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Abstract
‘Sarah Raine’s deeply informed, crisply written and authoritatively argued book will, I predict, swiftly become the indispensable analysis of Europe’s prospects as a strategic actor. The fact that she is clear-eyed (and dryly humorous) about the flaws and failures of European foreign and security policy makes her take on its strengths and possibilities all the more compelling.’
Dr. Constanze Stelzenmüller, Robert Bosch Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe
‘Love it or loath it, there will be no European Army any time soon: this is one of the conclusions of this well thought-out assessment. It factors in the transformational impact of Europe’s internal travails against a rapidly deteriorating and unforgiving strategic backdrop. The book is required reading for anyone who wants to form an educated opinion on Europe’s ability or inability to face these challenges in terms of policies, capabilities, money and organisation.’
François Heisbourg, IISS Senior Adviser for Europe; former commission member of France’s White Paper on Defence and National Security
‘The book brilliantly takes the reader through the strategic challenges facing Europe and makes the unfashionable argument that Europe has scored some notable successes as well as the well-known disappointments. Europe must act quicker, be more joined up and solve the tension between national policies and collective outreach. Sarah Raine makes a cautiously optimistic case that it may indeed do so.’
Peter Round, former capabilities director, European Defence Agency
Europe has suffered a decade of crises, with sovereign-debt troubles leading to austerity policies that exacerbated divisions inside member states and between them. Thereafter the Union was confronted with the challenges posed by a revanchist Russia in Ukraine and by a surge in migration from the Middle East and other conflict zones. The June 2016 United Kingdom vote to leave the Union threatened further damage to an institution that acknowledges it has failed to punch its weight in the spheres of foreign, defence and security policy. While that is a chronic shortcoming, its impact is becoming more acute as economic power moves east and Europe can no longer count on the steadfast support and leadership of the United States. The costs of Europe’s failure to achieve strategic coherence and effect are steadily rising.
This Adelphi book addresses the consequences of Europe’s multiple crises for its standing as a strategic actor, acknowledging its unique character and capabilities. It argues that strategic thought and action are belatedly being informed by the deteriorating security environment, and that nascent initiatives have the potential to effect a step-change. There are grounds for cautious optimism, visible in the success of stabilisation and counter-piracy operations as well as coordinated diplomatic activity. Also, the continent’s leading powers are becoming more pragmatic about how cooperation is organised within and beyond the Union. These developments offer the possibility that Europe might meet its aspirations to be a strategic actor of consequence, despite a long-track record of disappointment and the still-considerable obstacles that lie in its path.
Notes
1 Joint Declaration on European Defence issued at the British–French Summit, Saint-Malo, 3–4 December 1998, https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/franco_british_st_malo_declaration_4_december_1998-en-f3cd16fb-fc37-4d52-936f-c8e9bc80f24f.html.
2 ‘Juncker: EU Military Forces? All Squawk, No Bite’, AFP, 7 May 2015, https://www.defensenews.com/home/2015/05/07/juncker-eu-military-forces-all-squawk-no-bite/.
3 For more details on these constraints and developments, see Chapter Five. See also, for example, Daniel Keohane, ‘Constrained Leadership: Germany’s New Defence Policy’, CSS Analyses in Security Policy, no. 201, December 2016.
4 Tobias Buck, ‘Hardware: Submarines that Cannot Sail Expose the Impact of Budget Cuts’, Financial Times, 15 February 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/36e2cd40-0fdf-11e8-940e-08320fc2a277.
5 Ibid.
6 Mark Francois, ‘Filling the Ranks’: A Report for the Prime Minister on the State of Recruiting for the United Kingdom Armed Forces, September 2017, available at https://www.markfrancois.com/filling-ranks.
7 Richard Barrons, Evidence to UK Commons Defence Committee, National Security Capability Review HC556, 14 November 2017.
8 Problems with night-vision equipment, winter clothing and body armour were reported in the German Ministry of Defence’s annual Report on the Operational Readiness of the Bundeswehr’s Primary Weapons Systems: 2017.
9 EEAS, ‘Shared Vision, Common Action’, p. 4.
10 2018 and 2019 figures are budget requests. The European Deterrence Initiative was launched by Obama as the European Reassurance Initiative. In 2016, its budget was US$789m. For further details, see Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, ‘The US and its NATO Allies: Cost and Value’, IISS Military Balance blog, 9 July 2018, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2018/07/us-and-nato-allies-costs-and-value.
11 See EEAS, ‘Fact Sheet: Strengthening the Civilian Side of the EU’s CSDP’, 19 November 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/54030/factsheet-strengthening-civilian-side-eus-common-security-and-defence-policy_en.
12 European Commission, European Defence Action Plan, Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament et al., COM(2016) 950 final, 30 November 2016.
14 Jacopo Barigazzi, ‘Mogherini Hails “Historic” EU Defense Pact’, Politico, 13 November 2017, https://www.politico.eu/article/federica-mogherini-defense-hails-historic-eu-defense-pact-as-23-countries-sign-up/.
15 See, for example, ‘Third Progress Report on the Implementation of the Common Set of Proposals Endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017’, 6 June 2018, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_06/20180608_180608-3rd-Joint-progress-report-EU-NATO-eng.pdf.
16 Nick Whitney, ‘How to Stop the Demilitarization of Europe’, ECFR Policy Brief, 8 November 2011, p. 2. For CARD, see European Council, ‘Council Conclusions on Implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence’, 14149/16, 14 November 2016.
17 For further discussion, see Julia Himmlich, ‘Can CARD Change European Thinking about Defence Capabilities?’, European Leadership Network, September 2017, available at https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/policy-brief/can-card-change-european-thinking-about-capabilities/.
19 Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, ‘France Moves from EU Defence to European Defence’, Carnegie Europe, 7 December 2017, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/74944.
20 Steven Erlanger, ‘US Revives Concerns about European Defence Plans, Rattling NATO Allies’, New York Times, 18 February 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/18/world/europe/nato-europe-us-.html.
21 Madeleine Albright at a NATO ministerial meeting, Brussels, 8 December 1998, quoted in Robert E. Hunter, The European Security and Defence Policy – NATO’s Companion or Competitor? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), ch. 6.
22 Jonathan Caverley, ‘America’s Arms Sales Policy: Security Abroad, not Jobs at Home’, War on the Rocks, 6 April 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/.
23 Non-executive missions do not have a mandate to conduct governmental or executive tasks in support of, or indeed in the absence of, a government. They focus on tasks such as capacity-building and training and constitute around half of EU military operations, but just 13% of EU personnel deployed under CSDP (2017 figures).
24 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2018 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2018), p. 73.
25 For more on developments in this sector, see ibid.
26 Article 346(1)(b) of the TFEU reads ‘any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the internal market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes’.
27 Article 24.3 of the TEU commits member states to support the EU’s external and security policy ‘actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity’. It also requires them to refrain from any activity likely to undermine the effectiveness of the EU ‘as a cohesive force in international relations’. See Steven Blockmans, Differentiation in CFSP: Potential and Limits (Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 8 March 2017), p. 10.
28 IISS, Military Balance 2018, p. 67.
29 Figures cited by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in February 2018. He referred to 15 states, but the US and the UK are not (or will not be) EU member states. See David Bond and Gemma Tetlow, ‘UK missed 2% Defence-spending Target, Report Claims’, Financial Times, 14 February 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/c4005130-10dd-11e8-8cb6-b9ccc4c4dbbb.
30 Anne-Slyvaine Chassany, ‘France to Increase Military Spending’, Financial Times, 8 February 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/fede4e5a-0cb0-11e8-8eb7-42f857ea9f09.
31 UK House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, ‘MoD Lacks Funds to Buy All the Equipment It Says It Needs’, 11 May 2018, https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-accounts-committee/news-parliament-2017/defence-equipment-plan-2018-report-published-27-17-19/.
32 Austin Davis and Maximiliane Koschyk, ‘Germany Plans Military Spending Hike but is it Enough to Please NATO?’, Deutsche Welle, 6 February 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/germany-plans-military-spending-hike-but-is-it-enough-to-appease-nato/a-47394560.
33 For the 2024 spending estimate, see Kevin Koerner, ‘German Defence Policy: Towards a More Integrated Framework’, Deutsche Bank Research Germany Monitor, 8 August 2017.
34 For more details, see IISS, Military Balance 2018. Although capital expenses account for almost half of Romania’s 2017 defence spending, this is intended to change in the coming years, with an increased focus on procurement.
35 Amanda Lapo, ‘Italy: Renewed Focus on Overseas Deployments’, IISS Military Balance blog, 9 April 2018, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2018/04/italy-renewed-focus-overseas-deployments.
36 Elisabeth Braw, ‘The Future of Italy’s Military Footprint’, RUSI Commentary, 12 June 2018, https://rusi.org/commentary/future-italys-international-military-footprint.
37 Details on current military operations are taken from the website of Italy’s Ministry of Defence, 7 March 2019, https://www.difesa.it/EN/Operations/Pagine/MilitaryOperations.aspx.
38 Donald Trump, ‘Remarks by President Trump at NATO Unveiling of the Article 5 and Berlin Wall Memorials – Brussels, Belgium’, 25 May 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-nato-unveiling-article-5-berlin-wall-memorials-brussels-belgium/.
39 EEAS, ‘Fact Sheet: Strengthening the Civilian Side of the EU’s CSDP’, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/54030/factsheet-strengthening-civilian-side-eus-common-security-and-defence-policy_en.
40 Sebastian Moffet, ‘EU Considers Sending 200 Troops to Train in Mali’, Reuters, 30 October 2012, www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-crisis-eu/eu-considers-sending-200-troops-to-train-mali-army-idUSBRE89T1DB20121030.
41 Michael Shurkin, France’s War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014).
42 UK Ministry of Defence, ‘RAF Helicop-ters Ready to Support French in Mali’, 16 August 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/raf-helicopters-ready-to-support-french-in-mali.
43 ‘EU Doubles Sahel Force Funding amid Urgent Appeal from African Leaders’, France24.com, 3 March 2018, https://www.france24.com/en/20180223-eu-boost-funding-g5-joint-military-force-fighting-jihadists-west-africa-sahel.
44 Richard Reeve, Mali on the Brink (London: Peace Direct, 2018).
45 For latest deployment details, see http://eunavfor.eu/deployed-units/surface-vessels/.
46 ‘Somalia Wants More Help from NATO’, Maritime Executive, 19 March 2017, https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/somalia-wants-more-help-from-nato.
47 Testimony of Major-General Charlie Stickland to the UK House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, External Affairs Publication, cited in House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: Common Secu-rity and Defence Policy Operations, HL Paper 132, 14 May 2018, paras 80, 83.
48 The EU provides some 60% of all emergency aid to Somalia. For more on reasons behind the success of Atalanta, see House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy Operations, ch. 2.
49 EUCAP Niger is the only CSDP mission specifically to include counter-terrorism in its mandate as of 2018, but other missions have clearly been informed by terrorism concerns.
50 Discussions with EU officials, Brussels, 2018.