Introduction

Abstract

‘Sarah Raine’s deeply informed, crisply written and authoritatively argued book will, I predict, swiftly become the indispensable analysis of Europe’s prospects as a strategic actor. The fact that she is clear-eyed (and dryly humorous) about the flaws and failures of European foreign and security policy makes her take on its strengths and possibilities all the more compelling.’

Dr. Constanze Stelzenmüller, Robert Bosch Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe

‘Love it or loath it, there will be no European Army any time soon: this is one of the conclusions of this well thought-out assessment. It factors in the transformational impact of Europe’s internal travails against a rapidly deteriorating and unforgiving strategic backdrop. The book is required reading for anyone who wants to form an educated opinion on Europe’s ability or inability to face these challenges in terms of policies, capabilities, money and organisation.’

François Heisbourg, IISS Senior Adviser for Europe; former commission member of France’s White Paper on Defence and National Security

‘The book brilliantly takes the reader through the strategic challenges facing Europe and makes the unfashionable argument that Europe has scored some notable successes as well as the well-known disappointments. Europe must act quicker, be more joined up and solve the tension between national policies and collective outreach. Sarah Raine makes a cautiously optimistic case that it may indeed do so.’

Peter Round, former capabilities director, European Defence Agency

Europe has suffered a decade of crises, with sovereign-debt troubles leading to austerity policies that exacerbated divisions inside member states and between them. Thereafter the Union was confronted with the challenges posed by a revanchist Russia in Ukraine and by a surge in migration from the Middle East and other conflict zones. The June 2016 United Kingdom vote to leave the Union threatened further damage to an institution that acknowledges it has failed to punch its weight in the spheres of foreign, defence and security policy. While that is a chronic shortcoming, its impact is becoming more acute as economic power moves east and Europe can no longer count on the steadfast support and leadership of the United States. The costs of Europe’s failure to achieve strategic coherence and effect are steadily rising.

This Adelphi book addresses the consequences of Europe’s multiple crises for its standing as a strategic actor, acknowledging its unique character and capabilities. It argues that strategic thought and action are belatedly being informed by the deteriorating security environment, and that nascent initiatives have the potential to effect a step-change. There are grounds for cautious optimism, visible in the success of stabilisation and counter-piracy operations as well as coordinated diplomatic activity. Also, the continent’s leading powers are becoming more pragmatic about how cooperation is organised within and beyond the Union. These developments offer the possibility that Europe might meet its aspirations to be a strategic actor of consequence, despite a long-track record of disappointment and the still-considerable obstacles that lie in its path.

This past decade has been difficult for Europe. Multiple, simultaneous and overlapping crises have threatened the security of the continent and the stability of its Union. These crises, moreover, came while Europe was still struggling to adapt to more structural shifts in global affairs, and to what these shifts heralded for the global rebalancing of geo-economic and geopolitical power. This Adelphi book considers the strategic consequences that these crises have wrought for the foreign, security and defence policies of Europe, the European Union and its member states. It looks at how respective strategic outlooks and practices on the continent are changing in light of the challenges that continue to unfold within and beyond the EU’s borders, and it analyses what these developments might mean for the continent’s strategic influence in the future.

Europe is no stranger to crises. Indeed, European integration has often advanced because of them. Recent developments, however, do not so much present an opportunity to forge a more collective response, as demand it. Coming as they do against a backdrop of declining influence and growing illiberalism, a failure to respond adequately will sentence the continent to the strategic sidelines of world affairs.

Europe’s decade of crises was preceded by what might be the EU’s greatest foreign-policy achievement: the 2004 expansion that cemented a peaceful transition across most of the former Warsaw Pact, fundamentally altering the future prospects and outlook of these countries. Yet the EU’s international engagements have subsequently become unimaginatively dependent on the story of past accessions and the accompanying narrative of the transformational lure of the EU. Geopolitical developments from a reassertive Russia to questions over the future of the transatlantic alliance and the rise of a more self-confident and authoritarian China have all highlighted the limits of a policy whose potential is largely exhausted. As a result, European states and the EU now have to reinvent themselves as actors on the international stage.

The pressures of crises within, around and beyond the EU’s borders have led the European political establishment increasingly to focus on the EU’s future capacity and appetite for Weltpolitikfähigkeit  (roughly translated as the ability to play a role in shaping global affairs). This focus includes a push towards closer cooperation in security and defence policy, often framed in the context of developing a more sovereign Europe. As French President Emmanuel Macron told the German Bundestag in November 2018, Europe cannot let itself ‘become a plaything of great powers, [it] must assume greater responsibility for its security and defence’.¹ Should Europe fail to build and exercise its credentials as a global power, its future will be defined by the rules and demands of external actors.

In 2016, a new EU Global Strategy (EUGS) suggested that ‘a more fragile world calls for a more confident and responsible European Union, it calls for an outward and forward-looking European foreign and security policy’.² Plans for a renewed push on European security and defence were duly drawn up, aimed at addressing the continent’s declining security environment and its struggle for strategic relevance. Yet previous pushes in this direction have fallen far short of their accompanying rhetoric. Indeed, many of the latest ideas for improving Europe’s substance as a strategic actor have been proffered before, to little effect.

What are the prospects that this time will be any different? Will Europe and its Union live up to its ambition, as laid out in the EUGS, of being a ‘global security provider’, ‘handling global threats and local dynamics’? Can the continent develop its foreign, security and defence capabilities more effectively to project both power and stability, and can it summon the political will and unity of purpose to agree on how and where this power should be exercised, not just in theory but also in action?

Changing global and regional environments

The global strategic environment has become more congested and contested. Not only are there more active actors (both state and non-state), there is also greater competition between them. As the bipolar and unipolar moments of the late twentieth century have been overtaken by a more complex dynamic that has been labelled everything from ‘G-Zero’ to ‘G-Plus’, and ‘multipolar’ to ‘multiplex’, the ability of Europe, the EU and its member states to defend interests and project influence was always going to come under stress. Indeed, the very development of the EU has been fuelled, at least in part, by the anticipation of increasing competition for strategic influence. With many of the world’s most populous nation-states, fastest-growing economies and largest militaries now located in the Indo-Pacific, some sort of collective rebalance in strategic influence has long been inevitable.

The scale of the structural challenge Europe now faces should not be underestimated. A 2012 McKinsey report showed how the global economic centre of gravity shifted dramatically within the space of the decade from 2000–10 back towards Asia, reversing the trends initiated by the industrialisation and urbanisation of Europe and the United States.³ Should the current trajectory continue, by 2050 no European country would qualify to be in the Group of Seven (G7) most advanced industrialised nations.⁴ China’s economy could be as much as 50% bigger than that of the US; the EU’s leading economies will follow far behind.⁵ Europe also faces major demographic challenges: by 2020 the continent will host a significant number of the world’s ‘super-aged’ societies (where more than 20% of the population is 65 or older), including Croatia, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden.⁶

China’s presence is likely to continue to grow not just in Europe’s markets but also in its politics. Beijing will seek to influence European behaviour in international affairs, and to capitalise on Washington’s weakening interest in the continent. China will also continue to draw US attention away from the Atlantic and towards the Indo-Pacific. The challenges Asia itself faces, to be sure, should not be discounted. Asia is not immune from its own demographic pressures; China will have six working adults per elderly person in 2020, but just 1.5 by

2050.⁷ Nevertheless, the future of global security and prosperity will likely be written more in the Pacific than in the West,⁸ and what (if any) role European powers will play is uncertain.

Europe’s quest for strategic relevance is further complicated by a relative weakening in its transatlantic partner and protector’s ability to influence and shape international affairs. This reflects, in part, the rise of alternative narratives, for example that the West writ large is not so much the source of solutions to the world’s problems as part of those problems.⁹ Asia’s rise in general, and China’s in particular, challenge many of the assumptions on which the Washington Consensus had been based. The West stands accused of incompetence in its handling of global affairs. It is, moreover, charged with undermining existing multilateral institutions by failing to support their modernisation in alignment with the changing distribution of global economic power.

Meanwhile, although the transatlantic alliance continues to lie at the heart of Europe’s territorial defence, the foundations on which this alliance rests have slowly been weakening. Well before the 2017 arrival of President Donald Trump in the Oval Office, US attentions had been pivoting to Asia. With China now firmly established as Washington’s principal foreign-policy concern, US interest in and relations with its European allies look set to be subordinated to this overarching agenda. Under Trump, transatlantic strategic dissonance has sharpened still further, in particular as the president has become increasingly unconstrained in showing his personal hostility to the EU and its perceived desire to ‘take advantage of the US’.¹⁰ Indeed, as Trump sets about his ‘America First’ agenda, attacking multilateral institutions and approaches that have helped secure Europe’s peace and prosperity, European counterparts are, for the first time, being forced to consider what steps they might need to take to protect these institutions not only from their adversaries but also from their ally. As European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker opined in his 2018 State of the Union speech, Europe can no longer be sure that the alliances of yesterday will look the same in the future. With the US focused on Asia, Europe has to prepare for the possibility that it will not just have to contribute more to its own defence, but that it will have to take the lead.

Other powers of course have contributed to Europe’s shifting strategic circumstances. With the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of eastern Ukraine, a revanchist Russia confirmed its return to the strategic front lines. Moscow has shown an increasing appetite for hybrid engagements, while simultaneously investing in new advanced weapons systems as part of an ongoing programme of military modernisation. This includes the development of missiles that resulted, in early 2019, in the collapse of the more than 30-year-old Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty that removed ground-based missiles with ranges of 500–5500 kilometres from Europe. Russia has also used its intervention in Syria to try to reposition itself as a major power in international affairs, able to shape military outcomes and tip geopolitical balances.

In addition to this global structural repositioning, Europe has faced a complex range of multi-rooted and interlinked regional crises. The 2009 eurozone debt and banking crises heralded a decade of turmoil. A crisis of competition and growth in turn brought further crises of cohesion, confidence and even policy creativity. Heads of state and government lurched from one ‘make or break’ summit to the next. Events in Europe’s eastern and southern neighbourhoods saw refugees and migrants make their way to the continent in unprecedented numbers, creating an immigration crisis that peaked in 2015–16. It was against this backdrop that the membership crisis that was Brexit would unfold. For the first time in the Union’s history, changes to the EU’s membership looked as likely to involve departures as arrivals. The shock of the UK’s June 2016 vote to leave the Union was compounded in November by the looming threat of a transatlantic crisis. Trump’s electoral victory was, in his own words, ‘Brexit plus plus plus’.¹¹

There have, of course, been periods of respite. In elections in 2017, pro-European politicians in France and the Netherlands – both founding members of the European Community – defied fears and defeated populism (albeit by worryingly close margins). Macron’s victory in the French presidential elections that March provided a particular boost to continental confidence. Standing on perhaps the most pro-European platform of any leading politician on the continent, he defied sceptics not just once, but twice as his newly established political party secured victory in the country’s legislative elections a few months later. But the pendulum soon swung back. In Italy in 2018 a new populist coalition entered government, and the Italian president was forced to use his veto on cabinet posts for only the third time in the past 25 years to ensure that the new finance minister was someone who was not on record as favouring unilateral withdrawal from the euro. In the run-up to the EU parliamentary elections in 2019, clashes between European leaders such as Macron and Italian Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini intensified, fuelled by competing visions over the future of Europe.

Europe as a strategic player

From the perspective of many of Europe’s global partners, these crises meant that, just when the continent had promised it would start looking outwards, it instead became even more preoccupied with its own affairs. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty – which amended previous treaties to create today’s Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) – aggrandised the position of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and established a European External Action Service (EEAS).¹² The measures were designed, at least in part, to make the Union’s position on the world stage both more secure and more influential. A newly empowered EU would outgrow its stereotype as a ‘geopolitical pygmy’ and push back against the broader global structural shifts that seemed set to diminish the continent’s strategic relevance. Instead, facing shrinking financial resources, the EU found its status as an economic giant reduced and its soft power undermined by its chaotic and rancorous handling of its crises and the surge of populism these helped fuel.¹³

Even in the midst of crises, there nevertheless remain areas, such as aid and trade, where Europe and its Union maintain a serious strategic presence and influence. Though this Adelphi does not focus on such areas, they should be recognised as a critical part of the continent’s strategic presence.

For example, EU development policy has long been designed and promoted as a major contribution to international security. Europe is by far the world’s largest aid donor, collectively accounting for almost 59% of global assistance in 2017.¹⁴ In the midst of the EU’s austerity crisis, as the Arab Spring spread from Tunisia to Egypt, the EU and its member states still donated more money to both countries than the US did. The EU is also trying to work more closely with the private sector in development cooperation, including with regard to strategic infrastructure investment.¹⁵

Meanwhile, as global trade policy has turned more protectionist, the EU has remained open for business. The new free-trade agreement (FTA) between the EU and Japan that came into effect in February 2019 covers around one-third of the global economy and some 40% of global trade. This deal, notably, had been stalled for years before it was finally agreed in December 2018. Its conclusion is testimony to the ability of both sides to recognise the broader strategic imperative to act now to uphold the values and order that have served them so well. Meanwhile, the streamlining of the EU’s ratification process and the deal’s quick implementation should bolster a more robust narrative on EU trade-policy capabilities than that which emerged in 2016 in the wake of efforts by the Walloon parliament in Belgium single-handedly to hold up the ratification of the EU–Canada FTA.

Figure 1. Development Assistance Committee (DAC) net ODA, 2017

In light of the Trump administration’s protectionist instincts, there are obvious opportunities for the EU to expand its global leadership in this area. This includes not just the maintenance of commitments to a free and open economy, but also an insistence on meaningful standards, for example with regard to environmental protection or labour law. With the Lisbon Treaty committing the EU to encourage ‘the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade’, the manner in which these dynamics play out will have broader implications for the credibility of one of the ideological foundations on which not just the EU, but the liberal international order, has been constructed.

As the EU places itself at the centre of the world’s largest free-trade network, the Union’s profile on the international stage will be amplified (especially as a sanctioning power). But this will also increase Europe’s stake in the preservation of the open rules-based order on which such networks depend. Whether Europe is ready or not, the strategic periphery in which it has too often conveniently taken cover is slowly shrinking. The consequences for European security and defence engagements are unavoidable.

The continent’s common currency, the euro, is also systemically important globally, acting as the currency for 36% of international transactions by value and accounting for some 20% of international reserves of foreign central banks. Efforts to develop further the international role of the euro are likely to find increasing favour in a world where the perceived advantages of dependence on US global financial hegemony appear to be shrinking, even for Europe.

More generally, as Japan’s first National Security Strategy noted in 2013, ‘Europe has the influence to formulate public opinion’ and ‘the capacity to develop norms in major international frameworks’.¹⁶ Meanwhile, as freedom and democracy continue to retreat around the world, more attention is inevitably drawn to the EU and its role as one of the standard-bearers for multilateralism and democracy.

The question this Adelphi considers is whether Europe and its Union can evolve into what Juncker once referred to as being not just a ‘global payer’ but a ‘global player’.¹⁷Although the focus is on Europe and the EU’s evolving engagements in foreign, security and defence policies, it should be acknowledged at the outset that the full programme of EU external actions is far broader, ranging from support for multilateralism, to the consolidation of democracy and human rights, to the sustainable development of global natural resources.¹⁸ The EU aims ‘to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security’¹⁹ using tools that go beyond the realm of foreign, security and defence policies. In these other realms of strategic relevance, then, Europe and its Union already have a substantive strategic presence. Similarly, even as European developments under a specifically NATO platform have been deliberately excluded from consideration from this book given its already extensive scope, it is important to acknowledge the reality that NATO is the primary organisation for guaranteeing European territorial defence.

A sui generis union

Hard power cannot be the only metric of strategic influence. The EU’s evident preference for civilian-based security interactions might yet find a niche in a world where the Western appetite for military interventionism is declining and the array of threats to global security stretch beyond state militaries to include private companies, organisations and individuals. Although the role of military power remains critical, the demand for police and other civil law-enforcement and capacity-building capabilities is likely to grow as Europe seeks to shore up its crisis-management capabilities in its neighbourhood. The EU is underselling itself (and its transatlantic ally is missing a trick) if it cannot persuade others that the prospects for survival of the rules-based international order will be determined not simply by the willingness to use hard power in its defence, but also by the inclusive appeal of the broader model that this hard power has been developed to defend.

In focusing on European prospects for a more collective and effective presence in foreign, security and defence policy, however, it is important to recognise the peculiarities of the system in which such efforts are evolving. It is, for example, not too surprising that an institution created to preclude hardpower conflict does not naturally excel at its projection.²⁰ Moreover, a European Commission with limited competencies in foreign, security and defence policy will never be effortlessly inclined to think strategically about the Union’s geopolitical and strategic heft. Anyone designing from scratch a ‘European Union’ intended to give weight to Europe’s strategic ambitions would not construct the EU of today. The audacity of the EU’s initial ambition has been matched only by the eccentricity of its evolving design as a half-formed experiment in the extremes of multinational joinery.

But imperfect efforts can still be consequential. The EU will never evolve into a muscular superpower, able unilaterally to impose its will on others. But it does have at its command an array of tools which could be highly effective influencers in its neighbourhood, and at times beyond. If Europe is to develop greater strategic substance, however, it will need the military capabilities and political will to back up its economic presence and enable it to take action in its immediate neighbourhood when crises come.

The uniqueness of the EU’s ‘comprehensive approach’ to issues of international security is often over-stressed. But Europe does have near-unrivalled expertise in bridging the civil–military divide in crisis-management operations. In Asia, for example, which arguably suffers from a surfeit of hard power, Europe could make obvious contributions to international security not by any vain attempt to masquerade as a regional military power but through the development of a more substantive set of security partnerships. The EU’s skills in risk management, mediation, crisis prevention and preparation are all crucial aspects of security policy; demand for such skills is growing, both close to home and further away.

Crises matter

Against a backdrop of rising illiberalism and a growing rejection of multilateralism globally, the EU’s strategic future has taken on a symbolism that transcends geography. How Europe and the EU respond to what UK journalist Gideon Rachman has referred to as a ‘bonfire of agreements, norms and rules’ will help determine the prospects for what he labels as a ‘world based round rules and rights, rather than power and force’.²¹ Certainly the prospect that other mid-sized powers might similarly step up in defence of this world of rules and rights will be greatly improved if Europe and its Union are willing and able to play their full part.

The imperative for the EU to serve as an avatar for post-nationalist politics and effective multilateralism, and to act as an antidote to resurgent nationalism not just within its continent but beyond, has never been clearer. European nations have asserted a determination to stick to their multilateralist course. They have reiterated their commitments to foreign-policy agreements from which the US has unilaterally retreated, such as the Paris Agreement on climate change and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that they helped conceive as a mechanism for managing Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Statements of European intent are everywhere to be found. Following her experiences at the 2017 NATO and G7 summits, German Chancellor Angela Merkel obliquely suggested that ‘the times in which we can fully count on others are some-what over … we Europeans must really take our destiny into our own hands’.²² The day after Trump addressed the UN General Assembly, in an isolationist speech that referred no fewer than 21 times to the importance of ‘sovereignty’, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/ Vice President of the European Commission (HR/VP) Federica Mogherini declared, perhaps optimistically, that ‘the rest of the world is now looking at Europe for leadership’.²³

In reality, much of the rest of the world might reasonably have given up on European and EU leadership in international security. They have seen too many past promises go unfulfilled. But Europe and its Union have proven capable of exporting stability and security in the past. In today’s more competitive and unstable strategic environment, the requirement to do more at times appears unsustainable. Together, European states will have to forge a greater unity of purpose in foreign policy. They will have to develop better their collective military capabilities to help lend meaning to their policies. And they will have to summon the political will to act, if necessary without their transatlantic partner, where circumstances dictate.

Notes

1 ‘Europe Must Not Become a “Plaything” of Great Powers, says Macron in Berlin’, France24, 18 November 2018, https://www.france24.com/en/20181118-live-macron-german-parliament-bundestag-merkel-france-germany-eu.

2 European External Action Service, ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy’, June 2016, available at http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en.

3 Richard Dobbs et al., Urban World: Cities and the Rise of the Consuming Class (Brussels, San Francisco and Shanghai: McKinsey Global Institute, June 2012), p. 17.

4 Stefan Lehne, ‘Merkel and Macron Need to Talk about EU Foreign Policy’, Carnegie Strategic Europe blog, 14 December 2017, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/75017.

5 Dan Steinbock, ‘The Global Economic Balance of Power is Shifting’, World Economic Forum, 20 September 2017, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/09/the-global-economic-balance-of-power-is-shifting.

6 Moody’s Investor Service, ‘Moody’s: Aging Will Reduce Economic Growth Worldwide in the Next Two Decades’, press release, 6 August 2014, https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Aging-will-reduce-economic-growth-worldwide-in-the-next--PR_305951.

7 Ibid.

8 For one survey of these challenges, see John West, Asian Century … on a Knife Edge: A 360 Degree Analysis of Asia’s Recent Economic Development (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

9 See, for example, Kishore Mahbubani, ‘The Case Against the West: America and Europe in the Asian Century’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 87, no. 3, May–June 2008, pp. 111–24.

10 ‘President Trump Remarks at Rally in Fargo, North Dakota’, C-Span, 27 June 2018, https://www.c-span.org/video/?447664-1/president-trump-delivers-remarks-fargo-north-dakota. He argued that the EU had been repeatedly raiding the US ‘piggybank’.

11 ‘Presidential Candidate Donald Trump Rally in Raleigh, North Carolina’, C-Span, 7 November 2016, https://www.c-span.org/video/?418210-1/donald-trump-campaigns-raleigh-north-carolina.

12 For the consolidated texts of the TEU and TFEU, see https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12016ME/TXT.

13 See, for example, ‘European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2012’, European Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR_SCORECARD_2012_WEB.pdf.

14 European Political Strategy Centre, ‘Strong Europe, Better World’, 22 January 2019, available at https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/publications/other-publications/strong-europe-better-world_en.

15 See, for example, the EU’s 2017 External Investment Plan and its fact sheet on Africa, available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-factsheet-africa-europe_en.pdf. The plan aims to see an EU contribution of €4.1 billion leverage up to €44bn by 2020.

16 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘National Security Strategy 2013’, p. 27, available at https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf.

17 Jean-Claude Juncker, ‘State of the Union 2018: The Hour of European Sovereignty’, 12 September 2018, available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-speech_en_0.pdf.

18 The complete objectives of the EU’s external actions are laid out in the TEU. This includes the statement, in Article 3.1, that ‘The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values, and the well-being of its peoples’. The full programme for the EU’s external actions, where ‘the Union shall define and pursue common policies’, is laid out in Article 21.

19 TEU, Article 21.2(c).

20 Björn Fägersten, ‘The Ukraine Crisis has Highlighted the Flaws in the EU’s Technocratic Approach to Foreign Policy’, LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) blog, 8 May 2014, available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/71978/.

21 Gideon Rachman, ‘Mid-sized Powers Must Unite to Preserve the World Order’, Financial Times, 28 May 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/546ca388-625d-11e8-90c2-9563a0613e56.

22 Annett Meiritz, Anna Reimann and Severin Weiland, ‘A Trans-Atlantic Turning Point: What was Merkel Thinking?’, Spiegel, 29 May 2017, https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/merkel-and-trump-a-trans-atlantic-turning-point-a-1149757.html.

23 Max de Haldevang, ‘Being the Anti-Trump is the Must Have Look at This Week’s UN General Assembly’, Quartz, 20 September 2017, https://qz.com/1082972/unga-2017-federica-mogherini-outlined-the-european-unions-values-to-set-it-apart-from-the-us-under-trump/.