Assessing the JCPOA

Abstract

‘This is a clear-eyed assessment of the Iran nuclear deal and how it was working smoothly before President Trump's reckless withdrawal. No single volume makes better use of the facts to refute the criticisms levied by the Trump administration against the deal, or differentiates more clearly between those of Iran's ballistic missiles which could be allowed in a negotiated arrangement and those which should be prohibited.’

Angela Kane, Senior Fellow, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation; former UN High Rentative for Disarmament Affairs and UN Under-Secretary-General for Management ‘No one has contributed more to the public understanding of the complexities of nuclear proliferation and the attempts of various states to break out from the Non-Proliferation Treaty than Mark Fitzpatrick. Now he and his colleagues at the IISS have turned their focus to the withdrawal of the US from the JCPOA. Their new study is required reading for anyone concerned that this action could lead to yet another conflict in the Middle East or increase the risk of nuclear weapons spreading in the region.’

IISS

In July 2015, eight parties – France, Germany and the United Kingdom, together with the European Union and China, Russia and the United States on the one side, and Iran on the other – adopted the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), better known as the Iran nuclear deal. Under the agreement, Iran accepted limits to its nuclear programme and stricter international monitoring in return for sanctions relief. Detractors, however, saw the deal as overly lenient towards Tehran. Donald Trump described the JCPOA as the ‘worst deal ever’, and announced in May 2018 that the US would cease waiving sanctions and withdraw from the agreement.

This Adelphi book argues that the unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA was a grave error. Drawing on a deep understanding of the non-proliferation regime and their own technical expertise, the authors evaluate the principal criticisms of the JCPOA, some of which are unrelated to nuclear issues. The authors argue that the Procurement Channel – established by the JCPOA to give Iran a route to procure goods and services for its now-limited nuclear programme – has been an effective check on Iran's illicit procurement of nuclear-related goods. They also show that Iran's nuclear and ballistic-missile programmes are not intrinsically linked, for not all of its missiles were designed to be nuclear-capable. The fate of the JCPOA now hangs in the balance; its survival will ultimately depend on Iran.

Notes

1 This chapter draws on the following pieces previously published by the author: ‘Relief’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 57, no. 3, June–July 2015, pp. 219–26; ‘The good, the bad and the ugly in the Iran nuclear deal’, Prospect, 14 July 2015, http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/world/the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-in-the-iran-nuclear-deal; ‘Iran: A good deal’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 57, no. 5, October–November 2015, pp. 47–52; ‘Three strikes against claims that Iran is violating the nuclear accord’, IISS, 27 July 2017, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2017/07/claims-iran-violate-nuclear-accord; ‘Don’t repeat the Iraq War false WMD claims with Iran’, IISS, 1 August 2017, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2017/08/iran-war-false-claims; ‘The Iran nuclear deal is working – access debates are no cause for alarm’, Survival Editors’ Blog, 29 August 2017, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/survival-blog/2017/08/iran-nuclear-deal; ‘Fixing an Iran nuclear deal that ain’t broke’, Survival Editors’ Blog, 23 October 2017, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/survival-blog/2017/10/fixing-nuclear-deal; ‘Trust in the IAEA’s verification of Iran’s nuclear activities’, IISS, 5 December 2017, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2017/12/iaea-verification; ‘An Order of Priorities in Confronting Iran’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 59, no. 2, April–May 2017, pp. 25–29; ‘Critics are wrong: Iran remains in compliance with nuclear accord’, Survival Editors’ Blog, 15 June 2017, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/survival-blog/2017/06/iran-nuclear; ‘Iran’s Protests and the Fate of the Nuclear Deal’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 60, no. 1, February–March 2018, pp. 69–74; Mark Fitzpatrick and Dana Allin, ‘Iran nuclear deal on the ropes’, Survival Editors’ Blog, 1 May 2018, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/survival-blog/2018/05/iran-nuclear-deal; ‘Pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal is Trump’s most disastrous decision to date’, Prospect, 9 May 2018, https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/world/pulling-out-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal-is-trumps-most-disastrous-decision-to-date; ‘Pompeo’s 12 angry demands won’t restrain Iran’, Survival Editors’ Blog, 23 May 2018, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/survival-blog/2018/05/pompeos-12-demands.

2 Natural uranium ore contains 0.7% of the fissile isotope uranium 235. For use as fuel for power reactors, it needs to be enriched to 3.75–5% uranium 235. Research reactors require uranium fuel enriched to almost 20%. This percentage is the dividing line between LEU and HEU. Uranium enriched above 20% theoretically can be used for a nuclear weapon, but as a practical matter weapons need HEU at 80% or above, ideally at 93%.

3 ‘Israeli PM threatens to strike Iran’, Al Jazeera, 17 July 2013, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/07/2013714214528446397.html.

4 The NPT neither prohibits nor explicitly allows the sensitive technologies of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. Some states believe that the right is provided for in Article IV.1 of the treaty, which states: ‘Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty’. For the text of the treaty, see United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, ‘Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)’, https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text.

5 Paul Richter and Ramin Mostaghim, ‘Iran’s Khamenei adds a twist to tough terms for nuclear talks’, Los Angeles Times, 9 April 2015, http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iran-nuclear-khamenei-20150409-story.html#page=1.

6 ‘IRGC Deputy Commander: Inspection of Military Sites Impossible’, Fars News Agency, 19 April 2015, http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940130000234.

7 ‘Iranian official: We’ll allow “managed access” to military sites’, Times of Israel, 24 May 2015, http://www.timesofisrael.com/iranian-official-well-allow-managed-access-to-military-sites/.

8 Office of US Senator Tom Cotton, ‘Cotton and 46 Fellow Senators to Send Open Letter to the Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran’, 9 March 2015, https://www.cotton.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=120.

9 The full text of the deal is available on the European Parliament’s website: ‘Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’, 14 July 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/d-ir/documents/eu-texts.

10 United States House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, ‘Iran nuclear agreement: The Administration’s case, hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives’, 28 July 2015, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg95693/html/CHRG-114hhrg95693.htm. The figure is a matter of controversy and hard to pin down. President Trump often says the amount was US$150 billion, a figure typically used by conservative critics of the deal. The head of Iran’s Central Bank put the amount at around US$30bn. See Jon Greenberg, ‘Donald Trump says Iran got $150 billion and $1.8 billion in cash. That’s Half True’, Politifact, 27 April 2018, https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2018/apr/27/donald-trump/donald-trump-iran-150-billion-and-18-billion-c.

11 Darius Dixon, ‘Moniz: Test Results Back Up Assurances on Iran Deal’, Politico, 22 July 2015, https://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/moniz-test-results-back-up-assurances-on-iran-deal-120507.

12 Calculating the breakout time is a mathematical exercise that depends on how many centrifuges are operated, their efficiency at enriching uranium and their configuration. It does not take into account motivation and other intangible factors.

13 JCPOA, Preface.

14 Even one of the European parties objected to extending the ban on Iranian missile testing imposed by UN Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010), on the basis that the ban had been included to pressure Iran to accept a deal limiting its nuclear programme, so there was no justification to continue such a ban if a nuclear deal could be made. See Philip Gordon, ‘What’s Wrong with Michael Flynn’s Bluster on Iran? Plenty’, New York Times, 2 February 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/opinion/whats-wrong-with-michael-flynns-bluster-on-iran-plenty.html.

15 Testimony of then-Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on the Iran Nuclear Negotiations, 4 February 2014, http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/Services/Iran-Sanctions/US-Resources/Joint-Plan-of-Action/4-Feb-2014--Transcript-of-Senate-Foreign-Relations-Committee-Hearing-on-the-Iran-Nuclear-Negotiations-Panel-1.pdf.

16 JCPOA, Annex V.

17 JCPOA, paragraph 34.iv. Drawing the broader conclusion will require the absence of any lingering questions about Iran’s intentions, and will likely take longer than eight years. Reaching this conclusion took seven years for Taiwan, and ten years for Turkey, after each began to implement the Additional Protocol.

18 US National Intelligence Council, ‘Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities’, National Intelligence Estimate, November 2007, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2007%20Press%20Releases/20071203_release.pdf.

19 International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General’, GOV/2011/65, 8 November 2011, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2011-65.pdf.

20 IAEA, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General’, GOV/2015/34, 29 May 2015, paragraphs 65–68, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-2015-34.pdf. Officials with whom the author discussed the report said it meant Iran had provided substantive answers to only one of the 12 areas of concern and partial answers to a second one.

21 For the text of the road map, see IAEA, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General’, GOV/2015/50, 27 August 2015, Annex II, p. 16, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-2015-50-derestr.pdf.

22 JCPOA, Annex I, paragraph 66; Annex V, paragraph 9.

23 IAEA, ‘Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Report by the Director General’, GOV/2015/68, 2 December 2015, paragraph 62, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-2015-68.pdf.

24 Martin Malin, ‘Five Takeaways from the IAEA’s Report on Iran’s Nuclear Past’, Huffington Post, 7 December 2015, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/martin-malin-/iaea-iran-report-takeaways_b_8735838.html.

25 IAEA, ‘Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme’, paragraph 87.

26 Parisa Hafezi, ‘Iran’s Khamenei conditionally approves nuclear deal with powers’, Reuters, 21 October 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-khamenei-idUSKCN0SF18720151021#p1wA4JTczuJdEpgk.97.

27 Arash Bahmani, ‘How will Iran ratify the deal?’, Al-Monitor, 5 August 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/irandeal-legal-path.html.

28 US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, ‘Secretary Kerry’s Remarks: SFRC Hearing on the Iran Nuclear Deal’, 23 July 2015, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/07-23-2015%20Secretary%20Kerry%20Testimony.pdf.

29 See, for example, Isabel Kershner, ‘Iran Deal Denounced by Netanyahu as “Historic Mistake”’, New York Times, 14 July 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-israel.html.

30 ‘Transcript: President Obama’s Full NPR Interview On Iran Nuclear Deal’, National Public Radio, 7 April 2015, https://www.npr.org/2015/04/07/397933577/transcript-president-obamas-full-npr-interview-on-iran-nuclear-deal.

31 US Department of State, ‘Daily Press Briefing – April 7, 2015’, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/04/240401.htm.

32 ‘Critics Say U.S. Officials Promised “Anytime, Anywhere” Inspections In Iran Nuclear Deal’, National Public Radio, 11 August 2015, https://www.npr.org/2015/08/11/431672987/critics-say-u-s-officials-promised-anytime-anywhere-inspections-in-iran-nuclear.

33 Fredrik Dahl, ‘IAEA Now Has More Inspection Powers in Iran, Increased Knowledge of Its Nuclear Programme – Director General’, International Atomic Energy Agency, 14 November 2017, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/iaea-now-has-more-inspection-powers-in-iran-increased-knowledge-of-its-nuclear-programme-director-general.

34 IAEA, ‘Final assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme’, paragraphs 53–57.

35 IAEA, ‘Director General’s Speech on Iran, the JCPOA and the IAEA’, 14 November 2017, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/director-generals-speech-on-iran-the-jcpoa-and-the-iaea.

36 Author’s communication with former senior official who was involved in the visits.

37 Jonathan Tirone and Ladane Nasseri, ‘Iran Can Do More After Record Nuclear Inspections, IAEA Says’, Bloomberg, 4 June 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-04/iran-can-do-more-after-record-nuclear-inspections-iaea-says.

38 ‘Nuclear inspectors should have access to Iran military bases: Haley’, Reuters, 25 August 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-usa-haley/nuclear-inspectors-should-have-access-to-iran-military-bases-haley-idUSKCN1B524I.

39 Author’s communication with Western government official.

40 IAEA, ‘Director General’s Speech on Iran’.

41 IAEA, ‘Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015); Report by the Director General’, GOV/2017/24, 2 June 2017, paragraph 26, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2017-24.pdf.

42 David Albright and Olli Heinonen, ‘Verifying Section T of the Iran Nuclear Deal: Iranian Military Site Access Essential to JCPOA Section T Verification’, Institute for Science and International Security, 31 August 2017, http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/verifying-section-t-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal.

43 Francois Murphy, ‘IAEA chief calls for clarity on disputed section of Iran nuclear deal’, Reuters, 26 September 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-iaea/iaea-chief-calls-for-clarity-on-disputed-section-of-iran-nuclear-deal-idUSKCN1C12AN.

44 Joshua Block, ‘What the IAEA doesn’t know – or want to know – about Iran’s nuclear program’, The Hill, 18 October 2018, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/411734-what-the-iaea-doesnt-know-or-want-to-know-about-irans-nuclear-program.

45 Murphy, ‘IAEA chief calls for clarity’.

46 Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions at the Moscow Nonproliferation Conference, October 20, 2017’, 20 October 2017, http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/2913751.

47 Eliott C. McLaughlin, ‘Netanyahu says he has proof of secret Iranian nuclear program’, CNN, 1 May 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/30/middleeast/netanyahu-iran-nuclear-program/index.html.

48 John Kerry, Twitter, 1 May 2018, https://twitter.com/johnkerry/status/991400032736825344.

49 White House, ‘Statement by the Press Secretary on Israel’s Announcement Related to Iranian Nuclear Weapons Development’, 30 April 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-israels-announcement-related-iranian-nuclear-weapons-development.

50 Amir Tibon, ‘In “Spelling Mistake,” White House Says Iran Has a Nuclear Weapons Program’, Haaretz, 1 May 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/iran/in-spelling-mistake-white-house-says-iran-has-a-nuclear-program-1.6045782.

51 See, for example, John R. Bolton, ‘How to Get Out of the Iran Nuclear Deal’, National Review, 28 August 2017, https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/08/iran-nuclear-deal-exit-strategy-john-bolton-memo-trump/.

52 Richard Haass, Twitter, 1 May 2018, https://twitter.com/RichardHaass/status/991285070395727872.

53 JCPOA, Section T.

54 Robert Einhorn, ‘Israeli intelligence coup could help Trump “fix” the Iran deal’, Brookings, 4 May 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/05/04/israeli-intelligence-coup-could-help-trump-fix-the-iran-deal/.

55 William Tobey, ‘Iran’s Parchin Particles: Why Should Two Mites of Uranium Matter?’, Foreign Policy, 7 July 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/07/irans-parchin-particles-why-should-two-mites-of-uranium-matter/.

56 IAEA, ‘Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme’, p. 11.

57 The quarterly reports are available on the IAEA’s website: IAEA, ‘IAEA and Iran – IAEA Reports’, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/iaea-and-iran-iaea-reports.

58 Chris Smith, ‘Trump’s Cold War with the C.I.A. Could Derail the Iran Deal’, Vanity Fair, 6 October 2017, https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/10/trumps-cold-war-with-the-cia-could-derail-the-iran-deal.

59 John Hudson and Mark Seibel, ‘Trump Keeps The Iran Deal In Place, While Threatening New Sanctions’, Buzzfeed, 17 July 2017, https://www.buzzfeed.com/amphtml/markseibel/trump-certification-of-iran-nuclear-deal-comes-with-tough.

60 US Department of State, ‘Department Press Briefing’, 18 July 2017, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2017/07/272665.htm.

61 Nahal Toosi, ‘Haley: Trump “has grounds” to say Iran violating nuclear deal’, Politico, 5 September 2017, https://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/05/trump-iran-violate-nuclear-deal-nikki-haley-242331.

62 Office of US Senator Tom Cotton, ‘Cotton and Colleagues Urge Tillerson Not to Certify Iran Compliance with the JCPOA’, 11 July 2017, https://www.cotton.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=744.

63 Author communications with officials involved.

64 JCPOA, Annex I, C.14.

65 Author communication with a former US State Department official.

66 Germany Federal Ministry of the Interior, ‘2016 Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution (Facts and Trends)’, June 2017, https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/embed/annual-report-2016-summary.pdf.

67 David Albright and Andrea Stricker, ‘Analysis of the IAEA’s Sixth Iran Nuclear Deal Report: A Return to More Limited Data’, Institute for Science and International Security, 5 June 2017, http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/analysis-of-the-iaeas-sixth-iran-nuclear-deal-report-a-return-to-more-limit.

68 David Albright and Andrea Stricker, ‘JCPOA Exemptions Revealed’, Institute for Science and International Security, 1 September 2016, http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/jcpoa-exemptions-revealed.

69 Mahsa Rouhi, ‘Trump Should Avoid Believing the Myths of the JCPOA’, National Interest, 21 November 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/trump-should-avoid-believing-the-myths-the-jcpoa-23312.

70 International Crisis Group, ‘The Illogic of the U.S. Sanctions Snapback on Iran’, 2 November 2018, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/B064-the-illogic-of-the-us-sanctions-snapback-on-iran.pdf.

71 US Senate, Committee on Armed Services, ‘Hearing to Receive Testimony on Worldwide Threats’, 23 May 2017, p. 59, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/17-49_05-23-17.pdf.

72 White House, ‘Remarks by President Obama in Press Conference after GCC Summit’, 14 May 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/14/remarks-president-obama-press-conference-after-gcc-summit.

73 US Department of State, ‘After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy – Remarks, Mike Pompeo’, 21 May 2018, https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/05/282301.htm.

74 H.R. 1191 – Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, Public Law 114–17, 22 May 2015, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1191/text.

75 White House, ‘Remarks by President Trump on Iran Strategy’, 13 October 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-iran-strategy.

76 White House, ‘Statement by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal’, 12 January 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-iran-nuclear-deal/.

77 Interviews with officials involved.

78 Ben Smith, ‘Macron Says Trump Will Likely Kill The Iran Deal’, BuzzFeed News, 25 April 2018, https://www.buzzfeed.com/bensmith/macron-says-trump-will-likely-kill-the-iran-deal?utm_term=.na39V4VOr#.rlvGD0D8b.

79 Madeline Conway, ‘Bolton calls regime change the “only long- term solution” in Iran’, Politico, 17 November 2016, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/john-bolton-iran-regime-change-231586.

80 Bolton, ‘How to Get Out of the Iran Nuclear Deal’.

81 John R. Bolton, ‘To Stop Iran’s Bomb, Bomb Iran’, New York Times, 26 March 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/26/opinion/to-stop-irans-bomb-bomb-iran.html?_r=0.

82 ‘Rep. Mike Pompeo: One year later, Obama’s Iran nuclear deal puts us at increased risk’, Fox News, 14 July 2016, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2016/07/14/rep-mike-pompeo-one-year-later-obama-s-iran-nuclear-deal-puts-us-at-increased-risk.html.

83 Jake Sullivan, ‘Trump’s Only Iran Strategy Is to Punish Iran’, Atlantic, 19 May 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/trump-iran-jcpoa/560759/.

84 US Department of State, ‘Background Briefing on President Trump’s Decision To Withdraw From the JCPOA’, 8 May 2018, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/05/281959.htm.

85 ‘New U.S. envoy warns German firms to wind down business in Iran’, Reuters, 8 May 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-germany-grenell/new-us-envoy-warns-german-firms-to-wind-down-business-in-iran-idUSKBN1I92YP.

86 Michael Birnbaum, ‘E.U. leader lights into Trump: “With friends like that, who needs enemies?”’, Washington Post, 16 May 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/05/16/e-u-leader-lights-into-trump-with-friends-like-that-who-needs-enemies/?utm_term=.5b4e8f7cb4e4.

87 International Crisis Group, ‘The Iran Nuclear Deal at Two: A Status Report’, 16 January 2018, p. 10, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iran/181-iran-nuclear-deal-two-status-report.

88 US Department of State, ‘After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy’.

89 See, for example, Richard Goldberg and Jamie Fly, ‘What Washington can do to support Iran’s protesters’, New York Post, 2 January 2018, https://nypost.com/2018/01/02/what-washington-can-do-to-support-irans-protesters/.

90 In an interview on 3 January 2018, for example, Vice President Mike Pence said ‘my hope is that the people who are taking to the streets in Iran know that under President Donald Trump they are not alone’. See Peter Heinlein, ‘VP Pence Vows US Solidarity With Iranian Protesters’, Voice of America, 3 January 2018, https://www.voanews.com/a/vice-president-mike-pence-iran-interview/4191033.html.

91 Barbara Slavin, ‘Latest Iran poll suggests Trump rhetoric benefits hard- liners’, Al-Monitor, 2 February 2018, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/02/iran-poll-suggests-trump-rhetoric-benefiting-hardliners.html#ixzz55zXhegpW.

92 Nancy Gallagher, Ebrahim Mohseni and Clay Ramsay, ‘The Ramifications of Rouhani’s Re-election – The Questionnaire’, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, July 2017, http://www.cissm.umd.edu/publications/ramifications-rouhanis-re-election-questionnaire.

93 Paulina Izewicz, ‘Iran deal decertification looms: what’s next?’, IISS, 12 October 2017, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2017/10/iran-deal-decertification-looms.

94 European Union External Action Service, ‘Iran Deal: EU and partners set up mechanism to protect legitimate business with Iran’, 25 September 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/51066/iran-deal-eu-and-partners-set-mechanism-protect-legitimate-business-iran_en.

95 European External Action Service, ‘Joint statement by High Representative Federica Mogherini and Foreign Ministers Jean-Yves Le Drian, Heiko Maas and Jeremy Hunt, and Finance Ministers Bruno Le Maire, Olaf Scholz and Philip Hammond’, 2 November 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/53230/joint-statement-high-representative-federica-mogherini-and-foreign-ministers-jean-yves-le_en.

96 Saeed Kamali Dehghan and Julian Borger, ‘Iran threatens to withdraw from nuclear weapons treaty’, Guardian, 24 April 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/24/iran-threatens-to-withdraw-from-nuclear-weapons-treaty-npt.

97 IAEA, ‘Director General’s Speech on Iran’.