Chinese views of nuclear weapons

Abstract

China's nuclear arsenal has long been an enigma. It is a small force, based almost exclusively on land-based ballistic missiles, maintained at a low level of alert and married to a no-first-use doctrine – all choices that would seem to invite attack in a crisis. Chinese leaders, when they have spoken about nuclear weapons, have articulated ideas that sound odd to the Western ear. Mao Zedong's oft-quoted remark that ‘nuclear weapons are a paper tiger’ seems to be bluster or madness. China's nuclear forces are now too important to remain a mystery. Yet Westerners continue to disagree about basic factual information concerning one of the world's most important nuclear-weapons states. This Adelphi book documents and explains the evolution of China's nuclear forces in terms of historical, bureaucratic and ideological factors. There is a strategic logic at work, but that logic is mediated through politics, bureaucracy and ideology. The simplest explanation is that Chinese leaders, taken as a whole, have tended to place relatively little emphasis on the sort of technical details that dominated US discussions regarding deterrence. Such profound differences in thinking about nuclear weapons could lead to catastrophic misunderstanding in the event of a military crisis between Beijing and Washington.

Notes

1 Chen Jian and David L. Wilson (eds), ‘All Under the Heaven is Great Chaos: Beijing, the Sino-Soviet Border Clashes, and the Turn Toward Sino-American Rapprochement, 1968–1969’, Cold War International History Project, Bulletin 11, 1998: p. 159, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHPBulletin11_p3.pdf.

2 Address by Zhou Enlai at the Plenary Session of the Fourth Meeting of the State Council, 31 January 1955, http://digitalarchive. wilsoncenter.org/document/114333.

3 Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 85-117.

4 The Eisenhower administration decided in May 1953, in principle, to consider the use of nuclear weapons if armistice negotiations broke down. There is no credible evidence that the decision was conveyed to the Chinese. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles later claimed to have conveyed a threat through Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, but Nehru denied this and declassified accounts of the meeting support Nehru.

5 Guo Hualun, Study of Mao Zedong's Military Thinking: Essays on Military Issues of the Communist Bandits (Republic of China: Unknown imprint, 1 January 1973). A partial translation appeared in John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 70. A full translation is available in this volume.

6 Ralph L. Powell, ‘Great Powers and Atomic Bombs Are “Paper Tigers”’, China Quarterly, vol. 23, 1965, pp. 55–63.

7 J. Chester Cheng, Ch'inglien Han, Gene T. Hsiao and Yin-tso Hsiung (eds), The Politics of the Chinese Red Army: A Translation of the Bulletin of Activities of the People's Liberation Army (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1966). For a historical perspective on the importance of these documents, see Eugene W. Wu, ‘Library Resources for Contemporary China Studies’, in David Shambaugh (ed.), American Studies of Contemporary China (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 266. For analysis of these documents, see John W. Lewis, ‘China's Secret Military Papers: Continuities and Revelations’, pp. 68-78 and Alice Langley Hsieh, ‘China's Secret Military Papers: Military Doctrines and Strategy’, pp. 79-99, both in China Quarterly, vol. 18, April–June 1964. See also J. Chester Cheng, ‘Problems of Chinese Military Leadership as Seen in the Secret Military Papers’, Asian Survey, June 1964, pp. 864–72.

8 Powell, ‘Great Powers and Atomic Bombs Are “Paper Tigers”.

9 ‘Statement of the Chinese Government Advocating the Complete, Thorough, Total and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons Proposing a Conference of the Government Heads of All Countries of the World’, 31 July, 1963, published in Peking Review, vol. 6, no. 31, 2 August 1963, pp. 7–8.

10 China was sensitive to the political costs of atmospheric testing. Initial Chinese plans called for the fourth nuclear test to be conducted underground, despite the results of early underground tests being unsatisfactory. China later conducted many nuclear tests using aircraft in order to reduce the resulting fallout, both radioactive and political.

11 Morton Halperin, Communist China and arms control (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 1965).

12 Zhou Enlai, ‘Cable to All Heads of Government Proposing a World Summit Conference on the Prohibition and Destruction of All Nuclear Weapons’, Peking Review, vol. 8, no. 43, 23 October 1964, p. 6.

13 ‘Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China’, 16 October 1964, available in Peking Review, vol. 7, no. 42, 16 October 1964, pp. ii–iv.

14 Chinese government statement, ‘Protest Against U.S. War Provocation’, Peking Review, vol. 8, no. 1, 1 January 1965, p. 20.

15 China's nuclear testing programme is described in Chapter Two. The development of China's ballistic-missile programme is described in Chapter Three.

16 The Cultural Revolution in China lasted until the death of Mao and the arrest of the so-called ‘Gang of Four’ in October 1976.

17 In addition to Zhang's account (Zhang Yunsheng, ‘Discussing Lin Biao's “Number 1 Order”,’ (in Chinese) China News Digest, 14 January 2003, http://www.cnd.org/HXWZ/ZK03/zk323.gb.html, other accounts are Mei Xinsheng and Gao Xiaoling, Memories of Lin Biao's Secretary, (China Federation of Literacy and Art Circles Publishing Corporation, 1988), pp. 316–24; Tu Men and Xiao Sike, Super Trial, (Jinan, 1992) pp. 204–09; and Chi Zehou ‘In Biao and the “Number 1 Order” Revisited,’ China News Digest, 11 February 2003, http://www.cnd.org/HXWZ/ZK03/zk327.gb.html.

18 Li Zhishui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao (London: Chatto & Windus, 1994), pp. 504–19.

19 Nie returned to Beijing in February 1970, ostensibly for medical treatment. He managed to meet Mao, who urged him to stay in Beijing, and submitted his formal request to do so through Zhou, thus cutting out Lin.

20 John Lewis and Xue Litai, Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 175. See also: Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger During the Cultural Revolution (London, Hurst, 1996).

21 Ibid., pp. 61–62.

22 Ibid., p. 64.

23 This is what Saudi Arabia did when it alerted its DF-3 missiles in response to Iraqi missile attacks in 1991. See Khaled bin Sultan, Desert Warrior: Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander (New York: Harper Perrenial, 1996).

24 Communist China's Weapons Program for Strategic Attack, NIE 13-8-71. Available at: http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0001098170.pdf.

25 John Lewis and Xue Litai, ‘Making China's Nuclear War Plan’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 68, no. 5, September 2012, pp. 45–65. This article is based on a longer Chinese article by Lewis and Xue.

26 Ibid., p. 48.

27 Weishe is often used for concepts of both deterrence and compellence.

28 For a description of recent debates, see Michael S. Chase, ‘China's Transition to a More Credible Nuclear Deterrent: Implications and Challenges for the United States’, Asia Policy, vol. 16, July 2013, pp. 85–88, http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/free/ap16/Asia_Policy_16_July2013.pdf; and Taylor Fravel and Evan Medeiros, ‘China's Search for Assured Retaliation’, International Security, vol. 35, no. 2, Fall 2010, pp. 78–80.

29 ‘China military eyes preemptive nuclear attack in event of crisis’, Kyodo News, 5 January 2011.

30 For a discussion of these passages, see Gregory Kulacki, ‘Chickens Talking With Ducks: The U.S.-Chinese Nuclear Dialogue’, Arms Control Today, October 2011. Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_10/U.S._Chinese_Nuclear_Dialogue.

31 Nuclear Posture Review Report, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf.

32 Michael Chase has argued that these debates resulted in a reaffirmation that ‘peace and development remained the main theme of the times’, although leavened with ‘greater concerns about U.S. strategic intentions and a consensus in favor of higher defense spending’. See Chase, ‘China's Transition to a More Credible Nuclear Deterrent’, Asia Policy, vol. 16, July 2013; David M. Finkelstein, ‘China Reconsiders its National Security: “The Great Peace and Development Debate of 1999”’, CNA Corporation, December 2000, http://cna.org/sites/default/files/ research/D0014464.A1.pdf.

33 Gregory Lewis and Jeffrey Kulacki, ‘Understanding the Chinese ASAT Test’, Union of Concerned Scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/international_information/us_china_relations/understanding-chinas-asat.html.

34 Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2006, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China%20Report%202006.pdf.

35 The translated title of the article was ‘PRC Expert Warns PRC May Renounce “No-First-Use” of Nuclear Weapons in War Time’, with the actual title being ‘PRC Expert: China's Policy on Nuclear Weapons Remains Unchanged’. Chu did admit that he could not anticipate every circumstance, but the overall tone of the article was unequivocal, stating that ‘there isn't the slightest indication that China's government will let go of this promise’, quoting Chu saying he had ‘not heard any leader on any occasion state China will change or let go of this position. Never.’ Available at http://boxun.com/news/gb/ china/2005/07/200507181307.shtml.

36 ‘The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces’, Xinhua, 16 April 2013, http://news. xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/16/c_132312681.htm.

37 Speech by Qi Jianguo, ‘New Trends in Asia-Pacific Security’, 2 June 2013, Singapore, at IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2013-c890/fourth-plenary-session-0f17/qa-57d8.

38 For an explication of Chinese nuclear strategy, see Sun Xiangli, ‘Analysis of China's Nuclear Strategy’, China Security, Autumn 2005, pp. 23–27, https://web.archive.org/web/20081120194327/http://www.wsichina.org/back1_05.html (English-language version: Sun, ‘2005 Reports of International Arms Control and Disarmament’, China Arms Control And Disarmament Association, World Knowledge Press, Beijing, 2005) and Sun Xiangli, ‘Zhongguo Hezhanlüe Xingzhi yu Tedian Fenxi’, Zhanlüe Yanjiu, no. 9, 2006, pp. 23–28.

39 ‘The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces’.

40 The initial translation for these operations is ‘anti-nuclear deterrence combat’. However, ‘counter-nuclear coercion operations’ comes closer to the intended meaning. The term is discussed in the 2000 edition of Science of Campaigns and the 2004 Science of Second Artillery Campaigns.

41 Mark Stokes, ‘China's Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System’, 12 March 2010, http://www.project2049.net/documents/chinas_nuclear_warhead_storage_and_handling_system.pdf.

42 Given China's nuclear policy of no-first-use, and until recently its limited ballistic-missile early-warning capability, Beijing had assumed it might have to absorb an initial nuclear blow prior to engaging in nuclear counter-attack. Nuclear survivability was particularly critical given China's relatively small number of nuclear weapons and the development by potential adversaries of modern, precision munitions. In recent years, advanced construction design has allowed militaries to go deeper underground to complicate adversarial targeting. For a description of China's network of underground sites for the Second Artillery, see Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2011, p. 36, http:// www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_cmpr_final.pdf.

43 James Acton, ‘The Dragon Dance: U.S.-China Security Cooperation’, Carnegie, 29 November 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/globalten/?fa=50148. See also Lora Saalman, ‘China and the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review’, The Carnegie Papers (Beijing: Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, 2011), p. 9, http:// carneg ieendowment .org / files/ china_posture_review.pdf.

44 As a part of the discussion surrounding the 2013 White Paper, Yao Yunzhu, director of China's Academy of Military Science, specifically noted: ‘The United States is developing a series of conventional strategic strike capabilities. Once deployed, they could have the capability to strike China's nuclear arsenal and make China's NFU policy redundant.’ See Yao Yunzhu, ‘China Will Not Change Its Nuclear Policy’, China US Focus, 22 April 2013, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/china-will-not-change-its-no-first-use-policy/.