Direction of operations

Abstract

Launched in the wake of 9/11, the US-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq forced painful transformations in Western militaries. As successful regime-change operations gave way to prolonged insurgencies, these forces confronted wars whose character rapidly developed in unanticipated directions. The US and its allies repeatedly failed to align national ends, ways and means to achieve stabilisation, reconstruction and political progress in Afghanistan and Iraq, before rediscovering counter-insurgency principles established in previous conflicts. The lessons of the wars are likely to continue shaping Western states’ approach to intervention and warfare for years to come.

This Adelphi book examines the military evolution of the conflicts, and their implications for the future character of war. It shows why combat remains the core military capability, and explains successful and unsuccessful adaptation by armed forces, especially the essential roles of leadership, culture and organisational agility in promoting ‘learning under fire’. Written by the author of the British Army’s report on post-conflict stabilisation in Iraq, the book is a valuable guide for policymakers, government officials, military officers and scholars seeking to understand the military legacy of a contentious and unpopular chapter in Western strategy.

Notes

1 Readers may find it useful to refer to the definitions of levels of command on p. 14.

2 The Iraq Inquiry Report (also known as the Chilcot Report), published on 6 July 2016, and supporting documents are available at http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/.

3 Iraq Inquiry Report, ‘Executive Summary’, p. 91.

4 Private conversations with UK officials, 2016, and analysis of House of Commons Defence Committee report ‘Afghanistan – Camp BastionAttack’, 28 March 2014, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmdfence/830/83002.htm.

5 Ben Barry, ‘The Bitter War to Stabilise Southern Iraq – British Army Report Declassified’, IISS, 10 October 2016, https://www.iiss.org/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2016-9143/october-d6b6/the-bitter-war-to-stabilise-southern-iraq---british-army-report-declassified-953d.

6 George Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown, 2010), p. 268.

7 Ibid., pp. 363–75.

8 Iraq Inquiry Report, section 10.4, p. 9.

9 Iraq Inquiry Report, section 9.8, p. 481.

10 John Chilcot’s public statement, 6 July 2016, http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-inquiry/sir-john-chilcots-public-statement/; Iraq Inquiry Report, ‘Executive Summary’, pp. 124–5.

11 Iraq Inquiry Report, section 9.8, p. 502.

12 Author’s interviews, 2009–10.

13 Richard Dannatt, Leading from the Front: An Autobiography (London: Corgi, 2010).

14 Iraq Inquiry Report, section 10.4, p. 533.

15 Iraq Inquiry Report, section 10.1, p. 95.

16 Hilary Synnott, Bad Days in Basra: My Turbulent Time as Britain’s Man in Southern Iraq (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008), p. 252.

17 See Peter Ricketts, ‘National Security in Practice: The First 18 Months of the National Security Council’, address at the IISS, 30 November 2011, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2011-1092/november-75d8/national-security-in-practice-the-first-months-of-the-national-security-council-123b; David Richards, Taking Command (London: Headline, 2014), chapter 16.

18 Robert Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), p. 206.

19 See Tommy Franks, American Soldier (New York: HarperCollins, 2005); Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir (London: Portfolio, 2013); Richards, Taking Command; and George W. Casey, Jr, Strategic Reflections (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2012).

20 For examples of this in a US brigade, see Daniel P. Bolger, Why We Lost: A General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (Boston, MA: Eamon Dolan, 2014), pp. 352–6.

21 The different approaches are vividly illustrated by accounts of two provincial governance coordinators of the British role in Amarah during the 2004 Shia uprising. See Rory Stewart, Occupational Hazards: My Time Governing in Iraq (London: Picador, 2007); Mark Etherington, Revolt on the Tigris: The Al-Sadr Uprising and the Governing of Iraq (London: Hurst, 2005); and Richard Holmes, Dusty Warriors: Modern Soldiers at War (London: Harper, 2006).

22 Carl Bildt, Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998); Paddy Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares: Bringing Peace to the 21st Century (London: Orion, 2007).

23 NATO, ‘A “Comprehensive Approach” to Crises’, 21 August 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_51633.htm.

24 US Department of Defense, Decade of War, Volume 1: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations, J7 unclassified internal publication, p. 11, available at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/analysis-of-a-decade-at-war.

25 Carter Malkasian, War Comes to Garmser (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 85.

26 Iraq Inquiry Report, section 10.4, p. 529.

27 Author’s interviews, 2009–10.

28 Author’s interviews with US and UK officers and civilian officials, 2009–10.