest in the waste issue who have followed the nuclear waste issue for a long time. They are well informed and have experience of how the different actors have behaved over time. Although the responses are not representative of the population as a whole, they indicate dissatisfaction with how the government and the Environmental Protection Agency have dealt with the waste issue.

Table 3. Changes in attendees' confidence in key actors with reference to the transparency programme.

Attendees in public hearings	Increased	Decreased	Unchanged/Don't know
NW Council	41***	4	55
SKB	18**	21	61
Radiation Safety Authority	17***	4	79
Environmental Protection Agency	4*	9	87
Ministry of Environment	6*	10	84
Government (as a whole)	7*	9	84
Oskarshamn municipality	22**	5	73
Östhammar municipality	20**	9	71
Notes: N = 121; *** > 66%; **50–65%; * < 49% have high or very high confidence in actor's dealing with the nuclear waste issue.

Orla Vigsø has also studied the discourse and argumentation on the nuclear waste issue (Vigsø 2009). He describes the discourse climate as a battlefield with two main positions and lines of argumentation (p. 103). The SKB and their advocates have a positive view of the nuclear industry and how it investigates final solutions and of the suggestion for a final repository for spent nuclear fuel. The environmental organisations, by contrast, are critical and critical of the SKB's work. These two positions permeate all argumentation on such matters as risk assessment, what is considered a safe solution, whether the solution should consider the implications for safety, security, the environment and the economy or only safety and environment, who owns the waste problem, whether the challenge is to find a pragmatic or a truly sustainable solution, and what interests guide actors. There are also differences between the two environmental organisations. MKG uses the same concepts and language as the SKB and the state agencies, and is more informed about the scientific discourse when it questions the SKB's analysis. As a result the SKB respects MKG more than Milkas.

One of the NW Council's public hearings discussed Vigsø's report and how authentic the hearings were in terms of argumentation and dialogue. Both sides felt that their arguments had been described too coarsely and that important aspects had been left out. The SKB maintained that the nuclear power industry includes people who are for and against nuclear power, and that some environmental organisations and individual environmentalists consider nuclear power an environmentally friendly power source. One of the environmental organisations thought that the report did not do justice to the grounds for its arguments, insisting that they spring from a desire to create a sustainable society, and not merely on resistance to nuclear power as claimed in the report. Vigsø Only analysed only two hearings and the organisations' web platforms, which may explain why the actors' assumptions and arguments were not fairly represented.

(How) does the transparency programme provide legitimacy for an upcoming government decision? The promotion of dialogue in the government's nuclear waste management policy is a response to a recognized democratic and legitimacy deficit. The 1980 referendum did not resolve the future of the nuclear waste programme or the waste issue once and for all. Instead the waste issue was put on hold for the future, with support of the SKB's demonstration policy. The nuclear power companies were publicly owned in the 70s and 80s thus allowing public control, but when the companies were privatised in the 90s the conditions of governance changed. Public control over research on nuclear waste management and finding a final solution diminished, and so did insight into the affairs of the companies.

The approaching government decision implies a growing need for legitimatisation of the decision process and the final decision due to the following factors: the privatisation of the nuclear power companies, the insufficiency of the SKB's demonstration policy, the parliamentary decision in 2010 allowing for renewal of power plants, the SKB's decision to locate the repository in Östhammar, the SKB's submission of an application for a final solution based on the KBS-3-method, and the responsible agencies' review of the SKB's application.

Forums for democratic governance (or deliberative democracy), public hearings and dialogue meetings, has mainly been set up to enhance transparency and to gain acceptance for the upcoming decision. For the government and SKB the dialogue policy and transparency programme have mainly filled a legitimatisation function, not only for the decision process and the decision on a final solution, but also for a renewal of the nuclear power programme.

5. Discussion

The NW Council has implemented the government's legitimatisation policy by its existence and through the transparency programme. Within the existing power structure and at this late stage of the policy process, dialogue meetings and public hearings seemed reasonable measures. So far they have contributed to paving the way for the upcoming government decision. But whether the programme's justification and legitimisation “effect” will last also depends on how the key actors behave in the final stage of the policy process, and how the state agencies justify their decisions and judgements on long-term safety, security and sustainability. Before this is known the measures taken can only be said to provide legitimacy for the decision process.

The transparency programme and the NW Council have, however, contributed somewhat to legitimatising the decision process, but that the environmental organisations, Milkas in particular, have not so far been convinced. Both environmental organisations are critical of the SKB's final solution, and the transparency programme has not changed their doubts. The environmental organisations mainly have been co-opted. By providing them a platform to express their arguments, the government avoided criticism for not letting critical arguments and NGOs participate in the process.

The analysis of the nuclear waste management policy can also serve as frame of reference to interpret what will happen in future processes. To gain public acceptance for a future decision on a final repository, and since 2010 for a renewal of nuclear power, is a slow process (cf. Deutsch 1970; Wiberg 1988; Hanberger 2003). A formal political decision, will legalise the construction of a final repository, however, this does not mean that the decision will be publicly accepted in the country at large. Most likely there is a need for further action, including demonstrate that the repository holds what SKB claims it does, and also that transports to the site are safe. Although public acceptance for renewal of the nuclear power programme is highly linked to a sustainable solution to the waste problem, there will still be a large proportion of the population that continues to be worried about radioactive fallout.

From the perspective of historical institutionalism, the establishment of the SKB and to assign the company the mandate and role to undertake research on nuclear fuel safety initiated a path-dependent policy process on nuclear waste management in which the most important decisions have been in control of SKB and the government. The dialogue policy did not change anything of major importance, and was never meant to.

Viewed from the perspective of constructivist policy design, the SKB's construction of a robust and sustainable final solution to spent nuclear fuel has been conceived as “real” and trustworthy by some stakeholders, but not by the environmental organisations. Whether the public will legitimize and accept this construction depends on the outcome of the review of SKB's application for a final repository, and how the media will describe the safety and sustainability of the repository. It also depends on how the aftermath of Fukushima evolves, and if the government continue the renewal of nuclear power programme. At present, the dialogue policy has not calmed down people's worries for radioactive fallout.

The dialogue policy and transparency program contributed somewhat to legitimise the decision process for a final repository, but have not influenced the key decisions which remain in the control of the SKB and the government. The article has also illustrated the importance of decisions taken early in a policy process, and how the existing power structure constrained the policy dialogue and democratic governance.

Notes

1. When the government in 2010 took a new Parliamentary decision allowing for the replacement of old nuclear power plants, the demonstration policy based on SKB's Nuclear Fuel Safety programme (see below) indicate a revival for the demonstration policy. This time, however, it is used as to globally demonstrate a Swedish model for practical nuclear waste management that can be conceived as politically and environmentally sustainable (Elam et al. 2010, 199).

2. Representatives from the NW-council, Ministry of the Environment, SSM, SKB, MKG, Milkas, the Municipality of Oskarshamn and Östhammar, the Regional Council in Kalmar and Uppsala county.

3. The second winning alternative implied that nuclear power would be phased out over a period that would not impact too severely on employment and welfare. The twelve nuclear power stations operating or under construction would continue to be used until renewable sources became available. When the existing nuclear power stations would close down would be dependent on security. Efforts would also be made to reduce energy consumption whilst protecting low income groups. Nuclear power plants would be owned by central and local government and any surplus profits from the plants would be subject to a 100% tax rate.

4. To deal with the nuclear waste issue, the nuclear power industry founded the joint-company (SKB) in the 1970s.

5. The method is based on three protective barriers. The spent nuclear fuel must first be encapsulated in copper. The impermeable copper canisters are then placed in crystalline basement rock at a depth of about 500 m, embedded in bentonite clay. After disposal, the tunnels and rock caverns are sealed.