Abstract
The 2011 Arab uprisings began in North Africa and toppled the leaders of Tunisia and Libya, but the forces that wreaked this profound change also touched their fellow Maghreb states of Algeria and Morocco. This Adelphi book examines how the politics, security and economies – which were largely stable for decades prior to 2011 – have changed in the four states. It asks why the popular revolutions in Tunisia and Libya did not spread to Algeria and Morocco; how the revolutionary states have fared since 2011; why Libya descended into a deadly civil war while the others did not; and whether the sitting governments in Algeria and Morocco have applied sustainable strategies to address the new political climate.
The book includes chapters on each of the four core Maghreb states, together with regional assessments of the jihadist threat and economic challenges. It analyses the tension between security and political reform, and argues that without persistent and comprehensive development of government institutions focused on creating jobs and providing security, the region risks future protests, terrorism or even revolution – a lesson that states throughout the Middle East should take to heart.
For well over a generation, continuity was the watchword for the four countries at the heart of North Africa – Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. Politics did not vary much following the end of French colonial rule in Morocco and Tunisia in the 1950s or Algerian independence in 1962, despite the occasional handover of leadership. Muammar Gadhafi grabbed international headlines for sponsoring terrorism, but the brutal and bizarre Jamahiriya he created and led for 42 years drew far less attention. Algeria's 1991 election opened debates about the popular appeal of Islamist movements, but that debate would have to wait 20 years after the regime cancelled the election, provoking a horrific civil war and giving birth to some of the region's earliest jihadist groups.
Absent dramatic political change in the region, scholars sought to explain authoritarian resilience and why the Middle East and North Africa had managed to withstand the ‘waves’ of democratisation that had prevailed in Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe and much of Africa. They pointed to the police states of these regimes, the loyalty and effectiveness of security services, the persistent disorganisation of opposition groups and oil wealth for those regimes that benefitted from it. One scholar explained the success of regimes in resisting democratic trends as ‘upgrading authoritarianism’: allowing cosmetic alterations, such as having nominal elections or controlled market liberalisation, without changing the fundamental power structures.Footnote1 In other words, most experts dismissed the prospects of revolution in the Middle East and North Africa right up until the revolutions transpired. At a United States (US) State Department-sponsored conference in 2010 between US government officials and academic experts, no participant was willing to go out on a limb and suggest political transitions were possible – much less imminent – despite acknowledging growing youth populations and the ubiquity of new forms of social media that old methods of suppression would soon find harder to contain. The US National Security Council held a series of inter-agency discussions in 2010 and was drafting a presidential directive that would have elevated issues of political and economic reform in our bilateral relations with Middle East governments, when the Arab uprisings surprised everyone.Footnote2
The popular unrest that started in Tunisia in late 2010 and spread across North Africa and the wider Middle East happened at a pace no one predicted. Within a matter of months, decadesold regimes and their leaders were gone: Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia; Gadhafi in Libya; Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen; and most dramatically, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. Monarchies in Morocco, Jordan and Bahrain enacted reforms to varying degrees in attempts to stave off wider-scale protests. Tragically, Syria descended into a vicious civil war.
Scholars of the Middle East have begun to examine why they failed to predict the Arab Spring and to identify root causes of the uprisings.Footnote3 They have focused on the organisational tactics of protesters, new methods of exploiting social media and the commitment of security forces to defending now-vulnerable regimes.Footnote4 Foreign intelligence agencies have also recognised, in hindsight, that they relied too heavily on what their counterparts said was happening inside their own countries rather than developing their own sources within a host nation.
Few authors, however, have analysed the Middle East's subregions to assess how the uprisings emerged and the distinct ways in which they have developed since the drama of 2011. This book begins the conversation where the uprisings originated, examining why revolutions transpired in Tunisia and Libya but not in Morocco or Algeria.
A distinct grouping
The Maghreb (literally, west or the western Arab world, as opposed to the Mashreq, encompassing Egypt, the Levant and the Gulf to the east) has distinct cultural, ethnic, geographic, religious and historical experiences that are worth studying. The countries of this sub-region, for example, all share a Mediterranean coastline and proximity to Europe, as opposed to the vast deserts interrupted by the Nile, Tigris and Euphrates Vallies – the ‘fertile crescent’ around which much of Arab civilisation emerged. Foreign conquerors, whether the Caliphate from Damascus or the Ottomans, gave the Maghreb relatively more independence given its distance and comparative value to Egypt, the Levant, or the Hejaz. Egypt, in contrast, has always considered itself central to the Arab world, the country that has the longest history of self-government, and therefore an almost innate sense of nationalism.
Not until the 19th century did Europe, specifically France, begin to view the Maghreb as an essential part of its colonial enterprise.
French colonial rule began in Algeria in the early 19th century and later extended to Morocco and Tunisia, though Algeria was an actual colony while the other two were protectorates, with somewhat more authority granted to local leaders. France had several years – and in Algeria's case, decades – to modernise the territories in question and establish the early vestiges of local bureaucracy. As historian Michael Willis describes, ‘whatever political authority succeeded colonial control at independence would inherit a highly efficient, highly centralized and thus highly powerful state apparatus.’Footnote5 In contrast, British influence in the region (throughout most of the Mashreq after the First World War) was shorter in duration and more contested by nationalist forces. Libya stands apart as the only country in the Middle East that experienced Italian colonial rule, followed by an 18-year monarchy, before Gadhafi's coup. Even within Libya, there are significant differences between east, west and south, dating back well before pre-modern times (famously, Libyans in the west eat couscous and rice in the east).
Although the region is predominantly Arab, minority groups include ethnic Berbers, Touareg and other tribally based societies that extend beyond the region's formal borders and into less-governed territory. Governments have tended to focus their attention on the coastal cities, ignoring the interior regions, which has caused increasing economic and security problems across the region. These include the rise in smuggling and human-trafficking, ungoverned spaces exploited by terrorists, and economic disparity that has led to anti-government protests, including oil strikes. Indeed, the first major protest that launched the Arab uprisings was the self-immolation of a fruit vendor in the Tunisian interior town of Sidi Bouzid.
The vast majority of North Africa is Sunni Muslim, but unlike the rest of the Middle East, the dominant religious influences stem from the Maliki school of jurisprudence and the spiritual influence of Sufism, with its rituals and respect for Muslim ‘saints’ (distinct from the puritanical Wahhabism dominant in the Gulf). In fact, as extremist Islam has spread across North Africa, a common target of attacks has been Sufi shrines.
Why exclude Egypt? The answer is both substantive and pragmatic. Firstly, the size, scope and complexity of Egypt make it especially challenging to capture in one relatively brief chapter. The International Institute for Strategic Studies will therefore devote a separate volume entirely to the country. Secondly, while many comparisons can be drawn between the long-time rules of Mubarak and Gadhafi, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Ben Ali and even King Mohammed VI, Egypt was never resource-rich (unlike Algeria and Libya) and Mubarak derived much of his legitimacy in the West from his proximity to and role in the Israel-Palestine conflict. Egypt is clearly a major player in the politics and security of North Africa but would overwhelm a single study of the region.
Similarly, Mauritania is excluded from this study, although it is technically a member of the Arab League (and the barely active Arab Maghreb Union). Mauritania is arguably closer in ethnic and demographic composition and recent political history to its Malian and Nigerien neighbours in the Sahel than to the states of North Africa. Western Sahara, the disputed territory between Morocco and Algeria, is also excluded. Rival claims by the parties appear to have not been significantly affected by the 2011 uprisings and are no closer to resolution than when the United Nations (UN) established a peacekeeping force there in 1989.
Political change in its regional context
The factors mentioned earlier – colonial legacy, ethnic diversity and ungoverned spaces – long predated the dramatic upheavals in 2011 and thus explain little about the origins of the uprisings. In fact, scholarship of North Africa has featured few comparative studies of the sub-region, perhaps because little had changed in recent decades – with the notable exception of Algeria's brutal civil war.Footnote6
Today's circumstances, however, are radically different. Tunisia and Libya have attracted attention from journalists, researchers and democracy practitioners since the overthrow of Ben Ali and Gadhafi, as well as the divergent paths taken since their initial revolutions. But Morocco and Algeria deserve just as much focus for the revolutions that might have been but failed to materialise. Not including these stories when reviewing the uprisings in North Africa risks telling an incomplete story of the drivers of political change and the response of all four countries to enormous pressure for reform.
This book argues that North Africa represents a microcosm of what the broader Middle East experienced and thus offers lessons for the entire region. It tells the story of how four neighbouring countries responded in distinct ways to the most dramatic political change in the Arab world in at least a generation: Tunisia, with its hitherto largely successful democratic transition; Libya, with its popular revolution but inability to transform newly earned individual freedoms into national unity, leading to a breakdown of political order and civil war; Morocco, with its palace-led political reforms that purport to devolve power from the king to an elected government; and Algeria, with its use of state wealth to stave off potential political unrest. The book also addresses several underlying challenges in the region that endure (and perhaps have been aggravated) despite political change, namely economic grievances and the growing jihadist threat, which now includes the pan-regional Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), as well as localised groups, such as Ansar al-Sharia and al-Mourabitoun.
In all these cases, all segments of government desperately need institutional reform. While all four countries suffered from economic inequality and a lack of opportunities to pursue individual dignity, the institutional deficits in Libya and Tunisia were particularly severe, with the arbitrariness of Gadhafi's regime and the crony capitalism under Ben Ali. In contrast, Morocco and Algeria had just enough institutional legitimacy (from the former's monarchy and the latter's elite pouvoir) to enable them to make important policy decisions in the early months of 2011 that withstood the regional tide of unrest.
North African states need to learn how to provide security and respect the rule of law, while distancing themselves from the practices of brutal police states. To respond to citizens’ demands for dignity and opportunity, governments must adopt economic reforms that promote job creation and private-sector growth – steps that may often be challenged by the entrenched interests of the elite, and youth populations who have grown accustomed to public-sector employment and subsidies for everyday goods. In sum, whatever form of government exists, modernising political, economic and security institutions with the aim of improving transparency and accountability will enable North African citizens to feel more invested in the future of their governments. In turn, this will make them less inclined to launch sustained protests or follow a path toward radicalisation. Assisting the design, implementation and communication of such reforms should be a key function of the West's engagement with the region.
By examining the experiences of each of these North African countries, the book not only seeks to analyse developments in the region but also to draw attention to potential lessons for the wider Arab world: how and where can Islamists and secular or non-Islamist parties coexist (is Tunisia unique or can Egypt or Fatah and Hamas emulate the Tunisian model)? Why did the Libyan state break down so quickly after the revolution and what could it reveal about Syria after its civil war? How far do reforms need to go to preserve stability in Morocco and what can monarchies such as Jordan learn from its example? Finally, how long can hydrocarbon-rich states in the Middle East afford to avoid democratisation? While this Adelphi focuses on North Africa, it should be read with these broader questions in mind.
Western interests
The US and Europe need to better understand and invest in North Africa if they are going to manage the growing terrorism and migration crises emanating from the southern Mediterranean. Not since the early 1960s has the region played a more significant role in Europe's interests and stability. Two tragic examples illustrate this point.
Firstly, on 16 January 2013, al-Qaeda-linked militants attacked the In Amenas gas plant in southern Algeria, operated jointly between Norway's Statoil and BP, taking more than 100 foreigners hostage and sparking a stand-off that lasted three days. When the hostage-takers attempted to escape, Algerian security forces launched a heavy-handed response, leaving 39 foreigners dead, including five Britons, five Norwegians, ten Japanese and three US citizens. It became all too evident that despite extensive energy-sector links between Europe and North Africa, ties at the political and security levels were extremely limited, especially with the Algerians who are highly suspicious of anything resembling foreign intervention. That dynamic improved slightly in 2013, when Algeria opened its airspace to French warplanes and US refuelling tankers conducting operations in northern Mali. However, it still has a long way to go to reach more consistent security cooperation, both internally within North Africa and beyond.
Secondly, on 26 June 2015, a lone gunman with links to the Islamic State killed 38, mostly British, tourists on a beach resort in Sousse, Tunisia. It was the deadliest terrorist attack on British citizens since the July 2005 bombings in London. Despite the impressive progress Tunisia has made, the only Arab democracy is still suffering from substantial security and economic challenges that it will have to overcome to secure its democratic future. As the popularity of ISIS increases across the Middle East and among disaffected Muslims in Europe, securing closer government-to-government ties with North Africa will be required to address the interconnected problems of terrorism, extremism, migration and economic stability.
In the years ahead, Europe will become more deeply enmeshed in North African affairs. The migration crisis, which has complicated roots in sub-Saharan Africa, exacerbated by instability in Libya, Egypt and Syria, has increasingly involved the European Union (EU). Several member states now contribute naval assets under the Italian-led Operation Triton, interdicting illegal smuggling craft and often forced to rescue migrants aboard. The European Council released a broader strategy to confront the migration crisis in May 2015.Footnote7 In Libya, the US, EU, United Kingdom (UK), France, Germany, Italy and Spain backed months-long UN-led negotiations to forge the National Unity Agreement. As the Government of National Accord seeks to establish some credibility with the Libyan population, enhance security and confront terrorism, its international partners have pledged support. This will potentially include some form of a stabilisation force to protect government institutions and train Libyan security forces, drawing Europe back into the region militarily in a way it has not been since French forces withdrew from Algeria more than 50 years ago.
In sum, North Africa's problems can no longer be contained in North Africa. This book attempts to better inform readers and policymakers about the key political, economic and security challenges facing this under-studied region. It is an analysis of how North Africa emerged after the Arab uprisings and why four countries – Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya – have undertaken very different trajectories.
Notes
1 Steven Heydemann, ‘Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World’, Center for Middle East Policy Analysis Papers, no. 13, October 2007. See also, Larry Diamond, ‘Why Are There No Arab Democracies?’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 21, no. 1, January 2010, pp. 93–104; and Daniel Brumberg, ‘The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 13, no. 4, October 2002, pp. 56–68.
2 Ryan Lizza, ‘The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring Remade Obama's Foreign Policy’, The New Yorker, May 2, 2011. The author participated in these discussions.
3 F. Gregory Gause, ‘Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of Arab Authoritarianism’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 90, no. 4, July/August 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67932/f-gregory-gause-iii/why-middle-east-studies-missedthe-arab-spring.
4 Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2012); and Eva Bellin, ‘Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring’, Comparative Politics, vol. 44, no. 2, 2012, pp. 127–49.
5 Michael J. Willis, Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 34.
6 One notable exception is Willis’ recent comparative study of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia prior to the Arab uprisings, which excludes Libya. Other exceptions include: Dirk Vandewalle (ed.), North Africa: Development and Reform in a Changing Global Economy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); and Anthony H. Cordesman, A Tragedy of Arms: Military and Security Developments in the Maghreb (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002).
7 European Commission, ‘Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions A European Agenda On Migration’, Brussels, 13 May 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf.