The utility of force in Afghanistan, Iraq and beyond

Abstract

Launched in the wake of 9/11, the US-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq forced painful transformations in Western militaries. As successful regime-change operations gave way to prolonged insurgencies, these forces confronted wars whose character rapidly developed in unanticipated directions. The US and its allies repeatedly failed to align national ends, ways and means to achieve stabilisation, reconstruction and political progress in Afghanistan and Iraq, before rediscovering counter-insurgency principles established in previous conflicts. The lessons of the wars are likely to continue shaping Western states’ approach to intervention and warfare for years to come.

This Adelphi book examines the military evolution of the conflicts, and their implications for the future character of war. It shows why combat remains the core military capability, and explains successful and unsuccessful adaptation by armed forces, especially the essential roles of leadership, culture and organisational agility in promoting ‘learning under fire’. Written by the author of the British Army’s report on post-conflict stabilisation in Iraq, the book is a valuable guide for policymakers, government officials, military officers and scholars seeking to understand the military legacy of a contentious and unpopular chapter in Western strategy.

Notes

1 See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 16–18.

2 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Allen Lane, 2005).

3 Peter Mansoor, Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), p. 223.

4 Charles C. Krulak, ‘The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War’, US Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 83, no. 1, January 1999.

5 Drawn from Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama (New York: Pantheon, 2012), chapter 32.

6 Krulak, ‘The Strategic Corporal’.

7 Author's research, Helmand, 2009.

8 See John Gordon IV et al., Comparing U.S. Army Systems with Foreign Counterparts: Identifying Possible Capability Gaps and Insights from Other Armies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), chapter 3.

9 See David C. Gompert, Astrid Cevallos and Cristina L. Garafola, War with China: Thinking through the Unthinkable (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016).

10 Michael A. Vane, ‘New Norms for the 21st Century Soldier’, Military Review, July–August 2011, pp. 16–24.

11 Robert Winnett, ‘Syria Crisis: No to War, Blow to Cameron’, Telegraph, 29 August 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10275158/Syria-crisis-No-to-war-blow-to-Cameron.html.

12 David Cameron, ‘PM Statement on the Iraq Inquiry, 6 July 2016′, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-the-iraq-inquiry-6-july-2016.