Understanding the context of institutions and policy processes for selected anti-poverty interventions in Bangladesh

Abstract

This paper reviews the background and history of agricultural technology interventions and the policy processes underlying food-based and cash-based education incentive programmes in Bangladesh, their targeting mechanisms and performance, and their evolution over time. The study reviews similarities and differences among these anti-poverty interventions according to their pro-poor orientation, attention to gender issues, extent of involvement of other partners, attention to sustainability, and the use of research and evaluation to inform organisational change.

Keywords:

• Bangladesh
• microfinance institutions
• agricultural technology
• primary education

Acknowledgements

This research was funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council and Department for International Development under their Joint Research Scheme (Award Number RES 167-25-0361). It builds on collaborative work funded by the Chronic Poverty Research Centre, HarvestPlus, and the World Bank. The authors acknowledge helpful discussions with Angela Gomes, Banchte Shekha; Farida Huq, Primary Education Stipend Project; Dhirendro Kumar Roy, Gono Kallayan Trust; Anup Saha, Banchte Shekha; and Gias Uddin, Mymensingh Aquaculture Extension Project. They received valuable comments from Mohammed Zahidul Hassan and Mohammed Zobair, Data Analysis and Technical Assistance Limited, and an anonymous referee. All errors and omissions are the authors' own.

Notes

1. These projects are described in greater detail in Ahmed and Khondkar (2010).

2. Of the total quantity of FFE foodgrain distributed from 1997/98 to1999/2000, wheat accounted for about 64 per cent and rice for about 36 per cent.

3. Leakage in the context of targeted transfer programmes is defined as the unauthorised diversion of programme resources before they reach the intended programme beneficiaries. In most targeted public transfer programmes in Bangladesh and elsewhere, there are incentives and opportunities for the unauthorised diversion of transfer items (food, cash, for example). To the extent that such leakage occurs, the government and/or donors incur the cost while the benefits accrue, not to the intended or targeted beneficiaries, but to those who gain access to and misappropriate resources. Depending on the rules and operation of a particular public intervention, leakage may occur at several points in the distribution system.

4. In the FFE programme, 15 kg of wheat ration at Tk 10 per kg, amounted to Tk 150 per month per student beneficiary in 1996.