Chapter Two: Peacebuilding Operations and the Struggle for Legitimacy

Abstract

The widespread practice of intervention by outside actors aimed at building ‘sustainable peace’ within societies ravaged by war has been a striking feature of the post-Cold War era. But, at a time when more peacekeepers are deployed around the world than at any other point in history, is the international will to intervene beginning to wane? And how capable are the systems that exist for planning and deploying ‘peacebuilding’ missions of fulfilling the increasingly complex tasks set for them?

In Building Peace After War, Mats Berdal addresses these and other crucial questions, examining the record of interventions from Cambodia in the early 1990s to contemporary efforts in Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The book analyses the nature of the modern peacebuilding environment, in particular the historical and psychological conditions that shape it, and addresses the key tasks faced by outside forces in the early and critical ‘post-conflict’ phase of an intervention. In doing so, it asks searching questions about the role of military force in support of peacebuilding, and the vital importance of legitimacy to any intervention.

Berdal also looks critically at the ways in which governments and international organisations, particularly the UN, have responded to these many challenges. He highlights the pivotal role of politics in planning peacebuilding operations, and offers some sober reflections on the future prospects for post-conflict intervention.

Notes

Synnott, ‘The Coalition Provisional Authority in Southern Iraq’, p. 5.

Ibid.

Mayall (ed.), The New Interventionism 1991–94.

Ian Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’, International Organization, vol. 53, no. 2, 1999, p. 381.

Ibid., p. 387.

Ibid.

See James Fallows, ‘Why Iraq Has No Army’, Atlantic Monthly, December 2005 and, especially, Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco (London: Allen Lane, 2006).

Fallows, ‘Why Iraq Has No Army’, p. 9.

Ibid.

Dodge, Testimony to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 20 April 2004, p. 15, http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2004/DodgeTestimony040420.pdf.

Béatrice Pouligny, Peace Operations Seen from Below (London: Hurst & Co., 2006), p. 180.

Mats Berdal and Michael Leifer, ‘Cambodia’, in Berdal and Economides (eds), United Nations Interventionism, 1991–2004, pp. 58–9.

Adebajo, Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG and Regional Security in West Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 173–4.

UN, ‘Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly’, A/59/710, 24 March 2005.

See Jean-Marie Guéhenno, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, letter to Human Rights Watch, 1 August 2007.

For the classic treatment of the ‘spoiler’ challenge in peace implementation, see Stephen John Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’, International Security, vol. 22, no. 2, 1997, pp. 5–53.

United Nations, ‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations’, p. x. This was also one of the chief lessons enshrined in the ‘capstone doctrine’ adopted by the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations in 2008. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, ‘UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines’.

For example, by making use of strategic deployment stocks, rapid deployment teams and the authority to draw on funds before the Security Council formally approves a mission and its budget (the so-called ‘pre-mandate commitment authority’ proposed by the Brahimi panel), deployments have been speeded up and some of the procurement problems that usually bedevil the start-up phase of UN missions has been partially mitigated. For the benefits of these reforms, see UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, ‘Lessons Learned Study on the Start-Up Phase of the UN Mission in Liberia’, April 2004.

United Nations, ‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations’, p. 10.

Brian Urquhart, ‘Some Thoughts on Sierra Leone’, New York Review of Books, vol. 47, no. 10, 15 June 2000. For background on the fragility of the Lomé accord see Chapter 1, pp. 35 and 37. For a concise and persuasive account of its unravelling, see Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone (Oxford: James Currey, 2005), pp. 253–66.

Guéhenno, ‘On the Challenges and Achievements of Reforming UN Peace Operations’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 9, no. 2, 2002, pp. 76–7. For immediate background to the ‘May crisis’, see UN, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Sierra Leone’, S/2000/455, 19 May 2000, pp. 8–12.

UN, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Sierra Leone’, p. 1.

Urquhart, ‘Some Thoughts on Sierra Leone’.

David J. Richards, ‘Operation Palliser’, Journal of Royal Artillery, vol. 127, no. 2, Autumn 2000, p. 10. Richards became chief of the general staff in 2009.

Ibid., p. 12.

Ibid., p. 13.

Ibid.

Ibid.

UN, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Sierra Leone’, p. 10.

Ibid. The UN's head of peacekeeping operations at the time, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, similarly acknowledged that ‘the intervention of UK forces in the immediate aftermath of the crisis was critical’. See Guéhenno, ‘On the Challenges and Achievements of Reforming UN Peace Operations’, p. 76.

Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, p. 222.

Anton La Guardia, ‘Indian Troops to Pull out of Sierra Leone’, Daily Telegraph, 22 September 2000; private communication. India was at the time the second-largest troop contributor to UNAMSIL and was also providing the force with its key command elements.

Hew Strachan, ‘Making Strategy: Military–Civilian Relations after Iraq’, Survival, vol. 48, no. 3, 2006, p. 75.

Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, pp. 268–9; private communication.

Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, pp. 268–9.

Alao and Ero, ‘Cut Short for Taking Short Cuts: The Lomé Peace Agreement on Sierra Leone’, p. 126.

Olonisakin, Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: The Story of UNAMSIL, pp. 94–5.

Mitton, ‘Rearmament, Remobilisation and Disintegration in Sierra Leone’, p. 14.

Ibid. and UN Security Council, ‘Second Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone’.

UN Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region’; Mazzitelli, ‘Transnational Organised Crime in West Africa’; Tom Cargill, ‘Sierra Leone a Year After Elections: Still in the Balance’, Chatham House Briefing Paper, September 2008, p. 4; private communication.

The Pretoria agreement of December 2002 was part of the ‘Inter-Congolese Dialogue’, which culminated in the peace accord signed in Sun City in April 2003. Sun City formally endorsed the Pretoria agreement.

Prunier, Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe, p. 277.

UN, ‘Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in the DRC’, S/2003/566, 27 May 2003, pp. 3–5; private communication.

UN, ‘Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of Security Council’, S/2003/574, 15 May 2003.

UN Security Council Resolution 1484, 30 May 2003.

Ibid.

The Ituri Brigade was established as part of the expansion of MONUC authorised by the Security Council at the end of July 2003. See UN Security Council Resolution 1493, 28 July 2003.

See ‘Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force’, UN Department of Peacekeeping, Best Practices Unit, Military Division, October 2004, p. 16.

Ståle Ulriksen, Catriona Gourlay and Catriona Mace, ‘Operation Artemis: The Shape of Things to Come?’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 11, no. 3, 2004, pp. 518–19; see also Henri Boshoff, ‘Overview of MONUC's Military Strategy and Concept of Operation’, in Mark Malan and Jõo Gomes Porto, Challenges of Peace Implementation: The UN Mission in the DRC (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), p. 141.

‘Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force’, p. 13.

UN, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC’, S/2003, 17 November 2003, pp. 18–19.

Ulriksen, Gourlay and Mace, ‘Operation Artemis: The Shape of Things to Come?’, pp. 522–3.

For those mainly interested in the development of the European Security and Defence Policy and the intramural debates surrounding it, the conclusion that Artemis was a success appears to have been almost exclusively drawn from the fact that the mission showed that the EU was able to mount an operation on its own. This is not a measure of success with which this study (nor, presumably, the people of the DRC) is concerned.

‘Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Aide-Mémoire by France’, Annex to Letter from Permanent Representative of France to UN Secretary-General dated 18 January 1996, General Assembly/ Security Council, A/50/869-S/1996/71, 30 January 1996. For a discussion of French ideas and the notion of ‘active impartiality’, see Berdal, ‘Lessons Not Learned: The Use of Force in “Peace Operations” in the 1990s’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 7, no. 4, 2000, pp. 55–74.

Unsurprisingly, given the principles of traditional peacekeeping, this mindset tended to encourage a reactive, expressly non-threatening stance to the point of viewing a peacekeeping force's vulnerability almost as a virtue in itself.

Joshua Marks, ‘The Pitfalls of Action and Inaction: Civilian Protection in MONUC's Peacekeeping Operations’, in ‘Conflict Prevention and the “Responsibility to Protect” in Africa?’, special issue of African Security Review, vol. 16, no. 3, 2007, p. 69.

Maciek Hawrylak and David Malone, ‘Haiti, Again! A Tough Peacebuilding Task’, Policy Options, September 2005, p. 36.

Alpha Sow, ‘Achievements of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force and Future Scenarios’, in Malan and Gomes Porto (eds), Challenges of Peace Implementation: The UN Mission in the DRC, p. 211.

‘Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force’, p. 14. See also Christopher S. Chivvis, ‘Preserving Hope in the DRC’, Survival, vol. 49, no. 2, 2007, p. 28.

UN Security Council Resolution 1493, 28 July 2003, paragraph 26.

Private communication.

Patrick Cammaert quoted in Marks, ‘The Pitfalls of Action and Inaction: Civilian Protection in MONUC's Peacekeeping Operations’, p. 75.

‘Congo: Bringing Peace to North Kivu’, International Crisis Group, Africa Report no. 133, 31 October 2007, p. 13.

Ibid., p. 14.

Marks, ‘The Pitfalls of Action and Inaction: Civilian Protection in MONUC's Peacekeeping Operations’, p. 77. See also Spittaels and Hilgert, ‘Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern DRC’, p. 12. As noted in Chapter 1, the FARDC has also been deeply involved in the illegal exploitation of natural resources.

Marks, ‘The Pitfalls of Action and Inaction: Civilian Protection in MONUC's Peacekeeping Operations’, p. 77–8.

John Prendergast and Noel Atama, ‘Eastern Congo: An Action Plan to End the World's Deadliest War’, Enough! Project Report, 16 July 2009, p. 2, http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/eastern-congo-action-plan-endworlds-deadliest-war.

‘DRC: Massive Increase in Attacks on Civilians’, Human Rights Watch, 2 July 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/07/02/dr-congo-massiveincrease-attacks-civilians; private communication. See also ‘MONUC Responds to Concerns over FDLR Reprisals’, MONUC Office of Spokesperson press release, 18 July 2009.

Private communication.

UN, ‘Civilians Have Paid High Price in Campaign to Integrate Congolese Armed Forces, Dismantle Foreign Ones, Special Representative Tells Security Council’, Security Council press release, SC/9701, 10 July 2009.

Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, ‘Briefing: Kivu's Intractable Security Conundrum’, p. 2. Prendergast and Atama similarly stress how ‘the Congolese government often promotes insecurity and lawlessness’ to advance its own predatory aims. See Prendergast and Atama, ‘Eastern Congo: An Action Plan to End the World's Deadliest War’, p. 1.

Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, ‘Briefing: Kivu's Intractable Security Conundrum’, p. 1.

UN, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC’, S/2003, 17 November 2003, p. 2.

‘Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force’, p. 14.

These forces can only be deployed in response to a unanimous decision of the EU Council of Ministers.

Ian Traynor, ‘UK Blocking European Congo Force’, Guardian, 12 December 2008; ‘EU Split on Congo Troop Mission’, BBC News, 8 December 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7770916.stm. The two battlegroups on standby in December 2008 were led by the UK and Germany.

UN Security Council Resolution 940, 31 July 1994.

Malone and Einsiedel, ‘Haiti’, p. 185. This book chapter provides a concise and persuasive, if depressing, account of ten lost years of peacebuilding in Haiti.

Cockayne, ‘Winning Haiti's Protection Competition: Organized Crime and Peace Operations Past, Present and Future’, p. 83.

Ibid., pp. 79–83. For a thoughtful and detailed analysis of the unsuccessful attempts to reform Haiti's publicsecurity sector after 1994, see Johanna Mendelson-Forman, ‘Security Sector Reform in Haiti’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 13, no. 1, 2006, pp. 14–27.

‘Haiti: Country Programme’, UN DDR Resource Centre, http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=80#challenges; for an overview of armed groups see also ‘Haiti: Security and the Reintegration of the State’, pp. 4–7.

Michael Dziedzic and Robert M. Perito, ‘Haiti: Confronting the Gangs of Portau-Prince’, United States Institute for Peace, Special Report no. 208, September 2008, p. 4.

UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti’, S/2007/503, 22 August 2007, paragraph 22.

‘Consolidating Stability in Haiti’, International Crisis Group Latin America/Caribbean Report no. 21, 18 July 2007, p. 1.

‘Haitian Leaders Resort to UN in Fighting Gangs’, International Herald Tribune, 9 February 2007. See also ‘Consolidating Stability in Haiti’, pp. 2–3.

Private communication. Some NGOs and human-rights groups have accused the Brazilian military leadership of MINUSTAH of adopting the same brutal police tactics in Haiti as they used in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. See also Andrew Buncombe, ‘Civilians Caught in Cross-fire in Port-au-Prince Raids’, Independent, 2 February 2007.

UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti’, S/2007/503, 22 August 2007, paragraph 22.

Cockayne, ‘Winning Haiti's Protection Competition: Organized Crime and Peace Operations Past, Present and Future’, p. 87.

UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti’, S/2007/503, 22 August 2007, paragraphs 22 and 23. See also Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, ‘Violence-Plagued Haiti Sees More Peaceful Days’, on All Things Considered, NPR, 1 August 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12424369.

‘Consolidating Stability in Haiti’, p. 23.

Dziedzic and Perito, ‘Haiti: Confronting the Gangs of Port-au-Prince’, p. 6.

UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti’, S/2009/129, 6 March 2009, paragraph 23.

Dziedzic and Perito, ‘Haiti: Confronting the Gangs of Port-au-Prince’, p. 6.

Ulriksen, Gourlay and Mace, ‘Operation Artemis: The Shape of Things to Come?’, p. 522.

For more on the crucial importance of intelligence in such environments, see Patrick Cammaert, ‘Foreword’, in David Carment and Martin Rudner (eds), Peacekeeping Intelligence: New Players, Extended Boundaries (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), pp. xix–xxvi.

Since 2000, the UK's Department for International Development has spent some $500 million ‘in support of a vast range of reconstructive, institutionbuilding and developmental projects’ in Sierra Leone. Cargill, ‘Sierra Leone a Year After Elections: Still in the Balance’, p. 7.

Urquhart, ‘Some Thoughts on Sierra Leone’.

Rupert Smith, ‘The Use of Force in Intervention Operations’, seminar presentation to the IISS, 1994.

Menkhaus, ‘Somalia: Governance versus Statebuilding’, in Charles Call (ed.), Building States to Build Peace, p. 189. For the argument that the emphasis on ‘power-sharing agreements for the sake of “peace”’ has created a perverse incentive structure leading to more violence in the Africa, see Denis M. Tull and Andreas Mehler, ‘The Hidden Costs of Power-Sharing: Reproducing Insurgent Violence in Africa’, African Affairs, vol. 104, no. 416, July 2005, pp. 375–96. For a recognition and thoughtful discussion of the importance of focusing on the ‘local level’ and ‘local structures’ in contrast to ‘the Western-style paradigm of state-building’ that is ‘preoccupied with forming a national executive, legislature, and judiciary’, see Jarat Chopra and Tanja Hohe, ‘Participatory Intervention’, Global Governance, vol. 10, no. 3, 2004, pp. 289–305.

Chesterman, Ignatieff, Thakur, ‘Introduction’, in Chesterman, Ignatieff, Thakur (eds), Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance, p. 6; and Saikal, ‘Afghanistan's Weak State and Strong Society’, in ibid., pp. 193–209.

Bernhard Helander, ‘Civilians, Security and Social Services in North-East Somalia’, in Richards (ed.), No War, No Peace: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, p. 195.

‘The Role of Economic Instruments in Ending Conflict: Priorities and Constraints’, report on IISS roundtable, 6 May 2009, p. 9.

Peter D. Little, Somalia: Economy Without State (James Currey: Oxford, 2003), p. 167.

George F. Kennan, At a Century's Ending: Reflections 1982–85 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996), p. 295.

Ibid.

Menkhaus, ‘Somalia: Governance versus Statebuilding’, p. 187.

Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism, pp. 19–20; see also Little, Somalia: Economy Without State; and Mark Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland (Oxford: James Currey, 2008).

Menkhaus, ‘Somalia: Governance versus Statebuilding’, p. 200. Lewis and Mayall similarly highlight how ‘relative peace and stability has come to the two northern provinces of the former Somali Republic’. See Lewis and Mayall, ‘Somalia’, p. 137.

Menkhaus, ‘Somalia: Governance versus Statebuilding’, p. 193.

Ibid.

Bryden, ‘Disarming Somalia: Lessons in Stabilization from a Collapsed State’, pp. 11–12.

Ibid.

Lewis and Mayall, ‘Somalia’, p. 137.

Ibid.

Little, Somalia: Economy Without State, p. 162.

Menkhaus, ‘Governance without Government in Somalia’, p. 75.

Richards, ‘New War: An Ethnographic Approach’, pp. 14 and 19.

Synnott, ‘The Coalition Provisional Authority in Southern Iraq’, p. 13.

See ‘Iraq: Can Local Governance Save Central Government?’, International Crisis Group Middle East Report, no. 33, 27 October 2007.

George Packer, The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq (London: Faber & Faber, 2006), p. 297. For the conflict between ‘the objectives of local government reform – autonomy, local accountability [and] improvement of services’ and efforts to re-establish central government in Iraq, see also Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace, p. 119.

Menkhaus, ‘Governance without Government in Somalia’, p. 77.

Marriage, ‘Flip-flop Rebel, Dollar Soldier: Demobilisation in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, p. 122.

Matt Bryden, ‘Disarming Somalia: Lessons in Stabilization from a Collapsed State’, unpublished paper for project on ‘Conflict, Security and Development’, King's College London, March 2009.

Woodward, ‘Economic Priorities for Peace Implementation’, International Peace Academy Policy Paper on Peace Implementation, October 2002, p. 5. An extended version of the paper appears as ‘Economic Priorities for Successful Peace Implementation’ in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens, Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 183–214.

For an early and incisive recognition and treatment of this problem, see de Soto and del Castillo, ‘Obstacles to Peacebuilding’, Foreign Policy, no. 94, Spring 1994. For ways of addressing it, and some recognition of the problem by the international financial institutions themselves, see James K. Boyce, ‘The International Financial Institutions: Post-conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding Capacities’, unpublished paper prepared for Center on International Cooperation, New York University for a seminar on ‘Strengthening the UN's Capacity on Civilian Crisis Management’, Copenhagen, 8–9 June 2004.

‘Kosovo Unemployment a “Time Bomb” Warns Analyst’, Agence France-Presse, 16 October 2005, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/KHII-6H94FG.

Michael E. O'Hanlon and Jason H. Campbell, ‘Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq’, Brookings Institution, p. 40, viewed 9 July 2009, http://www.brookings.edu/saban/~/media/Files/Centers/Saban/Iraq Index/index.pdf.

Morten Bøås and Anne Hatløy, ‘Getting in, Getting Out: Militia Membership and Prospects for Re-integration in Postwar Liberia’, Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 46, no. 1, 2008, p. 34.

On 23 May 2003, ‘Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2’ disbanded the Iraqi army without pay and with immediate effect. See ‘Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 2, Dissolution of Entities’, 23 May 2003, available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20030823_CPAORD_2_Dissolution_of_Entities_with_Annex_A.pdf.

According to Toby Dodge, the dissolution of the army combined with ‘root-and-branch de-Ba'athification contributed to the personal, face-toface organisation of the insurgency by putting an estimated 750,000 people out of work’. Dodge, Iraq's Future: The Aftermath of Regime Change, p. 15.

Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala, Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation and its Legacy (London: Hurst & Company, 2006), p. 74.

UN, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Question Concerning Haiti’, S/1995/47, 1995, p. 6.

Ibid.

Ibid., pp. 6–7.

Power, Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World, pp. 312–13.

Packer, The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq, p. 225.

Ibid.

In his account of the Coalition Provisional Authority's reign in southern Iraq, Hilary Synnott writes: ‘People constantly told us, and I had no doubt that they genuinely believed, that the Coalition ought immediately to make life better for ordinary Iraqis: the prosperity and technological advances of our own countries showed that we had the capability; and we clearly had the resources.’ Synnott, Bad Days in Basra, p. 206.

‘Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience’, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, US government publication, February 2009, p. 144.

For an analysis of the failure to meet expectations with regard to water, electricity and employment in Iraq, see Herring and Rangwala, Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation and its Legacy, pp. 66–81. For comparisons between estimated pre-war levels of electricity generated in Iraq and the post-war period, including May 2009, see O'Hanlon and Campbell, ‘Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq’.

Hawrylak and Malone, ‘Haiti, Again! A Tough Peacebuilding Task’, p. 34.

Kingston Reif, ‘Iraq Health Update: Conflict Fuels Iraqi Health Crisis’, People's Health Movement, 5 September 2006, http://www.phmovement.org/cms/en/node/257.

The problems with excessive reliance on ‘output metrics’ are acknowledged by the US Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction in ‘Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience’, p. 144.

Quoted in Reif, ‘Iraq Health Update: Conflict Fuels Iraqi Health Crisis’, p. 6.

Synnott, Bad Days in Basra, p. 211.

‘Post-Conflict Economic Recovery: Enabling Local Ingenuity’, UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Report 2008, p. 15.

‘Health Service Delivery in Post-Conflict States’, report of the High-Level Forum on Health MDGs, Paris, 14–15 December 2005, p. 5, http://www.hlfhealthmdgs.org/Documents/HealthServiceDelivery.pdf.